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Abstract.  
 
The discipline of International Relations is frequently depicted as an American dominated discipline. 
This disciplinary self-image has become so entrenched that it is rarely questioned and operates as a 
‘quasi-fact’ within the field. However, the manner in which this widespread claim has been put forth 
is largely speculative. There is a surprising lack of data verifying the prominent notion, and indeed 
the ‘evidence’ that does exist is largely out-dated and methodologically problematic. As such, this 
thesis attempts to remedy this dearth of data by systematically investigating if and how the United 
States dominates the discipline of IR. Rather than speaking of a generic and ambiguous form of 
dominance this thesis begins by disaggregating the concept of dominance and stating the ways in 
which an actor can potentially dominate and how this can be measured. What this crucially means 
is that the US may dominate in some ways and not others. Through exploring twelve of discipline’s 
international journals over a ten-year period from 1999-2009, and four international conferences 
from 2005-2011 it becomes clear that the central issue is not whether the United States dominates 
the discipline but the degree and manner in which it does. Through demonstrating the numerous 
current trends and inclinations in the discipline a complex image of the IR emerges; an image that 
challenges a number of prevalent assertions about the disciplinary character of IR. The findings 
presented illustrate how the discipline of IR is more international and more diverse than is 
commonly perceived, and yet how the discipline of IR still experiences certain forms of American 
dominance. This thesis aims to highlight the importance of perspective and consequently how we 
need to be more nuanced and reflective in the ways we characterize the discipline’s dominance 
claims. Overall this thesis aims to highlight the many dynamics occurring at different levels of the 
discipline, all of which shape the contours of the field and IR’s relationship with the American 
academy.  
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1.  
 
Introduction: Is International Relations an American Dominated 
Discipline? 
 
Scholars addressing the question of whether the discipline of International Relations (IR) is an 
American dominated discipline tend to respond in some shape or form to the seminal article 
written by Stanley Hoffmann in 1977.1 Hoffmann was arguably the first recognized academic to 
draw explicit attention to the alleged American dominance of IR in mainstream circles. The 
question had first been raised by Alfred Grosser in 1956, in the French journal Revue Française de 
Science Politique, where Grosser explored the provoking possibility of whether the discipline was 
becoming an ‘American specialty’.2 However, the response to his stimulating review was minimal 
in France and non-existent in America. The issue in the 1950s failed to attract scholarly attention 
both in America and other IR communities, and as such no further questions were posed 
regarding the discipline’s spatial dimensions and geographical composition until 1977.  In the 
decades following the publication of Hoffmann’s article there have been multiple scholarly works 
claiming that IR is an American dominated discipline, so many indeed that the disciplinary 
depiction of American preponderance operates as a quasi-‘fact’.  
 Whilst the US may have dominated the discipline in the 1970s can we continue to claim 
that this is the current state of affairs? The literature indicates that it is. Hoffmann’s image of the 
field as an American enterprise has been adopted and seamlessly reproduced by contemporary 
academics time and time again. For example in 2000 Steve Smith stated that “the discipline 
remains a US dominated one”3, whereas in 2003 Arlene Tickner declared “Twenty five years after 
Stanley Hoffmann’s critical depiction of IR as an American social science, the basic contours of IR 
have changed surprisingly little”.4 In a recent ‘state of the discipline’ article by Michael Lipson et 
al, it was argued “The centre of gravity for the academic discipline of international relations is 
located in the United States”5, similarly Thomas Biersteker in 2009 claimed “American 
International Relations scholarship is globally hegemonic”.6 Claims such as these populate not 
                                                        
1 Stanley Hoffmann “An American Social Science: International Relations” Daedalus 106 (3) 
(1977), pp. 41-60.   
2 Alfred Grosser “L’Etude des relations internationales, specialite americaine?”  Revue Française 
de Science Politique 6 (3) (1956), pp. 634-651.  
3 Steve Smith “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 2 (3) (2000), pp. 396. 
4 Arlene Tickner “Seeing IR Differently: Notes From the Third World” Millennium 32 (2) (2003), 
pp. 297.  
5 Michael Lipson et. al., “Divided Discipline? Comparing Views of US and Canadian IR Scholars” 
International Journal 62 (2) (2007), pp. 327.  
6 Thomas Biersteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for ‘American’ International 
Relations” in Tickner, A. B., and Waever, O. (eds) IR Scholarship Around the World: Worlding 
Beyond the West (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 309. 
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only the literature but also the collective disciplinary mindset. This characterization and 
disciplinary label7 has become deeply embedded within the discipline and is treated a priori and 
rarely questioned.  This is extremely problematic given that the majority of claims that entrench 
this disciplinary characterisation are of a speculative nature.  
 Many of the arguments that IR is an American discipline are rarely supported by 
empirical data, lending the body of work to be largely impressionistic as opposed to detailed and 
systematic. Despite the dearth of data the disciplinary self-image of IR as an American field has 
become widely disseminated in the disciplinary consciousness, as Richard Little argues, “It has 
become almost a cliché to argue that during the course of the twentieth century the study of 
International Relations developed into a quintessentially American discipline”.8 The number of 
scholars who treat the alleged American dominance as a given is astounding. Certain sections of 
the discipline’s literature are rife with sweeping and speculative assumptions about America’s 
supposed intellectual hegemony.  It is not uncommon for academics to state,  “the discipline is so 
dominated by the United States. In general there seems to be little reason to revise Stanley 
Hoffmann’s verdict of more than thirty years ago about IR as an American discipline”.9 
Furthermore, articles examining the state of the discipline in different national communities 
often begin by unquestioningly declaring that America is disciplinary preponderant.10 This 
readily adopted premise is then used as a foundation from which to launch their own 
investigations into national IR communities. By uncritically accepting this notion this disciplinary 
self-image is embedded and perpetuated without it being questioned whether this is the even the 
current disciplinary reality.  
 It is worrying that many assertions that the discipline is hierarchical are empirically 
unsupported; instead scholars tend to solely justify their statements in relation to a relatively 
small body of literature.11 For example it is not uncommon for articles to state that IR is an 
                                                        
7 Felix Grenier “Conversation in and on IR: Labeling, Framing and Delimiting IR Discipline’ 
Bridges: Conversations in Global Politics 1 (1) (2012), pp. 1-17.  
8 Richard Little “Series Editor’s Preface” in Friedrichs, J. (ed) European Approaches to 
International Relations Theory: A House With Many Mansions (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), pp. iii.  
9 J. C. Sharman “Benchmarking Australian IR: Low Impact, a Bookish Lot or a Very British Affair?” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 62 (4) (2008), pp. 530-531.  
10 For two such examples see Alan Chong and Natasha Hamilton-Hart “Teaching International 
Relations in Southeast Asia: Historical Memory, Academic Context and Politics – an Introduction” 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 9 (1) (2009), pp. 1-18 and Jozef Bátora and Nik Hynek 
“On the Barbaricum in Slovakia” Journal of International Relations and Development 12 (2) 
(2009), pp. 186-193.  
11 For further examples see Henrik Ø Breitenbauch and Anders Wivel “Understanding National IR 
Disciplines Outside the United States: Political Culture and the Construction of International 
Relations in Denmark” Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (4) (2004), pp. 414-
443; Gunther Hellmann “International Relations as a Field of Studies” in Badie, B., Berg-Schlosser, 
D. and Morlino, L. (eds) International Encyclopedia of Political Science: Volume Eight (London: 
Sage, 2011); James Robinson “The State of IR in Mexico” Paper presented at the International 
Studies Association Annual Convention, New York, February 2009, pp. 1-30; and J. Ann Tickner 
“Dealing with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations” 
Millennium 39 (3) (2011), pp. 607-618;  
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American discipline based exclusively on citing the works of Kal Holsti12, Steve Smith13 and Ole 
Wæver14 in order to substantiate their allegations. It is rarely questioned whether the 
aforementioned works could be outdated or indeed inaccurate; for instance Holsti conducted his 
investigation into whether there was an American intellectual condominium in IR over twenty 
years ago. Considering the growth of the discipline in the last two decades, in global institutional 
as well as theoretical terms his claims need to be reassessed.15 Looking at Wæver’s 1998 
investigation one can argue that it is methodologically problematic and consequently his results 
limited (the problems with Ole Wæver’s methodology will be explored in more depth in the 
section detailing the research design, which appears later on in this chapter). Whereas Smith’s 
article contains no systematic investigation of his own, instead his claims are supported by the 
data produced by Holsti and Wæver.  
 The lack of empirical data and the impressionistic nature of IR research relating to state 
of the field inquiries was also raised in the 2007 TRIP survey: 
 
“Scholars of international relations periodically re-interpret the history of 
the discipline, assess current trends in the field, and speculate about or advocate 
particular directions for future research, but they rarely use systematic evidence to 
do so. To determine the content and trajectory of previous research, these scholars 
typically read hundreds of prominent books and articles and attempt to discern 
patterns. To determine the opinion of other scholars in the discipline they attend 
professional meetings, discuss papers and chat with colleagues and former 
students”.16  
 
This thesis attempts to remedy this problematic situation. Through employing an in-depth 
empirical investigation (which will be detailed shortly), exploring different realms of academic 
production, this study aims to generate a body of data that will demonstrate the present 
inclinations and trends in the discipline, and therefore be able to assess in what ways, if at all, the 
discipline is dominated by the US as the literature suggests. The need to systematically 
investigate this disciplinary characterization is imperative, because without empirically 
assessing the past and present we tend to ingrain and reproduce disciplinary myths.17 Myths that 
may condition negative academic practices and encourage marginalizing behaviours.  
                                                        
12 Kal J. Holsti The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1985).  
13 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 374-402.  
14 Ole Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European 
Developments in International Relations” International Organization 52 (4) (1998), pp. 687-727.  
15 The Worlding Beyond the West series of edited volumes details the global expansion of the 
discipline in both theoretical and institutional terms. For more see Arlene B. Tickner and Ole 
Wæver (eds) International Relations Scholarship Around the World (Oxon: Routlegde, 2009) and 
Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney (eds) Thinking International Relations Differently (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2012).  
16 Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney “The International 
Relations Discipline, 1980-2006” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August/September 2007, pp. 1.  Available at 
www.irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/publications.php 
17 Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline”, pp. 692.  
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 Not only does this thesis aim to produce a large data set that will 1) generate an in-depth 
insight into the discipline’s spatial configuration, and 2) re-assess speculative disciplinary self-
images, it also aims to do so in a more nuanced manner, which will consequently highlight the 
complexities within the global discipline. Rather than speaking about disciplinary dominance in 
generic terms this study aims to refine the way scholars will speak about intellectual hegemony 
by looking at the way one dominates, as well as the specific modes and forms of domination. The 
majority of the literature addressing the popular self-image speaks of an unspecified form of 
dominance, hence we need to ask what does it mean to be dominant and ask how exactly does 
America dominate the discipline, if indeed it does? Instead of treating ‘dominance’ as a general 
state of affairs we must begin to prefix discussions of dominance with the actual means of 
preponderance, be this theoretical, methodological, institutional etc. In other words dominance 
must be disaggregated.  By disaggregating the ways in which an academic community can 
potentially be hegemonic creates the possibility that America may dominate in some ways and in 
some realms of academic production and not others.  
 Overall, the aim of this thesis is to correct some of the problems with the existing body of 
scholarship in order to empirically, systematically and comprehensively address the issue of 
whether the contemporary discipline of International Relations can be described to be an 
American enterprise, in any or all forms of dominance. In doing so this thesis will illustrate the 
many dynamics in operation and how the question of American dominance is much more 
complex than is often presented.  Before presenting the methodology and laying out the structure 
of my thesis this chapter will begin by unpacking the term ‘dominance’. As suggested above, the 
word ‘dominance’ is actually used in many different ways, taking on many different forms and 
measured in numerous modes despite the fact that it is presented as ‘one size fits all’ practice of 
dominance. Yet American dominance has not developed in a uniform manner, upon a more 
detailed inspection it is clear that America allegedly ‘dominates’ in multifarious means due to the 
different conceptions of dominance being employed by different scholars. By unraveling the term 
and revealing the different lenses through which IR can be seen to be an American discipline a 
‘criterion of dominance’ was constructed in order to clearly explicate the different definitions of 
dominance in operation. Through disaggregating the term dominance it becomes clear why we 
must be more nuanced in our handling of dominance claims because the American IR community 
does not dominate in a generic manner; it dominates, or may dominate, in certain ways and not 
others.  
 
Dominant Definitions of Dominance.  
 
When claims are made that IR is an American discipline academics are simultaneously professing 
that the United States dominates the field. However, as previously mentioned one unified notion 
of dominance is not employed. Instead the various authors are drawing upon different 
definitions of dominance; hence they are looking at the issue through diverse standpoints. What 
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this means is that although certain scholars may agree that America is intellectually hegemonic 
they may be talking at cross-purposes about how and why America dominates. Employing 
divergent understandings of the term ‘dominance’ has and will lead academics, depending on the 
meaning adopted, to focus on particular ways in which the US professedly dominates. These 
means will differ depending on the definition and will therefore result in scholars drawing on 
different rationales and looking at different disciplinary implications.  Although there may be 
agreement in one sense, there will be different answers to the questions of how and why America 
allegedly became and remains disciplinary dominant. It is important to emphasize, that many 
academics do not declare what they mean or imply by dominance and as a result employ various 
conceptualisations and operate with different notions of the term. It is not uncommon for a given 
scholar to be speaking about one form of dominance on one page of a text, and then refer to a 
different understanding on another page.18 Conceptual ambiguity (whether intentional or 
unintentional) creates confusion and the potential generation of different disciplinary images, 
that may be either competing or contrasting. All together such fluidity and the lack of a clear 
position and awareness of how ‘dominance’ is being perceived creates a muddled picture that 
may be some distance from the actual disciplinary reality.  
There are five prominent conceptualizations of dominance (that are by no means 
mutually exclusive or exhaustive) and associated means of measurement that underpin the body 
of scholarship declaring that IR is an American enterprise. In other words the literature looking 
at whether the contemporary discipline of IR is an American one often frames the issue using five 
different forms of dominance, which are as follows: Dominance is the ability to: 
 
1) Set the intellectual agenda. 
2) Dominate the discipline theoretically 
3) Produce a set of preponderant epistemological and methodological assumptions that 
guide and fortify the majority of IR research and scholarship 
4) Command a dominant and overtly significant presence in the institutional structure. 
5) Gate-keep the disciplines borders, thereby managing the process of inclusion and 
exclusion into the international disciplinary realm. 
 
First, Dominance as Agenda Setting.  The argument follows that the United States 
dominates the discipline through its ability to set the intellectual agenda and align the discipline’s 
points of focus with the policy concerns of America. Hoffmann defines dominance in this manner 
as he clearly states, “To study United States foreign policy was to study the international system. 
To study the international system could not fail to bring one back to the role of the United 
States”.19 The function of setting the agenda means, according to Hoffmann and Steve Smith20 
                                                        
18 Smith’s “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 374-402, is a prime example of this 
conceptual ambiguity in practice.  
19 Hoffmann “An American Social Science”, pp. 47.  
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that America is able to exercise its dominance through defining the focus and scope of the 
discipline and therefore designating what is the appropriate subject matter of the field. It has 
been argued that IR is an American enterprise because the US has twisted the discipline towards 
the policy concerns of America.21 This form of dominance has a primarily ontological dimension, 
and has been measured in terms of the link between foreign policy goals and concerns of 
America and the research focus of the discipline.22  
Second, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan argue that American IR dominates the 
discipline because its theories dominate “largely unconsciously in the minds of others, and 
regardless of whether the theory is correct or not”.23 Dominance in this case is defined and 
measured as Theoretical Dominance. Kal Holsti, for example, claimed that dominance takes a 
theoretical form as it is clear that the American IR community’s theories saturate the IR literature 
and other academic communities are dependent on American scholarly works.24 According to 
Holsti, theoretical dominance is determined through focusing on the volume of theoretical works 
produced by the US in comparison to other IR communities, and by gauging how other academics 
both inside and outside the US rely on American theoretical works.  
It is argued however, that not only is America theoretically dominant due to the volume 
of theory produced, it also dominates the discipline through its associated ability to establish a 
theoretical orthodoxy. According to certain academics, not only does American theory dominate 
but also a specific theory (or set of theories) dominates. For example, Darryl Jarvis argues that IR 
is an American enterprise because neo-realist and neo-liberalist approaches tend to predominate 
in the field.25 Jarvis claims that this is seen from a quick perusal of the discipline’s leading 
journals, as their content clearly demonstrates the discipline’s commitment to the ‘neo-neo 
synthesis’.26 Defining dominance as the ability to establish and entrench a theoretical orthodoxy 
and produce a greater volume of theory, has lead some scholars, such as Jarvis, to 1) state that IR 
is an American discipline and 2) demonstrate this through the dominance of said theories in the 
discipline’s intellectual production. 
A third definition of dominance that is found in the literature takes on an epistemological 
and methodological form. Viewed from this perspective American IR is hegemonic when the 
issue is seen through the lens of Epistemological and Methodological Dominance. Allegedly the 
                                                                                                                                                              
20 Steve Smith “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of 
International Relations as a Social Science” Millennium 16 (2) (1987), pp. 189-206.   
21 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 394.  
22 For example see Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker “The Dialectics of World Order: Notes 
for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire” International Studies Quarterly 28 (2) 
(1984), pp. 121-142. 
23 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan “Why is There no Non-Western International Relations 
Theory? An Introduction” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (3) (2007), pp. 294.   
24 Holsti The Dividing Discipline, pp. 103.  
25 Darryl S. L. Jarvis “International Relations: An International Discipline?” in Crawford, R. M. A. 
and Jarvis, D. S. L. (eds) International Relations-Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity 
in International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 372.     
26 Ole Wæver “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate” in Booth, K., Smith, S. and 
Zalewski, M. (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 149-185.  
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discipline is an American one because IR is dominated by a specific series of ‘American’ 
epistemological and methodological assumptions. Steve Smith argues that we can support the 
claim of US dominance because of the preponderance of certain epistemological and 
methodological approaches.27 Although the discipline’s handling of the term epistemology has 
been rather vague and confusing,28 it is argued that the main epistemological assumptions 
guiding research in the discipline are empiricist, and thus license rational choice methodological 
approaches that are favoured by the American IR community.  
According to Smith the dominance of an empiricist epistemology and certain 
quantitative methods means that American IR is able to dominate the discipline through using its 
epistemological and methodological dominance to define what counts as legitimate knowledge in 
IR and acceptable ways of accessing and discovering that knowledge, thereby ultimately defining 
what counts as “proper social science”.29 Dominance is then defined and measured by an actor’s 
capability to establish an epistemological and methodological benchmark, a set the guidelines or 
a blueprint for research and knowledge accumulation. In the case of IR this means producing a 
set of epistemological and methodological assumptions that underpin and guide research, and 
thereby provide a certain way of thinking about knowledge and a researchers relationship to the 
social realm. This form of dominance can then be measured by assessing which epistemology and 
methodology dominates and whether this can be linked back to the mainstream approach in a 
given IR community.  
Fourth, is Institutional/Structural Preponderance. Jörg Friedrichs argues that IR is a 
hierarchical discipline with America at the apex, and this can be seen he declares as “intellectual 
hegemony as structural bias”.30 When speaking of American intellectual hegemony certain 
authors focus on the institutional elements to support their claims and argue that dominance 
takes a structural mode. By looking at indicators such as: the number of IR scholars from each 
national IR setting, the volume of national centers of IR, where the majority of academics receive 
their PhDs, and the rankings of universities, assessments of dominance have been made and 
certain academics have begun to compile a case to demonstrate American disciplinary 
dominance.  Through exploring such structural components certain academics, for example 
Freidrichs31 and Peter Volten32, have made claims of US dominance, arguing that the American IR 
community dominates in size (measured by the number of self identified American IR scholars 
compared to numbers in other national communities) and institutional volume (measured in the 
                                                        
27 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 374-402.  
28 For more see Colin Wight “The Impossible Dream: Theorising International Relations Without 
the Philosophy of Science” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, New York, February 2009.   
29 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 383.  
30 Jörg Friedrichs European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A House With Many 
Mansions (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 2.  
31 Ibid., pp. 1-23. 
32 Peter M. E. Volten “Theory of International Relations in Europe: A Social Science Stillborn or 
Still Born and Raised in America?” Paper presented at the Standing Group of International 
Relations conference, The Hague, September 2004, pp. 1-28.  
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number of IR departments and courses in existence when again compared to the institutional 
volume elsewhere). Whereas the 2008 TRIP survey33 investigated where scholars receive their 
PhDs and university rankings and found that: 
 
 “Sixty-eight percent of all IR scholars-including about half of scholars in 
Hong Kong and Singapore and around a third in Canada, New Zealand and Israel-
receive their PhDs in the United States. American universities top the rankings of 
the best PhD and M.A granting institutions”.34  
 
When viewed through the above institutional and structural frame the TRIP survey concluded, 
“there is evidence of US hegemony”.35 Overall, the fourth definition of dominance that is utilized 
is that dominance is witnessed in the internal structure of a discipline. Meaning that if an actor 
dominates the institutions and commands structural authority then this is representative of 
disciplinary dominance.    
The fifth widespread form that dominance takes in the body of scholarship investigating 
IR’s American status is that of Gate-keeping. It is argued that America dominates the discipline in 
terms of control of/or facilitating access to the discipline’s international arena. Ersel Aydinli and 
Julie Mathews,36 and Arlene Tickner37 for example, have employed this definition of dominance. 
Each has respectively argued that the American mainstream operates as the discipline’s 
gatekeeper, permitting entrance to American scholars or scholarly works that adhere to 
American standards, whilst restricting access to non-American academics or research that 
deviates from the American model. The selection of editors of key journals, and the reviewers of 
articles that are submitted are politicized enterprises as these individuals, according to Thomas 
Biersteker “play critical gate-keeping and discipline-defining roles, at times with a relatively 
narrow conceptions of the field, though rarely self-consciously so”.38  It appears that the gate-
keeping role is played out through publication practices, hiring strategies, and editorial selection. 
Hence this form of dominance is often measured through examining who is writing in the 
discipline and what type of research and scholarship is being published.  
                                                        
33 The Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) project seeks to investigate the 
relationship between IR research and teaching and its influence on “the real world of 
international politics and policy making”. The TRIP project has embarked upon numerous 
qualitative and quantitative data collections in order to capture the state of the discipline of IR 
and important features of international politics and policy. For more see the Institute for the 
Theory and Practice of International Relations, at the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, 
Virginia. http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/about.php.   
34 Richard Jordan, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson and Micheal J. Tierney “One 
Discipline or Many? TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in Ten Countries” Institute for 
the Theory and Practice of International Relations, at the College of William and Mary. Available at 
www.irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/ (February 2009), pp. 11.  
35 Ibid., op cit.  
36 Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious 
World of Publication in Contemporary International Relations” International Studies Perspectives 
1 (3) (2000), pp. 289-303. 
37 Tickner “Seeing IR Differently”, pp. 295-324.  
38 Biersteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony”, pp. 311.  
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Defining dominance in gate-keeping terms means that the hegemonic IR community 
polices the discipline’s borders, and protects the discipline’s parameters as defined by the 
mainstream. According to Roland Bleiker “The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or 
unknowingly, make sure that the discipline’s discursive boundaries remain intact”.39 The gate-
keeping function is thus an extension of and demonstration of the hegemons power. Therefore 
through demonstrating that IR is a field whose margins are defined and defended supports 
assertions that the discipline is an American dominated one. To conclude, dominance can also be 
defined as an actor’s capacity to maintain the present structure of the discipline that supports the 
status quo power through gate-keeping practices. Dominance defined as gate-keeping in IR 
means control of the process of inclusion and exclusion to the discipline’s international arena, 
entrance to which is guaranteed by adhering to the mainstream’s agenda, as Bleiker argues; “The 
doorkeepers of IR remind the women and men from the country who pray for admittance to the 
temple of IR that only those who abide by the established rules will gain access”.40  
These forms of dominance are not mutually exclusive, in fact they are mutually 
reinforcing. For example, if American academics are placed in positions of authority and control 
the access to the international disciplinary realm (dominance as gate-keeping) such scholars 
have the potential to enable and perpetuate the dominance of certain theories or methods. Or if 
American academics overwhelming populate the discipline and are parochial in their outlook this 
will then aid the positioning of American scholars in gate-keeping roles. Each means of 
dominance has the potential to lock together with other forms and exacerbate and entrench the 
dominant conditions being exercised. Whilst the central term dominance must be disaggregated 
in order to fully explore the disciplinary dynamics in operation, the different means of 
dominance do not need to be kept separate from each other. It is important to examine the 
interplay between each definition of dominance to see if they work to support the realization of 
each other and consequently stabilize America’s alleged hegemonic position.  
 The different definitions of dominance focus on the different ways in which the US is 
able to exercise its dominant position in order to change/dictate/condition the behaviour of 
other scholars to meet its agenda. Therefore if the US is dominant we should see the emulation 
and replication of its preferred means of ‘doing IR’ laid out above. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony seems to capture these relationships of dominance and explains how the US is 
potentially able to illicit the consent of global IR scholars to replicate its intellectual agenda, 
thereby exercising its dominance in different ways. For Antonio Gramsci the concept of 
hegemony captures a “special kind of power relation in which dominant groups secured their 
positions of privilege largely (if by no means exclusively) through consensual means”.41 
According to Gramsci hegemony is a “dynamic lived process in which social identities, relations, 
                                                        
39 Roland Bleiker “Forget IR Theory” in Chan, S., Mandaville, P. and Bleiker, R. (eds) The Zen of 
International Relations: IR Theory from East to West (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 44.  
40 Ibid., pp. 45.  
41 Mark Rupert “Antonio Gramsci” in Edkins, J. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (eds) Critical Theorists 
and International Relations (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 177.  
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organizations and structures based on asymmetrical distributions of power and influence are 
constituted by the dominant class”42 or in this case IR community. Hegemony is established when 
individual choices align with the preferences of the dominant strata largely through consensual 
means.  
 In terms of measurements, in order for Hoffmann’s disciplinary characterization to 
operate as an accurate self-image of the contemporary field, and therefore for the US to dominate 
in terms of a Gramscian style hegemony then there must be evidence of either: 1) America’s 
ability to set the disciplinary agenda and align the discipline’s concerns with those of the United 
States foreign policy ones; 2) The preponderance of either ‘American theories’ and/or a certain 
‘American’ theory which operates as the discipline’s orthodoxy; 3) Data suggesting that the 
majority of IR academics are working under the auspices of an empiricist epistemology and 
demonstrate a methodological proclivity towards quantitative methods especially the use of 
rational choice approaches; 4) A demonstration that the majority of work published is written by 
American scholars and/or scholars situated in American institutions; and 5) Finally verification 
of gate-keeping strategies being employed by predominantly American journal editors to exclude 
certain forms of scholarship and scholars.  
 Therefore to see whether the contemporary discipline of International Relations can be 
described as an American dominated discipline one needs to investigate each realm of 
dominance in turn to see if the claims in the literature capture the actual trends and inclinations 
taking place in the discipline. This means that we may find that America dominates in some 
realms and not others. For instance we could discover that the United States dominates the 
discipline in institutional/structural terms but not theoretical ones. Through disaggregating the 
issue and looking for different forms and means of dominance permits the possibility of 
producing a number of different perspectives regarding the issue of American disciplinary 
preponderance. In other words depending on the definition of dominance used, which 
correspondingly focuses attention towards certain disciplinary arenas and dynamics, one could 
potentially and most possibly construct a different image of the discipline. IR may appear more 
plural theoretically for instance, but seem more ‘American’ and dogmatic methodologically 
speaking.  
 Through highlighting the multiple ways in which dominance has been defined and 
allegedly has been exercised this thesis suggests that we can no longer speak of a carte blanche 
form of dominance. Because of the different conceptions of dominance operating in the literature 
it no longer makes sense to construct ambiguous statements of intellectual hegemony relating to 
some sort of overall American preponderance. Instead we need to conceive disciplinary 
dominance as something that needs to be prefixed with the form and means that it is taking. In 
staking this claim this thesis aims to highlight that the issue is not simply one of whether the US 
is disciplinary dominant, instead it is about revealing the ways in which the US is able to exercise 
                                                        
42 James H. Mittelman The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 167.  
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its hegemonic position and illustrate all the complex dynamics and forces in operation (American 
or otherwise) that shape the contours of the discipline. Overall, this analysis attempts to 
construct a multifaceted view of the discipline and in doing so aims to avoid producing a 
misleading disciplinary image that not only generalizes the situation, and perpetuates a number 
of myths but also overlooks and misses the complex reality.  
  
Methodology.   
 
To provide an insight into how America dominates the discipline of International Relations, if it 
even does, a number of different methods were used. The methodology was designed to explore 
each definition of dominance in turn to see if there was any evidence of the discipline being 
dominated by the United States in one, any, or all of the different arenas of dominance. The 
research design was predicated on producing a more reflective and detailed account of the 
discipline rather than responding to the question of whether IR is an American dominated 
discipline in a yes or no manner. To produce such an account the investigation was comprised of 
three principle areas of investigation; 1) Academic journals; 2) International Conferences; and 3) 
Interviews with a number of journal editors.  
                 In order to build a more comprehensive image of the state of the discipline it was vital to 
explore different scholarly domains to avoid producing an overly deterministic and 
impressionistic summation. Although the bulk of the data is generated from the journal 
investigation, the exploration into a number of conferences and interviews with some of the 
discipline’s journal editors provided some interesting insights. These two other avenues helped 
survey certain claims and disciplinary dynamics in more depth, for instance, the interviews with 
the journal editors helped examine the statements surrounding the alleged gate-keeping function 
of the mainstream journals. This mixed methods approach was devised to explore each realm of 
dominance in great depth to give a nuanced account of IR’s self-images.43 Due to the different 
mechanisms of these different academic forums one could find that the results from the 
conference investigation challenged those produced from the journal one. Rather than being used 
in the traditional triangulation purpose of a mixed methods research design to verify each 
other,44 the aim here was to highlight the different modus operandi and to argue that IR (like any 
other discipline) is a multifaceted field and resultantly American dominance may be expressed in 
some scholarly realms and not others. As it happens the data generated from the conference 
investigation was similar to that from the journals, meaning that the same disciplinary trends 
and inclinations were present in both arenas of scholarly production. Nonetheless, it was vital to 
                                                        
43 My mixed methods approach was based on the work of Mario Bunge, Andrew Sayer, Ray 
Pawson and Nick Tilley. For more see Mario Bunge “On Method in the Philosophy of Science” in 
Mahner, M. (ed) Scientific Realism: Selected Essays of Mario Bunge (New York: Prometheus Books, 
2001), pp. 121-141; Andrew Sayer Method In Social Science (London: Routledge, 1992); and Ray 
Pawson and Nick Tilley Realistic Evaluation (London: Sage, 2004).  
44 Colin Robson Real World Research: Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 371.  
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illuminate the different forces and to put a stop to ‘one size fits all’ disciplinary depictions; as one 
needs to specify where and how American dominates, even if it does.  
                   As previously noted America has been said to dominate the discipline of IR in five 
divergent ways, hence there are five different ways in which we can define dominance. The 
methodology was constructed in order to explore each realm and find out whether the United 
States is intellectually hegemonic in each, or any, of these spheres. Next the investigations will be 
detailed one by one, beginning with the journal analysis to show how they have been designed to 
specifically examine each arena of dominance in turn.  
 
Journal Investigation. 
 
Journals play a key role in the dissemination of scholarly knowledge. They are a vital means of 
both providing information and notifying scholars of the contemporary debates and issues in a 
field. Not only are journals an important means of scholarly communication and the distribution 
of knowledge they are also, according to Ole Wæver, the best and most direct measure of a 
discipline.45 Wæver formulated such a standpoint based on the work in the sociology of science 
by Robert Merton and Richard Whitley. Both of whom argued that journals are the ‘crucial 
institution of modern sciences’ and therefore can in a sense be seen to be a microcosm of a 
discipline itself.46 Whether one wholeheartedly or partially accepts Wæver’s claim (therefore 
leaving aside the statement that journals provide the best and most direct gauge of the discipline) 
journals nevertheless do provide a valuable insight into current academic trends and disciplinary 
inclinations.  
              This is not to say that textbooks, monographs and other forms of publication are not 
important or attractive to scholars, or indeed to claim that such formats do not have a lasting 
impact on a field, but rather, journals offer a clearer, current and more accurate picture of the 
present trends in a discipline than other modes of academic literary expression. This is due to a 
number of reasons; firstly as Marijke Bruening et. al. note, journals are a more immediate 
measure of a field.47 Textbooks and monographs for example take far longer to complete and 
publish, whereas journal articles tend to be more contemporary and responsive in terms of 
academic debates. Additionally, scholars also have a tendency to submit arguments to journals 
prior to publication in book format. Therefore ideas, theories, research and methods etc. that 
tend to eventually find their way into collected volumes or monographs, for instance, are usually 
first published in journals. Secondly, it has been argued that journals are often subject to 
different standards of scrutinisation and review than textbooks etc; such standards are debatably 
                                                        
45 Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline”, pp. 698.  
46 Robert K. Merton The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1979) and Richard Whitley The Intellectual and Social Organization of 
the Sciences: Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
47 Marijke Breuning, Joseph Bredehoft and Eugene Walton “Promise and Performance: An 
Evaluation of Journals in International Relations: International Studies Perspectives 6 (4) (2005), 
pp. 448.  
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“more rigorous and constitutive of any disciplinary subfield”.48 Finally, journals facilitate the 
conduct of systematic reviews, content analyses, or qualitative investigations of the sort being 
conducted here for the purpose of the thesis. This is due to the regular schedules of journals and 
the associated identification of articles. Overall, it can be stated that in the arena of published 
academic literature, journals provide a more up to date and immediate purview into the 
discipline of International Relations than other types of academic written expression, and hence 
why I opted to explore journals as one of the realms of investigation in order to question whether 
IR is an American dominated discipline.  
                 It must, however, be stressed that a field’s academic journals are not to be confused with 
or to become coterminous with ‘the’ or ‘a’ discipline. Scholarly journals must be viewed as a 
reflection of a field, and work as a means of representing, reviewing, and accessing trends of 
academic activity. A discipline is in part defined by the scholars who consider themselves part of 
an academic field and in turn form, construct and constitute that discipline.49 It must, therefore 
be kept in mind that the purpose of this journal investigation is to use a number of IR journals 
operating as a reflection of the discipline, and to examine the content of various journals in order 
to gain access to and understand the current developments and inclinations in the field. The 
journals investigated will not be treated as ‘the discipline’ but rather as a mirror of the field of 
International Relations. 
                 This thesis aims to investigate the content of a number of journals in order to question 
the various assumptions that have prevailed in the discipline regarding IR’s depiction as an 
American enterprise. Hence, the purpose of this inquiry is to use academic journals as a means of 
appraising the present inclinations in the discipline and to see whether such trends correspond 
to the many assertions operating in the field. By empirically exploring each area of dominance 
and the associated claims as to why IR is to be characterized as a US dominated discipline, this 
thesis attempts to put forth a sustained and non-speculative depiction of the discipline, one that 
addresses if and how the US dominates IR.  However, this representation of IR in a sense will only 
provide a partial insight into the contemporary workings of American disciplinary dominance 
because this investigation is only looking at one avenue of academic expression. Thereby giving 
only one view/insight into what is a multi-faced discipline, as IR cannot solely be reduced to its 
representation through journals. Looking at other academic domains such as pedagogy could 
provide an alternative portrayal of IR, due to the different structural and agential forces at play, 
which is why a number of conferences will be explored and a number of journal editors will be 
interviewed.   
                                                        
48 Daniel Maliniak et. al., “The International Relations Discipline, 1980-2006”, pp. 2. Also see 
Jennifer Kiester, James Long, Douglas McNamara, Susan Peterson and Michael Tierney “Trends in 
IR Pedagogy and Scholarship: An Introduction to the Project on Teaching and Research in 
International Politics (TRIP)” Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the North East Political 
Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, November 2004, pp. 6. Available at 
www.mjtier.people.wm.edu/intnlpolitics/teaching/trip04.pdf.  
49 Brian C. Schmidt The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 12.  
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 The content of the following 12 journals were examined: Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Cooperation and Conflict, the European Journal of International Relations, 
International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, International 
Studies Perspectives, International Relations, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, the Journal 
of International Relations and Development, the Review of International Studies and World Politics. 
In order to select the above publications I did not opt for a random sample, and instead decided 
on a targeted sample. By embarking on a random sample for the quest of unachievable objectivity 
and bias free research, would have run the risk of selecting all, or predominantly, American 
journals, which possibly could have reproduced a number of assumptions in the discipline; one 
being the unfounded assertion that there is hardly anyone writing or researching outside the 
United States. Or conversely this investigation could have ended up analyzing none of the ‘big 
name’ journals, and jeopardized the findings by presenting the discipline in a more diverse and 
eclectic light. It seems that the investigation would have been endangered and subjected to a 
range of problems if the methodology had driven the exploration. By letting the question lead the 
selection process and thereby by employing a targeted sample this study was able to overcome a 
number of potential pitfalls and ensure a degree of multiplicity and geographical diversity 
without potentially missing out any key disciplinary movements.  
 Returning to the issue of geographical coverage the publications selected stem from the 
Asia Pacific,50 Australia,51 Central, Eastern and Western Europe,52 Great Britain,53 North America 
and Scandinavia54. Despite the attempt to give broad geographical spread to the investigation, it 
is extremely clear that colossal gaps remain. These voids are due in part to the limited spatial 
diversity of the 2009 JCR,55 and also the language bias that is present in this investigation. All the 
journals are English language ones and this obviously drastically reduced the potential for 
geographical diversity, and centred the exploration around the ‘Anglosphere’ nations and 
Europe. Although a number of the journals selected do emanate from other regions, it can still be 
                                                        
50 The journal International Relations of the Asia Pacific is published by Oxford University Press in 
association with the Japan Association of International Relations.  
51 The Australian Journal of International Affairs is the journal of the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs and is regarded as Australia’s leading journal in this area.  
52 The Journal of International Relations and Development is published in association with the 
Central and Eastern Europe International Studies Association, whereas the European Journal of 
International Relations is the journal of the Standing Group of International Relations, which is 
supported by the European Consortium for Political Research.  
53 The journal International Relations is a British journal that is published in association with the 
David Davies Memorial Institute, in the UK, however the editorial team is based at Aberystwyth 
University. Whereas the Review of International Studies is the flagship journal of the British 
International Studies Association.  
54 The journal Cooperation and Conflict is published in connection with the Nordic International 
Studies Association.  
55 The 2009 JCR contained no journals from Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East or Russia. 
It is not because they are no journals being published in these regions, but rather because such 
journals are not being recognised by Thomson Reuters. This once again brings us back to the set 
of criteria and indicators used by the ISI to select the journals for evaluation, and how the 
measures employed work to exclude and delegitimize a number of journals outside the 
Anglophone nations and Western Europe 
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argued that due to their publication in English their content may have reoriented itself around an 
international English speaking audience, thereby bringing us back to an ‘Anglo-centric’ position. 
One of the suspected causes of the American preponderance in the literature is the linguistic bias 
in the discipline, due to the way that the English language is used as an exclusionary barrier. I am 
aware that I too could be potentially perpetuating the so-called ‘linguistic imperialism’56 by using 
all English language journals for my investigation, however, this choice was not strategic but one 
borne out of limitations. It remained unfeasible in terms or time and resources to select a greater 
number of journals including non-English journals to explore such claims and have the desired 
geographical spread.  
 Using the 2009 Journal Citation Report nine out of the twelve journals for this study 
were selected from a list of journals designated and evaluated as ‘International Relations’ by 
Thomson Reuters (formally known as the Institute for Scientific Information).57 Currently 
Thomson Reuters classifies IR journals as those covering “resources concerned with foreign 
policy, comparative world politics, world commerce and trade, international legal issues, peace 
studies and conflict resolution, military alliances and strategic studies”.58 The definition used is 
just one of the many prejudices and disciplining practices that is inherent in the Journal Citation 
Reports and the selection process for inclusion in the Social Science Citation Index hence by 
selecting all the journals for exploration from the list of ‘recognized’ IR journals by Thomson 
Reuters would have meant that the investigation would have inherited the predispositions of the 
ISI.59 The biases and selection criteria are investigated in more depth in Chapter five, for now one 
just needs to be aware of the existing prejudices, and to briefly highlight the outside processes 
and mechanisms at work that influence the present form of the discipline and knowledge 
production. In order to counter the biases of the ISI to ensure that the investigation did not 
reproduce the same preconceptions three ‘rogue’ or rather non-ISI approved journals one were 
selected to avoid such an entrenchment.60   
                                                        
56 Kim Nossal “Tales That Textbooks Tell: Ethnocentricity and Diversity in American Introduction 
to International Relations” in Crawford, R. M. A. and Jarvis, D. S. L. (eds) International Relations-
Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 171.  
57 The 9 ISI ‘approved journals’ reviewed were: the Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
Cooperation and Conflict, European Journal of International Relations, International Organization, 
International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of IR and Development, Review of 
International Studies and World Politics.  
58 Thomson Reuters “International Relations: Category Description” Scope Notes, ISI Web of 
Knowledge. Available at http://admin-apps.isiknowledge.com (accessed on 8/06/2011).   
59 The biases and problems with the way the Journal Citation Reports are compiled and how the 
journal impact factor is formulated is explored in great depth in chapter five when I examine the 
claims surrounding gate-keeping and American dominance.  
60 The three journals that I investigated that were not recognized by Thomson Reuters and 
therefore not featured in the annual 2009 JCR were: International Relations, the International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific, and International Studies Perspectives. However, the following year 
all three journals were included. The 2009 JCR included 59 IR journals whereas the 2010 ranked 
78, and the most recent 2011 report rated 80 IR journals. The greater volume of publications 
included reflects the steady increase in the number of publications, however the JCR is still not 
completely inclusive. Journals such as Perspectives on Politics and Third World Quarterly are not 
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 By selecting all non-JCR journals the investigation would have been completely safe from 
any biases intrinsic to the ISI, however, this would have also have denied the opportunity to 
discover and examine all the forces in operation regarding the construction of the discipline of IR.  
Further solely looking at ‘rogue’ journals would have meant that a disciplinary ‘gate-keeper’ or 
rather a preserver and producer of disciplinary standards would have failed to be accounted for. 
In other words, the inferences drawn would have possibly presented the discipline in a more 
pluralistic light, as Thomson Reuters’ agenda would not have been in full force.  Furthermore as 
the Journal Citations Reports are taken seriously by the discipline, it was important to explore 
the processes involved and their role in the construction of knowledge and standards.  
 The time span for this investigation was ten years, from 1999-2009. In a sense, this 
exploration picks up from where Ole Wæver’s investigation into the state of the discipline left 
off,61 to see the inclinations in the discipline of IR over the last decade. To state explicitly, the 
article was the unit of analysis for the purpose of this exploration. Rather than employing just 
one method for the analysis of each article, alternatively a mixed methods approach was adopted. 
Normally when one speaks of employing mixed methods or even triangulation this is in relation 
to using different methods, for example content analysis, interviews and participant 
observation.62 Therefore using different methods of inquiry, and doing different investigations 
and viewing the results next to one another to see if they support each other.63 However, a 
number of different means of enquiry were employed in the same journal investigation. These 
different means were not used to question or verify the other but rather to build a more 
comprehensive analysis. The method used depended on the ‘object’ or rather the line of inquiry, 
in a sense the investigation can be described as purposefully ‘methodologically opportunistic’.64  
The plurality of methods employed was in part designed to remedy the problems associated with 
content analysis.  
 If quantitative content analysis had been solely used one would have risked typecasting 
a number of articles into categories that had been constructed, which potentially may have been 
problematic and reductive. For example, by coding for methodology one would have had to 
create a number of categories and arguably would have had to limit the number to make the 
analysis work, thereby forcing approaches together and concealing differences. The journal 
explorations by Ersel Adylini and Julie Mathews,65 Marijke Breuning et. al.,66 and Ole Wæver,67 all 
                                                                                                                                                              
ranked as IR journals. The selection processes of Thomson Reuters and its exclusivity is 
discussed in depth in Chapter Five.  
61 Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline”, pp. 687-727.   
62 Bruce L. Berg Qualitative Research Methods: For the Social Sciences, Seventh Edition (Boston: 
Pearson Education Ltd, 2009), pp. 7. Also see for example Alan Bryman Social Research Methods: 
4th Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 635-648.  
63 Robson, Real World Research, pp. 370-373.  
64 Colin Wight “Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International 
Relations Theory: ‘What’s the Frequency Kenneth?’” Millennium 25 (2) (1996), pp. 310. Also see 
Andrew Collier Critical Realism: an Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (London: Verso, 
1994).  
65 Adylini and Mathews “Are the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 289-303.  
66 Breuning, Bredehoft and Walton “Promise and Performance”, pp. 447-461.   
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used quantitative content analysis, and due to the very nature of this method and the ensuing 
process of categorization and coding, their results suffered from pigeon holing articles by placing 
them within problematic categories that they devised, some of which only served to confound 
conceptual confusion in the discipline and work as reductive disciplinary devices themselves. For 
example, Wæver’s study operated with only two distinct paths of examination; one was the 
author’s country of residence whilst the second was the articles position on the 
rational/reflectivist axis. For the country of residence Wæver divided the globe into four 
categories: 1) United States and Canada; 2) the United Kingdom; 3) Rest of Europe and 4) Rest of 
the world. To quantify the contents of the articles under review Wæver devised six rather 
ambiguous categories; 1) Formalised rational choice; 2) Quantitative studies; 3) Non-formalised 
rationalism (‘soft’ rational choice); 4) Non-postmodern constructivism; 5) Post-structuralism, 
Marxism and Feminism; and 6) Other. The categories conflate theory, methodology, and different 
epistemological standpoints. Wæver’s bizarre categories hide crucial differences and jumbles 
widely different approaches. The problematic nature of Wæver’s categories diluted the 
explanatory power of his findings. Wæver himself openly admitted that the classifications he 
used for his investigation were rough and combined approaches that differed in certain 
respects,68 all in all culminating in a confusing set of categories.  
 By using a mixed methods approach with a largely qualitative orientation this 
investigation was able to put forth the positive analysis that was intended, looking at what was 
there as opposed to a negative analysis of what was not. Instead of coding for theory, and 
methodology the authors defined themselves, and through using the approaches of 
interpretivism69 and critical discourse analysis70 I was able to reveal academics self-
identification. Meaning one was able to delve deeper into the articles in order to gain a more 
                                                                                                                                                              
67 Waever “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline”, pp. 687-727.  
68 Ibid., pp. 701.  
69 To clarify when I speak of interpretivism I am referring to the specific methodological 
approach rather than a broad school of thought that includes numerous ‘interpretive’ approaches 
such as hermeneutics for example. By interpretivism I mean the interpretation of a text in light of 
its context, using interpretive judgements and inductive reasoning and as such I have drawn on 
Alfred Schütz’s understanding. Interpretivism is a distinct methodology drawn from the 
Intrepretivist tradition that is often juxtaposed with the philosophy of social science that is 
positivism. For more see for example Norman Blaikie ‘Interpretivism’ in Lewis-Beck, M. S., 
Bryman, A. and Liao, T. F. (eds) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods (Sage: 
London, 2004), pp. 509-511; Thomas A Schwandt “Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to 
Human Inquiry” in Denvin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds) The Landscape of Qualitative Research: 
Theories and Issues (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 221-259 and John Gerring Social Science 
Methodology: A Critical Framework (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
70 Critical discourse analysis is the Critical Realist understanding of discourse analysis. It rejects 
the anti-realism of poststructuralist understandings and looks at how discourse is an important 
part of reality, and how it interacts with non-discursive causal mechanisms and social structures. 
Critical discourse analysis encourages us to ask how ideas and discourse are related to the 
‘unobservable’ level and how discursive practices distort this ontologically real level. For more 
see Jonathan Joseph and John Michael Roberts (eds) Realism Discourse and Deconstruction 
(London: Routledge, 2004). Especially the chapter by Martin Jones “Critical Realism, Critical 
Discourse Analysis, Concrete Research”, pp. 43-67.  
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nuanced understanding of the content, the relationship to the perceived mainstream, the self-
positioning and location in debates, and impact on the discipline.  
 Quantitative content analysis was used in order to determine whether the article 
adhered to the American agenda and to ascertain the author(s) institutional affiliation. Firstly, I 
coded 0 if the article concerned itself with issues pertaining to the America agenda defined as 
American foreign policy aims, goals and issues, and 1 if it did not. If the article focused on items 
that were deemed to be of concern to the US government under the period of review it was noted 
in what way it did, for example making note of whether the article was concerned with 
democracy promotion or nuclear proliferation. Secondly, the following codes were used to 
determine into which category the authors of the manuscripts should be placed based on their 
institutional affiliation (for a full breakdown see the Appendix); 0 – The United States of America; 
1 – Latin America (including Mexico); 2 – Canada (including Greenland); 3 – The United Kingdom; 
4 – Western Europe; 5 – Russia and Eastern Europe; 6 – East Asia (including China); 7 – South 
Asia; 8 – South East Asia; 9 – Middle East and North Africa; 10 – Sub-Saharan Africa; 11 – 
Oceania; 12 – Non-Institutional Affiliation. Although a much greater number of categories than 
Wæver were employed there were of course still problems due to dividing the globe in such a 
manner. For instance the category of ‘Western Europe’ is comprised of numerous and distinct IR 
traditions. By subsuming all these IR communities within one designation the internal and inter-
regional dynamics are overlooked. Some of these IR academies within this category are more 
‘national’ than others. The French and Italian IR communities, for example, are more insular in 
their orientation and as such French and Italian IR scholars tend not to publish in the discipline’s 
international journals as much as Nordic or German IR scholars for example.71 Through 
undertaking the process of categorization resultantly the number of IR communities were 
reduced with the effect of glossing over the differences between them. The 2007 TRIP survey was 
used as the model and some minor modifications were made to the geographical template.72 In 
defense, the categories map on to the regional IR communities constituted through the 
discipline’s professional associations. There is already some notion of regional divides and 
enclaves and I capitalized on this growing phenomenon for the sake of analytical clarity in my 
results.73  
                                                        
71 For more on the French and Italian IR communities see Henrik Ø Breitenbauch “Cartesian 
Limbo: A Formal Approach to the Study of Social Sciences: International Relations in France” PhD 
dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 2008; Attinà Fulvio “The Study of International Relations 
in Italy” in Dyer, H. C. and Mangasarian, L. (eds) The Study of International Relations: The State of 
the Art (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 341-354; and Sonja Lucarelli and Roberto Meriotti “No-
Constructivists’ Land: IR in Italy in the 1990s” Journal of International Relations and Development 
5 (2) (2002), pp. 114-142.  
72 See the codebook for the 2007 TRIP survey, Maliniak et. al., “The International Relations 
Discipline, 1980-2006”, pp. 45-47.  
73 Christopher Jones “Locating the ‘I’ in ‘IR’ – Dislocating Euro-American Theories” Global Society 
17 (2) (2003), pp. 107-110 and A. J. R. Groom “International Relations in France: A View From 
Across the Channel” European Political Science 4 (June) (2005), pp. 164-174.  
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 After coding for adherence to the American agenda and the institutional affiliation of the 
authors the articles were explored in more depth to uncover their theoretical persuasions, and 
methodological approaches. Each of the lines of enquiry has been designed specifically to explore 
each definition of dominance and to examine the claims in the literature. The journal 
investigation will provide an insight into whether 1) America sets the disciplinary agenda 
through aligning the focus of IR with US foreign policy concerns; 2) Whether the American IR 
community has constructed a theoretical orthodoxy with the dominance of a specific ‘American’ 
theory; 3) Thirdly whether the United States is able to enforce its model of ‘appropriate’ social 
science on the global discipline through the preponderance of empiricism and rational choice 
methods; 4) The data produced will also be able to show whether the scholars from US 
institutions dominate the research published; and 5) Finally viewing all the results together will 
enable one to evaluate the claims of gate-keeping based on the plurality of theories and 
methodological approaches, and ‘who’ is being published in terms of where they are writing 
from.  
 In order to explore, deconstruct, code and record each article the following process was 
developed: First I read the article’s abstract, introduction and conclusion, skimming the main 
body as I went along and paying attention to repeated words, authors mentioned, the use of 
certain theories and substantive examples, and any pictorial information such as diagrams, 
graphs, and tables for example. If the authors made overtly clear the article’s focus, theoretical 
approach, and methodology through self-identification, then this was noted accordingly. 
However, if the author’s commitments and preferences were harder to detect and more implicit 
and hidden within the text, the article was read again, more attentively and in a more 
deconstructive fashion in order to draw out the inclinations and persuasions of the author. After 
the reading the article carefully if the article could still not be deciphered and deconstructed the 
article was re-read once more, and with even greater detail to ensure that every article was 
suitably explored and analyzed.  
               Overall the journal investigation was designed to provide an insight into the global 
disciplinary trends underway and to assess how the United States exercises its intellectual 
hegemony, if at all, through using the disciplinary purview provided by the selected publications. 
One will be able to see if American is preponderant in either one, none, all, or a combination of 
the criterion of dominance (in other words the way dominance has been defined and argued by 
IR academics). Meaning that we will be able to 1) classify dominance; 2) provide a more 
meaningful account of America’s relationship with the global discipline and 3) reveal the current 
complexities and dynamics within IR.  
 
Conference Investigation. 
 
There has been a severe lack of attention paid to other ‘microcosms’ or reflections of the 
discipline. Although there is a general lack of data as previously noted, the small number of 
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investigations that do exist have primarily focused on the discipline’s journals. Researchers in the 
discipline have shown rather an acute blindness to conferences as realms of inquiry. Conferences 
provide an interesting insight into the trends and inclinations of a given academic discipline that 
differ to the ones provided by a field’s journals, due to different dynamics and mechanisms of 
selection. Conferences provide a forum for scholarly conversation on research topics that are 
often fairly nascent and novel, and not always replicated in the pages of the journals. The ideas 
presented are often prior to publication as academics use the opportunity to present their work 
and receive crucial feedback. Often the comments from the audience and panel discussants are 
reflected upon and used to sharpen ideas and alter/improve arguments in order to get the work 
ready to be submitted to a journal. The conversations taking place show how interactive the 
conference environment is, and how it shapes the future trajectory of the discipline. Further, a 
degree of the research presented at conferences never makes its way to publication. Often works 
are abandoned or taken no further, therefore we get an insight into a slightly different body of 
research, as this body of work has not been subjected to editorial selection processes and review. 
Also one finds more graduate work showcased at conferences than in the discipline’s journals, 
due to the standards required for publication. This again means that we are privy to research 
that would not be found in the discipline’s journals. Looking at the work from the new generation 
of academics means that we can get an insight into possible future directions of the field, and 
what may be the next trend or ‘turn’ in the discipline.   
 The following conferences were investigated; the International Studies Association’s 
annual convention, the British International Studies Association’s annual conference, the Central 
Eastern European International Studies Association’s conventions and the International Studies 
Association’s Joint Conventions with other regional communities and associations. The four most 
recent conferences from each association were explored; consequently this meant that the time 
frame was not exactly the same for each association due to the divergent conference schedules in 
operation. However, the schedules were fairly similar which meant that the overall range was 
from 2005-2011. This shorter period when compared to the one used for the journal 
investigation (1999-2009) was due to the availability of information. For most of the associations 
only the full conference programme for the last four conferences could be accessed.74 
Consequently the selection was slightly limited due to available access to the conference 
archives. In order to adequately conduct the analysis the full conference programme had to be 
available. This therefore excluded a number of conferences, for example the Standing Group of 
International Relation’s past conferences, which would have broadened the geographical scope of 
the exploration.  The conferences selected were chosen by a targeted sample due to the 
accessibility of data, and the aims of the thesis. The discipline’s conferences that were 
investigated have a global reach and attendance in order to prevent one IR community being 
overly represented. Including smaller/national conferences or association conferences with a 
                                                        
74 The exception to this trend was the International Studies Association and it’s joint conventions, 
the association website (http://www.isanet.org/meetings/), has a detailed conference archive 
listing the majority of past programmes.  
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specific geographical caucus (such as the ISA-North East) could have skewed the results in favour 
of one locale at the expense of others. The conferences selected are all renowned and considered 
to be the main conferences within the discipline, as such their programmes are wide-scale and 
diverse which provided a greater insight into global research trends than the smaller conferences 
would have allowed.  
 Unlike the journal investigation this line of enquiry will only explore two of the five areas 
of dominance: agenda setting, and institutional/structural dominance. This was again due to the 
limits imposed by the issue of accessibility. Because not all the papers presented were made 
available I was unable to conduct a deconstructive analysis into the author’s theory, and 
methodology, as was done with the journal manuscripts. The majority of papers were not 
uploaded on-line; meaning only a small sample of papers could be read. Just addressing these to 
gain a degree of insight into the other three realms of dominance could have resulted in skewing 
the findings, as the papers uploaded may not have been reflective of the whole conference, and 
therefore presented the forum in a narrower or more eclectic light than the actuality. In order to 
protect the validity of the results only explored the realms of dominance that had sufficient data 
were explored.  
 Using content analysis, whether or not the panel adhered to the American agenda was 
coded for, therefore gaining an insight into whether America demonstrates its alleged dominance 
through its ability to set the intellectual agenda and therefore focus and subject matter of IR. The 
panel title and abstract was taken into account, as were the titles of the individual papers. This 
provided enough detail to assess if the panel was adhering to the American agenda, as defined by 
the foreign policy concerns of the US administration. The same codes were used as the ones 
employed for the journal investigation, likewise if the panel was deemed to adhere to the 
American agenda it was noted and in what way it did. In order to determine whether the United 
States commands a dominant presence in the discipline’s institutional structure the institutional 
affiliation of all the panel participants (Chairs, Discussants and presenters) for all the panels 
featured at each conference were coded for. This provided an insight into the configuration of the 
discipline and where the ‘who’ of IR are researching from.  Again the same codes as the ones 
exercised for the journal investigation were used. The results from the conference investigation 
will sit alongside the ones from the journal investigation and allow us to see if the American IR 
community is intellectually hegemonic in this area of academic production, and if the different 
dynamics and processes in operation enhance the overall degree of disciplinary dominance or 
the opposite.  
 
Interviews. 
 
To explore the claims of gate-keeping and the final definition of dominance in more depth a 
number of semi-structured interviews with a number of journal editors in the field were 
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conducted.75 Although looking at all the results generated from both the journal and conference 
investigations will provide an insight into whether gate-keeping practices are occurring through 
empirically revealing disciplinary silences that are lamented in the literature, these results will 
be unable to reveal the exact mechanisms underway. In order to explore the specific processes of 
selection and rejection, and the rationales adopted, a greater scope into the role of different 
journal editors was needed. Especially as most of the claims of exclusion and ‘misshaping’ the 
field are directed at the discipline’s editors. A number of questions were devised to look into the 
structure and policies of the journals of each respective editor, with a specific focus on editorial 
interventions. The interviews were largely conducted face to face,76 with only one conducted 
over the telephone. The interviews were semi-structured long interviews (see the appendix). 
Each interview was recorded, and transcribed and then sent back to the journal editors for 
approval before being used anonymously. The insights gained from the interviews helped delve 
into the processes of each respective journal and their relationship with the Journal Citation 
Reports and the associated rankings. The interviews not only helped explore the alleged gate-
keeping practices but also another organization, Thomson Reuters, and its effects on the 
discipline and what is being published.   
 
Chapter Overviews.  
 
The criterion of dominance has not only formed the framework for the empirical analysis it has 
also provided the overarching structure of this thesis. Not only do the different definitions of 
dominance provide the separate lines of inquiry for the empirical investigation, the structure of 
this thesis is predicated on the five divergent conceptions employed and therefore the five ways 
in which America allegedly is preponderant. In order to present the results of the various 
investigations the thesis will proceed as follows: the first chapter looks at the agenda setting 
realm of dominance in order to see whether the discipline has an ‘American outlook’. This 
chapter begins by examining the claims that the US dominates the discipline of IR due to its 
ability to make the focus of the discipline synonymous with the foreign policy concerns of the 
United States, and then moves on to detail the American agenda. Through looking at the various 
foreign policies of the US government over the last two decades we can see what has been given 
the status of ‘the most pressing issues in international politics’, and therefore what academics 
should be focusing on. Despite the claims of a new era of foreign policy, or a ‘paradigm shift’ the 
agenda has remained constant, and the majority of research in the field however, did not adhere 
to this agenda, and instead of concerning itself with American primacy, terrorism, nuclear 
                                                        
75 In total I conducted eight interviews with journal editors from leading international IR 
journals. I have chosen not to name the journals in order to preserve the anonymity of those 
interviewed.  
76 Even though I interviewed a number of editors that work in institutions outside of the United 
Kingdom, I was able to conduct the majority of the interviews face-to-face by interviewing a 
number of editors at the 2011 International Studies Association annual convention in Montreal 
and the journal Millennium’s 40th anniversary conference at the LSE in 2011.  
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weapons and rogue states for example, IR scholars displayed an independence from the concerns 
of American policy-making elites.  
 Chapter two also begins by examining the claims in the discipline, but this time in terms 
of dominance as the ability to create a theoretical orthodoxy, marginalize ‘alternative 
approaches’ and also produce the largest volume of theoretical material. Three claims populate 
the discipline in terms of what theory(ies) are professed to dominate, and each supports the 
notion that the US dominates the discipline because it produces the majority of theoretical 
output. This chapter looks at how these claims emerged, and explores the alleged dependent 
situation that entrenches America’s disciplinary stronghold. In doing so it questions what it 
means for a theory to be classed as American and what the implications of this form of 
dominance are for the discipline. The claims of dominance are then examined in light of the 
results produced from the journal investigation. The results illustrate that rather than the 
dominance of either 1) realism, 2) neo-realism and neo-liberalism or 3) constructivism the 
majority of articles in the discipline from 1999-2009 were conducted under the auspices of 
classical liberalism. Furthermore, instead of orthodoxy the results indicated a situation of 
theoretical pluralism, with no evidence of a ‘mainstream’ having the ability to marginalize 
approaches. Even though classical liberalism proved to be the most popular theory it did not 
command an overwhelming, dogmatic disciplinary presence. As such this chapter challenges a 
number of prevalent assumptions in the discipline and explores the dynamics of pluralism, whilst 
critically assessing the ‘Americanness’ of certain bodies of thought.  
 Chapter three addresses the claims of dominance in the realm of epistemology and 
methodology. The American IR community has exercised its dominance according to certain 
scholars, such as Steve Smith,77 through decreeing what counts as ‘proper social science’ in other 
words what counts as legitimate knowledge claims and appropriate methods of doing so. As 
previously mentioned if America is indeed intellectually hegemonic one would expect to see most 
research being conducted positivisticly, in other words we would see the dominance of 
empiricism and also the dominance of certain quantitative methods. This chapter will explore 
these claims in more depth and then assess their validity. After discussing the discipline’s 
problematic handling of the term ‘epistemology’ and detailing why I focused solely on the 
methods employed rather than trying to decipher each articles epistemology78 I will show - 
despite the numerous claims to opposite that populate the literature – that rational choice 
methods are not dominant. There was no emulation of the ‘American methodological blueprint’ 
for conducting IR research in the discipline’s journals which one would expect if IR were an 
American enterprise. The dominant method was interpretivism, which is associated with a 
                                                        
77 Steve Smith “The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations: the Forty Years 
Detour” Millennium 21 (3) (1992), pp. 489-506.  
78 Attempting to stake a claim as to each articles epistemological position would only serve to 
continue to mishandle the term epistemology, for I would be guilty of creating false categories 
and crediting authors with a prior allegiance to an epistemology, which I argue does not exist. My 
full rationale for not coding for epistemology in order to discern the disciplines epistemological 
inclination is given in chapter three.  
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different IR community: the British Academy. This chapter concludes by examining the British 
discipline and the applicability of certain American methods in non-American IR communities.  
 Chapter four turns its attention to claims of dominance defined as the ability of an 
academic community to command a significant presence in the institutional structure of a 
discipline. Many, such as Thomas Biersteker, have argued that IR is an American discipline 
because of the sheer size of the US academy;79 this has arguably resulted in the production of an 
insular and self-referential American enclave that is ignorant to the works produced outside of 
this geographical domain. This chapter will explore such claims by looking at the expansion of 
the discipline over the last few decades and the alleged consequences of this expression of 
dominance. This time the findings from the journal and conference investigations support the 
assertions of American hegemony. The discipline is indeed dominated by scholars writing and 
researching from American institutions. However, this chapter will look at what this form of 
dominance means for the discipline and question whether other factors such as the where one 
studies for their PhD and the resultant movement of ideas around the globe actually has more of 
a determining impact upon the form of the discipline.  
 The final chapter will scrutinize the statements that declare IR is an American endeavour 
due to the gate-keeping abilities of the American mainstream and their power of exclusion. If 
America were dominant in this manner than we would expect to witness a very narrow discipline 
that replicates the interests of the mainstream. Taking all the results produced into account the 
image of a diverse and eclectic global discipline emerges. This chapter does not claim that there 
are no gate-keeping exercises in operation, but rather they have not resulted in a strictly 
maintained discipline that satisfies the status quo/traditional boundaries of the field. The 
interviews with a number of journal editors evidenced tendencies towards actively diversifying 
and internationalizing the field, yet clearly standards and academic rigour have to be maintained 
which can be operationalised in a gate-keeping fashion. This chapter will examine the politics of 
publication and editorial interventions and how such practices shape the discipline. Moreover, 
this chapter will also explore the gate-keeping function of Thomson Reuters, and how this 
organization is disciplining the field. Through looking at the effect the Journal Citation Reports 
and the Journal Impact Factor is having on our discipline it is evident that they have the power of 
exclusion and operate as disciplinary agents of control. Overall, this chapter highlights the 
number of American and non-American structural forces and editorial practices that shape the 
contours of the field.  
The manner in which ‘American dominance’ has been disaggregated as previously 
mentioned has provided a means of assessing the various trends occurring within the discipline 
of IR. However, the view provided is largely internal. In other words this thesis mainly focuses on 
the internal dynamics and mechanisms taking place within the discipline. This is due to the fact 
that the focal and organizational point of this thesis is the different definitions of dominance, 
which were compiled after assessing the body of literature that claims IR is an American 
                                                        
79 Biersteker, “The Parochialism of Hegemony”, pp. 309.  
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dominated discipline. The definitions were drawn from IR academics, thus the definitions 
themselves emerged internally. Furthermore, the means in which the US has been claimed to 
exercise its hegemonic position largely focuses around the ways in which this dominant position 
affects the behaviours of IR academics. Accounts of the US’s disciplinary dominant position are 
explained through how the US can command emulation from non-American scholars to adhere to 
the desired substantive, theoretical, methodological etc agenda. Resultantly the different forms of 
dominance that this thesis addresses are mainly disciplinary internal rather than looking at 
external factors such as the role of American funding bodies (for instance the RAND 
Corporation), certain American institutions (for instance the Carnegie Council for Ethics, and the 
Brookings Institution), and the relationship that IR has to other academic discipline’s such as 
Political Science or Law.  
Each of these ‘external factors’ clearly has an impact on the global discipline of IR, the 
way the discipline has emerged in certain geographical locations, and therefore whether it can be 
described with accuracy as ‘an American dominated discipline’. For instance investigating the 
role of American philanthropic foundations Inderjeet Parmar concluded “It is clear that American 
foundations consciously have helped to construct US intellectual hegemony after 1945”.80 The 
vast financial resources allocated by foundations such as the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie 
Foundation have been crucial, from Parmar’s point of view, in supplying American IR with 
resources, thereby facilitating the continued high levels of research that aids the US in 
maintaining its position as allegedly the largest and most dynamic IR community.  
Furthermore, institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation, according to Nicolas 
Guilhot and Parmar, have used their abundant resources to develop international knowledge 
networks, which serve to entrench American disciplinary dominance of IR through cultivating 
American friendly research abroad “through the fostering of pro-US modernizing elites”.81 Once 
these relationships have been established the foundations then use their vast financial resources 
to demarcate what questions are worth asking, how these questions should be answered, the 
methodologies and theories to be adopted and finally which academics and institutions should be 
supported to carry out the research.82 Arguably not only do the foundations export and entrench 
the ‘American brand of IR’ aboard they also play a crucial role in generating a hierarchical 
intellectual infrastructure outside of the US. For example, through funding and creating other 
institutions in certain countries the foundations have thereby publicly given their support to 
research produced by those universities. Through giving status to certain universities and 
                                                        
80 Inderjeet Parmar “American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge 
Networks” Global Networks 2 (1) (December 2002), pp. 13. For more see Nicolas Guilhot “The 
Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of International Relations 
Theory” International Political Sociology 2 (4) (2008), pp. 281-304 and James Cotton 
“Rockefeller, Carnegie and the Limits of American Hegemony in the Emergence of Australian 
International Studies” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 12 (1) (2012), pp. 161-192.   
81 Parmar “American Foundations and the Development of International Knowledge Networks”, 
pp. 14.  
82 Nicolas Guilhot “Introduction: One Discipline Many Histories” in Guilhot, N. (ed) The Invention 
of International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 1-32.  
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deeming the research they produce as ‘credible social science’ the nature of academia encourages 
and persuades academics to join these institutions, emulate the trends produced, and 
disseminate the knowledge generated.83 All of which apparently reaffirms cements the purported 
American dominance of IR, as the scholarship being produced is decidedly American friendly and 
adhering to the agenda as set and defined by American institutions.  
 Certain external relationships and external agents will be reflected upon and 
encountered throughout the course of this thesis (especially in relation to certain American 
institutions such as the RAND Corporation and Thomson Reuters). However, the focus will 
largely remain on a series of internal dynamics due to the way IR scholars have focused on these 
dynamics in order to explain/prove/lament the alleged American dominance in IR. The thesis is 
centered on assessing the claims of IR academics and the disciplinary self-images that have been 
generated, and reproduced by scholars. The results of the journal investigation, conference 
analysis, and in-depth interviews with a number of journal editors do not provide much support 
for the continued use of Stanley Hoffmann’s disciplinary characterization by IR scholars. Because 
describing IR as an American dominated discipline, with dominance defined in general terms, 
presents a misleading image that overlooks the plural environment and a number of other forces 
and dynamics in operation.  
 The data presented throughout this thesis rather than working as a concrete foundation 
to bolster the internal arguments professing IR’s status as a US dominated discipline, instead 
challenges some rather entrenched disciplinary notions especially in regards to the ones 
surrounding the theoretical and methodological disciplinary tendencies. This thesis aims to show 
the numerous complex relations in operation in the global discipline and how referring to IR as 
an American discipline without prefixing discussions with the specific means of dominance 
serves to perpetuate a number of disciplinary myths. After extensive examination we currently 
find ourselves in a disciplinary milieu in which the United States is not as dominant as many have 
been lead to believe, and further the consequences of this form of dominance are nowhere near 
as disciplinary damaging as many have feared. Despite the empirical actuality that the results 
present the notion that IR is an American discipline is deeply ingrained, leading those in the field 
to behave as though the discipline was an American enterprise. The consequences of which have 
been to reproduce certain images and treat non-American IR scholarship in a somewhat 
exclusionary manner.84 Acting under the auspices of American disciplinary dominance certain 
scholars have a created a ‘virtual reality’,85 and in some ways IR is as much an American 
discipline as those in the field believe it to be. As Steve Smith noted “We construct, and 
                                                        
83 For more see Whitley The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences:  
84 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”, pp. 5-23.   
85 The term ‘virtual reality’ is used to denote and capture that which has been awarded the status 
of ‘real’ and is treated as the ‘reality’, yet this state of affairs is the product of a narrative. It is a 
social construction that differs from the empirical reality. My use and understanding of this 
concept is based on the work of Jean Baudrillard, for more see Jean Baudrillard The Perfect Crime 
(London: Verso, 2008), pp. 29-32; 65-71 and Jean Baudrillard The Spirit of Terrorism and Other 
Essays (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 27-30; 38.  
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reconstruct, our disciplines just as much as we construct and reconstruct our world”.86 The 
concluding chapter will explore the implications of this ‘virtual reality’ and how the actual differs 
from the consensus and self-image held in the discipline.  
 Overall, the image of the discipline presented throughout the course of this thesis 
challenges a number of popular and ingrained internal notions about IR. Furthermore, this thesis 
aims to show just how prevailing the idea is that IR is dominated by the United States within the 
discipline, and how this self-image does not capture the actual complexities and dynamics 
occurring in the field. However, through disaggregating the term dominance we can begin to 
illustrate these different dynamics in order to refine the claims made about the global discipline 
of IR and its relationship with the United States. 
                                                        
86 Steve Smith “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 
11” International Studies Quarterly 48 (3) (2004), pp. 510.  
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2. 
 
American Dominance as Agenda Setting? 
 
Steven Lukes’ radical conception of power claims that a dominant actor is able to determine what 
is taken to be true and false and thereby generate a dominant set of ideals.87 The hegemonic 
power then convinces other actors, through social relations and structures,88 to alter their 
interests or actions, and follow the desired agenda.89 This structural operation of power shapes 
the interests of actors to suit the dominant actors interests and therefore ensures the existing 
order remains the same.90 In the discipline of International Relations America’s hegemonic 
position in the international system has apparently enabled it to set the intellectual agenda.91 
Defining dominance as an actor’s agenda setting ability Stanley Hoffmann argued that IR was an 
American dominated discipline because American interests not only determined the scope and 
nature of the discipline, but also engendered academics around the world to adhere to this 
agenda and focus their research accordingly.92  
In the United States the discipline of IR developed with a very close link between the 
policy world in Washington and IR Scholars.93 Policy makers, according to Neil Richardson, 
desperately sought the aid of academics to help understand and guide US foreign policy in the 
early years of the Cold War. The distinction between the ‘two worlds’ of ‘foreign policy making’ 
and ‘IR academics’ was a matter of degree according to William Wallace during the Cold War, 94 
and the outcome of this close relationship was that IR was focused around being policy 
relevant.95 Furthermore, certain foundations funded key conferences and research projects, 
which also ensured that IR academics were addressing the issues that American policy elites felt 
                                                        
87 Steven Lukes Power: A Radical View (Houndmills: Macmillan Education, 1975), pp. 24.  
88 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall “Power in International Politics” International 
Organization 59 (1) (2005), pp. 53.   
89 Peter Digeser “The Fourth Face of Power” The Journal of Politics 54 (4) (1992), pp. 979.  
90 Lukes Power, pp. 24. Also see Robert Cox “Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond 
International Relations Theory” Millennium 10 (2) (1981), pp. 126-155.   
91 Steve Smith “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic 
Country, Hegemonic Discipline” International Studies Review 4 (2), pp. 67-85. 
91 Ekkehart Krippendorf “The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations” 
Millennium 16 (2) (1987), pp. 207.  
92 Stanley Hoffmann “An American Social Science: International Relations” Daedalus 106 (3) 
(1977), pp. 47.  
93 Ibid., op cit.  
94 William Wallace “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory Practice and in 
International Relations” Review of International Studies 22 (3) (1996), pp. 302.  
95 Christopher Hill “Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance” in Hill, 
C. and Beshoff, P. (eds) Two World of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the 
Trade in Ideas (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 3.  
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were the most pressing.96 The policy-oriented nature of IR research meant that the subject 
matter of the discipline became synonymous with the wants and concerns of American foreign 
policy elites.97 This state of affairs apparently continues unabated today. The dominant power 
that is America, according to Steve Smith, exercises its dominance through influencing the 
behaviour of IR academics globally to make the focus of their research coterminous with the 
American agenda.98 As a result, its alleged ‘American outlook’ defines the discipline as the subject 
is dominated by US foreign policy concerns.99  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the claims of dominance defined as the ability to set 
the intellectual agenda in the contemporary literature in greater depth and then to examine their 
validity in light of the results produced from the journal and conference investigations. Firstly, 
this chapter will address the current claims of dominance defined as agenda setting and look at 
the alleged implications before investigating the present American Agenda. In order to see if the 
content of the present-day field (as expressed through publications in a number of journals and 
material presented at certain conferences) is adhering to the US agenda one must ascertain what 
it means to comply with the issue areas of concern detailed by the US administration. Therefore 
after analyzing the arguments of American dominance the ‘American agenda’ will be detailed 
followed by the results of the journal and conference investigation. In doing so one finds it 
difficult to support the claims featured at the beginning of this chapter. The majority of articles 
and panels examined did not focus on items of concern to America; rather academic attention 
was placed elsewhere. The ontological pluralism exhibited by the discipline illustrates how 
contemporary academics are largely not being influenced by American policy elites. Whilst 
America is still the hegemonic power in the international system it has not been able to exercise 
it dominance in terms of agenda setting, as the discipline of IR is exercising its critical distance 
and separation from what Hoffmann termed the ‘kitchens of power’.100   
 
“Hegemonic Country: Hegemonic Discipline”101.   
 
In 1987 Ekkehart Krippendorf argued that the dominance of a particular state in the 
international system was affecting the subject matter of IR.102 According to Krippendorf the 
                                                        
96 Joseph Legold “Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy 
Relevance” Political Science Quarterly 113 (1) (1998), pp. 46.  
97 P. M. E. Volten “Theory of International Relations in Europe: A Social Science Stillborn or Still 
Born and Raised in America?” Paper presented for the Standing Group of International Relations 
conference, The Hague, September 2000, pp. 1.  Also see James L. Richardson “The Academic 
Study of International Relations” in Miller, J. D. B. and Vincent, R. J. (eds) Order and Violence. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150. 
98 Steve Smith “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 2 (3) (2000), pp. 394.   
99 Fred Halliday “The Pertinence of International Relations” Political Studies 38 (3) (1990), pp. 
304.  
100 Hoffmann, “An American Social Science”, pp. 49.  
101 Smith “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 67-85. 
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discipline of IR has been modeled on the world mission of the US due to its frightening 
accumulation of power.103 Similarly, Steve Smith104 and Richard Little105 recently claimed that the 
United States has capitalized on its power primacy throughout the twentieth century to align the 
focus of IR with its foreign policy concerns.  America’s power has apparently been exercised 
through its “exceptional influence over developments in IR across the globe”.106 By directing the 
attention of IR scholars and thereby implicitly defining what is international relations the 
discipline is apparently an American dominated one. The unaltered structure of the discipline 
arguably reproduces this ontological frame, thereby duplicating the American-centric focus of IR. 
In other words, America’s hegemonic hold on the discipline of IR is arguably a structural reality, 
and one that is constantly being embedded as academics continue to research items that are 
deemed to be of concerns to the US.107 Resultantly, according to Steve Smith, the discipline of IR 
views the world through ‘American lenses’.108  
America’s agenda setting power (if actualized) potentially has destructive ontological 
consequences for the discipline. If a disciplinary reality, this form of American dominance would 
generate a very narrow definition of international relations and therefore what counts as the 
acceptable subject matter of IR. If academics are adhering to the US intellectual agenda (as 
constructed by American foreign policy elites, corporations, think tanks, research centers etc) 
then the discipline is operating with a limited understanding of world politics, due to the fact 
academics are explaining and seeking to understand a small range of actors and events from an 
American centric perspective. The American IR mainstream is then able to criticize and 
marginalize work that addresses issues outside of the discipline’s predefined ontological scope, 
thereby embedding America’s dominant disciplinary position. For example, Smith argues “those 
approaches that do not treat inter-state war as the core problem to be explained by the discipline 
run the risk of their work being deemed ‘irrelevant’ or ‘not IR’”.109 Research that attempts to 
address issues beyond the narrow purview of American foreign policy concerns is, according to 
Smith, delegitimized as it is declared as not ‘doing IR’ and subsequently placed at the margins of 
the field, and “in a defensive position with regards to their fit within the discipline”.110 In order to 
prevent the marginalization of their work, scholars are then coerced into subscribing to the 
American conception of the discipline,111 the outcome of which further embeds America’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
102 Krippendorf “The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations”, pp. 207-
215.  
103 Ibid., pp. 213.  
104 Smith “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 67-85.  
105 Richard Little “Series Editor Preface” in Friedrichs, J. European Approaches to International 
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106 Ibid., op cit.   
107 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 394.   
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109 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 378.  
110 Ibid., op cit.  
111 Stephen Gill and David Law “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital” 
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disciplinary stronghold and ensures that the realm of international politics is continuously seen 
through an American ontological perspective.112  
America’s professed ability to set the intellectual agenda also has another ontological 
implication; through marginalizing certain strands of IR scholarship the discipline is critiqued 
with overlooking particular forms of international inequalities and being blind to certain 
international realities.113 According Mustapha Pasha and Craig Murphy “inequality disappears in 
the face of power”.114 The American dominated discipline apparently “sees a very specific world 
to study”,115 it sees political and military inequalities, but fails to consider other forms of 
inequality as relevant to IR, such concerns do not fit the ontological scope of IR as defined by US 
elites.116 In other words gender and racial inequalities, questions of culture and migration, issues 
relating to the environment and human rights are seen as not belonging to the core of the 
discipline.117 The logical implication of such arguments is that certain international realities and 
concerns are denied ontological status and declared as something external to the realm of IR. In 
essence such forms of inequalities etc are deprived the status of relevant objects of study.118 If 
the alleged American dominance has such ontological consequences this situation is not only 
detrimental to the discipline, but also to international politics thereby having very real human 
and political consequences.119 This is because attention potentially is being directed away from 
these issues and placed elsewhere; the status quo is upheld which dangerously denies any 
chance or possibility for emancipating and improving the lives of many.120   
Moreover, the aforementioned analyses themselves have important ramifications and 
implications; firstly, by arguing that IR is an American discipline because the United States is the 
hegemonic power in the international system, which has resulted in it setting the intellectual 
agenda to which academics must subscribe, means there is arguably little we can do to reverse 
the situation. According to Knud Erik Jørgensen “If the relationship between power and 
discipline is a close and unidirectional as these observations suggest [referring to the work of 
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Analysis (New York: St Martins Press, 1999), pp. 180.  
113 Stephanie Neuman “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?” in 
Neuman, S. G. (ed) International Relations Theory and the Third World (New York: St Martins 
Press, 1998), pp. 1-30.   
114 Mustapha K. Pasha and Craig N. Murphy “Knowledge/Power/Inequality” in Pasha. M. K. and 
Murphy, C. N. (eds) International Relations and the New Inequality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 
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Steve Smith], it is easy to predict a continued US intellectual hegemony, perhaps even empire”.121 
If accounts such as Hoffmann and Smith’s are correct the discipline looks set to continue to be 
dictated by American foreign policy elites until 1) the international system undergoes a shift in 
power distribution or 2) academics themselves become aware of the influence being exercised 
upon them and resist the coercive efforts.122 Out of the two options, the latter seems much more 
probable and even possible.  
Overall, there are clear dangers (‘real world’ and disciplinary) associated with an 
American foreign policy-focused discipline of IR. If the United States is found to be dominating 
the field in an agenda setting manner then the situation needs problematising and remedying in 
order to prevent the suspected continued marginalization of certain works, and more worryingly 
the ignorance to inequalities and the plight of many millions of people. With so much at stake it is 
important to discover whether such claims of American agenda setting do indeed capture the 
current disciplinary reality.  
 
The American Agenda.  
 
The structured expression that is foreign policy is where the American administration puts forth 
its views, policies, and practices thereby defining what are the important objects of focus and in 
need of attention in the international realm. What makes it on to the administration’s foreign 
policy represents what issues are deemed to be of interest and concern to US and therefore 
which issues are most in need of international scholarly attention. If America is able to exercise 
its dominance in the discipline of IR through its agenda setting power we would expect to see an 
overwhelming presence of articles and panels concerning themselves with issues that are 
deemed to be of concern to American foreign policy elites.  
 The official foreign policy documents that emerge from an American administration 
represent the convergence of a myriad of interests, and perspectives. It is the result of various 
bargaining, exchanges and debates between governmental actors, government agencies (in 
particular the intelligence agencies), elite individuals, interest groups, think tanks, research 
councils, various funding bodies, and certain ideological segments within a government (for 
example Conservative-Realists, Liberal Wilsonians, or Isolationists).123 Looking at the official 
discourse and academic accounts of recent American foreign policy provides a means of 
succinctly capturing the different agendas of certain actors in operation in order to ascertain the 
overriding American foreign policy agenda.  
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 Addressing who influences American foreign policy certain analyses for instance see the 
work of Ronald Rogowski124, Helen Milner125, and Jeffrey Winters126, have singled out big 
business corporations as the actors exerting a particular influence on US foreign policy because 
of “their effects on the economy and their capacity to prompt voters to publish the incumbent 
political party”.127 However, recent research on ‘epistemic communities’ has indicated that due to 
the growing complexity of the international system and the uncertainty of global problems, 
policy makers have begun to turn to “networks of knowledge-based experts”128 or in other words 
academics and think tanks. According to Peter Haas the “epistemic community members’ 
professional training, prestige and reputation for expertise…accord them access to the political 
system and … influence over policy debates”129 through their agenda setting capabilities and 
their ability to formulate policy alternatives. A recent empirical analysis conducted by Lawrence 
Jacobs and Benjamin Page revealed that American foreign policy is actually “most heavily and 
consistently influenced by business leaders, followed by experts”130 as opposed to other actors 
such as particular lobbyist groups or even public opinion.   
 Therefore, after detailing the ‘official ‘ account, the American agenda will be 
complemented and bolstered by a brief review of the Rockefeller Foundation and three American 
think tanks (the Project for the New American Century, Council on Foreign Relations, and the 
RAND Corporation) in order to show the correlation between their agendas and US foreign 
policy. The links between these bodies and US foreign policy will be examined to capture the 
mutually constitutive relationship that aids the construction of the American foreign policy 
agenda. Investigating the relationship between these actors and their own agendas will provide a 
more thorough insight into what is argued to be the most pressing issues that should be focused 
on by academics and researchers in the realm of international politics. 
 As previously mentioned, the construction and adherence to the American agenda was 
clearly seen during the Cold War era, especially throughout the period that has been termed the 
‘first Cold War’. It was during this timeframe that Hoffmann claimed that IR was an American 
dominated discipline, because he argued that the discipline had adopted the American agenda, as 
the field was primarily orientated around the superpower struggle - meaning that other issues 
were marginalized and not deemed to be IR. For example, Hoffmann argued: 
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“Almost inevitably, a concern for America’s conduct in the world blended 
with a study of international relations, for the whole world seemed to be the stake 
of the American-Soviet confrontation . . . To study United States foreign policy was 
to study the international system. To study the international system could not fail to 
bring one back to the role of the United States”.131  
 
Similarly Steve Smith in his article ‘Paradigm Dominance in International Relations’ noted that 
the discipline during this period was solely concerned with the Cold War.132 Following the ‘first 
Cold War’ the discipline, according to Fred Halliday,133 has continued to map itself against the 
concerns of America; from the Cold War, to a focus on International Political Economy in the 
1970s, back to the Cold War during the 1980s, with a supposed current preoccupation with 
‘terrorism’. This alleged chronological convergence is driven by the needs of American policy-
makers and elites.134  
 The question that now needs answering is: what is the recent/present American agenda? 
What issues have been given top priority and what should academics, according to the US 
administration, funding bodies and think tanks be focusing on? And crucially, is the content of the 
articles and panels being explored replicating the agenda by focusing on the issues of concern, 
thereby demonstrating the exercise of American dominance? The total period under analysis 
here, 1999-2011135, has housed three different presidents and this time frame has also been 
variously described as a tumultuous age in which the world has allegedly changed, or has 
undergone a substantial shift,136 so much so that we are now, according to some, in a new era of 
geopolitics or international relations.137 ‘Change’ or rather disruptions to the ‘norm’ or fabric of 
the international have been emphasized as the defining feature of this period; as Colin Wight 
notes “Change seems to be the leitmotif of the new millennium, although this undoubtedly also 
will be susceptible to change”.138 Therefore we would then expect to see dramatic shifts and 
turns in the American agenda to reflect the various exogenous changes and the differing 
identities and interests of each president. However, ‘change’ can only be understood in relation 
to continuity. If the American agenda has altered these changes can only be understood in 
relation to what has not changed. What ‘stays the same’; is just as telling and constitutive of the 
social realm as change. Indeed what undergoes metamorphosis – in this case the American 
agenda – can only ever be a partial change because “there is still a residue of the old such that we 
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can identify a change from ‘this’ into ‘that’. In this sense, continuity is what makes change 
possible”.139  
 This relational understanding of continuity and change, and how change is not possible 
without continuity, has led me to argue that there has been more ‘continuity’ in the American 
foreign policy agenda than is commonly perceived.140 The ‘changes’ have been over emphasized 
and highlighted in such a manner that the continuities, which are integral to any perceived 
changes, are overlooked. Stephen Walt argued that the basic foreign policy of the US was 
unaffected following 9/11141; I argue that this claim can be extended to cover the 12 years under-
review for there is a remarkable amount of similarity between the foreign policies of Bill Clinton, 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In other words, the American agenda has remained rather 
constant, however, “What has changed, of course, is the priority attached to these different 
goals”.142   
 All three presidents focus on the threat of terrorism, nuclear weapons and ‘rogue states’. 
In the various policy statements published between 1999-2011 these three issues appear 
repeatedly and are each denoted as key areas of concern for America.143 The differences find 
themselves in the ordering, strategies and whether other items share the foreign policy agenda. 
Although the underlying rationales have shifted, the general orientation and aims of the 
American agenda in this period has not.144 The next section will clearly elucidate the agenda of 
each president, drawing on the continuities and any fundamental differences that emerge out of 
the continuity. Any big conceptual changes will be highlighted in the American agenda in order to 
see whether these ‘changes’ come though in the journal and conference content. The following 
section will then examine the agendas of certain funding bodies and think tanks to map out their 
impact on the official foreign policy discourse. Rather than review all the myriad of corporations 
and think tanks individually, the integral role played by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Project 
for the New American Century, the Council of Foreign Relations and the RAND Corporation will 
be unpacked in order to highlight a section of the other agendas in operation that gave rise to and 
shaped of the official discourse. Overall it will be made very clear what it means for an article or 
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panel to be classified as adhering to the American agenda throughout this time frame. The twelve 
years under examination will firstly be broken up into three sections, one for each president, to 
map out the continuities and changes in American foreign policy. Then the agendas of 1) the 
Rockefeller Foundation and 2) think tanks will be individually examined and the constitutive 
relationships explored as to further provide a detailed and nuanced account of the American 
agenda during this period in order to see whether it is indeed being followed by IR scholars 
throughout the world.  
 By arguing that there is a notable degree of stability with the American agenda is not to 
negate that the decade under review did witness a number of ‘events’ or occurrences that were 
deemed as significant, and as such shaped the nature of international politics and framed new 
discussions in International Relations.145 The importance or assigned significance of exogenous 
factors is not being overlooked here, but rather the aim is to avoid conflating external events 
with the supposed adherence to the American agenda. For example, articles or panels discussing 
the events of September the 11th, or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should not be immediately 
viewed as conforming to the intellectual agenda constructed by the United States, and thus 
American disciplinary preponderance. These events have also been given significance by those 
outside of America; they are also the concerns of other governments and populations due to the 
perceived change in the nature of security threats. Mentioning objects or events of American 
concern does not warrant an example of American agenda adherence. The perspective and tone 
of articles and panels was taken into account, signifying words were looked for, as well as 
examples of critique or articles questioning the American agenda and America’s international 
conduct.146      
 
The Clinton Administration’s Foreign Policy.  
  
Bill Clinton’s strategic priorities for his government’s foreign policies were laid out in the 1999 
National Security Strategy for a New Century. The document stated that the foreign policy of the 
United States aimed to: 
 
 “construct new cooperative security arrangements and build peace, contain 
weapons of mass destruction, fight terrorism and international crime, rid the world 
of ethnic cleansing and genocide, build a truly global economy, and promote 
democratic values and economic reform . . . to strengthen international arms 
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control and non-proliferation regimes; to protect the environment and the health of 
our citizens”.147  
 
Looking at this policy statement the key items of concern were; deterring terrorism, preventing 
the proliferation of dangerous weapons, promoting democracy and human rights, to open 
markets and create economic prosperity and to protect the environment.148 These concerns were 
also echoed in the 2000 National Security Strategy (NSS). Furthermore the 2000 NSS detailed the 
administration’s ‘Engagement Strategy’. This initiative comprised three elements: 1) Enhancing 
security at home and abroad, embodying the administration’s responses and policies towards 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and ‘outlaw nations’; 2) Promoting economic prosperity 
and 3) Promoting democracy and human rights.149 These three aims encapsulate the core of 
Clinton’s foreign policy and his administration’s commitment to promoting the Liberal World 
Order through neo-liberal economics, democratic institutions and multilateralism.150  
 The rationale underpinning the administration determined why certain items made the 
agenda and were warranted to be of international attention, scholarly and otherwise. The Clinton 
administration has been characterized as ‘Liberal’,151 ‘Liberal Internationalist’152 or even 
‘Wilsonian’.153 Whilst the label may change from author to author a liberal vision for securing 
peace and stability in the international system framed and guided the Clinton administration’s 
foreign policy.154 Consequently policies such as nation building, democracy promotion, and 
economic liberalization featured prominently. Clinton’s preferred means of achieving these goals 
also reflect the liberal basis of his agenda; he argued, “The new century demands new 
partnerships for peace and security. The United Nations plays a crucial role, with allies sharing 
burdens that America might otherwise bear alone”.155  Working multilaterally with other nations, 
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organizations and institutions were the cornerstones of realizing his foreign policy aims and 
exercising America’s role as the ‘global leader’.156 
 The current institutional order and alliance system that the US fostered following World 
War II works to secure America’s interests and it’s preponderant power position.157 Although 
Clinton’s foreign policy may have been presented as ‘benign’158 with America as the ‘benevolent 
hegemon’159 it is key to remember that the current Liberal World Order benefits the US.160 It 
allows it to exercise its superpower status, albeit in a manner that appears relatively ‘harmless’ 
or ‘indispensable’161 for the prosperity and security of international order and other states. For 
instance G. John Ikenberry stated America 
 
 “dominates world politics by providing the language, ideas, and 
institutional frameworks around which much of the world turns. The extended 
institutional connections that link the United States to other regions of the world 
provide a sort of primitive governance system. The United States is a central hub 
through which the world’s important military, political, economic, scientific and 
cultural connections pass”.162  
 
Despite the rhetoric Clinton’s top priority was to preserve and maintain America’s hegemonic 
position and role as the global policeman.163 The adopted role of the ‘world’s sheriff’164 led the 
Clinton administration to pay particular attention to specific regions. Clinton argued that 
America should be ‘peacemakers’ where possible,165 which culminated in the Clinton 
administration becoming deeply diplomatically involved in the Middle East peace process, and 
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“building peace in Northern Ireland”166 amongst other efforts such as “working for peace in East 
Timor and Africa; promoting reconciliation between Greece and Turkey and in Cyprus; working 
to defuse these crises between India and Pakistan”.167 Acting in such capacity enabled the US to 
cement its ‘special superpower status’ and capitalize on the institutional framework it created, a 
framework that not only maintains the status quo (benefitting the US), but also attempts to frame 
America’s rule in positive terms.  
 Whilst Clinton’s liberal foreign policy placed issues such as the environment, human 
rights, and nation building firmly on the agenda, Clinton was still primarily occupied with 
potential security threats to the US. These threats consisted of terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction and rogue states.168 These three concerns feature consistently throughout his foreign 
policy169 and occupy a vast degree of attention. For example in his 1999 State of Union address 
Clinton stated “As we work for peace, we must also meet threats to our nation’s security, 
including increased dangers from outlaw nations and terrorism . . . We must increase our efforts 
to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles”.170 The top agenda items for the Clinton 
administration were American primacy and security, thus protecting America’s national 
interests. The primary objective was to protect the United States and it’s role as the world’s 
(reluctant) sheriff,171 thereby maintaining the status quo ensuring America continues to reap the 
benefits of being the sole superpower. Clinton viewed the key threats to America as terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction and ‘outlaw nations’. These constituted the items of concern, 
whereas strategies of nation-building and diplomacy represented the key means of ensuring 
America’s continued hegemony. Clinton’s liberal ideology meant that the policies put in place to 
achieve its central objective (protecting America against certain threats defined as terrorism, 
WMDs and ‘rogue’ states) centered on initiatives facilitating cooperation, economic prosperity 
and democracy promotion. However, both the means and the objectives were framed in a 
manner that presented them as the best way of securing peace and stability not just for America 
but for the international system as a whole.172 
  
The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy. 
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During 2000 George W. Bush campaigned for office with a foreign policy that claimed to be a 
complete contrast to Clinton’s.173 Bush campaigned for office seeking a return to a realist 
philosophy, a return to what he termed as the traditional agenda. Bush was henceforth 
characterized as a conservative candidate,174 as he placed emphasis on pursuing the national 
interest and focusing on great power relations.175 Bush’s national security advisor and soon to be 
Security of State, Condoleezza Rice argued for a move away from ‘nation building’ and ‘peace-
making’ activities to focus on what mattered; power. Bush and Rice argued that their foreign 
policy would “proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interest of an 
illusory international community”176 and furthermore America’s troops would be used to fight 
and win wars, not help build nations.177 Once in office according to Ikenberry, Bush realized his 
realist potential; “in the hands of the Bush administration, America was to become a conservative 
Leviathan. That is, the Bush architects of grand strategy bought a conservative discourse about 
order to the unipolar moment rather than the traditional liberal discourse”.178  
 The differences between Bush and Clinton in a certain sense have been exaggerated. 
Although they operated with different strategies, their primary objective was the same: American 
security and primacy, with the continuation of America’s sole superpower status.179 The 
similarities were illustrated by Bush’s key foreign policy priorities: US relations with China and 
Russia and discouraging security and economic competition with both,180 projecting American 
power and self-defense, dealing with ‘rogue regimes and hostile powers’, to promote economic 
growth and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism was also a 
concern for the Bush administration, however pre September the 11th 2001 it did little to deal 
with it in terms of concrete policies.181 Regarding the ordering of foreign policy items for Bush, 
international terrorism was one of the least stressed agenda items,182 whereas China – the rise of 
China, containing China and the threat of China - was arguably the top agenda item for the pre-
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9/11 Bush administration.183 All these issues featured on Clinton’s agenda, each was an item of 
concern and demanded America’s and the international community’s attention.184  
 The differences were found in the rhetoric and language used surrounding each item. 
Certain issues were presented by the Clinton administration in a more ‘multilateral’ and friendly 
tone than the Bush administration, thereby making American hegemony easier to ‘sell’ to other 
states and appear less problematic.185 With Clinton, American primacy was firmly linked to the 
liberal internationalist notion that this was for the good of the international community.186 For 
example as Michael Cox notes: 
 
“Believing that the United States had to lead from the front by playing the 
triple role of progressive policeman, benign economic shepherd, and fatherly 
umpire in the world’s many troubled spots, he [Clinton] made it easier for most 
states to look upon the United States in a rather favourable way . . . Bush, as we 
know, had no such vision”.187  
 
Rather than a complete ‘change’ in the agenda or the emergence of a new foreign policy vision, 
the difference was found in the language used and the ordering of foreign policies goals, due to 
the underlying rationales. Therefore if we look beyond the rhetoric we see the continuities 
between the agendas of Bush and Clinton.188   
 Unlike Clinton however, Bush and many of his top advisors were outwardly ideologically 
hostile to multilateralism and subsequently pushed for a more unilateral foreign policy,189 which 
for many represented a move away from the postwar liberal order and the beginning of a new 
era of American hegemony.190 Gone was the traditional liberal discourse of the Clinton 
administration, and in its place stood a staunch unilateral discourse. According to Stephen Walt 
“During its first months in office, the Bush administration often acted as if the opinions of other 
countries did not matter very much, an attitude revealed by its uncompromising pursuit of 
missile defenses, and brusque rejection of several prominent international conventions”.191 The 
Clinton, administration, however, was not immune from unilateral behaviour. Despite its 
multilateral rhetoric “the Clinton administration compiled a rather dismal record with respect to 
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US participation in major international treaty initiatives during the 1990s”.192 The administration 
acted unilaterally on a number of occasions, with the NATO intervention in Kosovo being the 
most glaring example.193 Rather than a preference for Clinton the unilateral actions of his 
administration seemed to be the result of domestic conditions and structural pressures from 
both home and abroad.194 The domestic hostility towards multilateralism was highlighted by 
Arthur Schlesinger, who remarked that there is no older American tradition in the conduct of 
foreign affairs than unilateralism.195 As such there were numerous concerns regarding the 
concentration of power and Washington’s penchant for unilateralism long before Bush came to 
office.196 Samuel Huntington in 1999 noted, “in the eyes of many countries it [America] is 
becoming the rogue superpower”,197 whereas the French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine coined 
the term ‘hyperpower’ to describe America, a term that he felt best described "a country that is 
dominant or predominant in all categories”.198 Although the emphasis and feelings towards 
unilateralism differed from Clinton to Bush, this did not result in a fundamental reorientation 
between the two foreign policies. The differences between the foreign policies of Bush and 
Clinton are not as pronounced, as many would believe, there is continuity, and even continuity in 
the use of unilateral strategies. This point is explicitly made by David Skidmore, “The appropriate 
contrast is not between a multilateralist Clinton and a unilateral Bush, but between two 
unilateralisms that differ not in kind, but in tone emphasis and degree.”199 Furthermore, just as 
Clinton engaged in some unilateral action, Bush was not impervious to multilateralism. 
Immediately following 9/11 Bush embarked on a number of multilateral efforts, which generated 
hopes that America would abandon its unilateral impulses.200 Overall, domestic and international 
realties conditioned which strategies were operationalised201 meaning that there are inherent 
continuities in the foreign policies of Clinton and Bush, as well as variations in their personal 
preferences.  
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 Even following the events of September the 11th the basic elements of American foreign 
policy were unaffected. The United States still wanted “to discourage security competition in 
Europe and Asia, prevent the emergence of hostile powers, promote a more open world 
economy, inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and expand democracy and 
human rights”.202 However, America’s ‘near-to-medium’ goals altered and as a result the 
priorities attached to the different foreign policy goals shifted. America’s short-term foreign 
policy was subsequently comprised of three central priorities and strategic concerns; 1) 
combating terrorism, 2) preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and 3) dealing 
with rogue states. As we have seen these items also featured in Bush’s pre-9/11 foreign policy 
and were central items of concern for the Clinton administration. Rather than a complete 
‘change’ as Melvyn Leffler argued occurred or the emergence of a new foreign policy galvanized 
and shaped by the fear for survival,203 the American agenda was streamlined in order to deal 
with ‘international terrorism’ which was perceived to be the gravest and most imminent 
threat.204 All other issues practically disappeared; relations with other states became morphed 
by the events of 9/11, and America reorganized itself to become interventionist driven by a 
missionary zeal to defeat terrorism.205   
 American primacy remained the chief agenda item, however following 9/11 this had to 
be achieved, in the short-term, by the elimination of Al Qaeda and ‘terrorism’ writ large.206 The 
2002 National Security Strategy207, or what has been termed the Bush Doctrine, clearly explicated 
the aims and focus of American foreign policy elites, however the administration’s agenda 
emerged prior to this and can be seen taking form in a number of speeches given by Bush.208 
From these public addresses it is clear that ‘terrorism’ became the administration’s top foreign 
policy aim.209 Bush’s focus was not confined to Al Qaeda, but rather the ambiguous category of 
‘global terrorism’ or ‘Jihadist terrorism’. The campaign against ‘terrorism’ was the premier 
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concern of US foreign, security and defense policy and as Walt noted all other international goals 
became subordinated to this broad objective.210 According to the 9/11 Commission Report; 
“countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the 
United States”.211 
 Although terrorism was the number one short-term agenda item, the concerns with 
weapons of mass destruction and ‘rogue states’ became enmeshed with the ‘war on terror’. The 
Bush administration’s central fear was that a few states would develop WMD and place these 
weapons in the hands of terrorists.212 Speaking at West Point Military Academy in 2002 Bush 
claimed “The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and 
technology”, and as such “we must oppose proliferation and confront regimes that sponsor 
terror”.213  Yet these terror-sponsoring regimes arguably meant and were limited to Bush’s Axis 
of Evil – Iraq, Iran and North Korea - and each became targets or special states of concern for the 
Bush administration. In his 2002 State of Union Address Bush argued that America’s goal was to 
prevent such states from threatening America and her allies with WMD, because “by seeking 
WMD, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger”.214 The Bush administration merged the 
top three issues of concern in a manner that seemed, as Francis Fukuyama declared, “utterly 
apocalyptic”.215  
  These security threats when combined in their lethal trinity, warranted intervention 
according to the Bush administration.216 The streamlined short-term foreign policy with its clear 
identification of what constitutes a threat and the shift in the use of power resulted in a new 
strategy. American foreign policy following 9/11 employed new means and methods that 
deviated from the past practices of both Clinton and Bush. The previous policies of containment 
and deterrence had been abandoned, as had any reliance on collective action. Containment was 
conceived to be outdated, and deterrence it was argued would not work as it once did.217 For 
example as Melvyn Leffler noted, many in the Bush administration had “grasped the reality that 
there were terrorist groups that were not likely to be deterred as states had been deterred”.218 
The crystallized and increased threat of terrorism, it was argued needed a new mode of thinking, 
which found its coherent form with the Bush Doctrine and its policies of unilateral action and 
preemptive and perhaps even preventive action: 
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“Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no 
longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a 
potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential 
harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit 
that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first”.219  
 
The administration put forth a strategy of preemptive action, incorporating the possibility of a 
preventive war as the administration now recognized “that our best defense is a good offence”.220 
One of the many problems is that such policies premised on American power and primacy play 
“havoc with the old international rules of self-defense and United Nations norms about the 
proper use of force.”221 The Bush Doctrine overturned the norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention and instead placed conditions upon respect for sovereignty,222 the conditions of 
which were determined by the US, thereby leaving the authority of whether sovereign rights had 
been forfeited with the Bush administration. The new policies not only interfered with long-
standing norms, they also exhibited a clear scorn for international rules, treaties and collective 
action, which the Bush administration had already displayed before 9/11.223  
 To counter the feelings of vulnerability that followed 9/11 the Bush administration set 
out to demonstrate America’s power, and to use its power to transform world politics.224 Charles 
Kegley and Gregory Raymond argued, “Gone were exhortations on the need to be humble with 
power”.225 The grand strategy of the Bush administration, as put forth in the NSS, was arguably 
linked to a shift in power; America’s was now to use its unrivaled military power to manage 
global order.226 Instead of America’s power being muted and disguised through the rule based 
international order Bush “thrust American power into the light of day”.227 According to Charles 
Krauthammer “we now have an administration willing to assert American freedom of action and 
the primacy of American national interests. Rather than contain power within a vast web of 
constraining international agreements, the new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American 
power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends”.228 American power in a 
sense became unbridled;229 there was a clear shift in the administration’s willingness to exercise 
American power. Yet the ideas to adopt a more assertive foreign policy were already in place 
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long before Bush was in office,230 but “What September 11 provided was the rationale and the 
opportunity to carry out his [Bush’s] revolution”.231 9/11 provided the impetus, means and the 
justification for America to overtly demonstrate its power rather than using American power 
indirectly through institutions as Clinton had done. However, the long-term agenda remained the 
same from Clinton to Bush: to prevent any nation other or bloc of states becoming hegemonic, yet 
how power was being exercised shifted from consent to coercion.232  
 The promotion of American power and patent American exceptionalism233 resulted in 
the US being frequently characterized as ‘neo-imperial’,234 or ‘imperial’235 with the use of the 
term ‘empire’ becoming prominent in describing the Bush administration’s foreign policy.236  
However, rather than depicting a break from the past the rhetoric of imperialism predates the 
Bush Doctrine and the presidency of Bush himself.237 For example Harold Laski invoked the 
image of empire in 1947 when he argued “America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither 
Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic supremacy enjoyed 
an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive”.238 This characterization and the countless 
others that followed are arguably due to the fact that the US helped establish the post-World War 
II international order, and was the principal beneficiary of the order it helped create.239 It has 
been argued that American influence is best directed and exercised through institutions,240 and 
the ‘Liberal World Order’ is the best expression of US dominance, for it helps protect the status 
quo and America’s hegemonic position.241 Jim Glassman argued that the Bush administration did 
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not fundamentally deviate from any past US practices; he argued that the present form of US 
imperialism was not new rather it was more overt.242  
 The focus on the ‘War on Terror’ resulted in immediate action: the invasion of 
Afghanistan. The administration’s short-term campaign focused itself on Afghanistan, removing 
the Taliban and in the process state-building. However, as 2001 turned into 2002 the Bush 
administration’s attention shifted to Iraq. As 2002 progressed Iraq became the key state of 
concern, due to its alleged links with both weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, thus from 
Bush’s perspective the ‘nexus’ was in place and as such the administration began to make the 
grounds for invasion.243 In his speech to the General Assembly of the UN in September 2002 Bush 
gave his rationale for intervention:  
 
“If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally 
forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-
range missiles, and all related material. If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will 
immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are 
required to do by UN Security Council resolutions.”244 
 
By 2003 after the invasion of Iraq was well under way the rhetoric of the administration began to 
shift, and a new aim began to feature more prominently on the agenda.245  In Bush’s 2003 State of 
Union Address regime change, democracy promotion, nation building and human rights all made 
a more substantial appearance and were used to justify intervention and the administration’s 
foreign policy more broadly. Once again this shift does not represent a change in the agenda, but 
rather an alteration in the ordering of foreign policy goals. After the short-term policies, the 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, had been put into practice, the administration prioritized its 
medium-to-long term aims in order to achieve the central agenda aims of American primacy and 
security. However, according to Bush America’s hegemonic position now depended on the spread 
of democracy.246  
 Following the invasion of Iraq, and the arrival of Bush’s second term in 2004 the spread 
of democracy became the top agenda item and the guiding principle for Bush’s foreign policy. The 
advent of Bush’s second term demonstrates another continuity, albeit a fractured one, between 
Clinton and Bush. After 9/11 Bush and Condoleezza Rice no longer vigorously opposed state-
building strategies.247 Like Clinton, Bush began to adopt the view that the spread of democracy 
was central to securing international peace and stability, and more importantly American 
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security.248 Niall Ferguson argued that Bush and Clinton’s efforts to promote the liberal ideals of 
democracy and human dignity were remarkably similar.249 The Bush administration’s newfound 
focus on democracy promotion and fostering regime change bought with it a host of new 
characterizations. Walter Mead coined the term ‘revival Wilsonianism’ to describe the 
administration and he referred to the new foreign policy as ‘Wilsonianism on steroids’.250 The 
various prefixes to ‘Wilsoniansim’ that were used accounted for the continued unilateral 
preference of the Bush foreign policy. The disdain for multilateral endeavours (a central element 
of Wilsonianism) questions the extent to which Bush’s foreign policy is actually Wilsonian.251 
Despite the lack of support for multilateral institutions the Bush administration acquired the 
various Wilsonian labels due to championing liberal internationalism and pledging to use 
American power to create a “universal dominion of rights”.252 However, what can be seen today 
as the essence of neo-conservatism - “The expansive, interventionist, democracy-promoting 
position”253 of the Bush administration - to some has conversely been labeled as ‘hard  
Wilsonianism’.254 
  Bush’s Second Inaugural Address illustrated the primacy attached to democracy 
promotion. In his address Bush said very little about security and terrorism and instead spoke 
about the universality of democratic values and the pursuit of freedom.255 Bush argued that only 
the force of human freedom could combat terrorism, tyrants and the proliferation of dangerous 
weapons.256 The implications were, as Ikenberry noted, that “the United States would not just 
need to use military force to destroy terrorists but to engage in a long-term transformation 
agenda aimed at overturning tyranny and spreading freedom and democracy”.257 The promotion 
of democracy and American security were now one of the same thing, Bush wanted to “make the 
world democratic so that the US could be safe”.258 In other words democracy promotion was the 
main priority of the Bush administration after 2004 because America’s security now depended 
on the promotion of freedom around the world. According to Bush: 
 
“The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of 
liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of 
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freedom in all the world. America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now 
one . . . So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”259 
 
 The three previous central concerns – terrorism, WMD, and rogue states – had not 
disappeared from the agenda. Rather these three issues remained key, however they all now 
became tied to and dependent on the spread of democracy. Democracy, it seemed, now presented 
the solution to the problem of terrorism, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, and ‘outlaw 
nations’.260 The 2006 National Security Strategy highlights how all other concerns revolved 
around the medium-long term goal of the spread of democracy: 
 
“Because democracies are the most responsible members of the 
international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure 
for strengthening international stability, reducing regional conflicts, countering 
terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and extending peace and 
prosperity”.261 
 
At first glance, America’s post-2004 strategy appears to be a complete contrast to the realist one 
that Bush originally bought to office. From his initial disdain for nation-building endeavours, the 
administration ended up embarking on one of the most ambitious democracy promoting 
strategies. Bush seemed to have done a complete foreign policy u-turn, and ended up reviving 
liberal internationalism à la Clinton, in order to justify the war in Iraq and his administration’s 
expansive global agenda. The liberal democratic peace thesis seemed to influence and guide the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy in this period.262 However, liberalism only facilitated the 
formation of one half of Bush’s grand strategy.263 For instance G. John Ikenberry argued that both 
liberal and imperial logics were both at play in Bush’s foreign policy, 264 The administration’s 
blueprint for fostering American security, prosperity and international stability based on liberal 
principles “was the necessary complement of the military pillar”.265 In other words the other 
component part of the vision structuring American foreign policy was still very much realist.266 
Instead of a different rationale underpinning Bush’s foreign policy the rhetoric of democracy 
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promotion had been utilized as a justification for the Bush Doctrine, and its use of force and 
unilateral action.267 According to Ikenberry the realist Bush administration wrapped itself in 
liberal clothing.268 America had not, argued Francis Fukuyama “really altered its basic foreign 
policy instincts, which was military threats and possible action, all in all a display of American 
unilateral might”.269 The realist/neoconservative rationale, that underpinned the 2000-2004 
foreign policy was still the guiding premise, and American primacy was still the main aim, yet the 
neoconservatives had now found their moral imperative,270 thus returning the focus of American 
foreign policy and its agenda back to democracy promotion, ‘nation-building’ and an 
internationalist stance.  
 Despite the changes in the priorities awarded to each agenda item, resulting in issues 
morphing on the agenda, if we look at the situation in the reverse the continuities are more 
apparent. There was a continued disregard for a number of issues; global warming or 
environmental issues more broadly conceived for instance did not feature as a high priority 
foreign policy concern during the presidency of George Bush.271 Although the Bush 
administration was determined to reduce America’s addiction to oil, this policy objective was 
tied to security rather than environmental concerns. Promoting international agreements, 
supporting international institutions and organizations also did not feature prominently on the 
Bush agenda, either as a foreign policy goal or approach.272 The mechanisms of and the 
deepening of global governance was steadily shunned and overlooked by the Bush 
administration.273 Furthermore, although the Bush administration was committed to combating 
AIDS, poverty and providing assistance to Third World Countries,274 all these issues were 
constantly placed at the bottom of the American agenda.275 Even though such issues featured in 
both the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies the amount of attention that they each 
received were substantially less than China for example, or terrorism or democracy promotion. 
The lack of attention and primacy awarded to the environment, global socio-economic problems 
etc was due to the fact that other issues took precedence, and according to the Bush 
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administration such concerns warranted more international attention and status as the most 
relevant and in demand subjects of focus for academics and the discipline of IR.   
 
 The Obama Administration’s Foreign Policy.  
  
Barack Obama in a number of addresses during his campaign ardently stated that his foreign 
policy agenda and strategies would be a move away from the foreign policies put forth by 
Bush.276 Obama ran for office presenting himself as a stark contrast to Bush, therefore a dramatic 
shift in America’s foreign policy could have been expected. The central element of Obama’s 
foreign policy was and is predicated on rebuilding America’s global leadership through regaining 
the international legitimacy that the US lost due to the Bush administrations controversial and 
widely unpopular foreign policy.277 Just like Clinton and Bush, Obama’s agenda is centered 
around retaining (or in this case rebuilding) American primacy and status as a global hegemon, 
thereby ensuring the maintenance of the current Liberal World Order that benefits America.278 
Once again the rhetoric of difference masks the deeper continuities that exist. 
 The language of change,279 and the different persuasions, rationales and composition of 
the Obama administration led, almost inevitably, to a different characterization. Primarily the 
Obama administration’s foreign policy has been depicted as ‘pragmatic’, which denotes a blend of 
realism, ‘community-organizer idealism’ and charismatic leadership.280 The administration’s 
foreign policy is practical and more conservative with regards to the issue of intervention and 
relations with other states, and it adopts elements from both the realist and liberal foreign policy 
approaches.281 Gone is the ‘Wilsonian Idealism”, or rather Bush’s aggressive democratization and 
aim to remake the global order through democracy promotion,282 and instead it has been 
replaced with a worldview that argues that “pragmatism should trump idealism”.283 
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 This pragmatic vision of international politics broadened the administration’s agenda 
and introduced new items of concern. Yet terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and rogue 
states continue to be the key areas of concern. Despite the fact that these three issues remain 
central, the strategies towards each are different from those employed by the Bush 
administration. Regarding counterterrorism the Overview of the United States of America’s 
National Security Strategy 2009 stated: 
 
“democratic reforms ought not to be mandated as a necessity for receiving 
US counterterrorism aid. In a departure from previous national counterterrorism 
strategies, we reject as false notion that democratic reforms are essential to 
counterterrorism efforts”.284  
 
Rather than preventing ‘Global Terrorism’ through the spread of democracy, the Obama 
administration reverted America’s focus back to specific terrorist organizations (primarily Al 
Qaeda), specific geographical settings (Afghanistan and Pakistan)285 and pledged to combat the 
socio-economic conditions that facilitate terrorism.286 The focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan was 
illustrated by Obama’s 2011 State of Union address, he declared “we have sent a message from 
the Afghan border to the Arabian peninsula to all parts of the globe; we will not recent, we will 
not waver, and we will defeat you”.287 Concerning WMDS, the primary objective remained 
preventing states from obtaining fissile material, however the means in doing so took a more 
multilateral direction. The Obama administration aimed to strengthen the Non Proliferation 
Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, in April 2010 Obama led the 
Nuclear Security Summit putting forth the multilateral goal of “securing all vulnerable nuclear 
material around the world in 4 years, so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists”.288 With 
regard to the threat of ‘rogue regimes’ Obama has advocated a non-interventionist stance. In an 
article he wrote for Foreign Affairs in 2007 he argued that his administration would reorient 
America’s foreign policy and its role in the world to become internationalist not 
interventionist.289 This stance was operationalised in 2011 when the US initially took a ‘back 
seat’ in the invasion of Libya, handing over the operational mantle instead to Britain and 
France.290 According to Fareed Zakaria Obama’s actions in Libya were depicted as a “model of 
limited intervention”.291  
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 Obama’s foreign policy strategy has two central pillars: “multilateralism and 
reinvigorated diplomacy to advance US interests.”292 In 2007 Obama argued that through 
increased multilateral and diplomatic endevaours he would renew American leadership.293 In 
2009 he again stressed the importance of an American foreign policy that behaved multilaterally, 
and how diplomacy was central to protecting America.294 However, Obama’s liberal strategies 
were advocated in order to rebuild America’s international image and thereby the legitimacy of 
American primacy rather than a commitment to a Wilsonian inspired foreign policy .295 Obama’s 
early focus on diplomacy and multilateralism was a pragmatic maneuver to bring about Obama’s 
main foreign policy goal: the restoration of American leadership.296  
 Despite the main aim of the Obama administration being the renewal of America’s 
legitimacy thereby securing its role as the world’s leader, the scope of American policy has 
considerably broadened since 2008. This has resulted in a host of other items making the foreign 
policy agenda. The general aims of the administration according to the White House in 2009 was 
to; refocus on the threat from Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan; responsibly end the war in 
Iraq; to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists; promote peace and security to Israel 
and the Middle East; re-energize America’s alliances; end the crisis in Darfur; restore American 
leadership in Latin America; and to ensure energy security and to fight climate change.297 Human 
rights and the environment are two concerns that feature fairly prominently in the Obama 
agenda. In both his Inaugural and State of Union addresses in 2009 Obama made his 
government’s aims and commitments clear: 
 
“To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make 
your farms flourish and let clean waters flow, to nourish starved bodies and feed 
hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we can no 
longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders, nor can we consume 
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the world’s resources without regard to effect. The world has changed, and we must 
change with it”.298  
 
The Obama administration has spoken of how human rights abuses and climate change are not 
only pressing global problems that require immediate action, but how both may also be future 
sources of instability and conflict.299 Clinton and Bush also focused on humanitarian issues at 
times, yet security issues continued to take priority, as did maintaining America’s superpower 
status. Only time will tell if Obama truly focuses on these concerns, and puts them at the top of 
his agenda, thus warranting them with the status of the primary concerns of both academics and 
government. As Obama’s presidency enters into his second term one struggles to see his rhetoric 
in action. Atrocities still continue in Darfur, Uganda, Yemen and so on.300 Therefore one must 
question how high such items have actually been on Obama’s foreign policy agenda.  
 Rather than ‘change’ if we look at the period under review what we see is that the 
American agenda and concerns have remarkably stayed the same.301 Instead of drastic changes 
as Robert Jervis,302 John Lewis Gaddis,303 Robert Litwark304 and Melvyn Leffler305 argued 
occurred in American foreign policy, the American agenda has and remains committed to 
protecting and enhancing America’s position as the world’s leader/hegemon/sole superpower.306 
Because, according to Ikenberry the “US insists that it will not accept the rise of a ‘peer 
competitor’”.307 As such certain concerns have consistently been identified as posing a  ‘threat’ to 
both America’s security and primacy. Clinton, Bush and Obama all focused on terrorism, weapons 
of mass destruction and ‘rogue’ states. These issues have all been constructed by each 
administration as ‘imminent’ threats, not only to the US but also to the present international 
order and society, thereby giving such concerns status as the primacy dangers of the Twenty-
First Century following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.308 
Meaning, these issue areas were then presented by the US administration as the most pressing 
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issues in international politics.309 The American foreign policy agenda thereby facilitated 
terrorism, WMDs, and ‘outlaw’ nations to become the appropriate subject matter of IR, as these 
issues were what policy makers were requiring information and advice on.310 Therefore, if the US 
is exercising it’s hegemonic influence over the discipline of IR then we would expect the content 
of the discipline’s journals and conferences to reflect the American policy-makers concerns with 
terrorism, WMDs and rogue states.  
 Due to the way the agenda has been presented and threats constituted by Clinton, Bush 
and Obama any article and panel focusing on ‘the threat’ of terrorism, WMD, and rogue states will 
be counted as adhering to the America agenda. Furthermore, any article or panel looking at the 
democratic peace thesis, and the benefits of nation building will also be categorized as 
conforming to the needs of US policy makers. Because the liberal means of achieving peace and 
security, through democracy promotion and regime change featured prominently in the foreign 
policies of Clinton and Bush. The core of all three President’s foreign policies has been securing 
America’s national interests. Therefore research that focuses on American primary, security, 
supporting American hegemony or unipolarity will also be classed as adhering to the American 
agenda. Finally, each President also argued that neo-liberal economic policies and furthering 
international trade would generate international and American economic prosperity and thereby 
further stabilize the international system.311 Due to the continued focus on economic neo-
liberalism by Clinton, Bush and Obama manuscripts and panels that promote such policies will be 
designated as acting in accordance with the interests of each US administration. Through 
unpacking the American agenda and each President’s foreign policy this section has aimed to 
explicitly highlight what ‘counts as IR’ from an American foreign policy perspective, thereby 
delineating the key issues that are deemed to be of concern to America and her interests.  
 Overall, each respective foreign policy has been rather traditional in its outlook, placing 
US interests at the core and revolving around issues of cooperation and conflict. Even though the 
environment, human rights, poverty and AIDS have featured in the various foreign policy 
statements and National Security Strategies of all three presidents these issues have consistently 
featured lower down the agenda, and were virtually non-existent during the Bush 
administration.312 Resultantly this has meant that American policy elites have principally 
demanded and required advice on the threats of terrorism, WMD, rogue states313 as opposed to 
issues relating to poverty, refugees, gender or migration for example. The emphasis has 
consistently been on presenting the above threats as the most pressing matters in world politics 
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and therefore what the discipline should be focusing on if it is to be deemed policy relevant.  The 
American agenda has remained state-centric, revolving around issues of conflict defined by 
America and generating means of cooperation, all of which seek to maintain the present Liberal 
World Order that benefits America.314  
 The question that we now need to reflect upon is; ‘how did this American agenda 
emerge?’ Whilst the official discourse may present the American agenda, this succinct expression 
needs to be unpacked in light of the influential role of certain corporations, foundations and think 
tanks. The interplay between these bodies and the US government is crucial as it partially 
dictates the construction of American foreign policy. This chapter has elaborated upon the 
American foreign policy agenda, yet we need to briefly pay a closer look at the agendas of a 
specific set of actors. Unfortunately there is not the room to review all the actors involved, hence 
the section will focus on a few, beginning with the Rockefeller Foundation, to show how it is the 
agenda setting capabilities of members of ‘epistemic communities’ that influence US foreign 
policy.  
 
Foundations.  
 
According to Inderjeet Parmar “the major American foundations promote Americanism in a 
variety of ways, principally through supporting the research and activities of academics, think 
tanks and other intellectuals”315. The following brief account of the Rockefeller Foundation shows 
its commitment to promoting an American-led liberal world order through funding specific 
research programmes that ensure the advancement of its aims and mission.  
 
The Rockefeller Foundation: The Rockefeller Foundation was established in 1913 by John D. 
Rockefeller and aimed to promote the well being of humanity with its wide-ranging philanthropic 
mission. The foundation represented what came to be known as ‘scientific philanthropy’. Barbara 
Howe defines scientific philanthropy as a rational activity that seeks to “maximize its effects on 
the social and other problems of order and stability in an industrializing and urbanizing 
American at the turn of the twentieth century”.316 The Rockefeller Foundation (and also the 
Carnegie Corporation) advanced a theory of ‘human capital development’317 in order to “explain 
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and justify their activities, especially in funding higher education and advanced research, but also 
in attempts to alleviate poverty and disease control”.318 
 From 1999-2009 the Rockefeller Foundation has focused on issues such as redeveloping 
inner city neighbourhoods in the US, aiding and funding the reconstruction efforts following 
hurricane Katrina, and working to prevent the transmission of HIV in developing countries. 
Despite its philanthropic commitment the foundation is founded upon promoting neo-liberal 
economic values. In the Rockefeller Foundation’s 2009 annual report the President Judith Rodin 
noted that the foundation “strives to achieve and enable by promoting smart globalization”.319 
Resultantly, the Rockefeller Foundation favours “particular kinds of economic development”320 
and sponsors research programmes that advocate and focus on its economic preferences.321  
 Whilst the Rockefeller foundation has no direct links to the creation of US foreign policy, 
it crucially funds the think tanks and academic research that does influence and advise US foreign 
policy. For instance, The Rockefeller foundation gives generous funds to the Council of Foreign 
Affairs, which exerts a large amount of influence over US foreign policy (see next section). 
Furthermore, each year the foundation awards millions of dollars in grants to different research 
projects. According to its 2009 annual report it spent $43 million that year in payable grants.322 
The grants are awarded to research projects that adhere to and promote its agenda.323 Such 
projects and policy recommendations have in the past provided policy recommendations to the 
US administration. In 2009, for example, the Rockefeller Foundation announced that President 
Obama adopted initiatives that emerged from one of the Rockefeller’s supported grantees which 
suggested tool for helping American workers save more and become better able to withstand 
periods of economic uncertainty.324 Through an indirect causal relationship, the Rockefeller 
Foundation is therefore able to promote its agenda through funding specific research, which 
often goes on to the shape American policy decisions.  
 
Think Tanks.  
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Think tanks are defined as independent permanent bodies that in theory have “neither a 
dependent not derivative policy position”.325 They are “non-profit organizations that produce 
and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policymaking 
process”.326 Think tanks have a strong desire to inform the policy process through their research 
and analysis which is often complemented by “informal strategic advisory ties to government, 
business or the public”.327 The role of think tanks in also inherently political, as governments can 
use them as legitimating devices in order to harness support for certain policies, due to their 
independent and ‘expert status’. During the period under review (1999-2009) it is clear that 
certain think tanks achieved a considerable degree of influence over the direction and agenda of 
US foreign policy. 
 
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC): During the Bush Administration the think tank 
driving American foreign policy was the Project for the New American Century. PNAC was 
established in 1997 and is an extremely well connected and funded think tank. The founding 
members of PNAC formed a combination of neo-conservative, and conservative-realist 
politicians, academics, businessmen, and ideological activists328 with links to energy giants such 
as Enron and Halliburton. Regarding PNAC’s aims, according to Parmar “As early as 1998 PNAC 
leaders argued that the policy of ‘containment’ was inadequate and dangerous; they urged 
President Clinton to attack Iraq and seize its alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction”.329 
9/11 functioned as the permissive cause in the realization of PNAC’s agenda.330 PNAC’s advice to 
Bush was to destroy the Al-Qaeda network through pre-emptive action against ‘rogue states’.331 
Not only did PNAC guide the formation of Bush’s post-9/11 foreign policy it also used its 
influence to shape the agendas of other think tanks and research institutes. The Middle Eastern 
Forum, the Hudson Institute, and the Middle East Research Institute for example all began to 
argue for “a new dynamic US foreign policy to eliminate terrorist organizations and networks, 
‘rogue states’ and the holders and proliferators of WMD, including of course, Iraq, Iran, Syria 
North Korea”.332 
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 The implementation/adoption of PNAC’s agenda was in part due to its bipartisan 
support. As the above section highlights, there are a series of continuities between the foreign 
policies of Clinton and Bush, especially with regard to their policies towards Iraq and ‘nation-
building’. Senior Democrats such as John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman supported the 
interventions and regime change missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.333 As such there was a great 
degree of agreement and support for PNAC’s aims from both parties. For instance, in 2003 Joseph 
Lieberman stated “we must reinvigorate US military for the new century through an aggressive 
transformation that makes it lighter, more lethal, and more readily equipped to win 
unconventional wars. What American foreign policy needs is to place ‘muscle behind our 
morality’ if it is to build the basis of the next American century”.334  
 It is clear that this think tank dramatically influenced the agenda of US foreign policy 
following 9/11. The amount of influence it was able to exert was in a large part due to the close 
links between its members and the US administration at the time. Donald Rumsfeld (Bush’s 
Secretary of Defense), Richard Cheney (Vice-President of the US during the Bush administration) 
and Paul Wolfowitz (assistant Secretary of Defense) were founding members of PNAC. Their 
placement within Bush’s inner circle ensured that the policy advice PNAC generated was directly 
delivered to the Bush administration and its adoption encouraged. Further, the financial ties of 
PNAC to Enron and Halliburton and the funding given by these corporations to the Bush 
administration also aided the adoption of its foreign policy agenda, which also incorporated the 
preferences of such corporations. The fact that the aims and policy suggestions put forth by PNAC 
captured the political sentiments and wishes of the American government (including most 
Democrats) and population resulting from the vulnerabilities and insecurities generated by 9/11 
further ensured the transposition of ideas from PNAC to US foreign policy.  
 
The Council of Foreign Relations (CFR): The CFR emerged after the Versailles Peace Conference, 
and the outcomes of its economic research agenda influenced US foreign policy during WWII and 
especially afterwards during the post-war reconstruction period.335 The CFR was instrumental in 
the creation of post-WWII economic institutions and the UN.336 Over the last ten years, the 
research agenda of the CFR has centered on reforming the multilateral trade system, specifically 
“the management of the international financial system and the significance and dangers of US-
Japanese conflict over trade and competitiveness”.337 Its recent policy initiative “Renewing 
America” is focused on generating “policy recommendations for revitalizing economic strengths 
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at home and bolstering US competitiveness”.338 Furthermore, the CFR current Task Forces are all 
oriented around strengthening American economic relations and ties.339  
 The CFR is described by Parmar as the “traditional liberal think tank at the very heart of 
the US foreign policy establishment”.340 The CFR supported Obama’s presidential campaign and 
once in office members of the CFR (such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lawrence Korb and Susan Rice) 
became Obama’s foreign policy advisors. The CFR’s agenda and policy recommendations (which 
can also been seen in the articles its journal Foreign Affairs publishes) have influenced Obama’s 
foreign policy in terms of its economic dimension. Obama has focused on reforming the global 
economic system and its key institutions in line with CFR’s initiatives alongside integrating China 
in the economic system (another chief aim of the CFR).341 
 The influence on the Obama administration’s foreign policy that the CFR has had is due 
to the fact it is a well connected and legitimate centre for the study of international affairs. Its 
current President is Richard Haas (former special assistant to George H. Bush, former Treasury 
Undersecretary for the Clinton administration and was a close advisor to Secretary of State Colin 
Powell), and its current directors include Joseph Nye, Madeline Albright, Colin Powell and Fareed 
Zaharia.  The influence that well established think tanks, such as the CFR, are able to exert on US 
foreign policy is because many policy institutes in the US “act as a revolving door for individuals 
to come and go from administrative agency to think tank to agency, to media, back for a 
sabbatical (at a think tank) and finally into a high level policy making position in a sympathetic 
administration”.342 If a think tanks lacks ‘clout’ in terms of its links to political parties, 
governmental bureaucracies, foundations, and interest groups then it is unlikely that such a think 
tank will be able to operationalise its ideas.343  
 
The RAND Corporation: The RAND corporation is a “non-profit institution that helps promote 
policy and decision-making through research and analysis”. Founded in 1948 the institution 
currently focuses on a wide array of issues, from healthcare to business, with the aims of 
developing effective and enduring solutions. Despite its wide remit “about one half of RAND’s 
research involves national security issues”.344During the Cold War RAND was incredibly 
influential in the formulation of US security policy. According to Richard Higgott and Diane Stone 
“RAND scholars, as civilian security intellectuals, played a central part in the formulation of US 
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security orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s”.345 RAND personnel advised the government to 
implement its defense management and counter insurgent strategies; in the 1960s RAND’s 
intellectual dominance over US defense and security policy was nearly absolute.346 
 Whilst RAND’s recent/current influence is not quite so hegemonic it does still wield a 
large degree of influence over US national security policies, in that it is able to ensure that some 
of its preferences are met and its policies adopted. One prominent example of the adoption of 
RAND’s policy recommendations was Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘revolution in military affairs’.347 RAND 
championed the defensive capabilities of America’s airpower, which was then institutionalized 
by Rumsfeld (a board member of RAND) during the Bush administration. Another pertinent 
example is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Obama administration as apart of its 
national security policy.348 Not only was this policy suggestion promoted by RAND, RAND 
researchers have also been instrumental in pioneering this field of weapons development.349 
 A large number of RAND’s recent research briefs focus on American military defense 
with a particular emphasis on airpower, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgencies strategies, 
bioterrorism and nuclear weapons. These research briefs help highlight RAND’s agenda and its 
impact of US policy. The corporations continuing close ties to the Pentagon have ensured that its 
policy suggestions and thus agenda are adopted and implemented.  
 This brief section has sought to show that American foreign policy is the amalgamation 
of different agendas and policy recommendations produced by a variety of different actors. 
Corporations, think tanks, elite individuals and so on are able to ensure their preferences are 
realized through the networks of patronage and expertise. Whilst each agency/body may have its 
own agenda and notion of what issues should be being researched and what ‘international 
problems’ the community of scholars should be addressing and devising policy recommendations 
for, we need to examine whether this has translated into the IR community. Are IR scholars 
adhering to the American foreign policy agenda? Has the influence of think tanks such as RAND 
and the CFR transferred over into the discipline of IR to dictate the focus of scholarly research?  
  
The Diverse Discipline.   
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The claims that America is intellectually hegemonic in the discipline of IR due to its ability to set 
the intellectual agenda are challenged by the results of the journal and conference investigation 
conducted. Only 21.9% of articles under review focused on items designated to be of concern to 
the United States (see figure 1.1), and only 15.9% of panels at the discipline’s international 
conferences examined addressed issues pertaining to the US agenda (see figure 1.2). This means 
that out of all the articles that were investigated from 1999-2009 only 661 made their ontological 
foci synonymous with the foreign policy concerns of the United States, and out of the conferences 
examined from 2005-2011 only 901 panels did the same. Combining both sets of results only 
18% of research in these different academic outputs adhered to the American agenda. The 
results suggest that majority of intellectual output under inspection in the specified time frame 
was focusing on other issues.   
 Whilst the United States may have identified specific items of concern it has not been 
able to influence the research interests of IR scholars to follow this agenda. Subsequently, one 
cannot argue à la Stanley Hoffmann and Steve Smith that to study international relations is to 
study the role of the United States in the international system.350 Presently the field’s academics 
are writing about and placing their attention on a whole spectrum of issues, concerns, topics and 
events, and not just those that have been demarcated as ‘important’ by the United States foreign 
policy elites and think tanks.  
            
Figure 1.1: 
Percentage of articles adhering to the American agenda in 12 of the discipline’s international Journals from 
1999-2009.  
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Figure 1.2:  Percentage of panels adhering to the American agenda in 4 groupings of international 
conferences from 2005-2011.  
 
 Breaking down the overall percentage of 21.9% of articles adhering to the American 
agenda to gain a more nuanced insight into the focus of the discipline and examine the 
percentage for each journal respectively, a divergence in orientation between the American 
journals, the European ones and the Pacific publications illustrates itself (see table 1.1).   
 
Adherence 
to the 
American 
Agenda %: 
IO IS ISQ ISP WP EJIR CC JIRD IR RIS AJIA IRAP 
 
Yes 32.3 48.5 6.8 28.5 37.7 8.3 7.8 5 22.1 14.2 34.8 22.4 
No 67.7 51.5 93.2 71.5 62.3 91.7 92.2 95 77.9 85.8 65.2 77.6 
 
IO = International Organization; IS = International Security; ISQ = International Studies Quarterly; ISP = 
International Studies Perspectives; WP = World Politics; EJIR = European Journal of International Relations; 
CC = Cooperation and Conflict; JIRD = Journal of International Relations and Development; IR = 
International Relations; RIS = Review of International Studies; AJIA = Australian Journal of International 
Affairs; IRAP = International Relations of the Asia Pacific. 
Table 1.1: Distribution of articles adhering to the American agenda in 12 international journals from 1999-
2009.   
The American journals published more articles concerning themselves with the policy interests 
of the United States than the European and Asia Pacific journals. Almost half of the content in 
International Security turned its attention towards 9/11, Iraq, China, North Korea and nuclear 
proliferation for instance. The degree of correlation between American foreign policymakers and 
American academics was also captured by the 2012 TRIP survey of IR scholars and policy 
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practitioners.351 However, whilst the survey showed some points similarity (regarding global 
debt crisis and failed states) it also highlighted the vast differences in focus between the two sets 
of actors. For instance, according to the 2012 TRIP survey 28% of policy makers were concerned 
with international terrorism compared to the 12% of academics; 0% of policymakers were 
addressing the eurozone crisis compared to the 20% of American academics; and 27% of 
policymakers were focused on WMD proliferation compared to only 11% of academics.352 This 
survey supports the finding of this investigation, that instead of exhibiting a full-scale emulation 
of the US foreign policy agenda, IR academics, including American scholars, are exercising their 
critical distance from US foreign policy elites.  
 It is somewhat unsurprising scholarship in America revolves around America’s role in 
world affairs more so than in Europe and the Asia Pacific, so that the scope and subject matter of 
the field in the US becomes intertwined with what its administration and foreign policy elites 
decides its greatest foreign policy concerns are. This departure and the minimal engagement 
with the American agenda, especially by the European journals, questions the claims in the 
literature that the US exercises its hegemonic influence through its agenda setting capabilities. As 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, the test of dominance is emulation (either through consent 
of coercion). Yet the non-American journals did not emulate the American agenda and 
consequently construct a discipline with an American centric subject matter. For example only 
7.8% of scholars who published in Cooperation and Conflict from 1999-2009 produced pieces of 
research that focused on American foreign policy concerns. Instead of concerning themselves 
with the threat of terrorism, nuclear weapons, or rogue states, and encouraging democracy 
promotion the majority of scholars published in Cooperation and Conflict looked at 
Nordic/Scandinavian foreign policy, and Securitization Theory. A large percentage of articles 
focused on issues pertaining to the EU and Scandinavia with little reference to areas outside of 
this perspective. The journal and the academics who were published instead of adhering to the 
American agenda operated within their own parameters, independently constructing the subject 
matter of IR without it revolving around the US and its role in the international system. The 
authors of the published content paid little attention to the American agenda as defined by 
certain US think tanks and US foreign policy elites, and often when scholars did it was largely for 
the purpose of critique. Cooperation and Conflict, like the other European journals chose to ‘go its 
own way’ and aid the construction of the discipline of IR in their respective communities in 
detachment from the United States.353 Instead of adhering to the demands of American policy 
elites, and demonstrating their subservience to the American IR community these journals 
choose to publish research and promote the study of international relations on their own terms 
and not ones preferred by the United States.  
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 There is, however, one seeming anomaly: the Australian Journal of International Affairs. 
34.8% of the articles published from 1999-2009 in the AJIA researched issues of concern to the 
United States administration. Here one could then potentially make the case for the operation of 
American dominance due to the fairly high percentage of alignment with the American agenda. 
Yet, considering the symbiosis between Australian foreign policy concerns and those of the US 
this figure is not that unexpected. It is difficult for one to separate cases of American agenda 
compliance from those articles operating with an Australian agenda. There were clear links 
between the John Howard and Bush governments, with the Australian government broadcasting 
its support for US foreign policy initiatives for its own strategic interests.354 As such it is not 
astonishing that the outlook of the AJIA was seemingly American in part due to the similar 
security concerns of both America and Australia. Taking into account Australia’s regional security 
concerns and its relationship with the United States it makes sense that this journal would be 
more aligned with the American agenda than the European ones.355 But the number of articles 
focusing on ‘international terrorism’ WMDs, and rogue states for example still only accounts for 
just over a third of articles published. The remaining 65.2% focused on a wide array of concerns, 
especially those relating to Australia’s foreign relations with other states.356   
 It seems that each journal is strategically focused and has its own regional lens as well as 
a global one. Considering each publication has its own mission statement and orientation it 
makes sense that the substantive direction also maps on to a regional outlook due to strategic 
interests and target audiences. The fact that the American journals focus more heavily on the 
American agenda and the non-American ones do not is a natural consequence of 1) the politics of 
publication357 and 2) the existence of different IR communities, both of which prompt an element 
of parochialism in order to appeal to an intended audience.358 These factors entrench the 
regional outlooks of each publication, and ensure their defined identities. In order to first secure 
and then maintain readerships journals need to maintain a separate identity in order to attract 
and satisfy their target audiences. This need and the pressures placed upon editors by publishers 
to acquire readers and retain subscriptions explains the space each journal tries to negotiate and 
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why it may prefer certain types of scholarship, which may include articles that focus on regional 
issues for example.359  
 For instance, each of the American publications investigated (except International 
Studies Quarterly) tended to orientate around a different aspect of the American agenda. 
International Organization primarily looked at issues relating to the American economy and 
American economic relations, and World Politics contained many articles paying attention to 
democratic transitions and putting forth arguments about the alleged benefits of democratization 
and democracy promotion. Whereas ISQ was quite detached from America’s position and role in 
the international system. Rather than seeing international relations through an American lens 
the published manuscripts were more ‘disciplinary’ than ‘commentary’. In other words instead of 
focusing on ‘external’ events or ‘occurrences’ in international politics a large amount of articles 
were geared towards testing earlier works or other theories/methodologies/data sets/and or 
models. If one was to gain an insight into ‘events’ that have occurred around and during the 
period under review ISQ would prove to be a poor guide, as the articles largely did not relate to 
or focus on timely or contemporary issues. The focus was rather on disciplinary debates 
especially methodological ones rather than providing analysis on the situation in Sudan, or the 
recent British terrorist attacks or the global recession, or exogenous foreign policy concerns 
more generally, American or otherwise.  
 Each journal (non-American and American) has carved out it’s own niche, due to the 
aims of the editorial teams and the broader mission of each journal in terms of providing a space 
for certain forms of scholarship and creating specific conversations and dialogue.360 Therefore it 
makes sense for each journal to be slightly parochial in terms of establishing and promoting a 
certain geographical outlook or issue preference. Furthermore the international reputation that 
each journal amasses then influences academics in terms of deciding where to send their work. 
Academics have to make strategic choices regarding where their work will best received.361 This 
in turn reinforces the identity and orientation of each journal. Because other structural forces 
(journal rankings and concerns with subscriptions for instance) and forms of dominance (for 
example editorial decisions may be used in a gate-keeping sense) may be conditioning journal 
content and therefore effecting the degree to which a given journal adheres to the American 
agenda it was vital to look at a different realm of academic production to see if the same trends 
where occurring. However, the research presented at the conferences investigated adhered in an 
even more marginal degree to the U.S agenda. 
 Looking at the composition of the overall figure of 15.9% of panels adhering to the 
American agenda we can see that the conferences that contained the most number of panels 
concerning themselves with items of interest to the United States were the ones organized by the 
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British International Studies Association. Once again this is perhaps not surprising given the UK’s 
‘special relationship’ with the US, yet as table 1.2 shows still only 28.5% of research presented at 
BISA from 2007-2011 adhered to the American agenda, meaning there is no evidence of 
complete mirroring of the US agenda.  
 
Adherence 
to the 
American 
Agenda 
from 2005-
2011 % 
 
 
BISA 
 
 
CEEISA 
 
 
ISA 
 
 
ISA-JC 
 
 
Overall 
Yes: 28.5 9.7 14.4 20.1 15.9 
No: 71.5 90.3 85.6 79.9 84.1 
 
CEEISA = the Central and Eastern European International Studies Association, BISA = the British 
International Studies Association, ISA = the International Studies Association, ISA-JC = the joint ISA and 
regional conventions. 
 
Table 1.2: Percentage of panels adhering to the American agenda in the specified international conferences 
from 2005-2011.  
 
Those panels that focused on issues marked as America’s top foreign policy aims looked mainly 
at counter-terrorism and intelligence initiatives, as well as reflecting on past and present 
practices in Afghanistan and Iraq. Considering Britain’s involvement in both operations and the 
terrorist threats and attacks that have occurred in the UK recently this academic attention is not 
unexpected. One could claim that such adherence is to the British rather than American agenda 
given their similarities. Articles that adhered to the American agenda were however, in the 
minority of intellectual outputs showcased at BISA, meaning one can infer that academic 
endevours taking place in the British discipline of IR remain largely independent from policy-
making elites. The ‘ivory tower’ it seems is keeping its crucial distance in order to perform the 
crucial task of ‘speaking truth to power’362 and academic critique.  
 What was interesting is that the percentage of panels concerning themselves with issues 
such as rogue states and nuclear weapons for instance, at BISA was higher than the British 
journals reviewed, and this trend was also found with the European conferences that were 
investigated as part of the joint conventions. Looking at table 1.3 we can see that a higher 
percentage of research presented at the European conferences adhered to the American agenda 
than was the case when compared to the substantive focus of the European journals.  This 
suggests, or rather supports, the notion that some research that is presented at conferences often 
does not end up in the discipline’s journals. Either the work is abandoned, modified or finds 
alternative future avenues of academic expression.  This was also found in the reverse, in terms 
                                                        
362 Hans J. Morgenthau Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970 (London: Pall Mall, 1970), 
pp. 15. For more see Murielle Cozette “Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J 
Morgenthau and the Ethics of Scholarship” Review of International Studies 34 (1) (2008), pp. 5-27 
and Robert J. Meyers “Hans J. Morgenthau: On Speaking Truth to Power” Society 29 (2) (1992), 
pp. 65-71.  
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of what was present at the conferences investigated and what was absent in the journals 
reviewed. For example there were numerous panels on feminist scholarship in all the 
conferences, yet there was a notable silence of feminist research published.363 The meta-
theoretical debates taking place were also substantially higher in the conferences than the in 
journals.  
 
Adherence to the 
American 
Agenda % 
WISC 2005 
(European) 
WISC 2008 
(European) 
ABRI-ISA 2009 
(Latin America) 
Asia-Pacific-ISA 
2011 (Asia-
Pacific) 
Yes 17.84 23.07 19.56 21.53 
No 82.16 76.93 80.44 78.47 
 
Table 1.3: Percentage of panels adhering to the American agenda for the four conferences reviewed as part 
of the joint conventions category.  
The dynamics explaining these trends and the potential forms of dominance that may be affecting 
content will be explored in more depth in later chapters. But this brief insight aims to highlight 
the fact that research exhibited at conferences is more encompassing in terms of substantive 
issues, theoretical diversity and the American agenda in certain cases. In other words the 
conferences investigated seemed more inclusive and representative of global scholarship than 
the journals examined.  
 The higher rate of research adhering to the American agenda in the non-American 
conferences and the more inclusive nature when compared to the journals is also in part 
probably due to the purpose behind these academic events. Conferences are designed as 
platforms to showcase and celebrate each respective IR community, which naturally would 
create a leaning towards demonstrating the breadth and depth of scholarship being undertaken 
which would include ‘American issues’. Furthermore as conferences present a unique 
opportunity for an academic community to physically get together and debate in person it makes 
sense to include a broad range of research in order to receive optimum feedback and for 
participants to benefit from the knowledge of others. Bar the ISA364 each of the conferences 
displayed a tendency to include slightly more ‘American’ research. It must be stressed, however, 
that none of the conferences and by association regional academic communities showed any sign 
of wholesalely replicating the American agenda, which one would expect if America were 
exercising it’s dominance through its agenda setting capacity. Whilst the conferences did contain 
a slightly higher percentage of research focusing on issues of concern to the American 
administration this is not to be confused with American disciplinary dominance operationalised 
in this manner. Rather it is explained by the nature of conferences and the fact they are a forum 
                                                        
363 This point is explored and explained in much more depth in the chapter on dominance as 
gate-keeping.  
364 The ISA was the only exception to this general rule. Only 14.4% of panels focused on items 
designated as pressing issues by the US, yet the American journals showed a much higher degree 
of adherence. This is most likely explained by the organizations aim to be a hub for global 
scholarship rather than representative of the American IR community.  
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for ideas that may not end up in journals.  Overall, looking at the results from both the journal 
and conference investigations it is clear that research in our discipline is largely independent 
from the policy-making elites in America. The majority of recent research has not focused on 
American foreign policy concerns and instead has concerned itself with a myriad of differing 
issues and foci. The subject matter of the contemporary discipline is as a result of this critical 
distance incredibly inclusive and plural.  
 
Conclusion.  
 
Despite the many assertions in the literature that claim America’s hegemonic position in the 
international system has enabled it to set the intellectual agenda in the discipline of IR thereby 
making IR an American dominated field,365 the results of this investigation have indicated 
otherwise. Looking at the results produced by the journal and conference investigations it seems 
America has not been able to translate its power preponderance into an intellectual hegemony, 
and therefore it has failed to orient the discipline of IR around the foreign policy concerns of the 
US as defined by US think tanks and foreign policy elites. The results presented here suggest that 
America has not been able to exercise its power to influence the research interests of IR 
academics to meet its policy needs.  
 Measuring dominance in terms of adherence to the US agenda, if there was a US 
intellectual condominium in action exercised in this specific way we would expect to see the 
discipline’s intellectual outputs and research conforming to the needs of the United States 
administration, and its preferred think tanks. In other words research would be focused around 
being policy relevant and addressing the items of concerns that are designated by American 
policy elites. Yet the field’s researchers are not overwhelmingly aligning their research with the 
foreign policy concerns of America and its elite foreign policy institutions. There is little evidence 
of emulation and replication by the field’s scholars. As Higgott and Stone argue “Research carried 
out by Royal Institute of International Affairs, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Brookings, 
American Enterprise Institute, CFR, and RAND is not analogous to that undertaken in 
universities”.366 Looking at the data produced here we can say with a fair degree of certainty that 
the global discipline of IR does not adhere to the American agenda as the overall outlook of the 
global discipline is not American, the substantive focus of global IR is not viewed through an 
American lens. Rather than having an Americo-centric subject matter the focus of the discipline is 
international and concerns itself with a multitude of issues, concerns, events and topics. Meaning 
that to study IR is not only to study America and its role in the international system but also a 
vast host of other issues.  The concerns expressed by Steve Smith367 and others368 that American 
                                                        
365 For example see Chan, Chinese Perspectives on International Relations and Smith “The United 
States and the Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 67-85.   
366 Higgott and Stone, “The Limits of Influence”, pp. 29.  
367 Smith, “Singing Our World into Existence”, pp. 499-515.  
368 For example see Pasha and Murphy, “Knowledge/Power/Inequality”, pp. 1-6.  
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dominance leads to a narrow discipline that ignores many international realities are not 
warranted, for the discipline is more diverse and in a much healthier state than either Stanley 
Hoffmann or Smith claimed, a point that will continue to be demonstrated as this thesis 
progresses.  
 In 1977 Hoffmann called for a ‘triple distance’ as he argued that IR was “too close to the 
fire” and the discipline needed to create some independence from the demands of policy elites in 
order to focus on “the weak and the revolutionary”.369 It seems that Hoffmann’s disciplinary 
aspiration came true. In the years since he wrote his article the discipline has moved away from 
being primarily focused on America’s role in the world and with American foreign policy 
concerns. Whilst the discipline may have been dominated by America through its ability to 
determine the intellectual agenda in the 1970s this is no longer the case. The discipline has 
undergone a substantial shift and has broadened its academic horizons. An ever-growing body of 
literature and research is devoted to a sweeping range of issues, including those addressing the 
various forms of inequality in today’s world. The concerns surrounding the ‘failure’ of the 
discipline370 and its inability to deal with international realities due to the perceived narrow 
purview are slightly unfounded. Whilst the discipline may still be critiqued for being Eurocentric 
in outlook due to the formation of the international system itself and the language and state-
centricity of some theories371 it has developed and maintained a critical distance from American 
policy making elites.372The discipline displayed this independence through its eclectic range of 
topics, especially those that are critical in orientation.  
 The broadening of the discipline’s ontological scope and critical distance from policy-
making elites has not been seen as a positive development by all in the field. Kal Holsti, for 
instance has argued that the range of topics and issues addressed by the discipline and therefore 
what comes under the rubric of international relations has expanded to such an extent as leave 
the discipline without a core.373 Whereas according to William Wallace the discipline of IR has 
become too distant from the policy-making sphere and as a result is in danger of becoming 
irrelevant.374 According to Christian Büger and Frank Gadinger an increasing number of scholars 
have begun to question how useful our knowledge is,375 as such they have begun to question 
whether the gap between the worlds of policy makers and academics needs to be bridged.376 This 
                                                        
369 Hoffmann “An American Social Science”, pp. 59.  
370 Barry Buzan and Richard Little “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual 
Project and What to do About It” Millennium 30 (1) (2001), pp. 19-39.  
371 Branwen Gruffydd Jones Decolonizing International Relations (Maryland: Rowman & Little, 
2006). 
372 Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats”, pp. 305.  
373 Kal J. Holsti quoted in Adam Jones “Interview with Kal Holsti” Review of International Studies 
28 (3) (2002), pp. 621. 
374 Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats”, pp. 307.   
375 Christian Büger and Frank Gadinger “Reassembling and Dissecting: International Relations 
From a Science Studies Perspective” International Studies Perspectives 8 (1) (2007), pp. 93.  
376 Ibid., op cit.  
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concern has been reflected in the themes of a number of recent conferences and publications.377 
For instance, the 2012 BISA Conference asked participants to reflect on the policy relevance and 
impact of their research and to question whether they have a responsibility to address policy 
concerns.  
 Whether one sees this as a positive or negative state of affairs for the discipline, this 
should not detract from the disciplinary reality that the discipline of IR is diverse in its focus as 
its intellectual agenda is not determined by the United States. Meaning the United States is not 
able to exercise its disciplinary dominance in this manner. By demonstrating the discipline’s 
diverse subject matter the results of the this investigation challenge one prominent self-image of 
the discipline and therefore a number of state of the discipline accounts, hence we can argue that 
such disciplinary depictions do not capture the full range of disciplinary dynamics in action.  
                                                        
377 See for example George Lawson “For a Public International Relations” International Political 
Sociology 2 (1) (2008), pp. 17-37; Stephen Walt “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in 
International Relations” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005), pp. 23-48; and Stephen Walt 
“International Affairs and the Public Sphere” Social Science Research Council, 21st July 2011. 
Available at http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/ 
(date accessed 25/08/2013).  
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3.  
 
American Theoretical Dominance? 
 
The previous chapter looked at the claims surrounding American disciplinary dominance in its 
agenda setting form. This chapter, however, will look at the arguments concerning American 
preponderance in the discipline of International Relations through its ability to allegedly 
dominate the discipline theoretically. Whilst the claims are multifarious in terms of which 
theoretical perspective is said to dominate, the overarching assumption in the literature is that 
American intellectual hegemony operates through being able to set a theoretical precedent, and 
through commanding adherence to this predefined orthodoxy, whereby the alternative to such 
observance is marginalization and academic exile to the periphery.378  
 There is no agreement within IR about which theory(ies) supposedly dominates and 
therefore indicates America’s disciplinary dominance. There are three main arguments that have 
emerged from the literature regarding the preponderance of certain theories. It is claimed that 
the US is intellectually hegemonic because 1) Realism (as a school of thought which includes both 
its classical and structural variants) is the dominant theory in the discipline;379 2) Neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism are the mainstream’s preferred theoretical model and therefore the 
discipline’s theoretical orthodoxy;380 and 3) Constructivism is the dominant theoretical approach, 
as this approach is claimed to be ‘American’, IR is arguably an American dominated discipline.381 
Furthermore, each of these assertions supports another related claim of American theoretical 
dominance; it is argued America dominates the discipline not only because its theories do, but 
also because it produces the greatest volume of theoretical research.382  This has resulted in 
other IR communities becoming dependent on American intellectual productions, meaning 
American theories, thinkers and texts.383 American dominance is apparently exercised and 
entrenched through structural dependence, which results in further replication of the desired 
                                                        
378 J. Ann Tickner “On the Frontlines or Sidelines of Knowledge and Power? Feminist Practices of 
Responsible Scholarship” International Studies Review 8 (3) (2006), pp. 383-395 
379 Fred Halliday “International Relations ins a Post-Hegemonic Age” International Affairs 85 (1) 
(2009), pp. 39.  
380 Thomas Bierksteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for ‘American’ International 
Relations” in Tickner, A. B. and Waever. O. (eds) International Relations Scholarship Around the 
World: Worlding Beyond the West (Routledge: London, 2009), pp. 308-328.   
381 Steve Smith “The Discipline of International Relations: An American Social Science?” British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 2 (3) (2000), pp. 374-402. Also see Paul C. Avery et. 
al “The Foreign Policy Survey: Inside the Ivory Tower” Foreign Policy 191 (Jan/Feb) 2012, pp. 93.  
382 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations 
Theory? An Introduction” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (3) (2007), pp. 294.   
383 Kal, J. Holsti The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1985).  
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orthodoxy as other IR communities through their reliance on American literature adopt and 
emulate the mainstream’s preferences.384 
 In order to examine whether IR can be depicted as an American dominated discipline 
through addressing the issue theoretically this chapter will firstly explore each of the above 
claims in turn and look at the narrative behind American theoretical preponderance. This 
chapter will address how this alleged theoretical hegemony came about and how it supposedly 
operates before examining the professed implications. Secondly, this chapter will assess the 
validity of these claims in light of the results produced from the 1999-2009 journal 
investigation.385 Drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci, a dominant actor becomes the ‘model’ 
for others to follow and emulate, such replication ‘may enhance the prestige and hence the power 
of the dominant’ actor or in this case IR community.386 Therefore if America were disciplinary 
dominant in this manner one would expect to see the American mainstream’s theoretical 
preferences emulated and subscribed to by the majority of IR scholars.387 Measuring dominance 
as replication this chapter will look to see if the majority of research in the twelve journals 
investigated are using certain ‘American’ theoretical approaches. As with conceptions 
surrounding adherence to the American agenda, this chapter challenges the prevalent 
assumptions in the literature, for it does not provide corroborative evidence of an alleged 
theoretical orthodoxy in operation. Despite the many accounts in the field lamenting the 
presence of either a realist, neo-realist/neo-liberalist or constructivist mainstream that polices 
the discipline; the present academic trend illustrated by the results was for theoretical pluralism. 
As such this chapter will explore the debates surrounding theoretical pluralism and argue that 
this current disciplinary reality has benefitted IR. Despite the plural theoretical environment 
America does dominate the discipline in a certain respect because it produces the majority of 
theoretical output.388 In order to explore such claims, finally, this chapter will examine what it 
means for a theory to be classed as ‘American’ and question the ‘Americanness’ of certain 
theories and how they have been received and understood in other IR communities. In doing so 
we will be able to explore not only the identities of certain theories, and the movement of ideas, 
but also show how the issue of American theoretical dominance is much more complicated than 
is often presented in the literature.  
 Overall, this chapter aims to challenge a number of prominent assumptions about the 
theoretical orientation of the global discipline of IR. Primarily, it attempts to illustrate that rather 
than a discipline that operates with an American mainstream rigorously policing and maintaining 
the discipline’s borders, the discipline is in a state of plurality which challenges a number of 
                                                        
384 Arlene Tickner “Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies” 
International Studies Perspectives 4 (4) (2003), pp. 326.  
385 For the methodology see the relevant section in the introductory chapter.  
386 Antonio Gramsci quoted in David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 36.  
387 Pinar Bilgin “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29 (1) (2008), pp. 5-23.  
388 Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, and Acharya and Buzan “Why is There No Non-Western 
International Relations Theory?”, pp. 287-312.  
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entrenched notions regarding IR’s American self-image. Furthermore, it also raises a number of 
questions about the formation of theories and attempts to problematise how academics 
unquestioningly reproduce certain notions and self-discipline themselves in the process.  
 
Dominance and Dependence: The Claims of American Theoretical Preponderance.  
 
This first section aims to reproduce the popular historiographical narrative of the theoretical 
developments within IR. In doing so this section will highlight how the three claims regarding 
which theories allegedly dominate the contemporary discipline emerged in the literature, what 
they are founded upon and how they have been reproduced. Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned these arguments support and demonstrate the notion that the American IR 
community produces the greatest volume of theoretical literature, which the rest of global IR 
community consumes. The arguments surrounding the production and consumption of IR theory 
and global dependence on the American IR will also be explored in order to unpack and assess 
this form and means of American dominance.  
 
Forms of Theoretical Dominance.  
 
According to Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan America displays its intellectual hegemony 
through the fact that its theories dominate.389 During the period from 1945 to around the late 
1970s the American theory that was claimed to dominate the global discipline of International 
Relations was realism. Despite the European origins and inception of the theory, Stanley 
Hoffmann stated that its theoretical home became the United States as the theory developed and 
drew on US experiences, and became institutionalized in American universities.390 Furthermore, 
the theory became associated with the American administration’s foreign policy during the Cold 
War; not only did this cement realism’s ‘American’ status, it also aided realism’s rise to 
disciplinary dominance.391 A typical history of the discipline as told through the discourse of the 
Great Debates depicts the tale of realism’s continued disciplinary preponderance.392 Despite the 
                                                        
389 Acharya and Buzan “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?”, pp. 294.   
390 Stanley Hoffmann “An American Social Science: International Relations” Daedalus 106 (3) 
(1977), pp. 44.    
391 Steve Smith “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of 
International Relations as a Social Science” Millennium 16 (2) (1987), pp. 198.    
392 It is important to note that this narrative itself helps aid the image of realism’s dominance. 
The accounts often serve to legitimize certain perceptions of realism’s disciplinary centrality. For 
more on the Great Debates and how they present an image of Realism’s seeming continued 
dominance see Yosef Lapid “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a 
Post-Positivist Era” International Studies Quarterly 33 (3) (1989), pp. 235-254; Arend Lijphart 
“International Relations Theory: Great Debates and Lesser Debates” International Social Science 
Journal 26 (2) (1974), pp. 11-21, Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez In Search of Theory: A New 
Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); William Olson and A. J. 
R. Groom International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation (London: 
HarperCollins, 1991); and Ole Wæver “Still a Discipline After All These Debates?” in Dunne, T., 
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challenges from competing schools of thought - Idealism in the First Debate, Behaviouralism in 
the Second, and Liberalism and Marxism in the third or as it is commonly known the Inter-
Paradigm debate – many such as Barry Buzan and Stefano Guzzini have claimed that Realism has 
been the dominant orthodoxy in IR since World War II.393  In The Power of Power Politics John 
Vasquez empirically captured realism’s dominance, through illustrating how realism in its 
classical variant has guided and informed more than 90% of research published in a number of 
the discipline’s journals from 1945-1970.394  
Realism’s dominance is still very much a contemporary disciplinary reality according to 
Daniel Philpott, and despite recent challenges it “persists formidably”.395 Whilst realism faced a 
barrage of criticism due to its failure to predict the end of the Cold War396 - which looked set to 
threaten its hegemonic position – it has allegedly experienced a resurgence due to recent 
American foreign policies concerning the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.397 
This resurgence has apparently secured realism’s dominant position within IR. For example, 
Brian Schmidt writes, “realism is considered by many to be the leading paradigm in the field”398 
whereas Jack Donnelly claims “political realism, Realpolitik, ‘power politics’, is the most oldest 
and most frequently adopted theory of international relations”.399 Realism has remained central, 
it is argued, is due to its success in defending itself.400 This is seen for instance by the various 
responses from prominent realists, such as William Wohlforth, with regards to the criticisms 
                                                                                                                                                              
Kurki, M., and Smith, S. (eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 288-308.   
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Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 29. 
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realism faced at end of the Cold War.401 Furthermore, such critiques and others have helped keep 
realism dominant in another way, as Barry Buzan notes realism “has been, and remains, the 
favoured target of dissenters and radicals within the discourse of the discipline”.402 The irony is, 
that realism’s dominant position is partially constructed by those who seek to critique it. Because 
in doing so they reify realism’s disciplinary centrality through treating it as the object of 
critique.403 By making realism the primary point of criticism scholars have actually entrenched 
and enacted its perceived authoritative position.  
Not all academics in IR agree that realism is still dominant. Scholars such as Stanley 
Hoffmann and Steve Smith used the dominance of realism to argue that IR was an American 
dominated discipline in the 1970s/1980s404, however according to Smith this is no longer the 
current disciplinary situation. It is frequently cited that realism was superseded by the neo-
realism and neo-liberalism in the early 1980s.405 The alleged change in the theoretical orthodoxy 
is arguably due to a number of factors, both internal and external. There is much debate about 
which factors facilitated and caused the change in theoretical direction and the associated 
emphasis to be placed,406 however despite the disagreements there is nonetheless a relative 
consensus that a new orthodoxy was ushered in,407 an orthodoxy that allegedly continues to 
dominate the discipline today and gives the field its American self-image.408 
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Following the challenges to realism during the Inter-Paradigm debate409 Kenneth Waltz 
responded with his reformation of realism; structural/neo realism, and thus some academics 
claimed a new orthodoxy was formed.410  Waltz’s 1979 Theory of International Politics was a 
straight up defense of realism, but it was formulated into a self-identified ‘scientific theory’.411 
Waltz’s felt that Hans Morgenthau’s rejection of the scientific method meant that no matter how 
well founded his premises were “there were grave limitations to the utility of his approach”.412 
Waltz’s shared many of Morgenthau’s basic premises but he proceeded with, what he argued 
Morgenthau lacked, scientific rigour. The inception of neo-realism into the discipline of IR 
sparked the neo-neo debate that took place in the 1980s. Publishing his book After Hegemony in 
1984, Robert Keohane sought to build on Waltz’s neo-realism as well as challenge it.413 For 
Keohane there was a huge hole in Waltz’s theory, it was good at explaining conflict yet it could 
not explain institutional cooperation.414 The anomaly of the growing number of institutions and 
institutionalised cooperation was the problem field for Keohane that he sought to explain, thus 
his Liberal Institutionalism or rather neo-liberalism was his theoretical response to the 
perceived inconsistencies of neo-realism.  
 The neo-neo debate that followed has occupied a lot of academic attention in the United 
States415 and elsewhere. The debates between the two theories raged in the discipline’s journals 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. The neo-neo debate however, also laid the foundations for the 
fourth debate416 and cemented the neo-neo perspectives as the alleged theoretical orthodoxy. 
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The 1990s saw the emergence of theoretical innovations that challenged the traditional 
boundaries of thinking and research in the discipline, stimulating a “theoretical and 
epistemological ferment”.417 Viewed as the dominant theoretical approaches, neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism were subjected to vigorous critique from a range of ‘new’ theoretical approaches 
that entered the discipline in the early 1990s with the aim of broadening the discipline.418 
Keohane himself arguably drew up the terms of the debate and in doing so bifurcated the 
discipline. In his 1988 Presidential Address to the ISA he referred to ‘two approaches to 
international institutions’.419 On the one side was the rationalist approach that referred to the 
merged neo-realist and neo-liberal research programmes, and on the other side were the 
approaches that Keohane united (or rather conflated) together under the label ‘reflectivists’. This 
label was “to cover those inspired by French post-modernists, and German hermeneutics as well 
as late Wittgensteinian rules-perspectives and social constructivism”420 and to stretch to 
incorporate feminist approaches to IR, post-colonial theory, anthropological approaches as well 
as historical sociology. 
 Most accounts of the fourth debate argue how neo-realism and neo-liberalism used this 
debate to cement their dominant disciplinary position through the marginalisation of ‘reflectivist’ 
works.421 It is argued that the neo-neo mainstream framed the debate, placing themselves in a 
position of authority with the power to decide what counted as acceptable IR scholarship. 
Following the fourth debate ‘radical’ voices were either regarded as illegitimate or co-opted into 
the mainstream’s agenda.422  Resultantly, the contemporary discipline, according to such 
accounts, is dominated by a neo-neo mainstream that controls the discipline’s borders and 
polices the content of IR’s journals.423 As a result of the perceived neo-neo theoretical dominance 
‘reflectivist’ work has allegedly been sent to the margins of the discipline and has been denied 
entrance into the global IR debate.  
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 Darryl Jarvis argues that this situation is seen from a quick perusal of the discipline’s 
leading journals as their content, from his perspective, demonstrates the discipline’s 
commitment to the ‘neo-neo synthesis’.424 Similarly Ole Wæver stated that these American 
theories dominate research being conducted: 
 
“If one reads the pages of any major IR journal or even more strikingly the papers of 
an ISA conference, one gets the impression that 80 per cent of the discipline is neo-
realist – therefore most papers are prefaced with a critique of this dominant 
paradigm - and the rest neo-liberal institutionalist, leaving postmodernists and the 
like marginalized, questioned as to whether they are to be counted as legitimate 
members at all”.425  
 
The professed dominance of neo-realism and neo-liberalism has become ingrained in the minds 
of a large number of academics. Many scholars operate with the assumption that neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism dominate, which is seen through the adoption of the term ‘mainstream’ when one 
speaks about such theories.426 According to Judith Squires and Jutta Weldes “Theoretically, 
mainstream IR has largely been defined by the debate between, or synthesis of – depending on 
one’s theoretical and political viewpoint – neo-realism and neo-liberalism or neo-liberal 
institutionalism”.427  
 Once again through employing the term ‘mainstream’ and through the process of 
situating one’s self within a debate academics often self-identify in a relational manner and refer 
to the perceived dominant body of thought as that which one is defined against. In constructing 
such disciplinary space, and the contours of debate, the neo-neo approaches are often placed in a 
central position, like realism, and reaffirmed as the dogmatic school of thought that needs 
critiquing, problematising and ultimately surpassing. This discourse highlights the position of 
presumed authority and disciplinary control that has been awarded to neo-realism and neo-
liberalism. However, recently another school of thought has also been the subject of such 
treatment. Conventional constructivism428 - which is “compatible with the basic rational 
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assumptions of the neo-neo schools”429 - has also been referred to as the mainstream approach 
or rather dominant theory in contemporary IR.  
  The inroads made by constructivism has been noted by Stefano Guzzini: 
 
“What a success story! Hardly known a decade ago, constructivism has risen 
as the officially accredited contender to the established core of the discipline. ‘The 
social construction of . . .’ is littering the title pages of our books, articles and 
student assignments as did ‘the political economy of . . .’ in the 1980s”.430  
 
In 1998 Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner declared that the rationalist-
constructivist debate had taken centre stage in the discipline, and that constructivism was 
becoming increasingly popular.431 Throughout the last decade more and more research, 
according to Jeffrey Checkel is characterizing itself as constructivist and “constructivism has 
increasingly acquired buzzword status”,432 it is as Checkel terms “trendy”.433 What was initially 
presented as a challenger to the dominance of neo-realism and neo-liberalism434 has now 
apparently become the predominant theoretical approach in the global discipline. The 
dominance of conventional constructivism is often linked to the perceived demise of realism by 
some and its failure to predict the end of the Cold War, this has according to William Wohlforth 
“helped make Constructivism into far more popular theoretical approach (measured by number 
of professed adherents) than realism is or ever was”.435 The alleged dominance of constructivism 
not only takes the form of scholars identifying as constructivists but also due to the way other 
scholars “situate their arguments vis à vis those of constructivists”.436 By defining themselves in 
relation to or opposition to constructivism certain academics are implicitly treating 
constructivism as the dominant body of thought. Similarly to the way realism and the neo-neo 
approaches have been referred to, certain academics in effect discipline themselves through their 
performances of feeling dominated. Which in turn leads academics to repeatedly critique these 
bodies of thought, thereby increasing their centrality, alleged dominance, and one’s own feelings 
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of marginalization.    This brief account of the development and debates in IR theory has 
shown that there are three popular claims regarding the theoretical orientation of the discipline 
in the literature. Moreover, each has been used as grounds to argue that IR is an American 
dominated discipline.437 Yet what does it mean for a theory to be ‘American’? And if we can 
designate certain theories as being American is the dominance of a certain theoretical approach 
an empirical disciplinary reality? Presently even though numerous academics unquestionably 
speak of a realist, neo-neo, or constructivist mainstream, there is however, little evidence to 
support these claims. According to the literature America’s intellectual hegemony is exercised 
through the ability of the American mainstream to command a theoretical orthodoxy and exclude 
research that does not adhere to this canon of thought (be it realist, neo-realist, neo-liberal or 
constructivist). Resultantly the discipline’s journals should reflect the mainstream’s preferences 
and their power of exclusion,438 meaning that the results of the journal investigation undertaken 
here should reveal a Gramscian style hegemony through a large majority of articles declaring 
themselves, using or advocating realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism or constructivism.  
 Even if these theories are not found to dominate one can still make the claim that IR is an 
American dominated discipline because it produces the majority of theoretical output.439 Two 
mutually constitutive factors have been used to explain America’s supposed overall theoretical 
dominance; 1) the ‘big-head’ start that the American IR community had in theory production in 
comparison to other academic enclaves,440 which resulted in 2) other academic communities 
becoming and remaining supposedly dependent on theoretical knowledge produced in US.441 
These conditions, according to the literature professing the disciplinary dominance of America, 
enabled the production of an American theoretical mainstream that disciplines the discipline 
thereby reproducing America’s hegemonic position in the discipline.  
 
American Production and ‘Peripheral’ Consumption. .  
 
When explaining the alleged US disciplinary dominance many academics point to the 
asymmetrical relationship between the ‘core’ (America) and the ‘periphery’ (all other academic 
communities) in terms of theory production. According to Ersel Adylini and Julie Mathews, “It 
was pointed out more than 20 years ago that the spread of ideas in IR was moving exclusively 
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from the core to periphery, and little seems to have changed since then”.442 It has been argued 
that the US IR community was able to take the lead in IR scholarship, producing a vast body of 
theoretical knowledge and literature before other IR communities. 443 As the discipline began to 
develop in other countries the various nascent IR communities relied upon American theories 
and American developments.444 What subsequently occurred was a dependent dynamic, a 
distinction between an ill-defined ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, all the while supposedly stabilizing and 
cementing American theoretical dominance over the discipline. Furthermore, it is claimed that 
the dependent relationship inhibits the production of non-American IR and stifles the growth of 
indigenous445 or ‘homegrown’ theory,446 thus perpetuating America’s theoretical hegemony.447  
The United States is often referred to as the theoretical centre of IR due to the sheer 
volume of theoretical output that has emerged from the United States.448 This ‘head start’ in 
terms of theoretical knowledge is a result of the relatively early development of the discipline in 
the United States. In the 1920s the discipline had begun to institutionalize itself with the 
emergence of IR as a field of study within American universities.449 This process of 
institutionalization continued with a rapid rate of expansion in the following decades. Combined 
with the arrival of many European scholars in the 1930s,450 theoretical knowledge in the US 
continued to grow, and as the typical disciplinary historical narrative goes this expansion 
culminated in the ‘First Debate’.451 By the end of World War II the US IR community had 
produced numerous theoretical works before the discipline had even emerged in some 
countries.452 This body of theoretical knowledge has been continuously added to over the years; 
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as such other IR communities have struggled to ‘catch up’ with American developments; as Ole 
Wæver puts its “All other national IR communities are running huge balance of trade deficits 
against the United States”.453 This head start in terms of theory production has meant that other 
IR communities in their quest to ‘catch up’ have absorbed certain American texts and arguably 
become dependent on them. Consequently an asymmetrical relationship between the US and 
other IR communities has emerged, in which it is argued that non-American IR academies are 
‘consumers’ rather than ‘producers’ of IR theory.  
In his review of the discipline in 1985 Kal Holsti explicitly investigated Stanley 
Hoffmann’s claims to see if the discipline could still be depicted as an American discipline 8 years 
on, through defining dominance as theoretical preponderance.454 Holsti aimed to assess the 
development of IR theory in the US and in seven other countries (Australia, Canada, France, India, 
Japan, Korea, and the UK) to see whether the field had become an international community of 
scholars. Through analyzing the reference sections in a diverse sample of textbooks and the 
patterns of theoretical recognition, theoretical production and exchange Holsti discovered that 
the United States dominated the field’s literature. Scholars in other countries, he argued, relied 
on US theoretical literature in their teaching and research, and that US scholarship dominated the 
discipline to such an extent that the evidence suggests, “that international theory barely exists 
outside the Anglophone countries”.455 Holsti was not claiming that theoretical research was not 
taking place outside of the US, but rather he was arguing that it was not being spread and 
disseminated throughout the globe: “while the works of scholars in other countries are 
acknowledged primarily in the writer’s own country or geographical region. It is not so much 
asymmetry of production as of consumption”.456 According to Holsti there were clearly few 
global producers and many consumers of IR theory with knowledge flowing outwards from the 
centre to the periphery.457 Rather than representing an international community of scholars the 
asymmetric pattern of scholarly communications rendered the field closer to the model of a 
hierarchical discipline. The consequence of such a relationship was allegedly that the ‘periphery’ 
(defined as non-American IR communities) became dependent on the core (defined loosely as 
America).458 Whilst this may have been the case in the 1970s/1980s is the contemporary 
discipline still reliant upon American theories? 
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It has been over twenty years since Holsti conducted his investigation, yet according to 
Chris Brown little seems to have changed. In 2001 Brown wrote:  
 
“IR is an American discipline in the sense in which Coca Cola is an American 
drink and MacDonald’s hamburgers are American beef-patties; although lots of 
people in the rest of the world ‘do’ IR, it is American, that for the most part, they are 
doing, just as MacDonald’s are American burgers, even when ingredients, cooks and 
consumers are all drawn from another continent”.459  
 
Although other countries are ‘doing’ IR they are, as Brown states, doing IR as defined by America. 
Despite the theoretical efforts of the English School and the Copenhagen, Welsh and Paris schools 
of security theory, it is argued that generally other national IR communities are emulating and 
replicating American theoretical trends. The dependent relationship continues, it is argued, 
because there is now a structural bias firmly in place. Using Johan Galtung’s theory of structural 
imperialism460 Jörg Friedrichs argues that we should continue to see Holsti’s asymmetrical 
pattern of theoretical communications in operation for the foreseeable future.461 Friedrichs 
noted that the intellectual hegemony of America relies upon how scholarship in the periphery is 
“oriented according to the image of the dominant mainstream in the centre”.462 Allegedly 
American theoretical standards are produced and purposely embedded throughout the different 
national IR communities making the periphery even more dependent on American theoretical 
literature and developments. Peripheral scholars have little choice, it is argued, but to conform to 
and work within the defined theoretical boundaries or face further marginalization. According to 
Arlene Tickner “International relations studies in the periphery have frequently been described 
in terms of their adherence to US models”463 and their inherent dependence on American 
theoretical literature.  Through investigating the state of the discipline in Latin America Tickner 
discovered that the process of assimilation of imported IR knowledge from the US does indeed 
take place, especially at the level of teaching. Kim Nossal also claimed that in the contemporary 
discipline the dissemination of theories across national settings is unidirectional; international 
                                                                                                                                                              
concludes that there is a “reliance solely on Americans to produce the new insights, theoretical 
formulations, paradigms, and data sets of our fields” (The Dividing Discipline, pp. 128). Hence, 
Holsti arguably when referring to the core is solely referring to America, and perceives the 
discipline to be dominated by the US.   
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theory is produced in the US and ‘the rest’ “tend to either ‘consume’ that theory, implicitly or 
explicitly, in their writing, or simply to ignore the theoretical produce altogether”.464  
As previously mentioned the alleged asymmetry arguably makes it difficult for national 
IR communities to develop under their own terms and produce their own theories.465 A number 
of recent studies investigating the relationship between American IR and IR scholarship in 
certain countries have shown that peripheral scholarly communities continue to be, as Gerald 
Holden claims, “importers rather than exporters of IR concepts” and theories.466 For instance, in 
Marina Lebedeva’s review of contemporary IR scholarship in Russia she demonstrates how 
Russian scholars “remain influenced by the American IR literature”.467 Whereas Song Xinning, 
despite being fairly optimistic about the Chinese IR communities’ future trajectory, concludes 
that at present Chinese IR remains dependent on American theoretical literature, thereby 
severely impeding the immediate development of an IR theory with Chinese characteristics.468 
Looking at the Turkish case Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews concluded that the Turkish 
discipline is characterized by power competitions at the local level as such theoretical 
developments have been minimal.469 The little advancement that has been made and the 
fledgling production of ‘homegrown’ theory has not brought about a shift in circumstances for 
“Turkish IR scholars currently complain that their attempts to have their voices heard in core IR 
theoretical discussions go unheard”.470 Similarly Tickner’s investigation into Latin American IR 
shows evidence of an ever-growing body of Latin American scholarship being produced that 
differs from the theoretical ‘mainstream’ as defined by America, but she also acknowledges that 
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the structural bias will inevitably prevent such theoretical scholarship being consumed by the 
core.471  
The asymmetrical scholarly exchange and reliance upon American theories has arguably 
not escaped Europe. Even though IR as a discipline has been organized, institutionalized and 
professionalized in Europe more so than in the other countries mentioned above the recognized 
theoretical contributions to the discipline have been, according to Miles Kahler, marginal.472 
Kahler argues that most of the theoretical innovations in IR have emerged from the US and it is 
“Only in peace research (which is less a body of theory than a particular methodological 
viewpoint) and in international economics can Europe be said to hold its own or to take the 
lead”.473 Measuring dominance through theoretical output Kahler states that the US dominates 
the discipline in this respect. However, Knud Erik Jørgensen has argued that there is a large body 
of European IR theory and research in existence, and states that it is only ‘marginal’ in the sense 
of its alleged impact on the American IR community.474  
Despite the numerous theoretical works that do exist within Europe, Jørgensen 
acknowledges the lack of dissemination from Europe to the US.475 As long as America continues 
to produce the vast majority of IR theories the periphery will remain, according to Aydinli and 
Mathews, “a weak, subservient partner in the discipline, and this imbalance will continue to limit 
the extent to which the discipline can achieve its goal of understanding global politics”.476 The 
alleged American theoretical dominance has a number of negative implications for the discipline. 
The professed theoretical dogmatism is claimed to create a narrow discipline that reproduces the 
status quo and in doing so remains blind to certain inequalities and international realities.477  
 
Implications for the Discipline.  
 
There are a number of other profound implications that would arise from the preponderance of 
either realism, the neo-neo perspectives or constructivism, which explains the concern and 
attention surrounding this issue. For instance, according to critics of the aforementioned theories 
this situation is regarded to be problematic due to 1) the epistemological fallacies produced; 2) 
the fact that realism, and especially neo-realism and neo-liberalism uphold the status quo; 3) 
each theory is regarded as ahistorical; and 4) they are often conceived to be too narrow, 
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Eurocentric and state-centric meaning they each overlook many international inequalities, and 
problematically actually entrench many of the world’s inequalities through their blindness to the 
Third World.478 As such, claims are made that realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and 
conventional constructivism cannot effectively analyze many of today’s international concerns 
and events in contemporary world politics. This next section will briefly focus on the central 
criticisms of realism, the neo-neo approaches, and conventional constructivism to highlight a 
number of problems associated with a potential theoretical orthodoxy in the discipline.479 This 
section will briefly explore the four most cited (detailed above) in order to show some of the ‘real 
world’ implications of a given theoretical orthodoxy and why this suspected preponderance is of 
much disciplinary concern.  
Firstly, realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and conventional constructivism are often 
critiqued on philosophical grounds due to their positivistic foundations. According to some, such 
as David Dessler, this has resulted in not only the generation of inaccurate accounts of world 
politics but also the production of problematic epistemological assumptions.480 This critique has 
taken on numerous forms. For instance, Mark Neufeld criticizes the neo-neo approaches 
adherence to positivism arguing that such a commitment results in 1) the supposed separation of 
theory from the real world, producing truth as correspondence; 2) naturalism, in other words the 
assumption that there is no difference between the social world and the natural world; and 3) the 
production of ‘objective’ value free knowledge.481 All of which is problematic for Neufeld as it 
mistakes the theoretical process and results in a lack of social critique along with the generation 
of foundational epistemic claims. Alexander Wendt however, criticizes realism and the neo-neo 
theories from the point of the agent-structure debate. Wendt claims that neo-realism in 
particular misunderstands the concept of ‘structure’ (a point which is also articulated by Richard 
Ashley482) and consequently the neo-neo approaches are unable “to explain the properties and 
causal powers of their primary units of analysis, a weakness which seriously undermines their 
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482 Richard Ashley “The Poverty of Neorealism” International Organization 38 (2) (1994), pp. 
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potential explanations of state action”.483 Using the philosophy of social science that is Critical 
Realism Heikki Patomaki specifically problematises neo-realism and neo-liberalism’s 
prioritization of epistemological and the epistemic fallacy that both theories commit due to their 
conflation of the epistemological with the ontological.484 Using the arguments of Roy Bhaskar485 
Patomaki shows how both theories are guilty of incorrectly reducing the ontological or rather 
statements about being to statements about knowledge. It is argued that by transposing 
ontological questions into epistemological ones both neo-realism and neo-liberalism effectively 
marginalize and subvert the ontological realm.  
Secondly, using the work of Robert Cox we can see how realism, neo-realism, neo-
liberalism and conventional constructivism can be conceived to be upholding the status quo and 
therefore entrenching current global inequalities.486 For instance, realism, the neo-neo theories 
and arguably even conventional constructivism fall into Cox’s problem-solving category. 
According to Cox problem solving theories take the world as they find it and in doing so implicitly 
accept “the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they 
[problem solving theories] are organized”.487 In taking the world as a given and seeking to 
explain it as it is, rather than questioning the foundations and construction of the international 
system, such theories preserve the present order and in doing so reduce the scope for 
emancipatory potential. As such realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and conventional 
constructivism are often critiqued for being conservative, instead of suggesting change each 
attempts to “smooth the functioning of the whole”488 and in doing so supports the present 
structure and those that benefit from this state of affairs. What this means is that realism, the 
neo-neo approaches and conventional constructivism are deemed to embed current power 
inequalities, ensuring the continued dominance of America in the international system, the 
preponderance of certain multinational corporations and institutions and therefore the 
subjugation and marginalization of many, especially those in the Third World.489  According to 
Mustapha Pasha and Craig Murphy the aforementioned theories “work overtime to erase traces 
of some forms of human suffering – of tired and famished children, of overworked girls in 
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crowded sweatshops, all the instances of discrimination, poverty and hopelessness – relegating 
them to side-shows and careless expressions of normative excess”.490  
The penchant to uphold the status quo is linked to another prominent criticism of the 
theories. By taking the present order as given and ensuring the continuation of the present, 
problem-solving theories (neo-realism and neo-liberalism in particular) are non-historical.491 
Richard Little and Barry Buzan have been vocal in their criticisms of realism, neo-realism, neo-
liberalism and conventional constructivism’s ahistorical nature and how this has led to the 
reproduction of what they term ‘the Westphalian straightjacket’ thereby perpetually limiting the 
scope of analysis.492 Furthermore Buzan and Little have argued that the theories lack of historical 
perspective makes them “unable to answer, in many instances address, the most important 
questions about the modern international system”.493 The fact that each theory is contextually 
blind and ignores the constitutive role of history is somewhat ironic given that each of the 
theories are framed and dependent upon European concepts, foundations and Western 
experiences494, which leads to the final critique.   
Realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and conventional constructivism have been 
critiqued due to their inability to theorise the Third World, which is largely due to the 
Eurocentric nature of each theory.495 According to Micheal Desch “The role of the Third World in 
international politics remains a ‘theoretical puzzle’, presenting us with observable outcomes for 
which existing explanations seem insufficient or erroneous”.496 For instance, it is argued that 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism’s focus on interstate war and economic institutional cooperation 
is far removed from the empirical reality of the Third World. Mohammed Ayoob argues that both 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism fail to provide an adequate explanation for the cause of most 
sources of conflict and disorder.497 In failing to adequately describe and explain the realities of 
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contemporary political life for those outside of the Western state framework the world beyond 
the West is neglected and marginalized.498 Furthermore it has been argued that not only are the 
core concepts of each theory are of relatively little analytical purchase in the Third World, and 
instead act as colonial reminders and ensure further subjugation.499 
The theoretical irrelevance of realism, the neo-neo theories, and conventional 
constructivism for the Third World,500 not only has detrimental consequences for the discipline 
of IR, but also grave ‘real world’ implications attached to the blindness of the each theory to the 
Third World.501 For example, by focusing on the ‘great powers’ and military inequalities and 
economic relations realism, the neo-neo approaches and conventional constructivism exclude the 
Third World from their analytical purview and reproduce certain inequalities.502 If it is accepted 
that a theoretical orthodoxy reinforces, reproduces and perpetuates images of ‘reality’ upon 
which policy-makers and academics base their decisions, prescriptions and policies,503 the 
resultant situation is one in which policy-makers and other academics will follow suit and 
overlook the Third World, thereby leading to the ‘real world’ marginalization of the Third World, 
and a lack of attention being paid to many issues of concern and human suffering.504 The Third 
World and the experiences of many have the potential to be neglected due to not only the neo-
neo theories state-centrism and Western framing, but also realism and conventional 
constructivism’s, and therefore further subjugated due to the Eurocentric discourse in 
operation.505  
The situation is potentially worryingly cyclical and the dominance of either realism, neo-
realism, neo-liberalism or conventional constructivism as a disciplinary reality poses numerous 
detrimental implications. Many as we have seen have lamented the dominance of realism, neo-
realism, neo-liberalism and conventional constructivism due to the above consequences. The 
reality of such theoretical dominance would indeed be alarming. However, the results of the 
journal investigation conducted present a very different image of IR. Rather than a discipline 
policed by a certain theoretical orthodoxy the present inclination in the field, as indicated by the 
discipline’s journals, is for theoretical pluralism. Instead of a discipline unable to deal with many 
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contemporary problems and realities, the discipline is in a much healthier state and many of the 
above concerns are not a disciplinary reality. According to Rosa Vasilaki theoretical pluralism 
works: 
  
“to democratize IR by opening up space where parallel stories can be told 
without being thought as mutually exclusive and without making absolute 
normative or ethical claims, but by simply sharing the terrain of IR and looking at 
‘what kind of configuration the combination of all of them produces’”.506 
 
 
The results will show the reality is very different from the popular discourse. Whilst some 
sentiments may have achieved the status of ‘common knowledge’ within the discipline we must 
bear in mind that the empirical actuality may be different due to the discipline’s reticence to 
systematically investigate it’s past and present inclinations.507 As previously mentioned, IR has a 
tendency to adopt notions about it’s self-image and reproduce these without empirically 
assessing the validity of such claims. As a result, claims such as the dominance of realism, neo-
realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism become embedded within the discipline’s global 
conversation and treated as a given, resulting in the production of unquestioned assumptions 
and self-disciplining behaviour.  
 Overall, the remainder of this chapter will attempt to show how situation concerning the 
discipline’s theoretical orientation is very complex. There are numerous claims operating in the 
discipline, and various explanations given as to how and in what ways the US exercises its 
theoretical preponderance. Whilst the results of the journal investigation might not reveal any 
evidence of a theoretical orthodoxy, America can still be claimed to dominate the discipline 
theoretically because it produces the greatest volume of theoretical works. This complexity is 
further compounded by the issue of whether a theory can be classed as American and if so what 
warrants such a designation? Such questions and the empirical reality of theoretical pluralism 
(that will be demonstrated next in the results section) highlight how it is not simply a case of 
whether the US is theoretically dominant, it is also about exploring and revealing the different 
dynamics and patterns of interaction in the discipline that shape its contours.  
  
 The Plural Discipline.  
 
Looking at one means of theoretical dominance; if America were intellectually hegemonic we 
would expect to see in the contemporary field the discipline’s journals filled with articles writing 
from either a realist, neo-realist, neo-liberal or constructivist perspective. However, neither 
theory was found to be theoretically preponderant. Despite the numerous claims made that IR is 
an American enterprise due to the ability of the American IR community to instill a theoretical 
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orthodoxy across the global discipline,508 this exploration found no evidence of this, not even in 
the American journals. The American mainstream may still be advocating and singing the praises 
of realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism or constructivism but this has not been converted into a 
theoretical orthodoxy to which the global discipline adheres. Further, the plurality of theoretical 
perspectives encountered also challenges the claim the mainstream are marginalizing those 
writing from different theoretical perspectives.  
 In order to ascertain the theoretical composition of the field each article in each of the 12 
journals under review from 1999-2009 was analysed in order to determine the theoretical 
orientation of the article. The categories used for this analysis emerged from the body of 
literature being examined (see appendix for definitions). As noted in the introductory chapter 
instead of coding for theory the investigation was based on the way author’s defined/identified 
their research. Through using the approaches of interpretivism (see appendix) and critical 
discourse analysis509 I was able to note the theories used and the categories of analysis emerged 
from this process. This accounts for why the categories ‘rationalism’ and ‘reflectivism’ exist (see 
appendix for definitions). Authors labeling their work as ‘rationalist’ could upon further 
examination been designated as either ‘neo-realism’ or ‘neo-liberalism’. However, this analysis 
was centred around illustrating how academics position themselves and what is actually 
occurring in the discipline, rather than collapsing research into a predetermined finite number of 
categories. It was important to capture the labels actually being used by scholars in the discipline 
to see how academics understand their own intellectual products. Most articles explicitly stated 
their theoretical framework and their theoretical position, however if the author did not self-
identify then I made an interpretative judgement based on the claims being made after a 
thorough critical reading of the text.  
 Looking at the theory that most populated in each journal under review we see that 
instead of realism, either neo-neo approach, or constructivism it was classical liberalism that 
actually was the approach that was most employed by academics in the field, as we can see from 
table 2.1, six out of the twelve journals investigated showed a prevalence of articles written from 
this school of thought. If we accept that a discipline’s journals act as a mirror of current trends, 
and give us a reflection of inclinations and positions in a given academic field, then we can argue 
that classical liberalism appears to be the theory under which the majority of academics are 
conducting their research, not realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism or constructivism as claimed 
by those stating that IR is an American enterprise.  Yet, whilst classical liberalism is awarded the 
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label of the ‘most popular theory’, constructivism was found to be rather prominent in the 
discipline, especially in the European journals. What was surprising was the actual paucity of 
academics in IR writing from a neo-neo perspective (see figure 2.1); for example in the European 
Journal of International Relations only 5.8% of articles used either approach to frame their work, 
whereas only 2.9% of articles in the Review of International Studies could be classed as either 
neo-realist or neo-liberal. As table 2.1 shows even though realism, and constructivism were not 
dominant they still managed to command a fairly significant place in the discipline, the same 
however, cannot be said for either neo-realism or neo-liberalism.  
 
Journal Dominant Theory Percentage % 
International Organization Neo-Liberalism 27.2 
International Security Classical Realism 39.6 
International Studies Quarterly Classical Liberalism 26.8 
Int. Studies Perspectives Classical Liberalism  25.4 
World Politics Classical Liberalism  30.3 
European Journal of IR Constructivism 27 
Cooperation and Conflict Constructivism 20.6 
Journal of IR and Development Constructivism 18.8 
International Relations Classical Liberalism  16.9 
Review of International Studies  Classical Liberalism  18 
Australian Journal of Int. Affairs Classical Liberalism  23.4 
IR of the Asia Pacific Classical Realism 22.4 
 
Table 2.1 The dominant theory in each journal under review from 1999-2009.  
 Apart from the dominance of neo-liberalism in International Organization even the other 
American journals exhibited a lack of neo-neo research being published. For instance only 11.7% 
of articles in International Security, 11% in International Studies Perspectives, 20.5% in 
International Studies Quarterly, 24.3% in World Politics, were neo-realist, neo-liberal or self-
identified using Keohane’s ‘rationalist’ label to denote their neo-realist or neo-liberal perspective. 
Excluding IO the American journals demonstrated an inclination towards classical realism and 
classical liberalism, as these were the theories that the majority of academics were working with 
or praising the theoretical merit of. The claims in the literature surrounding the dominance of 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism in the discipline, put forth by Darryl Jarvis510 and Thomas 
Biersteker for example,511 are questioned and challenged by the data here. The assertions of a 
dominant ‘neo-neo mainstream’ for instance policing the boundaries of the discipline and 
marginalizing research that does not adhere to the preferred theoretical framework seem 
slightly mythical, as the empirical reality demonstrates the relatively small amount of research 
using either a neo-realist or neo-liberal perspective (see figure 2.1). The results suggest that 
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American theoretical dominance is not exercised through the dominance of the neo-neo 
approaches.  
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IO = International Organization; IS = International Security; ISQ = International Studies Quarterly; ISP = 
International Studies Perspectives; WP = World Politics; EJIR = European Journal of International Relations; CC = 
Cooperation and Conflict; JIRD = Journal of International Relations and Development; IR = International Relations; 
RIS = Review of International Studies; AJIA = Australian Journal of International Affairs; IRAP = International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific. 
Figure 2.1: Articles written from either a neo-realist, neo-liberal or ‘rationalist’ theoretical perspective in 12 
international journals from 1999-2009.  
 
 Furthermore, the results also refute the claims of American theoretical hegemony due to 
the dominance of realism.512 Scholars such as Barry Buzan,513 Michael Doyle514 and Kenneth 
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Waltz515 still argue that ‘realism’ writ large is the dominant theory in IR with most international 
relations scholars being “either self-identified or readily identifiable realists”.516 Due to realism’s 
American status, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, this can also be used to support the claims 
of American disciplinary preponderance. However, from 1999-2009 in the journals under review 
15.2% of research was identified as classical realist, 2.6% was neo-realist, meaning that 17.8% of 
all research published in the ten year time frame was ‘realist writ large’. These findings are very 
similar to those of Thomas Walker and Jeffrey Morton in their 2005 study.517 They investigated 
515 data-based articles from 1970-2000 and noted the steady decline of realism, especially since 
the 1990s. From 1995-2000 their results showed that “realism accounted for less than 22% of 
the data-based studies in world politics”.518 Rather than a discipline dominated by realism, or 
even neo-realism and neo-liberalism, as many have depicted, Walker and Morton also discovered 
a discipline “characterized by theoretical diversity with a leaning towards liberalism”.519 My 
results indicate the continuation of the trend noted by Walker and Morton, that of the persistent 
decline of realism and ascendency of liberalism. The results are very similar and both work to 
refute the prevalent notions of 1) the preponderance of realism and 2) the existence of a neo-neo 
theoretical orthodoxy. Both sets of results can be seen to function as myth-breaking exercises, 
over turning widely held assumptions in the discipline that are the product of the lack of rigorous 
empirical work previously done to address such issues.  
 Regarding the claims about the dominance of constructivism, the content of the journals 
investigated has reflected the assumptions of Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen 
Krasner that constructivism is making vast inroads into the discipline and becoming part of the 
‘mainstream’ (see figure 2.2).520 Whilst the dominance of realism, and the neo-neo perspectives 
has been challenged through looking at the inclinations in the global discipline the growing 
popularity of constructivism has been demonstrated (see figure 2.3). 13.52% of research 
published in the 12 journals examined was identified as Constructivist. Whilst this category 
unfortunately does not account for the differences in this approach to IR - in terms of specifying 
what percentage was actually ‘conventional constructivism’ and which was ‘critical 
constructivism’ - it still highlights that this approach has had a significant impact on the global 
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discipline. However, it is not dominant as William Wohlforth521 and others522 have claimed. 
Although this investigation demonstrates the growing popularity of constructivism, this 
approach to international relations is not disciplinary preponderant in this investigation.  
 
 
Philosophy of SS= Philosophy of Social Science. Competing= Competing theoretical perspectives. 
Figure 2.2: Theoretical perspectives of articles published in International Organization from 1999-2009. 
 Returning to the theory that was found to be the most employed and embodied theory, 
classical liberal research accounted for 23.04% of scholarship, meaning that 76.96% of 
scholarship argued from an alternative theoretical approach. In this study classical liberal works 
sit alongside scholarship written from a vast and broad array of different theoretical 
perspectives, as figure 2.3 shows. Earlier the claim was made that classical liberalism is the 
theory most adopted by academics, which it is according to this investigation; however, this is 
not to be confused with a claim for overall preponderance and dogmatism. Classical liberalism 
‘dominates’ but is certainly not dominating the field; rather this theoretical school has the status 
of the most employed theory as opposed to theoretical orthodoxy in the contemporary discipline. 
If International Relations cannot claim a theoretical paradigm (in the true sense of the term, 
meaning a broad school of thought that all adhere to and work with and therefore adopt this 
                                                        
521 William Wohlforth “No One Loves a Realist Explanation”, pp. 449.  
522 For example see example Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics”, 
pp. 229.  
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worldview) then the discipline must be in Kuhnian terms in revolution,523 or in other terms a 
state of plurality.  
 
 
Philosophy of SS = Philosophy of social science; Sociology of K = Sociology of knowledge. 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of theoretical perspectives in 12 international journals from 1999-2009.  
 The diversity of theoretical perspectives populating the discipline is evident if one looks 
at figure 2.3. The range of theories in the pages of the discipline’s journals challenges the 
assertions made by Steve Smith524 and others525 that non-mainstream works have been and are 
being marginalized. Looking at the overall percentages, more poststructuralist articles (4.8%) 
were published than neo-realist ones (2.6%). The number of poststructuralist works published – 
especially when compared to the one of the ‘mainstream’ theories – questions the claims of a 
mainstream that polices the discipline’s boundaries through excluding works that it declares as 
‘not doing’ IR. If one was to lay all of the IR theories on a spectrum it has been argued that 
poststructuralism is arguably the most left-wing or critical of the theories housed under the 
‘reflectivist’ label. Therefore one would imagine it would be the prime target of the mainstream 
and recipient of the status of the most marginalized approach. Instead we find a healthy number 
                                                        
523 Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1962).   
524 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”,  pp. 374-402.  
525 J. A. Tickner “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR 
Theorists” International Studies Quarterly 41 (4) (1997), pp. 611-632.  
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of poststructuralist works in the journals under review. The array of theories found, especially 
the ‘critical’ theories, was incredibly diverse and suggest the contemporary discipline is inclined 
towards plurality and openness as opposed to dogmatism and exclusion.  
 One finds this theoretical plurality even in the American journals, where if there were to 
be exclusions made on theoretical grounds, this would arguably be the principal arena. Once 
again instead of a realist, neo-neo, or constructivist dominance we find openness and diversity. 
For example in the American journal International Studies Perspectives research employing a 
wide variety of different theoretical approaches was published (see figure 2.4).  Although the 
number of classical liberal approaches was preponderant in ISP– accounting for 32% of articles – 
there still was a relatively high number of articles endorsing/employing Critical Theory, 
postcolonialism and even English School theory. Although International Organization was rather 
theoretically narrow in comparison, its fellow American publications were quite the opposite, 
and suggested that the discipline is not only diverse but also inclusive. Similarly in their recent 
investigation into the American IR academy Daniel Maliniak et al also discovered “considerable 
theoretical diversity within the American IR community and that diversity has grown over 
time”.526 Looking at faculty surveys and IR journal articles Maliniak et al noted the decline of 
realism and the growing theoretical plurality within the US IR community.527 Likewise, Walker 
and Morton concluded that their investigation also “shows a field with a plurality of theoretical 
concerns. Rather than a Kuhnian paradigm, recent research suggests theoretical diversity”.528 
The diversity of theoretical approaches was not confined to the American journals, but was a 
global scholarly trend; all the journals investigated demonstrated a proclivity for pluralism (see 
figures 2.5 and 2.6).  
 
                                                        
526 Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson and Michael J. Tierney “International Relations in 
the US Academy” International Studies Quarterly 55 (2) (2011), pp. 439.  
527 For more on the methodology and the time spans used see Ibid., pp. 440-441.  
528 Walker and Morton “Re-Assessing the ‘Power of Power Politics’ Thesis”, pp. 353.  
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of theoretical approaches in articles published from 1999-2009 in International Studies 
Perspectives.  
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of theoretical approaches in articles published from 1999-2009 in the Review of 
International Studies.  
 
 110 
 
Figure 2.6: Distribution of theoretical approaches in articles published from 1999-2009 in Cooperation and 
Conflict.  
 
 Although some such as Kal Holsti529 may lament the state of pluralism arguing that it has 
resulted in disciplinary fragmentation, I believe it is a cause for celebration. A disciplinary 
situation of theoretical pluralism means that the consequences of a realist, neo-neo, or 
constructivist mainstream are not a disciplinary reality. In other words the field is not 
conditioned by a narrow, ahistorical Eurocentric problem field, it is not presented with limited 
tools of analysis, and it no longer arguably overlooks a number of international realities and 
pressing issues. Instead we have a healthy discipline equipped to help understand and explain 
the myriad of international realities we are faced with in an ever-growing complex world.  
   
Theoretical Pluralism: A Cause for Celebration.  
 
There is however, no consensus over theoretical pluralism.530 The counter arguments point to 
what Michael Banks terms an ‘incoherent discipline’.531 Pluralism, critics such as Kal Holsti532 and 
                                                        
529 Kal J. Holsti in Adam Jones “Interview with Kal Holsti” Review of International Studies 28 (3) 
(2002), pp. 621.    
530 Steve Smith “Debating Schmidt: Theoretical Pluralism in IR” Millennium 36 (2) (2008), pp. 
306. 
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Margaret Hermann argue,533 has resulted in intellectual confusion and ‘theoretical anarchy’ with 
a lack of communication between theories534, resulting in a divided discipline.535 All in all, this 
means we are in a Kuhnian state of revolution and theoretical pluralism has made it “difficult if 
not impossible, for knowledge to accumulate in the field”.536 For those who remain committed to 
Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific development, theoretical pluralism is viewed as an 
impediment to progress.537  
 Kuhn argued that science develops through two distinct phases, that of 1) revolutionary 
science and 2) normal science.538 In its revolutionary phase, science is characterized by 
theoretical fragmentation, as new theories enter a given discipline to challenge traditional modes 
of thought that are in ‘crisis’. The revolutionary phase ensures that theoretical advancement is 
always possible, but Kuhn argued that such revolutionary phases did not lead to a progression in 
terms of a body of cumulative knowledge. Knowledge could only progress, Kuhn argued, in 
periods of what he termed normal science. In an era of normal science a ‘paradigm’ would 
dominate, meaning that under this ‘worldview’ or ‘outlook’ a given field could progress to 
produce a cumulative body of knowledge.539  Applying Kuhn’s work to IR (as many, such as John 
Vasquez,540 Steffano Guzzini,541 and Kal Holsti,542 have done in order to critique the recent 
theoretical expansion), the current state of pluralism means that the field is in the midst of a 
revolutionary phase and unable to progress and advance a collective body of research. According 
to Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach theoretical pluralism should not be not be celebrated 
but despaired.543  
 There are a number of problems with the above arguments. For instance, Kuhn’s 
arguments cannot be applied to the social sciences, for he argued that his theory of scientific 
revolutions only applied to the mature sciences, and not to the arts and social sciences. Kuhn 
believed the social sciences to be pre-paradigmatic, and he doubted whether they could ever 
progress to be ‘mature sciences’. Due to his belief in the immature status of the social sciences 
Kuhn’s theory was derived from his observations in the natural sciences, therefore as Hugh 
                                                                                                                                                              
531 Michael Banks “Where Are We Now?” Review of International Studies 11 (3) (1985), pp. 217.   
532 Kal J. Holsti “”Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest Theories of All?” International 
Studies Quarterly 33 (3) (1989), pp. 255-261.  
533 Margaret Hermann “One Field, Many Perspectives: Building the Foundations for Dialogue” 
International Studies Quarterly 42 (4) (1998), pp. 606.  
534 Brian Schmidt “International Relations Theory: Hegemony or Pluralism?” Millennium 36 (2) 
(2008), pp. 298.  
535 Holsti “Interview with Kal Holsti”pp. 621.  
536 Schmidt “International Relations Theory”, pp.298.   
537 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.   
538 Ibid., pp. 10-13; 90-92.  
539 Ibid., pp. x; 24; 42-44 
540 Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics.  
541 Guzzini “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations”, pp. 158-159.  
542 Holsti “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall”.  
543 See for example Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach Ferguson “Between Celebration and 
Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory” International Studies 
Quarterly 35 (4) (1991), pp. 363-386. 
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Wilmott argues “Kuhn’s theory is of tenuous relevance for understanding the processes of theory 
development in the social sciences”.544 If we cannot apply Kuhn’s theory to the social sciences 
then the concerns about stagnation and the inability to progress are unwarranted. Pluralism does 
not prevent progress.  
 Furthermore, the concern regarding the lack of communication between theories seems 
slightly over exaggerated. One only has to look at the themes of some of the discipline’s recent 
conferences to see the attempts to stimulate dialogue between different theoretical schools in 
action.545 The discipline’s journals are also full of cross-theoretical debates, and show the 
inclination to promote further theoretical conversations.546 The term ‘synthesis’ has become one 
of the discipline’s ‘buzz words’ in recent years,547 and hybrid theoretical endeavours have 
attracted much attention and encouraged further debate.548 It seems that claims that lament 
theoretical pluralism and the associated arguments that incite fears of preventing scientific 
advancement, or illicit notions of disciplinary degradation can operate in a gate-keeping manner 
due to their attempts to limit the number of theories present. It seems that those wishing to 
protect the traditional boundaries of the discipline have evoked such arguments, to bring back a 
theoretical orthodoxy like the discipline had in the 1970s with the dominance of realism to the 
detriment of the discipline.549 
 Pluralism is exceedingly important for IR as it ensures that we uphold the Socratic belief, 
that ideas are improved through debate and critique and such activities help the development of 
alternatives.550 Progress is achieved not through consensus but “through the conflict of ideas”.551  
According to John Mearsheimer, scholarship:  
 
“is best advanced in any discipline when there are contending schools of 
thought that are free to compete with each other in the marketplace of ideas. 
                                                        
544 Hugh Wilmott “Breaking the Paradigm Mentality” Organization Studies 14 (5) (1993), pp. 687.  
545 For example recent ISA conference themes have been; “One Field Many Perspectives: Building 
the Foundations of Dialogue” in 1999; “Dissolving Boundaries: The Nexus Between Comparative 
Politics and IR” in 2002; “The Construction and Accumulation of Knowledge” in 2003; and 
“Bridging Multiple Divides” in 2008. Another recent example is the 2012 BISA-ISA joint 
convention, of which the theme was, “Diversity in the Discipline: Tension or Opportunity?”. As 
such there were multiple panels addressing the issue if generating cross theory communication.  
546 There have also been a number of works published lately also addressing the issue of, and 
encouraging or seeking, inter-paradigm dialogue see for example the recent special issue of 
Millennium titled ‘International Relations in Dialogue’ 39 (3) (2011), and monographs by Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics (Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 
547 For example see the forum “Are Dialogue and Synthesis Possible in International Relations” 
published in International Studies Review 5 (1) (2003), pp. 123-153.  
548 Hegemonic Stability Theory is often referred to as a hybrid theory. For more see James F. 
Hollifield “Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and the European Community” 
International Migration Review 26 (2) (1992), pp. 568-595.  
549 Smith “Paradigm Dominance in International Relations”, pp. 196.  
 
550 Yaqing “Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress Through Debates”, 
pp. 231-257.  
551 Holsti ,“Mirror, Mirror on the Wall”, pp. 257.  
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Pluralism, not monopoly, is what we should foster in our departments and in the 
broader field of international relations”.552  
 
Our ideas and research are bettered from engaging with others who adopt different approaches 
to us, for they force us to reflect upon our work in different ways and continue to improve our 
insights. Theoretical pluralism is be beneficial for the discipline because not only does it 
engender debate ensuring progress, it also prevents 1) over simplification and 2) enables the 
discipline to effectively deal with changing potentialities and pressures.  
 Theoretical pluralism is almost necessary in order for the discipline of IR to function and 
be relevant. Because of the complex nature of international politics one theory alone cannot 
explain the workings of international relations from all corners of the globe. We are currently 
faced with a range of diverse issues, from terrorist threats, to nuclear proliferation, to migration, 
and climate change, hence we need a multiplicity of theories to help us understand global 
events.553 According to Mearsheimer, “even if one has an impressive theory or perspective, it 
cannot tell us all we need to know about international politics”.554 Because it is highly unlikely 
that one single theory could adequately explain all the features of the contemporary international 
system we are better off with a wide range of competing ideas. Furthermore, theoretical 
pluralism prevents us from committing the dangers of oversimplification.555 Having a divergent 
range of theoretical perspectives ensures that issues are viewed in numerous ways and prevents 
from parsimonious accounts, which potentially could limit solutions. As J. Ann Ticker states: 
 
 “we must all respect and support scholarly pluralism and protest efforts to 
enforce intellectual conformity from wherever they may arise…. New questions, 
new concepts and definitions, and new modes of analysis are essential tools for 
seeing beyond ideological and epistemological boundaries that are driving global 
politics and inhibiting our quest to understand them”.556 
 
  
 According to Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith an increased number of theoretical 
approaches is better for IR because not only does a milieu of pluralism enable old issues to be 
addressed in new ways, but also “pluralism opens up the new agenda which speak more directly 
to changing threats and potentialities”.557 The array of theoretical perspectives present in the 
discipline and the correlated diversity of ontological foci has sparked a debate and subsequent 
expansion of the subject matter of IR, rather than focusing on cooperation and conflict which 
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have been the traditional parameters of the discipline,558 the influx of theories in the 1990s and 
their current adoption has allowed academics to focus on a broad range of issues, giving the 
discipline a truly international outlook.559 This has enabled the discipline to become more 
relevant to people in a variety of locations that has until recently been the case, as Steve Smith 
argues, theoretical pluralism has permitted IR “to develop theory relevant to a wider range of 
humanity”.560 Embracing theoretical pluralism means exposing the discipline to new issues and 
concerns, meaning that it can speak to a broader range of realities.  
 The inclination in the discipline towards theoretical pluralism is one to be revered, for 
the plethora of theories being adopted generates increasingly relevant scholarship for a diverse 
range of locales, which opens up the possibility of creating new future international realities. The 
present state of theoretical diversity means that the discipline is more applicable, more reactive 
and therefore emancipatory in that it raises the possibility of new and alternative future realities.    
It is important to remember that pluralism for pluralism’s sake is not desirable, yet there are real 
and actual tangible benefits to the present theoretical diversity in the discipline, for the different 
theories can help increase our knowledge and make the discipline increasingly relevant.  
 Whilst the results from the journal investigation demonstrates IR’s theoretical pluralism 
and therefore the lack of an American theoretical orthodoxy, IR is an American dominated 
discipline in a sense because the US produces the majority of theoretical works, which the rest of 
the global discipline consumes.561 American dominance may not be exercised through the 
preponderance of either realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism or conventional constructivism, but 
it still operates through the volume of outputs.562 Most theories, with the exceptions of the 
English School, and the Copenhagen, Welsh and Paris schools of security theory, have emerged 
from the US. Even poststructuralism, which is based on the works of certain French theorists, as a 
theory of IR was developed in the US.563 This final section will explore what it means for a theory 
to be ‘American’, and ask whether we can meaningfully speak of ‘American’ theories?   
 
What Does it Mean to be ‘American’? 
 
                                                        
558 J. Ann Tickner Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global 
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Given the alleged dependence of other IR communities on American theoretical texts the case for 
disciplinary dominance could potentially be made. However, if one were to examine the origins 
of all IR theories and which ‘classical’ thinkers have been drawn upon one could argue that all 
theories are suffused with both American, non-American, Western and non-Western 
influences.564 Each theoretical text and theoretical artifact is itself the product of past 
interactions. This means that bodies of scholarship, ideas, and even theories are always 
amalgamations of different intellectual sources from differing geographical locales, which 
ultimately brings into the question the ‘Americanness’ such work.565 Texts and theories need to 
be understood as the products of numerous interactions and influences. Although the final 
product is confined to, and framed by, a more specific setting, such as the US, the actual 
intellectual product and its identity is negotiated and renegotiated following the authors’ 
interactions with other texts, which take place in a context that shifts.  
 Despite the above, theories have been designated as American because it is claimed that 
they are embedded within American experiences, and aimed for an American foreign policy 
audience. Looking at the emergence of poststructuralism as an ‘American’ theory of IR, Francois 
Cusset argued that when ‘French Theory’ (or what we now commonly understand as 
‘poststructuralism’) travelled to North America it was read in an alternative way due to the 
determining influences of the US context.566 What occurred, claims Cusset, was an American 
‘misinterpretation’ of the original texts. According to Cusset this American reading differed 
somewhat remarkably from the original meanings,567 which was due to the American influences 
and experiences in which the texts were interpreted against. Resultantly, this means we can label 
this IR theory as American.  
 Cusset draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu to argue that when ideas and theories 
travel they do not carry their context with them when they travel. Resultantly when theories 
‘travel’ from one academic community to another they become decontextualised and 
denationalised. According to Bourdieu “International exchanges are subject to a certain number 
of structural factors which generate misunderstandings”.568 By ‘misunderstandings’ Bourdieu 
refers to the notion that ideas shift and suffer a metamorphosis when they are disseminated in a 
new context; “many misunderstandings in international communication are a result of the fact 
that texts do not bring their context with them”.569 This means for example that theories are 
interpreted in a different way because they are influenced by the immediate context, which is 
often different from that in which the theory was originated. In short, historical circumstances 
and national situations do not travel or follow the movement of those theories generated within 
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221. 
569 Ibid., op cit.  
 116 
them. It is the static nature of context that enables theories and ideas to be read in a different 
fashion due to the determining force of the new environment.570  
 Following Bourdieu’s reasoning, theories are dependent on the context in which they are 
generated (or in Bourdieu’s terms, the field of production), but this dependence no longer comes 
into play once ideas begin to leave the original context. Instead, they become dependent on the 
new context in which they are read, what Bourdieu terms ‘the field of reception’. The way the 
theory is interpreted and disseminated is reliant on the receptive field, that is, the site where the 
theory will be understood in light of new circumstances. The outcome of this process is that the 
theory takes on a different identity than the one it originated with. Upon assimilation in the field 
of reception, ideas in a sense are re-historicised: they gain a new history, and resultantly are now 
applicable to the new environment.571   
 Furthermore, according to Edward Said theories develop in response to specific 
historical and social reasons, but when they move from their site of origin, the power, history and 
arguably ‘rebelliousness’ attached to them dissipates as they become domesticated in their new 
location.572 Like Bourdieu, Said argued that theories can be reinterpreted, or ‘misinterpreted’ in 
situations that differ from their original environment due to the determining effects of historical 
circumstances.573 Theories, it seems, can be understood and put to use in a different manner, or, 
in other words, made relevant to the ‘local’ context, because of the decisive force of circumstance 
and situation.574 It is, then, possible that the same theory originating in the US may travel to 
different IR communities and be understood and (re)interpreted in a number of divergent 
fashions. In each of these possibilities, the ‘renationalised’ set of ideas always differs from the 
original one. What this means is that whilst America has produced the greatest volume of 
theoretical works, and that other IR communities have consumed such works it does not mean 
that they have been interpreted and understood in the same manner. Rather, the suggestion is 
that as the mainstream theories have travelled and become assimilated in other IR communities 
their identity shifts through ‘misinterpretations’ borne out of the determining influences of 
context, culture and circumstances. In other words it can be argued that they lose their 
‘Americanness’.  
 Looking at what happens when theories and ideas travel challenges the pervasiveness of 
American dominance. Whilst America may produce the greatest volume of theory and these 
theories are seemingly consumed by academics in other IR communities, they way they are 
understood, applied and both denationalized and renationalized dilutes the degree of American 
theoretical dominance. As Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever argue, “the US brand of IR is always 
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present as a reference point”575 yet this brand is mixed with local knowledge and experiences 
and interpreted against them. We can in a sense still claim that the US is theoretically dominant 
but we must begin to question the degree to which it does, and look at how American theories 
are understood and applied in different IR communities. Each national IR academy has its own 
traditions and history and these influences will shape scholarly interactions with American 
theories. Furthermore, taking into account the numerous works published recently that have 
looked for, promoted, and encouraged further development of non-Western IR theory,576 it may 
be the case that non-American IR communities are not as dependent upon US theoretical works 
as is perceived. Whilst this chapter is unable to fully answer the above questions, it has aimed to 
show that the situation is more complex than is presented in the literature and the degree to 
which the US is able to exercise its hegemonic influence is not as determining for the discipline as 
it initially appears.  
 
Conclusion.   
 
This chapter has sought to unpack the various claims of American theoretical dominance that 
proliferate in the literature. Through assessing whether these claims capture the current 
disciplinary environment this chapter has revealed the contemporary discipline of IR to be 
theoretically plural. This disciplinary reality of theoretical pluralism has therefore challenged 
certain assumptions regarding the theoretical inclinations of the discipline. Through questioning 
the claims regarding the ways in which the United States allegedly theoretically dominates the 
discipline this chapter has attempted to argue that whilst the US does not exercise its hegemony 
through creating a theoretical orthodoxy it can be still claimed to dominate the discipline due to 
it being the main producer of IR theory. But in turn this has raised a number of issues regarding 
whether theories can be designated as belonging to country X and what happens to them when 
they become disseminated in another academic community.  
 This chapter began by exploring the many claims in the literature that state that IR is 
dominated by an American theoretical orthodoxy and as such the United States is intellectually 
hegemonic. The chapter was based around empirically examining three prominent claims 1) the 
dominance of realism 2) the preponderance of the neo-neo approaches and 3) the most recent of 
claims, the dominance of conventional constructivism. The chapter then explored the underlying 
claims of American disciplinary dominance due to the dynamic of dependence in operation. The 
US can be argued to dominate the discipline due not only to the sheer volume of theoretical 
works developed in the United States, but also because other IR communities have become 
dependent upon American theoretical productions. The reliance of other IR communities upon 
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American theoretical outputs has apparently caused and sustained American theoretical 
dominance, which in turn allegedly hinders the development of non-American and especially 
non-Western International Relations Theory. Despite recent efforts to develop, advance and 
discover non-Western IR theory the arguments that proliferate the discipline are that such 
efforts are consistently overlooked by the United States therefore they are destined to remain 
peripheral due to the structural bias formed out of previous theoretical and textual 
dependency.577  
 The notion of US theoretical dominance has become embedded within the discipline and 
reproduced without question and without empirical verification. One of the underlying 
interventions throughout this chapter has been to highlight and problematise that the popular 
discourse and notions of American theoretical dominance conditions the current behaviour of 
academics. Firstly, the claims that have populated the discipline, such as the dominance of 
realism, or conventional constructivism for example has resulted in academics reenacting their 
perceived marginal positions and thereby disciplining themselves. As noted throughout this 
chapter the literature gives the impression of the dominance of the US IR community due to the 
alleged preponderance of either realism, the neo-neo approaches or conventional constructivism. 
Whilst this investigation has suggested that this is not the empirical actuality academics continue 
to define themselves in relation to the ‘mainstream’ (defined as a set of American realist/neo-
realist/neo-liberal/constructivist scholars) and thereby give the aforementioned theories 
authority. Because of the way academics refer to the perceived mainstream theories and use 
them as their referent object the narrative of dominance is reproduced. Realism, neo-realism, 
neo-liberalism and conventional constructivism are kept central and all other theories (whether 
they are American or not) are constantly compared against these approaches, resulting in them 
being reified in discourse. Most theoretical articles encounter and engage with the perceived 
mainstream theory in order to 1) critique it and/or 2) show how the chosen alternative 
theoretical account is better in order to vie for theoretical superiority or explanatory prowess. 
But in doing so each article acknowledges the perceived centrality/authority/dominance of the 
mainstream accounts and constructs their ‘outlier’/marginal status, which as my results have 
shown is not the case.  
 Even though this study has attempted to argue that the empirical actuality differs from 
the popular notions, the commonplace assumptions of a realist, neo-neo or constructivist 
dominated discipline are continually enacted and reproduced through academics behaving as if it 
were the empirically reality. Marginal statuses are being constructed by those who claim to be 
marginal. In other words, certain academics are performing their own peripheral statuses and 
actively self-disciplining. This in turn hampers academic activities, reproduces and entrenches 
certain disciplinary self-images, which further conditions scholarly behaviour, thereby effectively 
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marginalizing non-Western IR theory or any other non-American category that emerges because 
it is perceived to be marginalized by the ‘mainstream’.578  
 Secondly, the claims of a dependent periphery have generated a series of arguments that 
state that because of the consumption of American theories scholars in the so-called periphery 
simply emulate American theoretical trends. The perception of this supposed emulation is that 
peripheral scholarship produces nothing original.579 According to Donald Puchala ‘peripheral 
scholarship’ is often perceived as “nothing other than what it has been taught”.580 The fact that 
there is an asymmetry in the production of theoretical knowledge does not mean that we must 
deny any agency to scholars who adopt elements of the mainstream or use American theoretical 
frameworks.581 Furthermore, as the final section of this chapter argued even if American theories 
are consumed in the ‘periphery’ they are often interpreted and applied differently due to the 
determining effects of context.582  
 The discipline of International Relations does experience a degree of American 
theoretical dominance but we should be careful of uncritically reproducing this self-image due to 
the way this self-image conditions academic behaviour. Disciplinary accounts need to take the 
diverse array of dynamics and tensions into account and there needs to be more discussion into 
what makes a theory ‘American’ and what happens, when, and why these theories travel and 
become disseminated in a new context. Furthermore, American theoretical dominance, 
understood as a dominance of theoretical production, occurs alongside the disciplinary trend of 
theoretical pluralism. We must also be wary of overlooking the theoretical diversity underway, 
because it is this plural reality that challenges the other set of claims regarding American 
theoretical dominance.  
                                                        
578 These arguments are expanded upon in the conclusion chapter.  
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Research 34 (2) (1997), pp. 139.  
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4.  
 
American Epistemological and Methodological Dominance? 
 
Whereas chapter one displayed IR’s pluralist tendencies in terms of the discipline’s subject 
matter, and chapter two showed IR’s theoretical pluralism, this chapter will illustrate the 
discipline’s pluralist tendencies methodologically speaking, and in doing so will challenge a 
number of prevalent assumptions regarding the methodological inclinations of International 
Relations. Defining dominance epistemologically and methodologically there are two prominent 
claims in the literature regarding the way the US allegedly exercise’s its hegemonic influence in 
the discipline.  It has been argued that IR is an American dominated discipline due to the 
preponderance of 1) Rationalism and 2) Positivism. For instance according to Darryl Jarvis:  
 
“Despite the increasing array of formulations advanced to challenge this, 
positivist-rationalist-empirical approaches still tend to predominate. A perusal of 
the pages of the discipline’s leading journals, for example – measured in terms of 
circulation – all display an affinity for methodological conformity evidenced by how 
few articles feel the need to even problematise the issue of method or 
epistemology”.583  
 
 Rationalism in this sense refers to a methodological approach. Used in IR contexts it 
refers to “formal and informal applications of rational choice theory, to any work drawing on the 
tradition of microeconomic theory from Alfred Marshall to recent developments in evolutionary 
game theory”.584 The way the term is commonly employed in the discipline of IR is not to refer to 
the epistemological position of rationalism585 but rather points to a methodological approach 
that draws on certain philosophical assumptions regarding the rationality of actors in the 
international system.586 As noted in the previous chapter Robert Keohane devised the term 
rationalism,587 not only in order to refer to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, but also to denote his 
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Contemporary Epistemology (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1985), pp. 66-84; John Locke An Essay on 
Human Understanding: Fifth Edition (London: Collins, 1969) and Steve Smith “Positivism and 
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commitment to rational choice theory.588  In the contemporary literature it is frequently 
commented that rational choice methods or formal models dominate the discipline, and by 
extension so does the American IR community.589 For instance, Chris Brown laments  “The 
‘Americanness’ of IR is now a matter of the legitimacy of methods employed by the discipline. 
Those of us who do not employ rational choice thinking are now marginalized, whether we are 
American or not”.590 
 According to Steve Smith, however, “For the last forty years the academic discipline of 
International Relations has been dominated by positivism”.591 Because of the association with the 
American IR academy, due to America being the ‘birthplace of the behavioural revolution’,592 the 
dominance of positivism is often interpreted to mean that IR is an American enterprise.593 As 
positivism is a philosophy of social science it has ontological, epistemological and methodological 
components, hence IR is often depicted to be an American discipline due to the alleged 
dominance of certain methods and ways of acquiring and evaluating knowledge claims. It is 
frequently argued that ‘neo-positivist’ methods dominate,594 which is usually taken to imply the 
dominance of certain quantitative methods that are statistical in orientation. Whereas, 
epistemologically speaking, according to Molly Cochran, “For contemporary IR as an American 
social science, that playing field is now positivism: what counts as knowledge is that which can be 
proven to have explanatory power and we study it empirically”.595 The supposed dominance of 
positivism equates to a dominance of empiricism and the associated methodologies licensed by 
the commitment to the view “that the only grounds for justified belief are those that rest 
ultimately on observation”.596  
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 This chapter aims to explore these two alleged forms of American disciplinary 
dominance and to question whether most contemporary research in the discipline can be 
depicted as either ‘rationalist’ through the use of rational choice and/or formal modeling, or 
‘positivist’ in terms of whether research is being conducted under the guises of empiricism and 
using the associated quantitative methods. For the purposes of this chapter, dominance will be 1) 
defined by an actor’s capability to establish an epistemological and methodological benchmark, a 
set the guidelines or rather a blueprint for research and knowledge accumulation; and 2) 
measured by whether these principles are emulated and replicated by the global IR community.  
If either positivism or rationalism have been adopted outside of the American academy and this 
way of conducting research is being emulated throughout the globe, then there is an empirical 
basis upon which to claim and demonstrate how America exercises it’s disciplinary dominance. 
In other words, this chapter is ultimately looking to ascertain whether there is a Gramscisan style 
hegemony in the discipline with the dominant body being the US.   
 However, due to the way the discipline tends to misunderstand and mistreat ‘positivism’ 
and ‘epistemology’ the claims regarding the discipline’s empiricist commitments could not be 
empirically explored.597 Instead this chapter will focus on exploring the methodological 
inclinations of the contemporary discipline and examine whether rational choice approaches, 
formal models, and the quantitative methods associated with positivism populate the field of IR. 
Firstly, this chapter will begin by defining and clarifying the key terms that are central to this 
realm of dominance in order to avoid further conceptual conflation or confusion. Secondly, this 
chapter will then move on to explore the reasons why the claims surrounding the dominance of 
positivism and empiricism could not be empirically investigated. The problematic relationship 
that the discipline of IR has with the Philosophy of Social Science will be examined, and in doing 
so this chapter suggests that the claims relating to the dominance of positivism may not be 
indicative of just American dominance but also of another disciplinary dynamic. It will be argued 
that the seeming dominance of positivism is in part due to the discipline’s selective engagement 
with the philosophy of social science. Because of these dynamics and disciplinary 
misunderstandings the claims surrounding the dominance of rationalism and the methodological 
inclinations of IR will be the principal focus of this chapter. Therefore, thirdly this chapter will 
explore the claims that IR is an American dominated discipline because of the dominance of 
certain methods and look at the debates taking place in the literature. The results of the journal 
investigation will then be presented in order to see if the claims of a rationalist dominated 
discipline capture the current methodological trends in the discipline. Instead of supporting the 
prominent disciplinary characterization the results reveal the discipline’s interpretive 
inclinations. It seems that the discipline is more historicist and interpretive than is often 
depicted, as the methodological approaches that are popular and even dominant in the US 
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academy were not employed in the non-American IR communities.598 As such, this chapter, along 
with the others preceding it, challenges a rather entrenched disciplinary image, that of the 
dominance of certain quantitative methods.  
 Overall this chapter will reveal, once again, how complex the situation is and how the 
disciplinary accounts of American dominance due to the dominance of either positivism or 
rationalism do not reflect or acknowledge the many divergent dynamics in operation. 
Furthermore, such disciplinary depictions also fail to reflect the actual methodological 
preferences of contemporary IR scholars. This chapter therefore aims to 1) problematise the 
discipline’s handling of ‘positivism’ and ‘epistemology’ 2) reveal the plural methodological 
disciplinary environment and 3) question why certain IR communities are averse to employing 
specific quantitative methods.  
 
Conceptual Confusion: Epistemology and Positivism.  
 
To see if positivism dominates the discipline of IR one would have to look at whether 1) 
empiricism dominates and 2) whether the associated methodologies do. However, because of the 
way the terms epistemology and positivism are often mistreated in the discipline one cannot 
meaningfully explore the claims surrounding the preponderance of positivism. Examining the 
ways in which the terms are misunderstood it becomes clear that if one were to empirically 
investigate whether the majority of research in the discipline uses an empiricist epistemology for 
instance one would end up reproducing a number of problematic assumptions. Furthermore, one 
would also overlook and fail to problematise the ways in which many in the field 
(mis)understand and (mis)use the concepts of epistemology and positivism. This section will 
begin by looking at the contentious use of the term epistemology before exploring the many 
definitions of positivism used in IR.  
 Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is driven by three main questions: ‘What is 
knowledge? ‘What can we know?’ and ‘How do we know what we know’?599 Epistemology is the 
study of and theory of knowledge, and the justification of belief.600 There is not one theory of 
knowledge, but rather there are many different accounts or rather epistemological positions.601 
Many within the discipline use the term in a controversial manner and often use “epistemology to 
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refer to general worldviews, theories or paradigms”.602  For example, looking at the content of 
the 12 journals that were investigated for this thesis a number of academics explicitly labeled 
themselves as having a ‘social constructivist’603 epistemology or even an ‘indigenous’,604 
‘’hermeneutic’605, ‘Taoist’606 or ‘reflexive’607 epistemology in their articles. None of these 
designations correspond to the different epistemological positions; instead they operate as 
perspectives or methodologies, but not epistemologies. Within IR academics often confuse 
epistemological questions with either ontological or methodological ones,608 or employ the term 
in such a broad and encompassing manner that it becomes meaningless.609  
 To empirically explore these claims would be to overlook the problematic treatment of 
‘epistemology’, and in doing so one would end up reproducing a number of misleading 
assumptions. To attempt to discover the epistemological leanings of the global discipline one 
could for example, conduct a journal investigation of the sort undertaken for this thesis, and code 
for the epistemological position of the article under review. The result however would be 1) the 
reproduction of the notion that epistemologies are exclusive, which they are not610 and 2) the 
misrepresentation of the actual practices of researchers. For instance, one could discount the 
authors’ own epistemological self-identifications and read a manuscript and decide that it is 
empiricist, rationalist, pragmatist, relativist or standpoint feminist. Conducting a content or 
discourse analysis of a given journal sample would then allow one to seemingly make a claim 
regarding the epistemological orientation of IR.  Yet, in practice there is often no clear distinction 
between what epistemology is actually underpinning research. Because the epistemological 
positions themselves are not mutually exclusive researchers are then able to adopt certain beliefs 
or aspects from the differing epistemologies.611 What this means is that in reality epistemic 
claims are often drawn from different epistemological positions. Because research is often an 
amalgamation of differing epistemological assumptions one cannot designate an article as 
belonging to a certain epistemological camp. For example, articles may appear as both rationalist 
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and empiricist as they may have drawn on aspects of both, and indeed both may be required in 
order to arrive at an adequate explanation.612  
 Furthermore, one cannot code for epistemology in order to determine the 
epistemological inclinations of the discipline because in actuality there is no true overriding prior 
allegiance to epistemological positions.613 According to Colin Wight “as far as the actual practices 
of scientists are concerned, as opposed to philosophical descriptions of them, their activities tend 
to support the view of epistemological eclecticism”.614 What this means is that epistemological 
positioning operates as ‘best fit’ choices, or what Wight call’s ‘rules of thumb’ rather than ‘all or 
nothing positions’.615 Rather than an unshakable commitment to a hermetically sealed 
epistemology, academics treat epistemology opportunistically and use it as a ‘tool’ to justify and 
support research. Scholars select the appropriate ‘tools’ (epistemological claims) for research 
and if they don’t work then they select another one.616 In practice ontological decisions are made 
prior to epistemological ones.617 Therefore academics enter the exercise of research with a prior 
notion of what exists and what their object of study is, or rather what they seek to explain or 
understand. Epistemological concerns enter the fray when one seeks a justification for the 
knowledge uncovered. In other words they are made later, and work as posterior supports rather 
than a prior set of epistemic commitments.618 Instead of operating with a dogmatic adherence to 
a set of epistemological assumptions academics use them as tools to justify their claims. Research 
is guided by the ontological, and as such there is no true allegiance to epistemological positions in 
practice, what there is in fact is epistemological opportunism.619 If epistemology is essentially 
reduced to how we justify beliefs620 and employed opportunistically one cannot meaningfully 
code for epistemology and discuss the epistemological trends in the discipline without 
misrepresenting the actual eclectic practices of scholars.  
 Furthermore, like ‘epistemology’ the term positivism is used in a number of divergent 
fashions by IR scholars. There is practically no consensus on what positivism is, for example 
Peter Halfpenny identified twelve different versions of positivism being used within the 
discipline.621 This confusion is due to the fact that the discipline of IR has never truly attempted 
to understand what is, as Wight describes, a very sophisticated philosophy of social science.622 
There are many different accounts of what positivism means, and further there are “many 
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versions of positivism and much that divides those who claims to be positivists”.623 Due to the 
divergent understandings of positivism and the different ways the term is employed, the 
question is raised of how can we meaningfully speak of the dominance of positivism?  
 There are certain shared central characteristics that allow us to define positivism. 
According to Wight there are four such components, positivism is comprised of: 
phenomenalism,624 nominalism,625 cognitivism626 and naturalism.627 Following these 
philosophical assumptions most positivists hold the following beliefs: 1) A Humean 
understanding of causation;628 2) Instrumentalism; 3) A commitment to operationalism and 4) an 
adoption of the ‘covering law model’ of explanation.629 Positivism is much more than a 
commitment to empiricism or a set of methodological principles;630 it is a set of beliefs 
concerning the nature of science and scientific practice. Someone who claims to be a positivist is 
therefore claiming a belief in the unity of science (naturalism), the distinction between facts and 
values (cognitivism), the belief that good knowledge is useful and practical (instrumentalism), a 
belief in the existence of regularities (Humean causation), and a belief that only knowledge which 
can be directly experienced can count as knowledge (phenomenalism and nominalism).631 The 
belief in the unity of science has meant that methods normally used in the natural sciences have 
been transported into and privileged in the social sciences.632 Coupled with phenomenalist 
nominalism this has lead positivists to “privilege observation, empirical data, and measurement; 
what cannot be an object of experience cannot be scientifically validated”.633  
 As previously mentioned positivism (a philosophy of social science) is often 
misinterpreted and applied in numerous fashions. The four most common misapplications of the 
term are: 1) Positivism as an epistemology;634 2) Positivism as a methodological approach;635 3) 
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Positivism as science;636 and 4) Positivism as behaviouralism.637 Firstly, positivism is more than a 
commitment to an empiricist epistemology; meaning positivism is not an epistemology.  As Colin 
Wight states: “positivism embodies certain epistemological commitments, but it is not itself an 
epistemology; unless that is, one is stretching the use of the terms to make it meaningless”.638 Yet, 
many continue to treat positivism as an epistemological position.639 For example, the various 
TRIP surveys coded for ‘epistemology’ in order to determine the epistemological persuasion of 
the discipline. The TRIP surveys asked scholars to characterize their work in epistemological 
terms, asking academics to state whether their work is “Positivist; Non-Positivist; Post-
Positivist”, whereas their journal investigation coded articles using the aforementioned 
categories to determine the dominant epistemology.640 Instead of providing a snapshot of the 
discipline’s epistemological inclinations the TRIP surveys actually embedded and endorsed the 
problematic notion that positivism is an epistemology.  
 Secondly, positivism is often reduced to denoting a methodological approach. For 
instance Steve Smith defines positivism as “a methodological view”.641 Just as positivism cannot 
be conflated with an epistemological position neither can it be used to solely refer to a set of 
methodological principles. Whilst treating positivism in this manner may be useful for certain 
academics in terms of detailing and positioning their research design and methodologies, it is 
according to Mark Neufeld a misrecognition.642   
 Colin Wight has charted the discipline’s developments and relationship with the 
philosophy of social science and he noted that in the 1960s “the label science was conceded to 
logical positivism”.643 When Stanley Hoffmann declared that IR was an American social science in 
1977 he was in fact arguing that IR was an American discipline because of the dominance of 
positivism.644 Hoffmann spoke of tests, regularities, predictions, empirical analysis, and laws as 
the basis for IR’s emergence as a social science in the United States following World War II.645 He 
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used a context specific understanding of social science and science,646 and went on to argue that 
the convergence of three factors resulted in IR becoming an American discipline, one of them 
being ‘intellectual predispositions’ which we can unpack to mean positivism. Following the 
‘behavioural revolt’647 positivism, according to Hoffmann, became the ‘operational paradigm’ in 
the United States.648  
 If we consider that at this juncture in the history of IR positivism was largely an 
American phenomenon it makes sense that IR would be an American social science if by social 
science we mean undertaking positivist research. This means of conducting inquiry had not been 
replicated elsewhere and was confined to the US, as Hoffmann notes “What is specifically 
American is the scope of these beliefs, or the depth of faith”649 in the ‘scientific method’ 
(positivism). What this means is that through equating science with positivism Hoffmann was 
able to declare that IR was an American social science, because the application of positivism was 
primarily an American enterprise.650 Hoffmann’s claims were grounded in a specific moment in 
the development of IR and he first licensed the prevalent notion that exists in the literature today 
that IR is an American discipline because of the dominance of positivism. The terms science and 
positivism have since become linked to such an extent that any ‘reference to science is taken to 
imply positivism’.651 The result of which being that ‘science’ has become a problematic and 
heavily loaded term in the discipline652 and it is difficult, if not impossible, to meaningfully talk 
about both ‘science’ and positivism in the contemporary field.653  
 The final common misapplication of positivism is positivism as behaviouralism. The 
term behaviouralism signifies a movement in the social sciences.654 The concept is used to 
capture a particular timely scholarly enterprise, the aim of which was “to implement a particular 
philosophy of social science that was dominant at that time”.655 The discipline’s Second Debate656 
is often depicted as a debate between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘behaviouralists’,657 with the subject of 
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debate being “the merits and adequacy of a positivist approach”658 to IR. In order to make IR a 
more credible and legitimate discipline the behaviouralists (for example Morton Kaplan, David 
Singer, Karl Deutsch, Thomas Schelling and Bruce Russett) sought to apply positivism to IR, 
which they did.659 However, in doing so, not only did the term science become conflated with 
positivism,660 so did behaviourlism. Whilst many behavouralists were positivists and applied 
positivistic principles,661 one cannot use the term ‘behaviouralism’ to depict a philosophy of 
social science.  
 It is because of the misapplication of the terms positivism and epistemology in the 
discipline that the claims surrounding the dominance of a certain set of methods were focused 
on. As noted in the introduction, this chapter will solely focus on the methodological inclinations 
of the discipline to see if America exercises its intellectuall hegemony in this way. In doing so this 
chapter hopes to avoid entrenching certain misperceptions and creating further ones by 
misrepresenting the practices of researchers and alluding to misleading notions of 
epistemological exclusivity. The next section will look at the dynamics that may be causing 1) not 
only the contentious use of epistemology and positivism, but 2) also the seeming dominance of 
positivism itself. Because the term positivism is used in multifarious ways (as demonstrated 
above) this may compound the perception of disciplinary dominance, and furthermore, 
positivism may dominate because the discipline does not understand positivism and therefore 
cannot escape what it understands to be its positivistic commitments.662 This chapter will now 
look at IR’s selective engagement with the philosophy of social science and how this may help 
explain why positivism is perceived to dominate in the discipline of IR.  
 
The Dominance of Positivism: A Philosophy of Social Science Perspective.   
 
The previous section has shown how both positivism and epistemology are ill defined and 
misunderstood in the discipline. A potential source of this confusion is the discipline’s selective 
engagement with the philosophy of social science. Often this selective engagement has been 
driven by a need to give credibility to mainstream intellectual endevours rather than a real 
interest or participation in the debates.663 One could argue that engagements with the philosophy 
of social science have largely been self-serving measures to promote certain discourses or 
legitimate certain academic moves to discipline the field.664 The uncritical acceptance of 
                                                        
658 Brian Schmidt, “On the History and Historiography of International Relations” in Carlsnaes, 
W., Risse, T. and Simmons, B. (eds) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd, 2003), pp. 11.  
659 Kurki and Wight “International Relations and Social Science”, pp. 23.  
660 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, pp. 6-8.  
661 Wight, “Philosophy of Social Science and IR”, pp. 29.  
662 Wight “Philosophy of social science and IR”, pp. 40.  
663 Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory, pp. 23.  
664 Schmidt “On the History and Historiography of IR”, pp. 9.  
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‘positivism’ and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigms and his incommensurability thesis665 are 
prime examples of the problematic relationship that IR has with the philosophy of social science. 
 It appears that IR has adopted a ‘pick and mix’ attitude towards developments and 
theories within the philosophy of social science.666 For example, as Colin Wight notes “Often 
Kuhn’s notion of paradigms was grafted onto a Lakatosian framework for theory choice with 
little in the way of justification”.667  Kuhn’s theory was anti-positivistic, whereas Lakatos’s was 
not and was actually formulated to overcome the perceived problems associated with Kuhn’s 
account of science.668 The fundamental incompatibilities and purposeful differences seemed to 
escape many IR academics, which highlights how often certain academics have tended to select 
certain elements in order to justify scholarly moves and define what counts as acceptable 
scholarship. Rather than a concrete reading of the relevant literature often IR scholars simply 
choose what best applies in order to promote a certain state of affairs (for example maintaining 
realism’s status as the dominant IR theory in the 1970s by employing the notion of 
incommensurability). The treatment is primarily instrumental and stems from the largely 
agnostic attitude of most IR academics towards the philosophy of social science.669 For instance, 
meta-theoretical explorations are often criticized for ‘navel gazing’ or being ‘scholastic’ and 
challenged to place their emphasis on substantive and empirical research.670 Yet the need to 
legitimize work and create authority has resulted in academics ironically turning to the 
philosophy of social science (an example being Keohane’s use of Lakatos to marginalize 
‘reflective’ scholarship).671 However, as we have seen the manner in which this mostly has been 
done is selective, which has had numerous implications upon the discipline, one being the 
seeming dominance of ‘positivism’.  
According to Michael Nicholson “it is hard to dispute that a lot of research is being 
currently using research strategies based on positivist principles”.672 Numerous state of the 
discipline review articles (both past and present) have also commented on the discipline’s 
positivistic leanings.673 Despite the challenges to positivism and the demise of the positivist 
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orthodoxy within the philosophy of science, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson674 and others675 have 
claimed that many IR academics still employ positivist principles (either intentionally or 
otherwise) and hold the idea that science is synonymous with positivism.676 Often these claims 
are used to argue IR is an American dominated discipline. For instance, J. Ann Tickner recently 
stated that discipline is dominated by the US because of IR’s commitment to positivism.677 Seeing 
how the discipline does not truly understand positivism how can this philosophy of social science 
meaningfully dominate the discipline? The conceptual confusion surrounding the meaning of 
positivism has resultantly threatened any attempt to effectively use it.  
The self-identified ‘positivistic’ efforts of scholars are unlikely to be accurately positivist 
because, as previously argued, many scholars do not employ the term correctly.  Whilst the 
discipline may be depicted as positivist it may not be necessarily positivistic because the version 
of positivism employed and certain academic’s social construction of the term is often far 
removed from the actual philosophical account. In other words, positivism may dominate but the 
version of positivism that would/does dominate is a disciplinary construct rather than the actual 
dominance of logical positivism for example. Rather than American hegemony being exercised 
through the dominance of positivism another disciplinary dynamic may also help explain the 
seeming preponderance of research that labels itself positivist: the selective engagements with 
the philosophy of social science.  
The discipline uncritically adopted positivism in order to increase the status of 
intellectual outputs by attaching the ‘science’ label, but in doing so there has been the general 
pervasiveness of a ‘loose positivism’ that has taken on numerous forms. The lack of initial critical 
reflection during the 1950s meant that there was effectively no discussion of what positivism 
meant.678 This has structured the field remarkably, and helped generate the prevailing self-image 
of IR as a positivist discipline, with the majority of scholars remaining committed to this model of 
investigation. However, because the discipline does not necessarily understand its positivistic 
commitment it is therefore apparently unable to escape from it, because it never really 
understood positivism itself.679 Furthermore, because large sections of the discipline have 
arguably not been exposed to alternative philosophies of social science through their limited 
encounters with the relevant literature they remain committed to ‘positivism’. If the discipline as 
a whole was more attune to the developments in the philosophy of social science then more 
academics might be aware that positivism has been discredited within this academic field of 
                                                        
674 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations.  
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study, and that there is no longer a definitive or agreed canon of scientific explanation.680 IR 
scholars would then be aware of the alternatives available and perhaps adopt a Critical Realist or 
Pragmatist framing for research, instead of remaining wedded to a murky understanding of 
positivism,681 which is removed from the actual philosophical account of positivism.  
Overall, this section has attempted to highlight that the dominance of ‘positivism’ may 
not be solely due to the exercise of US power in the discipline but also a consequence of the 
discipline’s fractured relationship with the philosophy of social science. However, many claims of 
American disciplinary dominance due to the preponderance of positivism that have been made in 
the discipline often overlook these tensions, hence we can argue that numerous disciplinary 
depictions do not actually capture many of the current complexities in IR. It is because of the 
selective engagements with the philosophy of social science and the many misperceptions that 
resultantly take place in the discipline that the rest of this chapter will focus on the claims of the 
dominance of ‘rationalism’. In doing so this chapter hopes to prevent reproducing a number of 
tensions in the discipline.  
 
International Relations, the Rationalist Discipline?  
 
The discipline of International Relations is an American one according to Thomas Biersteker 
because there is a rationalist hegemony, which has manifested in the denial of historicist 
arguments and the embracing of quantitative methods.682 Ole Wæver’s 1998 journal 
investigation revealed the dominance of these methods in the form of rational choice approaches, 
including game theory, formal modeling and various other quantitative studies.683 The “North 
American fetish for quantitative methods”684 has arguably generated a global discipline that 
employs economic methodology to the study of international politics. Whilst not all academic 
communities subscribe to these methods, this way of conducting research has reached, according 
to Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, ‘honourable status’ in certain IR academies.685 It 
is this emulation and the status attached to rational choice approaches that has given rise to the 
claims that IR is an American dominated discipline. As Fred Halliday, argued the country that 
dominates the study of international relations is the United States “from the behavioural 
revolution of the 1950s through to the current predominance of rational choice theory 
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mainstream social science, to the detriment of the United States and much of the rest of the 
world, has been dominated by such methodologies”.686 Apparently the discipline is in the midst 
of what Knud Erik Jøregnsen and Tonny Knudsen have termed a “rational choice inspired 
American hegemony”.687 
 Rational choice approaches according to Steve Smith “lie behind the major research 
programmes in the US community, either in hard form (mathematical modeling) or in its softer 
form”.688 They have allegedly become the dominant methods within the discipline and as such IR 
can be characterized as an American discipline. Because these methods are ‘American’ in the 
sense that they have been championed by the American mainstream as the appropriate and best 
way to conduct social science inquiry,689 the discipline can then be claimed to be an American 
dominated one. The Perestroika movement of October 2000 in the American Political Science 
Association shows not only the American commitment to rational choice theory in Political 
Science writ large, but also what is at stake if rationalism is found to be dominant in IR. The 
Perestroika movement’s primary objective was to reverse the trajectory of ‘methodological 
totalitarianism’.690 The Perstroikians chiefly criticized 1) the overwhelming preference for 
rational choice approaches in the American Political Science Review, 2) the dogmatism of a 
narrow range of methods (namely rational choice and formal modeling) within the discipline at 
large, and 3) the disregard for work employing qualitative methods. Mr. Perestroika asked: 
  
“Why are all the articles of APSR from the same methodology – statistics or 
game theory? Where is political history, International history, political sociology, 
interpretive methodology, constructivists, areas studies, critical theory and last but 
not the least – postmodernism?”691 
 
Similar questions have been posed by Steve Smith regarding the content of International 
Organization.692 Smith argued that IO is representative of a larger trend occurring in the 
discipline, namely the marginalization of work that does not adhere to rationalism and its canon 
of methodological thought. According to Smith “the ratchet has been getting tighter and tighter as 
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to what counts as legitimate social science”.693 The American mainstream, it is argued, is able to 
deem work that does not follow the rationalism’s methodological guidelines as ‘illegitimate social 
science’ and is awarded the status of unacceptable knowledge. Qualitative work is allegedly 
exiled to the margins of the discipline; to its detriment as such work could offer new insights and 
important analyses of present international concerns and issues.694 According to Chris Brown the 
marginalization that takes place on the basis of methodological grounds has resulted in a distinct 
lack of methodological pluralism.695 The literature presents an image of IR that is similar to that 
of Political Science earlier this century, one of methodological totalitarianism. The dangers of 
which are not only confined to the marginalization of scholars who do not employ rationalist 
approaches and the denigration of their work. This suspected methodological orthodoxy also 
could produce a “dangerous limitation of the range of questions asked”696 and impede relevant 
and important research pertaining to pressing problems.  
 Academic inquiry in IR runs the risk of being stunted if rational choice, game theory and 
large-N studies are found to be dominant and constituting what John Mearsheimer terms a 
hegemonic threat.697 The alleged lack of methodological pluralism is apparently disciplining the 
field to a negative extent, because it closes doors to certain questions and views of the social 
realm. Because rationalism “treats identities and interests as given, and never enquires to how 
these come about”,698 the adoption of rationalist methods thereby deeply conditions scholars’ 
understanding of the world and the possibilities available. There are severe implications 
attached to the alleged American dominance of the discipline through its associated dominance 
of rationalism.699 However, are these fears justified? Is the contemporary literature actually 
dominated by game theoretic approaches? Is the discipline of IR marked by methodological 
totalitarianism, which demonstrates America’s disciplinary dominance? Despite Smith and 
Wæver’s claims to the contrary the journal investigation revealed a surprising lack of rational 
choice approaches and formal modeling. Instead of finding methodological dogmatism through 
the preponderance of a specific brand of quantitative methods, the results showed the global 
discipline’s tendency towards methodological pluralism. It seems that different academic 
communities have different methodological preferences; as such the claims about the dominance 
of rationalism do not capture the methodological reality outside of the US.  
 
The Interpretive Discipline? 
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This section will first challenge the notion that quantitative approaches dominate the field using 
the problematic quantitative/qualitative dichotomy, secondly it will question the prevailing 
arguments about the dominance of rationalist methods through illustrating the levels of 
methodological pluralism in IR, and finally this section will look at the impact interpretivism has 
had on the discipline, which encourages use to reconceptualize IR’s methodological self-image.  
 Each article from the 12 journals being investigated from 1999-2009 was analysed in 
order to determine the methodology used. If the authors made overtly clear the article’s 
methodology through self-identification, then this was noted accordingly. The self-categorization 
of academics themselves gave rise to the different categories used. In other words all the 
different methodologies captured emerged from the authors themselves (and each is defined in 
the appendix). If the author did not make his/her methodology explicit, each article was read 
carefully using critical discourse analysis in order to uncover the methodology used, which was 
then noted. Therefore interpretive judgments were made in some cases to determine an articles 
methodology. The designations made were based on repeated words, self-positioning, use of 
certain authors and any visual information such as diagrams, graphs, and tables. Interestingly 
however, most authors were explicit about their methodology. Regarding the use of mixed 
methods if an article employed two distinct methodologies such as statistical analysis and 
interviews for example the ‘dominant’ method was noted. In other words the method that 
produced the primary insights was accounted for. 
 Overall there were no major problems in judging which method was used as the primary 
means of inquiry. Mixed method analyses were not in the majority and often the secondary 
method was used in order to support the conclusion drawn from the first. Whilst this process 
was not ideal, this approach was taken in order to avoid creating a ‘mixed methods’ category; as 
such a category would not have been able to showcase the actual methods being used and 
therefore the articles relationship to the claims of US methodological dominance would not have 
been questioned.  
 According to the American rationalist model ‘proper’ social science must be conducted 
through the collection of data.700 If this can be said to be the American methodological guide it is 
one that has not been emulated globally, as it is qualitative methods, not quantitative, ones that 
are preponderant in the global discipline. Meaning there is no Gramscian style American 
methodological hegemony in operation. Looking at figure 3.1 more academics choose to employ 
qualitative methods than quantitative ones, 77% of IR scholars in the journals under examination 
used a set of qualitative principles to fortify their research.  
 Whilst this bifurcation of methodological approaches is not ideal it does allow us to 
challenge a prominent disciplinary self-image, that of the dominance of quantitative methods. For 
the purpose of this thesis quantitative research is defined as methods of data collection and 
analysis that involve the use of numbers. As Norman Blaikie notes “Quantitative methods are 
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generally concerned with counting and measuring aspects of social life, while qualitative 
methods are more concerned with producing discursive descriptions”.701 Therefore qualitative 
research is defined here as the methods of data collection and analysis that emphasize words.702 
 The legitimacy of the above distinction has been challenged on a number of grounds.703 
For instance, Barry Turner argues that all data used by researchers begins in a qualitative form, 
as it is only after words have been transposed into numbers that can quantitative data come into 
existence.704 Peter Halfpenny argues that there is no fundamental difference between the two 
approaches, only ‘surface differences’. According to Halfpenny “Quantitative data is usually 
produced coding some other data, which is reduced to a number by stripping off the context and 
removing content from it. Later, after manipulating numbers, they are interpreted, that is 
expanded by adding content and context which enable one to see through the numerical token 
back to the social world”.705 However, If one, contra Halfpenny, accepts there is a distinction 
between quantitative and qualitative methods this does not prevent qualitative methods taking 
on a quantitative dimension and vice versa. This means that at times the distinction, if adopted, is 
often blurred in reality and exercised in an arbitrary manner. 
 This study recognizes the problems with classifying research as belonging to one 
tradition or another, but it also recognizes the instrumental function of such classification. It 
provides a means of classifying different methods and for the purpose of this study enables us to 
examine one of IR’s prominent self-images. Using the quantitative/qualitative binary quantitative 
approaches dominated in certain American journals (see figure 3.2), yet this trend was not 
replicated in the non-American journals, which one would expect if these methods were 
disciplinary dominant as the literature claims.706  
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Figure 3.1: Methodological orientation in 12 international journals from 1999-2009. 
 
 
IO = International Organization; IS = International Security; ISQ = International Studies Quarterly; ISP = 
International Studies Perspectives; WP = World Politics; EJIR = European Journal of International Relations; CC = 
Cooperation and Conflict; JIRD = Journal of International Relations and Development; IR = International Relations; 
RIS = Review of International Studies; AJIA = Australian Journal of International Affairs; IRAP = International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific. 
Figure 3.2: The quantitative/qualitative split for each journal under review from 1999-2009.  
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The lack of emulation suggests that the ‘American model’ is not working as a methodological 
‘blueprint’ for the conduct of social science globally. Rather the American mainstream has 
preserved certain space for the publication of its preferred methodological approaches, whilst 
other journals seem to operating with their own methodological agendas and encouraging 
methodological pluralism. Not only does this journal investigation show that quantitative 
approaches do not dominate in the scholarship published, we can also refine the focus to 
challenge the assumptions about the dominance of certain methods.  
 Rational Choice approaches and formal models were not the most commonly employed 
methods in the global discipline according to the results of the journal investigation presented 
here. Contra to what the literature has depicted, the dominant method was actually 
interpretivism. Figure 3.3 clearly shows the prevalence of interpretivist research in the global 
field during the time frame investigated. 42% of articles conducted interpretivist analyses 
compared to 1.9% that used rational choice and 2.7% that applied formal modeling. The amount 
of interpretivist research conducted in the global discipline is startling when placed in relation to 
the supposed dominant rationalist model. However, rationalism was still very much the 
dominant American approach. The methodological inclinations for either the prominence of 
rationalism or interpretivism shifted depending on the geographical perspective used. 
International Organization, International Studies Quarterly and World Politics demonstrated a 
penchant for quantitative analysis of the sort advocated by rationalists. These American journals 
contained numerous articles employing statistical/mathematical/economic or rather heavy 
quantitative methods. What Caroline Kennedy-Pipe refers to as the ‘North American fetish for 
quantitative methods’707 appears alive and well, but it is precisely that, a North American fetish, 
and one that is confined to the pages of IO, ISQ and World Politics. There seems to a 
methodological divide occurring between these particular US journals and the others featured. 
For instance, the other nine journals shared a similar pattern of methodological content, which 
gravitated around interpretivism, historical analyses and case studies, whereas IO, ISQ and World 
Politics gravitated towards the statistical.  
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Figure 3.3: The different methodologies employed in 12 international journals from 1999-2009.  
 Figure 3.4 shows the division between the aforementioned US journals and the ‘rest’, 
and how other IR communities have not adopted the American rationalist’s methodological 
preferences. Resultantly, we can argue that there is no global methodological orthodoxy in 
operation, or methodological totalitarianism to fear. Whilst the American mainstream is still 
advocating rational choice approaches and still adopting these principles, they have not managed 
to translate this national penchant into a global one. Furthermore, even though rationalism still 
dominates in the US academy the American journals investigated still published a wide range of 
research employing a wide variety of methods, both quantitative and qualitative. We can infer 
from the results that methodological pluralism seems to be the state of affairs in the global 
discipline, and also in the US to a lesser degree. The overall dominance of interpretivism (see 
figure 3.3) in this study, and its status as the most employed method challenges the claims about 
the dominance of rationalism in the global discipline. It also forces us to examine why such 
methods have not been readily adopted in certain IR communities.708 For example, it seems that 
the way research is conducted in the UK is very different from that in the US.  
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IO = International Organization (American); RIS = Review of International Studies (British); JIRD = Journal of 
International Relations and Development (Eastern European); IRAP = International Relations of the Asia Pacific 
(East Asian). 
Figure 3.4: The different methodologies employed in the articles under review from 1999-2009 in 4 of the 
discipline’s international journals.
709
  
  The methodological approach of interpretivism is not associated with the US IR 
community but rather the British one. The British IR community has become globally recognized 
for its pluralistic approach to the study of world politics and carries a reputation for a specific 
way of ‘doing IR’. The international image of the British Academy is one of a theoretically diverse 
community that is noted for its interpretivist and historical tendencies and its lack of quantitative 
methods, especially the ones associated with rationalism such as rational choice and formal 
modeling.  Ole Wæver argued that the British community is not only “uniquely diverse” but also 
known for its ‘traditional’ as opposed to ‘scientific’ approach to the subject.710 According to 
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe “It has always been a virtue of British International Studies that it has 
valued eclectic methods and an even more eclectic range of topics”.711 The British academy’s 
preference and reputation for intepretivism has been crafted due to its juxtapositional 
relationship with the United States. Throughout the British Academy’s history, and to the present 
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710 Ole Wæver “The Sociology of a Not so International Discipline”, pp. 711.  
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day, British IR continues to define itself in relation to being distinct, or rather presenting a 
different way of doing IR from the American IR community.712  
 The American IR community is often the referent object for the British academy. In other 
words the British IR community is defined in relation to what the American community is 
allegedly not, which in turn partially prescribes the form of British IR. For example, in describing 
the character of British theoretical and methodological endeavours Chris Brown employs an 
archetypal comparison between British and American IR;  
 
“British International relations (IR) theory is distinguished by a concern 
with institutions and norms, and by an emphasis on history, philosophy and law 
rather than the formal methods of the social sciences; in both respects, but 
especially the latter, it differs from American IR theory”.713  
 
This practice of juxtaposition began in the 1960s with the Second Debate and has continued 
unabated since. In the 1960s the fault lines were drawn and over the years have been entrenched 
which has resulted in British IR faithfully and continuously advocating and endorsing 
interpretivist inquiry. The behaviouralist revolution was associated with key American scholars, 
whereas the classical approach, or rather interpretivist and historical methods, was linked to 
British scholars or members of the British Committee such as Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight 
and Hedley Bull. Therefore the second debate assumed a geographical split between the US and 
the UK.714 The debate famously played out on the pages of the journal World Politics in 1966 
between Morton Kaplan advocating a ‘scientific approach’ to IR and Hedley Bull defending 
‘traditionalism’.  
 Morton Kaplan argued for more rigour and precision to be bought to the study of IR, 
which he argued could be achieved through a more ‘scientific approach’, which would entail 
using the methods of the natural and mechanical sciences. According to Kaplan “the self 
corrective techniques of science” could “sustain orderly progress in the discipline”.715 Whereas 
on the other side of the Atlantic Bull famously argued that the social sciences, including IR, were 
not amenable to the methods of the natural sciences, he claimed there should be ‘no unity of 
                                                        
712 Robert Crawford “Where Have all the Theorists Gone – Gone to Britain, Every One? A Story of 
Two Parochialisms in International Relations” in Crawford, R. and Jarvis, D. (eds) International 
Relations – Still an American Social Science? (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 
pp. 221-242; Kal Holsti The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Relations 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Gene Lyons “The Study of International Relations in Great 
Britain: Further Connections” World Politics 38 (4) (1986), pp. 626-645; Steve Smith 
International Relations, British and American Perspectives (London: Blackwell, 1985).  
713 Chris Brown “The Development of International Relations Theory in the UK: Traditions, 
Contemporary Perspectives, and Trajectories” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 11 (2) 
(2011), pp. 309.   
714 Lyons “The Study of International Relations in Great Britain”, pp. 629 and George “The 
Reconciliation of the ‘Classical’ and ‘Scientific’ Approaches to International Relations” pp. 28-29.  
715 Morton Kaplan “The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations” 
World Politics 19 (1) (1966), pp. 20.  
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method’ and that a scientific approach could not advance IR theory.716 Instead Bull defended and 
advocated the interpretivist tradition of British IR, which embodies the use of history, judgement 
and induction and was formed based on insights drawn from the ‘classical disciplines’ political 
philosophy, law and diplomatic history. Bull’s attitude “was shared by the majority of British IR, 
and some scholars were also explicit in their rejection of the behaviouralist and positivist 
movement”.717 Almost collectively the British Committee argued that the views on science and 
methodology adopted by many of their American colleagues prevented serious investigations 
into the types of questions they found important.718   
 As Knud Jørgensen and Tonny Knudsen noted Bull “concluded his forceful attack on the 
American behaviouralists with an appeal to the (British) traditionalists that they ‘should remain 
resolutely deaf’ to demands from the Americans to follow them down the so-called scientific 
road”.719  His wishes bore fruition, as Bull’s sentiments are still very much alive and well today in 
the British academy. For example, Fred Halliday once termed behaviouralism a ‘feckless cult’,720 
and Chris Brown noted, “it is still the case that most British scholars are sceptical of social science 
methodologies, especially quantitative methods, and of formal model-building”.721 The national 
self-image of a ‘traditional/classical/interpretative’ academic community formulated by the 
British Community, and Bull especially, has been built on and entrenched over the years. The 
British academy is famed for it’s approach to IR and this way of doing IR remains the prominent 
methodological approach in the contemporary national discipline. For example 43.06% of the 
articles in International Relations from 1999-2009 used interpretivism, as did 67% of research 
published in the Review of International Studies. Given that the majority of scholars in these 
journals are from UK institutions, this gives a strong indication of the methodological persuasion 
of the British IR community. 
 As previously mentioned, the British academic identity has in part been built on being 
the antithesis to the American model.722 The following quotes first by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and 
Nicholas Rengger and then Steve Smith demonstrate the comparative identity forming exercise 
in operation that often takes place in the literature: 
 
“formal theory in International Relations – meaning the use of formal 
mathematical and statistical techniques – is a major presence in the study of 
International Relations in the United States and has what we might term 
                                                        
716 Hedley Bull “International Theory: The case for a Classical Approach” World Politics 18 (3) 
(1966), pp. 361-377.  
717 Jørgensen and Knudsen “United Kingdom”, pp. 154-155. 
718 Tim Dunne 'The English School', in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds) International 
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd Edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
pp.117: 122-124.  
719 Jørgensen and Knudsen, “United Kingdom”, pp. 155.  
720 Halliday “The Future of International Relations”, pp. 319.  
721 Brown “The Development of International Relations Theory in the UK”, pp. 311. 
722 For instance see Chris Brown “IR Theory in Britain – the New Black?” Review of International 
Studies 32 (4) (2006), pp. 677-687 and F. S. Northedge “Transnationalism: The American 
Illusion” Millennium 5 (1) (1976), pp. 21-27. 
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honourable status in many other countries. Yet, in Britain, it has remained largely, 
though certainly not wholly, unrecognized”.723 
 
“UK IR never really followed the US in accepting behaviouralism and 
positivism has historically been much less established in the UK than in the US. 
There has always been resistance to the attempts of US IR to create a ‘science’ of 
IR…. Instead the UK community is much more likely to analyse IR through detailed 
historical analysis”.724  
 
Following the second debate positivism, as we have noted, was adopted in the US and not in the 
UK. As such the US became associated with positivism and conducting research using a specific 
brand of quantitative methods, and the UK became America’s counterpart and therefore 
associated with being ‘non-positivist’ and conducting research using a specific set of qualitative 
methods. In order to explain it’s academic identity the British IR community continues to define 
itself against the US, it is for a better word it’s ‘other’.  
 It seems from this brief account that the UK has its own methodological preferences and 
that the rationalist methods do not provide the desired means of investigation for the types of 
questions and research being conducted in the British academy.725 The actual paucity of 
quantitative research of the sort advocated by rationalist component of the US IR community 
adopted outside of the US raises the question of why some ideas travel and are disseminated 
readily by other academies and others do not? The sheer scarcity of rational choice research 
found in the journals investigated suggests that certain IR enclaves have not readily received 
such ideas and in fact rejected them.726 Whether a set of ideas, in this case certain methodological 
assumptions, are adopted in another academic community largely depends on their ‘fit’ with 
what Pierre Bourdieu terms the ‘field of reception’.727 In order for certain ideas to travel from 
their original field of inception, in this case America, to ‘foreign terrain’728 there needs to be some 
semblance of compatibility based on former and current intellectual persuasions and historical 
context. This fit can come in many different forms,729 but regardless there needs to be some form 
of affinity, otherwise the ideas would not be adopted for they would make little to no sense. In 
other words, rational choice approaches are perhaps not amenable to the type of questions being 
                                                        
723 Kennedy-Pipe and Rengger “BISA at Thirty”, pp. 668.  
724 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 398.  
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729 For example see Thomas Risse-Kappen “Ideas Do Not Freely Flow: Coalition Politics, 
Domestic Structure and the End of the Cold War” International Organization 48 (2) (1994), pp. 
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asked by the majority of IR scholars around the globe.730 Furthermore they may not interlock 
with the methodological precedent of certain IR communities borne out of their intellectual 
histories and development,731 as is the case with the British IR academy. The probable lack of ‘fit’ 
has meant that America has not been able to exercise its dominance methodologically, as globally 
speaking scholars have opted for a plethora of other methods, methods that better suit their 
research agendas and foci. 
 Similarly, the methods advocated by the British community may not suit the research 
interests and problem fields of many American scholars. This study has shown that the British 
model – interpretivist and historical analyses- has not penetrated the pages of certain American 
journals, which suggests that such methods do not facilitate certain academics to address their 
respective research questions. Given the quantitative orientation of the American community it is 
important not to turn the global popularity of interpretivism into claims of a British 
methodological preponderance. Whilst this method is employed more than the various state of 
discipline articles depict it is not dominant in the US. It seems that both the American and British 
IR communities have their own methodological traditions. There is however a concern that the 
commitment to each tradition may prevent increased methodological pluralism within the UK 
and US IR communities. For example, the British IR community is predisposed to qualitative 
methods and therefore scholars in the UK tend to not embark upon quantitative endeavours. 
According to Chris Brown “very few British IR scholars were then trained in the methods of the 
behavioural sciences, and this remains the case, despite the efforts of the ESRC to force us to 
change our ways”.732 In a study by Wayne Cox and Kim Nossal into the state of British IR they 
noted that “there are virtually no professors of IR in the British academy who embrace 
methodologies popular in American IR, such as rational choice and formal modelling”, and 
furthermore that “there is a marked absence of any indication of followers of rational choice or 
quantitative approaches at UK universities”, with the University of Essex being the only exception 
to the norm.733 This study empirically supports these claims concerning the dearth of 
quantitative methods, especially those of the econometric variety. Using the 
quantitative/qualitative binary 0.4% of articles from 1999-2009 in the Review of International 
Studies were quantitative, meaning that out of 491 articles only two used methodological 
approaches that could be designated as quantitative. In the other British journal investigated, 
International Relations, 4.3% of research published in the time frame under review was 
quantitative; which meant 11 out of 255 articles employed either statistical analysis, or 
quantitative content analyses. It seems that the British IR community is somewhat adverse to 
either publishing or even in fact conducting quantitative research, which means that it possibly 
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could be accused of neglecting certain methods and being truly methodologically plural. The 
reasons for the lack of quantitative methods go beyond the scope of this chapter, however this 
section has hoped to demonstrate that the US and the UK IR academies are very different in 
terms of their methodological preferences, and this is most likely to be the case with other IR 
communities.734   
 There seems to be different methodological inclinations in the discipline, and these 
operate on a multilevel and geographical basis. Globally the discipline is methodologically plural, 
but nationally the degree of pluralism reduces as national IR communities exhibit preferences for 
certain methodological approaches. These preferences differ from academy to academy. What 
this means is that depending on the perspective used one gains a different insight into the 
methodological orientation of the discipline. Returning to the issue of whether rationalism 
dominates in the discipline, it does in the US, but not in the global discipline. The overall trend in 
the discipline seems to be one of methodological pluralism, which is evidenced by the multitude 
of other methodological approaches being advanced in the contemporary discipline. But again 
the degree of plurality experienced changes from journal to journal, and IR community to IR 
community.  
 
Conclusion.  
 
This chapter has sought to highlight and problematise a number of different dynamics occurring 
within the discipline of IR that force us to re-conceptualise and re-frame the issue of American 
disciplinary dominance in its epistemological and methodological forms. This chapter has 
endeavoured to bring attention to a number of issues that are often overlooked by the majority of 
state of the discipline reviews. In doing so this chapter has argued that the current state of affairs 
cannot be reduced to claims of whether the US does or does not dominate through its ability to 
establish a blueprint for social science research. The situation is incredibly complex, and further 
complicated by the problematic ways epistemology and positivism are treated by many in the 
discipline.  
 Overall, this chapter has attempted to make three related claims that challenge a number 
of prevalent assumptions regarding the way America is perceived to dominate the discipline 
epistemologically and methodologically through the dominance of either 1) positivism or 2) 
rationalism. The first claim that this chapter made was in regards to the way many academics 
(mis)understand positivism. Due to the rampant misperceptions within IR one cannot 
meaningfully claim that positivism dominates the discipline, and furthermore this seeming 
dominance may in part be the consequence of the discipline’s troubled relationship with the 
philosophy of social science. This claim challenges certain scholarly behaviour and causes us to 
re-examine the way scholars are actually employing the term, and question what is actually 
meant when academics states that ‘positivism’ is disciplinary preponderant.  
                                                        
734 Schmidt “On the History and Historiography of International Relations”, pp. 5.  
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 Secondly, the claim was made that the discipline is methodologically plural. Instead of 
being characterized by the dominance of rationalism and therefore rational choice approaches, 
game theoretical methods, formal models and so on, the discipline of IR demonstrated its plural 
methodological inclinations through the journals investigated. Although the prominent 
conception of the discipline is one of the dominance of rational choice approaches, the results of 
the empirical investigation conducted challenges this popular discourse. Rather than replication 
and American hegemony, the global IR community did not emulate the ‘American’ 
methodological model and instead employed numerous other methods, especially those of a 
qualitative orientation. What this means is that the discipline is more interpretive and historical 
than many state of the discipline articles depict. The sheer number of interpretive analyses 
conducted in the period under review encourages a re-reading of the discipline and how we 
capture its methodological trends. Meaning that rather than putting forth universal disciplinary 
wide conceptions this study advocates recognizing the differing methodological trends that are 
occurring at differing disciplinary levels. For instance, in the US rationalism can still be claimed to 
dominate this IR community, but this is not the case in other IR academies. Different IR 
communities have different methodological preferences, which then when viewed together as a 
composite whole generates the global disciplinary situation of methodological pluralism.  
 Thirdly the claim was made that not only do different IR communities have different 
methodological trends, whether certain methods are adopted depends upon their ‘fit’ with the 
researchers aims, which are often influenced by the methodological traditions and aims of 
differing IR communities.  The ways of ‘doing IR’ differs from IR community to IR community 
because of the different contexts, traditions and historical experiences. Each of these shape the 
contours of the respective IR academies and conditions whether certain methods are applicable 
or not. The lack of global emulation of the various rationalist methods can be argued to be due to 
rationalism’s unsuitability and applicability of these methods to largely non-American academics.  
  The primary aim of the chapter was to illustrate that the issue of whether IR is or is not 
an American dominated discipline due to the dominance of rationalism for example is not as 
decisive as the literature tends to portray. Whether the US is perceived to exercise its intellectual 
hegemony in such a manner depends on the perspective one adopts. Certain IR communities 
have sought to embed and advocate other ways of researching IR, whilst others have employed 
‘American’ methods. There are numerous methodological trends and inclinations underway in 
the global discipline, and there are also other dynamics in operation that also influence 
individual methodological decisions, such as collegiate trends, resources, and available expertise 
for example. As such this chapter recommends that we begin to question the accuracy of the 
popular narrative, pay more attention to the differing national inclinations and for the discipline 
to develop a closer relationship with the philosophy of social science, which if it does could bring 
about further methodological pluralism both at the national and international disciplinary levels. 
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5. 
 
American Institutional Dominance?  
 
 
This chapter aims to show that American scholars, defined as scholars from American 
institutions, command an overt presence in the discipline, in terms of numbers of scholars being 
published and participating at conferences. In this investigation more Americans were found to 
be present in the discipline’s academic forums than academics affiliated with universities from 
other geographical regions. In this realm of dominance the empirical reality matched the 
prominent conceptualization. However, in exploring whether IR can be depicted as an American 
dominated discipline due to it’s institutional stronghold this chapter argues that we must be 
careful of seamlessly reproducing this disciplinary self-image, because in doing so we run the risk 
of diverting attention away from the large number of non-American scholars participating in the 
global discipline.735 American institutional dominance is only one side of the disciplinary reality; 
it co-exists alongside non-American scholarly efforts. If one simply talks of US institutional 
hegemony this gives the impression that no one is publishing outside of the US,736 and as the 
results from the journal and conference investigations will show this is not the current state of 
affairs. This chapter aims to highlight that the disciplinary situation is not solely one of whether 
the US is institutionally preponderant or not, it is about revealing the other disciplinary dynamics 
in action, exploring the development of non-American IR communities, and unpacking and 
questioning what American structural preponderance actually means for the discipline.  
 This chapter also seeks to illustrate that American institutional dominance is nowhere 
near as damaging in terms of its associated parochialism as the literature tends to depict.737 
Furthermore, it seems that some forms of American dominance are more destructive for the 
discipline than others. For example, it seems that institutional dominance only merits a 
disciplinary concern if it brings about the preponderance of a certain theory, method, focus, 
which subsequently results in either dogmatism or ethnocentrism. If scholars from American 
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institutions dominate the discipline but they constitute an eclectic and diverse group then the 
associated concerns in the literature are somewhat diminished.738  
 This chapter will also examine whether the current institutional dominance could simply 
be due to the high number of universities in the US and the availability of IR courses.739 As 
previously mentioned in chapter two the US had a ‘big head start’ in terms of actually 
institutionalizing the field of IR within the university structure compared to many other 
countries. For example, according to Marina Lebedeva in Russia “there were no courses on IR 
theories until the late 1980s”.740 Whereas Leticia Pinheiro argued that; “while other Social 
Sciences started their institutionalization process in the 1960s and 1970s, only in the mid-1970s 
did Brazilian scholars turn their interest to International Relations as a topic and as an 
autonomous discipline”.741 Even in the UK whilst the discipline may have been first formally 
institutionalized there,742 the growth of the discipline was comparatively minor to that of the US. 
According to Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger “until well after the Second World 
War the numbers involved in teaching or writing about International Relations ‘professionally’ 
were small”743 in the UK. Therefore it is not surprising that the US commands a significant 
presence in the geographical composition of the discipline. However, this chapter will ask 
whether this current preponderance will continue unabated in the future?744  If the discipline 
continues to expand and be studied in a wider capacity in other countries, than the present 
situation of US hegemony could shift and we could potentially see the emergence of a truly 
international global discipline in years to come.  
 To explore the above tensions and trajectories surrounding institutional diversity and 
dominance, and to assess the claims that proliferate the literature, the institutional affiliation of 
academics were coded for (see the appendix for the codes used). For each article that was 
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published in the twelve journals during the ten-year time frame (1999-2009) the authors’ 
geographical setting based on the location of their institutional affiliation was noted.745 The same 
was done for each panelist (Chair, discussant or paper giver) at each of the conferences explored 
to see who is actually comprising the discipline of IR, and who is presenting/being published in 
order to observe whether the geographical make-up of the discipline is disproportionately 
American. Looking at institutional affiliation as opposed to other institutional indicators such as 
numbers of IR courses available comparatively provides a means of assessing the notions of 
insularity that are frequently levied at American scholars, as well the claims of structural 
preponderance. Therefore this chapter aims to see if the American journals are as parochial as 
Ersel Adylini and Julie Mathews state,746 and whether the European IR journals “largely remain 
outlets for scholarship from Western IR scholars in general and scholars from the US in 
particular”.747  Looking exclusively at the actual institutional infrastructure would not have 
provided the insights necessary to examine other structural practices allegedly in operation that 
emanate from the size of the US IR community.  
 Ole Wæver and Jörg Friedrichs conducted a similar investigation into the geographical 
location of scholars in 2009.748 They examined the institutional affiliation of authors published in 
five leading IR journals749 and their results presented “a picture of continued or even solidified 
American dominance”.750 The results shown here will display a similar pattern of American 
institutional preponderance, as overall out of the 38,478 scholars investigated 17,171 were from 
American institutions, meaning that 44.62% of the academics investigated can be classed as 
‘American’, if we define American as being from an American university.751 The American IR 
community, which is comprised of not only Americans but also other nationalities, commands a 
significant structural authority. Therefore we can argue that in institutional terms America is 
disciplinary dominant. However, this depiction does not capture all the dynamics underway in 
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this area of dominance.  Despite the overall dominance of authors from American institutions a 
number of other global disciplinary trends exist, with one being parochialism. This inclination 
was not just confined to the US IR community, but each national IR community displayed a 
leaning towards being slightly parochial.752  
 This introductory section has illustrated numerous issues associated with American 
institutional preponderance and this chapter seeks to explore each of these in turn and look at 1) 
what the global expansion of the discipline means for American institutional dominance and the 
global discipline; 2) why the US is currently institutionally hegemonic, how this is exercised and 
what are the consequences for the discipline; 3) what developments are happening in other IR 
communities and why is there a trend for parochialism in national IR academies; 4) what does 
this form of dominance mean and 5) do other factors and structural dynamics such as where one 
studies for their PhD and the movement of scholars and ideas around the globe have an equally 
determining effect upon the configuration and form of IR? In order to answer these questions 
and reveal the different dynamics in operation this chapter will proceed as follows; firstly the 
problem field as it is presented in the literature will be explored along with the claims that the 
discipline is internationalizing and that we are seeing a decline in US institutional dominance will 
be explored. The global expansion of the discipline will be analysed before presenting the results 
of the journal and conference investigations. Despite the increasing inclusion of academics from a 
broad range of geographical settings one can still claim that the US is still institutionally 
dominant. However, as previously mentioned this self-image does not encapsulate the full 
complexity of the situation. For instance, there are dual tendencies in the discipline; the 
discipline is internationalizing at the same time as America exercises its institutional dominance. 
This chapter will then look at the reasons as to why the American IR community is able to 
command a position of structural dominance, and whether this situation will continue in the 
future. This chapter will then examine the consequences of this form of dominance, and the 
allegations of self-referentialism and the suspected insular nature of American IR. Looking at the 
results produced in more depth another tendency in IR is revealed, that of parochialism. Not only 
is the global discipline expanding, and dominated by the US, but at the national level each IR 
communitiy exhibited parochial tendencies.  The inclination towards parochialism will be 
explored, and this chapter will attempt to explain this trend. Before concluding, the chapter will 
unpack what this form of dominance means, and looking at other determining influences. This 
chapter will argue that more research needs to be done in this realm of dominance to find out the 
true extent to which the US may dominate. For instance, this chapter will argued that we need to 
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investigate the biographies of IR scholars in American and non-American universities to see the 
movement of scholars around the globe, because upon further examination one may find that 
there are more American scholars located in non-Western universities. This could result in the 
dissemination of ‘American’ ideas and the acculturation of ‘American’ models thereby enhancing 
America’s institutional stronghold.753 But one may also find that there are numerous non-
American scholars located in American universities as well as other institutions. Such scholars 
could bring with them a host of different ideas based on non-American knowledge and facilitate 
dialogue and interactions that result in the spread of such ideas,754 which would temper the 
effects of American institutional dominance.  
 Overall, this chapter aims to illustrate all the dynamics occurring in the discipline that 
exist alongside each other and reframe the issue of American institutional dominance. Whilst the 
discipline can still be characterized as an American institutionally dominated one: this chapter 
aims to show that there also exists an underlying plurality.  A lively non-American and crucially 
non-Western body of research is being published in the discipline’s journals (including the 
American ones), and being presented at the discipline’s international conferences. This plurality 
of perspectives and influences may not be as prominent as one may hope for; but there are still 
plenty of non-American voices contributing to the global IR conversation.755  
 
The Global Expansion of International Relations: De-Americanization?  
 
The contemporary discipline of International Relations has continued to be characterized using 
Stanley Hoffmann’s depiction as an American enterprise because American scholars command an 
overwhelming presence in the discipline.756 According to Hoffmann certain internal 
circumstances accompanied by a specific institutional structure permitted IR to become an 
American social science.757 Despite the growth of the discipline worldwide since Hoffmann wrote 
his article, this situation has allegedly not abated, and American disciplinary dominance 
continues to operate as “structural bias”.758 Scholars based at American institutions dominate the 
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discipline’s journals and conferences, and by extension the discipline, IR is and has been “a field 
of study dominated by scholars working in the United States”.759  
 Accordingly, American dominance presents itself by the size of the US IR community 
when compared to any other country;760 there are more self-identified American IR scholars and 
more IR departments and courses in the United States than in any other national setting. 
Furthermore, the 2009 TRIP survey761 noted than “most authors in the top ranked journals (76 
percent in 12 peer reviewed journals), and top universities (16 of the top 20) come, 
overwhelmingly, from the United States”762 meaning that “American IR is hegemonic”.763 Thomas 
Biersteker noted that “More IR scholarship is also written and published in the US than in any 
other country in the world, producing the structural benefits of sheer market size”.764 It seems 
that America is the largest IR community in terms of numbers of academics – whether measured 
by membership to IR associations, conference attendance, “or (the very tricky figure of) academic 
posts under an IR label”765 – which has resulted in a greater volume of outputs.  The resultant 
situation, Steve Smith argues, is that other IR scholars are “simply overwhelmed by the sheer size 
of the US community and find it difficult to be at the leading edge of the discipline”.766 Through 
being able to convert its unprecedented size into a correlating wealth of intellectual output the 
US IR community has rooted its hegemonic position. The alleged consequence for the global 
discipline is that the American IR community is allegedly deaf, blind and dumb767 to research that 
is conducted outside the United States. For example as Vendulka Kubálkova laments, American IR 
scholars “train the best students to mimic them, they are indifferent to the emergence of global 
and regional networks of scholars in IR, and they are impervious to criticism from beyond their 
shores.  The hegemonic mainstream hardly notices, much less takes into account, national IR 
disciplines”.768 The size of the American IR community means that it can afford to be self-reliant 
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and remain ignorant to the intellectual developments of non-American scholarship.769 American 
institutional dominance has supposedly generated an insular and self-referential American IR 
community that promotes itself whilst other non-American works are neglected, marginalized, 
and denied an international audience, which guarantees the reproduction of America’s 
disciplinary dominant status.    
 Given the global expansion of the discipline and the divergent ways in which different IR 
communities are developing and researching international relations770 the above claims are 
being challenged. According to Wayne Cox and Kim Nossal there is a process of de-
Americanization underway.771 The earlier chapters through showing the substantive, theoretical 
and methodological pluralism in the discipline suggests that other IR communities are growing 
“increasingly distinct from the ‘American IR core’”.772 Although there are disagreements as to the 
degree of such enlargements and developments, there is nevertheless some consensus that the 
discipline is undergoing structural internationalization. For some, such as Miles Kahler, the 
growth of IR courses outside of the US is first hand evidence that IR can no longer be conceived 
as an American enterprise,773 whereas for others, such as Jörg Friedrichs, the clear quantitative 
growth of IR communities throughout the world is a sign of a decrease in American hegemony to 
come.774  
The past few decades have witnessed the exponential growth in the institutionalisation 
and formalisation of the discipline of International Relations across the world. Recent years have 
seen IR being taught and researched in more universities throughout the globe with the number 
of students studying IR also increasing. For instance in 1980 Norman Palmer argued that the 
discipline was undergoing a process of internationalisation: 
 
“The study has been evolving rapidly, not only in countries such as the 
United States, England and Canada, where it has been developed for a long time, but 
also in other countries of the Western world, in the Soviet Union and some 
countries in Eastern Europe (notably Poland and Rumania), in Japan, and to a more 
limited extent in major nations of the developing world”.775 
 
From the 1980s onwards the process of worldwide institutionalisation noted by Palmer has 
continued and intensified, leading many to note that there has been a movement towards a more 
pluralistic and balanced discipline. The growth of International Relations as a separate field of 
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study in different geographical settings has been chartered in the literature through an 
increasing number of ‘state of the discipline’ articles that have emerged in recent years.776 These 
manuscripts have often focused on the relationship between each national community and the 
United States, and questioned how the discipline of IR can be conceived as one dominated by 
America given the “different styles and contents of IR research around the world”.777 With the 
discipline becoming further established throughout the globe the journal editors interviewed as 
part of this investigation also noticed a corresponding increased rate of submissions from 
scholars further afield.778 Each editor reported an influx of scholarship from authors based, for 
instance, such as Turkey, Korea, Iran and elsewhere. These developments point to, not only the 
existence, but also the growing prominence of an increasing range of non-American IR 
scholarship.  
 According to John Groom this institutional expansion is indicative of the discipline 
becoming a truly international enterprise and therefore moving away from its previous American 
centricity.779 Because the worldwide institutional expansion has meant that there are now more 
opportunities available to students within their countries of residence, this has arguably resulted 
in the field undergoing a shift in the instructional location. In other words, America is no longer 
perceived to be by some, such as Groom, the discipline’s educational heartland.780 As a result of 
the worldwide growth in IR infrastructure a greater number of students are being taught in their 
countries of residence instead of studying abroad. Certain scholars have asserted that there has 
been a notable shift in the last few decades in the location of where IR students are being 
educated.781 Instead of vast numbers of students studying abroad in the US, students are now 
professed to be doing so to a lesser extent due to the possibilities that now exist for students 
study IR at local universities and research institutes. Adrian Wooldridge, for instance, noted that 
                                                        
776 For example see the edited volume by Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver International Relations 
Scholarship Around the World (Oxon: Routledge, 2009) and articles such as K.S. Balakrishnan 
“International Relations in Malaysia: Theories, History, Memory, Perception and Context” 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 9 (1) (2009), pp. 107-130; William Callahan “Chinese 
Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review 10 
(4) (2008), pp. 749-769; Petra Roter “At the Centre and Periphery Simultaneously: The 
Incomplete Internationalization of Slovenian International Relations” Journal of International 
Relations and Development 12 (2) (2009), pp. 180-186 and Kazuya Yamamato “International 
Relations and Theories and Japan: A Trajectory Shaped by War, Pacificism and Globalization” 
International Relations of the Asia Pacific 11 (2) (2011), pp. 259-278.  
777 Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch and Anders Wivel “Understanding National IR Disciplines Outside the 
United States: Political Culture and the Construction of International Relations in Denmark” 
Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (4) (2004), pp. 415.  
778 These claims are explored in more depth and expanded upon in the following chapter.  
779 A. J. R. Groom “International Relations in France: A View From Across the Channel” European 
Political Science 4 (2) (2005), pp. 164-174.  
780 A. J. R. Groom “The World Beyond: The European Dimension” in Groom, A. J. R. and Light, M. 
(eds) Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 219-
236.  
781 Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon “The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a 
More International Discipline” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 1 (1) (2001), pp. 1-20, 
also see Pippa Norris “Towards a More Cosmopolitan Political Science?” European Journal of 
Political Research 31 (1-2) (1997), pp. 17-34.  
 154 
there appears to be an overall decrease in admissions of ‘foreign students’ to American 
universities: 
 
 “The number of foreign students on American campuses declined by 2.4% 
in 2003-2004-the first time the number has gone down in 30 years. Foreign 
applications to American graduate schools fell by 28% and actual enrolment 
dropped by 6%”.782 
 
Wooldridge’s exploration seems to suggest that what is allegedly happening in the IR realm could 
be reflective of a broader trend. Although Wooldridge cites a number of possible explanations he 
still allows explanatory room for the fact that universities outside the US are growing, not only in 
number, but also in standards and reputation. In their survey into the state of the discipline Hugh 
Dyer and Leon Mangasarian also noted the reduced flow of foreign students travelling to the 
more established institutions in the US due to the national options available.783 Furthermore, 
they argued that students might now actually be dissuaded from studying in the US due to the 
high tuition fees. Similarly, John Groom and Peter Mandaville argued that it is no longer 
necessary to travel to America to make a successful career in IR due to the growth of national IR 
communities, and the associated strength and growing prestige of non-American universities. 
According to Groom and Mandaville this is both symptomatic of and is “one of the manifestations 
of the weakening or decline of North American hegemony in the field”.784  
 The expansion of the discipline has resulted in a change in the spatial dimensions of IR; 
this does not mean, however, that the discipline can be perceived as an international community 
of scholars. Robert Crawford argues “There are, at least, some reasons to suppose that IR may be 
finally undergoing some sort of geographical and intellectual diaspora”785 but he also argued that 
institutional growth should not be conflated with the materialization of a truly international 
discipline and the subsequent emergence of a global network. According to Crawford “The 
consensus to date is that IR is “international” only in subject matter and name, and pretty much a 
North Atlantic, disproportionately Anglo-American, preoccupation”.786 Ole Wæver also noted a 
similar trend; he acknowledged that the discipline has expanded over recent years as there are 
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now numerous regional IR communities, but he argues that this disciplinary 
‘internationalisation’ has not translated into a truly global discipline.787  
 This brief account of the claims being made in the literature captures the dual tensions in 
the discipline. IR is both 1) dominated by the US and 2) undergoing a process of 
internationalisation, or what some may term de-Americanisation. As previously mentioned one 
of the aims of this chapter is to reveal both dynamics, so that the claims of US institutional 
dominance do not operate in a manner which ignores the global developments in IR, and to 
highlight how “there are many indigenous scholarly communities that have their own unique 
disciplinary history” and ways of ‘doing’ IR.788 As such, the following section presenting the 
results of the journal and conference investigations will attempt to illustrate both American 
dominance and the current institutional diversity.  
 
American Institutional Dominance and Diversity.  
 
Looking at the image of the discipline generated through the journal and conference 
investigations conducted the results suggest that the discipline is comprised of scholars from a 
wide range of geographical locations (see figures 4.1 and 4.2) but that this international element 
exists alongside ‘American’ institutional dominance. The results presented support both sets of 
claims in the literature that firstly, the discipline is undergoing a process of ‘internationalisation’ 
due to the number of authors published outside of the United States, and secondly, despite this 
tendency there is still evidence of American institutional dominance.  
 Just over 44% of all scholars investigated were from American institutions (see figure 
4.3). It is important not to lose sight of the fact that 55.38% of scholarship emanated from non-
American institutions. Unpacking this percentage further, even though 35.44% of academics 
were from Europe and Oceania, there was still evidence of a lively Asian IR community. 
Academics from Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Singaporean institutions were published in the 
discipline’s journals, including the American ones, and further all of these national communities 
were represented by authors from their respective universities in the conferences examined. 
Another national academy that featured fairly prominently in the geographical composition of 
the discipline was the Turkish IR community. Again these scholars were published in the 
American journals as well as European ones and displayed a sustained presence in all the 
conferences explored. This study suggests that there are plenty of scholars researching and 
publishing outside of the US, and that the study of international relations is an international 
endeavour. However, there was one notable silence. There were very few scholars from Africa 
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present in the investigation; only 0.23% of scholars in the 12 journals examined from 1999-2009 
were from African institutions, whereas 0.24% of academics participating in the conferences 
explored were affiliated with African universities. As one journal editor noted “We 
disappointingly receive a small number of submissions from Africa”.789   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Institutional affiliation of authors published from 1999-2009 in the 12 journals investigated.  
                                                        
789 Interviewed journal editor number 8.  
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Figure 4.2: Institutional affiliation of conference panellists from BISA, ISA, ISA-Joint Conventions and 
CEEISA from 2005-2011 (Chairs, panellists and paper-givers).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Overall composition of the field from the combined journal and conference investigations.   
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 The small number of academics from African institutions featured in this investigation 
could be due to the infant state of IR in the continent coupled with limited resources. 
Furthermore, the focus on pedagogy as opposed to individual research could also in part explain 
why so few scholars from Africa were present. It seems African scholars face internal pressures 
to prioritise teaching rather than individual research. Looking specifically at the state of the 
discipline in South Africa, Maxi Schoeman noted that South African academics are overwhelmed 
with high teaching loads meaning they  “have to concentrate on teaching rather than 
publishing”.790 Teaching becomes a priority due to high student demand yet the specific internal 
structure also prevents the expansion of the discipline in order to incorporate more research. In 
general terms “relatively few academic positions become vacant, universities do not create new 
positions, university salaries are relatively low”.791 Schoeman implies that African academics 
remain overburdened and unable to embark upon research projects that would enable a higher 
international profile. The focus on teaching is crucially linked to the issue of resources. Funding 
plays a central role, for if there were cash injections then scholars would be able to undertake 
research, yet according to Cirino Hiteng Ofuho “African universities are grossly underfunded, 
understaffed, ill-equipped with facilities for top-notch teaching and research”.792 The situation is 
mutually reinforcing, thereby preventing African IR from entering into the global disciplinary 
discourse. Without funding universities are forced to focus on what generates income: teaching. 
This in turn inhibits research, and without better facilities and more staff, African departments 
are too stretched to undertake the kind of research that would attract funding from external 
sources.   
 Whilst there may be a silence from African scholars in the discipline indicating that the 
global discipline is not as inclusive as desired there is still a cause to celebrate the existing degree 
of geographical plurality. The results suggest that the current disciplinary trajectory is one of 
‘internationalisation’, which if the discipline continues along we could potentially expect more 
academics from non-American institutions to comprise the global discipline.  If a greater number 
of academics from non-American and specifically non-Western institutions continue to increase 
their presence in the discipline through publishing to international audiences and presenting 
their research at global conferences then over time the discipline will hopefully become ‘truly 
international’. There is one barrier however, that potentially could prevent the discipline from 
becoming more international, and that is the issue of resources. Looking briefly at the state of the 
discipline in Africa above, it seems that a lack of resources is preventing the field from developing 
within the continent. Similarly, in India Navrita Behera argues that the lack of funding for 
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research in India is one of the factors that contributes to India’s marginalization from the core of 
IR scholarship.793 Because of its determining function the impact of resources will now be 
examined, and in doing so the next section will look at how America became institutionally 
dominant. This section will also contemplate the future trajectory of the discipline, through 
questioning 1) whether other national IR communities can ‘catch up’ and increase their 
institutional presence thereby bringing about a decrease in American dominance; or 2) whether 
American hegemony is too institutionally embedded as to bring about further 
internationalization.   
 
How Did America Become Institutionally Dominant?  
 
Currently America offers more centres of IR research and teaching than is available anywhere 
else in the world.794 Its preponderant size is due to its institutional ‘big head start’ that came 
about because of the structure and arrangement of the global discipline and the unrivaled 
resources available to the nascent American academy. These mutually reinforcing factors 
facilitated the growth of numerous IR departments and thus scholars before the field had even 
emerged in India,795 Turkey,796 and Russia for example.797 The “institutional opportunities”798 
awarded to the United States enabled it to become and remain institutionally dominant, as in 
later years it has arguably been able to capitalize on its early institutional lead. Stanley Hoffmann 
argued that the close relationship between “the scholarly world, and the world of power: the ‘in-
and-outer’ system of government”799 meant that the demand for scholarly knowledge and 
academic consultants resulted in American universities receiving large amounts of funding from 
certain government departments. The large amounts of funding from government sources and 
private foundations enabled the American IR community to develop at an exponential rate and 
endowed it with a host of opportunities that were not to be found elsewhere.800 Additionally the 
institutional structure of the universities themselves enabled American universities to become 
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the primary arenas of research. Again this situation was not mirrored elsewhere. In Europe, for 
example, Hoffmann argued that the postwar European universities were paralysed by “public 
regulations, quasi-feudal traditions, financial dependence, and intellectual routine”.801 
Resultantly Hoffmann stated IR research was stunted in Europe, as such the US was able to 
develop a ‘big head start’802 in terms of IR research and scholarly output, because the inhibiting 
conditions in Europe and elsewhere were absent in the US.  
 As previously mentioned IR became a professional discipline in the US before it became 
institutionalized elsewhere, hence American IR was able to monopolize the ‘professional’ label.803  
The way American universities themselves developed (based on the German model), and the 
departmental structure they invented, combined with their flexible nature and state 
independence all attributed to the generation of a professional discipline of IR.804 A discipline 
that was then able to command authority and criticize other burgeoning IR communities for 
being unprofessional. Andrew Abbott noted that “academic disciplines in the American sense - 
groups of professors with exchangeable credentials collected in strong associations - did not 
really appear outside the United States until well into the postwar period”.805 The flexibility of 
the American university system also allowed the US to take the lead in developing a separate 
discipline of IR. The elasticity of the institutional structure permitted American universities “to 
adopt this newcomer [the discipline of IR] and give it a proper place next to the older faculties 
and departments (one need only to look at the often successful resistance of European academic 
institutions to accept even the much less controversial and much older field of political science as 
a legitimate discipline)”.806 The postwar era however, began to see the exportation of the US 
university model. Despite the institutional growth of IR outside the US, the prestige and 
professionalization that the US commanded meant “American universities often were the 
pinnacles of career prospects for foreigners too”.807  
The current institutional structure of IR in America has meant that the US is able to 
arguably offer the most prestigious jobs, and therefore offer greater financial incentives and 
career opportunities that, as of yet, have not been rivaled elsewhere.808 The situation is sustained 
through associated systemic indicators such as university rankings. American institutional 
dominance due to its ‘head start’ has subsequently been built into the structure of the global 
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educational system and reproduced. If American universities are perceived to be the best centers 
of IR, and can offer more advantages, financial and otherwise, then America will be viewed as the 
career peak for IR academics, which potentially means that America may remain institutionally 
preponderant for some time. The early institutionalization of the discipline in the US when 
compared to China,809 Latin America810, Australia811 or France812 was possible due to the funding 
and resources available. The 1960s were the zenith of government funding in the US according to 
Neil Richardson, and this financial support has continued throughout the following decades with 
resources consistently being piled into research grants and scholarships.813 The high level of 
resources that America was and still is a beneficiary of was not, and is not, only due to 
government cash investments but also due to the influential “role of grant-awarding foundations 
to spur research”.814 Investigating the role of American philanthropic foundations Inderjeet 
Parmar argued “It is clear that American foundations consciously have helped to construct US 
intellectual hegemony after 1945”.815 The vast financial resources allocated by foundations such 
as the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation have been crucial, according to Parmar in 
supplying American IR with resources, thereby facilitating the continued high levels of research 
positions available and departments etc that enables the US to be institutionally dominant.816  
When looking at the conditions of other IR communities it becomes clear how vital a role 
the abundant resources play in sustaining American institutional dominance. Looking at the state 
of the discipline in China, Gustaaf Geeraerts and Men Jing claim that, it is “The poor financial 
situation in the academic field also constrains the development of IR theory…Library holdings 
are woefully inadequate due to budgetary difficulties. Academic institutions are short of funding 
for research and for purchasing library material and equipment”.817 Whereas in Russia, Andrei 
Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov stated that Russia’s material weaknesses have stunted the 
development of IR research. Russian IR, they argue, lacks even the most elementary resources. 
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The dire consequences have been that the “financial crisis has lasted long enough to force many 
out of the profession”.818 It is argued that such conditions do not encourage ‘homegrown’ 
scholars to stay in their locales. If resources are indeed so sparse it is claimed academics will seek 
employment elsewhere and with its numerous universities, opportunities etc this often means 
America. The situation is potentially cyclical for fewer national scholars means fewer courses 
available for students which places increased demand on American universities and ensures 
funding and faculty positions, which therefore attracts further scholars. With the international 
reputations of American universities and the funding and research opportunities they can offer 
the outcome is that the situation serves to attract a high proportion of foreign students and 
academics alike.819   
What we could be currently witnessing however is a period of catching up.820 If enough 
resources were forthcoming to other IR communities we could soon witness the emergence of a 
more institutionally plural and diverse discipline of IR. Meaning the tendency for 
internationalization could potentially become more prominent than the one of American 
institutional dominance.  Whilst the results presented here indicate that more ‘international’ 
scholarship is making its way into mainstream circles, some scholars such as Jörg Friedrichs 
argue that the discipline will retains it’s American dominance, because this has translated into a 
disciplinary structural bias.821 Certain conditions generated the initial American institutional 
preponderance, which has continued, albeit to a lesser degree, and perhaps will continue in the 
future if other IR communities cannot exert more of a presence. We need to question whether the 
initial head start can ever be ‘caught up’, for it may be too embedded within the structure of the 
discipline. Not only are certain American universities perceived to be the most prestigious and 
offer the best career opportunities, other indicators used to generate the hierarchical 
organization of the educational system throughout the world, such as the ranking of professional 
journals and the network of peer reviews has only served, it is argued, to perpetuate the 
American dominance of the discipline born out of the consequences of its institutional structure. 
The top journals are arguably American, and most journal editors and reviewers are presumed to 
be American.822 Therefore even if other IR communities are able to populate the discipline to a 
more significant extent in terms of publications and presentations at conferences, arguably 
American scholars will still be the ones in the influential positions and at the apex of the 
discipline.823 
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 Looking at the discipline through a more optimistic perspective could lead one to argue 
that just because at present America is institutionally preponderant and may be for some time, 
this does not mean it always will be.  Looking at the recent 2011 Journal Citation Report as 
ranked by impact factor out of the top 20 International Relations journals 10 were American 
meaning that 10 were from Britain and Europe.824 Whereas in the world university rankings by 
subject matter for Politics and International Studies as compiled by QS for 2011/2012 8 out of 
the top 20 were non-American.825 Although America commands a dominant position in these 
institutional indicators, there is evidence of an emerging counter-force from Britain and other 
parts of Europe, and a growing Asian and Australian institutional presence.826 Other universities 
and journals have amounted growing prestige and their success points to the internationalization 
of the discipline taking place. If this course of action continues and non-American universities 
and journals continue to ‘perform’ well, as gauged by the above sort of performance indicators, 
then we could see the dissipation of American structural bias and a decrease in American 
institutional dominance. In an effort, however, to compete other ‘elite’ non-American, especially 
non-Western, universities may try and attract American scholars in order to increase their 
prestige.827 Whilst their international profile might be raised, we have to question the 
diversifying effects of such seeming ‘internationalization’. We have to question whether such 
universities are representative of their national communities or whether the composition of each 
respective faculty is largely American? Clearly more research is needed to explore the internal 
dynamics of IR departments worldwide and to see whether American dominance is actually 
more widespread than initially depicted in this study or vice versa.828 One of the problems with 
coding for institutional affiliation as opposed to the nationality of scholars is that it does not 
reflect or provide an insight into the movement of academics around the globe and it does not 
reveal whether the American IR community itself is more or less monolithic as it is perceived to 
be.   
Some academics, such as Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews, argue that because of the 
alleged insular nature of the American IR community it does not matter how many IR 
departments are opened worldwide, or how many non-American scholars publish in the 
discipline’s journals. They claim that American journals and American academics themselves 
remain acutely unaware of non-American developments and tend to focus on and promote fellow 
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American research.829 According to Robert Crawford “It is perverse that a discipline called 
International Relations should be so manifestly parochial”.830 Even though there is a wealth of 
non-American research available (as this study shows), some disciplinary commentators, such as 
Crawford, fear that American academics behave in a self-contained manner and have an innate 
incapacity to notice “theoretical construction in different national research communities”.831 For 
example, the 2005 TRIP survey into the state of IR in the USA revealed “American scholars are a 
relatively insular group who primarily assign American authors to their students”.832 Instead of 
familiarizing students with work outside of the US, or even personally engaging with non-
American research, the TRIP survey argued that the American IR community remains rather 
inward-looking and fixated on American and opposed to global developments in the discipline.833 
 The concerns associated with American institutional dominance will now be addressed. 
This next section will explore the concerns associated with American institutional dominance 
and attempt to show that whilst American parochialism may indeed be a disciplinary reality, it is 
not only the American IR community that is guilty of this inclination. Other academic 
communities have displayed similar tendencies and according to Chris Brown this situation not 
only makes sense but also should be encouraged.834  
 
International Relations – The Parochial Discipline? 
 
The alleged insular nature of the American academy is witnessed not only through the allocation 
of reading materials to students835 but also individual citational practices. By relying on work 
predominately produced in the US, the American IR community has become, according to Ole 
Wæver, self-referential.836 In her 1995 Presidential address to the ISA Susan Strange highlighted 
the depth of this supposed American self-referentialism whilst arguing that the discipline for its 
benefit should pay more attention to the non-American scholarship being produced for it is 
certainly not inferior: 
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 “American scholars may not be aware that they need a hearing aid. Non-
Americans have no doubt of it. You - as authors and too often as editors of 
professional journals - appear to be deaf and blind to anything that is not published 
in the USA. Ask yourself when you last quoted an author or a journal outside the US? 
How many non-American journals do you look at?”.837  
 
A number of empirical investigations have been conducted in order to show how non-American 
scholarship is being essentially ignored by the majority of American academics. Certain studies 
into citation patterns, academic syllabi and journal content have revealed that American IR 
remains virtually uninfluenced by non-American scholarship.838 For example, in 1984 Hayward 
Alker and Thomas Biersteker conducted an investigation into academic syllabi to generate a 
picture of IR scholarship being taught. Their results revealed that not only do “most American 
general theory courses do not do justice to the world-wide variety of substantively and politically 
significant approaches to international relations”839 there was also a striking tendency of 
parochialism in the form of self-referentialism. They argued that  “most ‘leading’ American 
instructors of courses on theories of international relations were exceedingly parochial”840 
because the majority of course readings on syllabuses were written by American scholars. 
More recently in 2001 Kim Nossal embarked upon an investigation into the citation 
patterns of IR textbooks in order to decipher whether the same insular and self-referential 
characteristics were reflected in IR textbooks that are used to introduce students to the field.841 
His investigation arguably revealed clear evidence of a deep parochialism in American IR texts;  
 
“Nearly all of the textbooks surveyed leave their readers with the 
unmistakable impression that there is no one writing in English outside the United 
States on world politics. With but a few exceptions, overwhelmingly the references, 
the suggestions for further reading, and the selected biographies are the works of 
American scholars, writing in American journals, or for American publishing 
houses”.842  
 
The suspected self-referential nature of American IR has been interpreted by the above authors 
to construct a view of IR as an ethnocentric discipline; a discipline that despite its global nature is 
dominated by American scholars and their associated worldview.  
 Whilst this investigation does not examine citation patterns and individual engagement 
with the literature, it can address the claims of parochialism due to editorial selection. Figure 4.4 
shows that 84.5% of authors from the five American journals investigated were affiliated with 
American institutions. The American journals displayed a strong proclivity for publishing work 
by scholars from US universities, which indicates one form of American parochialism being 
exercised. However, the American IR community was not the only IR academy guilty of 
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 166 
promoting national scholarship. According to Gunther Hellmann “parochialism seems to be an 
almost inevitable and universal characteristic of IR globally”.843 Looking at Figure 4.5 we can see 
that each journal had a tendency to publish more work from scholars within its associated 
geographical domain. In other words, the British journals tended to privilege authors affiliated 
with British Institutions than ‘foreign’ or rather non-British ones, and so on. Parochialism, 
understood as the practice of promoting national research, was not confined to the US IR 
community as figure 4.5 illustrates. Whilst the US exhibited a stronger inclination to publish 
‘domestic’ research, than other IR communities, this could be due to the increased numbers of 
American scholarship available. The disciplinary trend for parochialism was even more 
pronounced in the discipline’s conferences as we can see from figure 4.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Institutional affiliation of all scholars published in International Organization, International 
Security, International Studies Perspectives, International Studies Quarterly and World Politics from 1999-
2009. 
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Figure 4.5: Institutional affiliation of authors published in International Studies Quarterly (American), 
International Relations (British), Cooperation and Conflict (European), and the Australian Journal of 
International Affairs (Australian) from 1999-2009.  
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Figure 4.6: Institutional affiliation of participants at the BISA, CEEISA, ISA, and the ISA-Joint Convention 
conferences from 2005-2011 (Chairs, panellists and paper-givers).  
The results of the journal and conference investigations suggest that there may be a logic of 
parochialism operating at the national level. Rather than the existence of a singular practice of 
insularity confined to the US IR academy the situation in the US is representative of a more 
endemic disciplinary situation and mode of academic behaviour. In Richard Whitley’s account of 
the way academic communities operate, he argues that there is a rational sense to being 
parochial due to the fact academic reputations are much more bound up with your national 
academic community than the international community.844  
 By exploring his concept of mutual dependence we begin to see how this is so.  
Academics depend upon the recognition of their work by colleagues, they are bound together by 
their dependence “to make competent contributions to collective intellectual goals and acquire 
prestigious reputations which lead to material rewards”.845 Researchers seek to persuade peers 
of the importance and relevance of their work; therefore reputations and academic credentials 
are built on the acceptance of others.846 Scholars seek the acceptance from local peers first, which 
if given then develops outwards nationally. One’s reputation is founded in relation to those 
closest first (which usually means one’s research community and institutional colleagues) and 
then tied to a web of constructed dependence that is centered upon one’s national academic 
community. As research clusters and networks are built, the point of immediacy is the national 
context and one’s entrance into such associations is often reliant upon a fore-grounded 
recognition that has been granted by one’s national peers. This situation is never ending; 
scholars are in constant need of approval throughout one’s career, and this approval tends to 
originate with those based locally or within our research networks predicated upon national 
recognition.847 International reputations can be crafted but they themselves are dependent upon 
a previously established national reputation and also the disciplinary hierarchical structure itself. 
According to Ole Wæver “recognition is the central medium, but recognition from some colleague 
counts more than from others”.848 Whether one gains an international reputation is predicated 
upon the approval of those who have already amounted a prestigious reputation. An 
endorsement from a scholar who is internationally renowned will immediately establish a 
merited reputation, yet the foundation of all these mutually dependent relationships is the 
national community.849 Following these arguments one could claim that it makes sense for each 
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IR community to privilege the national dimension in order to help establish and entrench 
reputations.  
 Furthermore, different national IR communities experience different structural 
constraints, which may affect the relationship academics have with the international sphere. For 
example, in the UK the government devised the Research Excellent Framework in order to rate 
academic departments.850 This framework encourages British academics to publish in 
international journals, especially the top ranked American ones. In the UK IR academics tend to 
strive for an ‘international’ reputation, however this desire is not necessarily universal. In Brazil 
for example IR scholars are much more tied to their national context and pressures are placed on 
publishing in national rather than international journals.851 Aside from Western Europe, Israel 
and parts of South East Asia “For much of the rest of the world of IR scholars … trying to get an 
article published in a leading journal – unless you actually aspire to a career in the United States 
or Europe – is not the most relevant or strategic career move”.852 It seems that not everyone 
desires to carve out an international reputation, preferring instead to be ‘national stars’.853 
Moreover, given the pressures that scholars face in terms of language barriers it may be 
preferred if not deemed the ‘moral’ choice to publish in ones own language as opposed English, 
which then would rule out publishing in certain journals.854  
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Figure 4.7: Institutional affiliation of all scholars published in the British journals International Relations 
and the Review of International Studies from 1999-2009.  
 
 Taking the above into account may explain the proclivity for parochialism, and when 
looked at in the reverse it may account for the high percentage of American scholars publishing 
in American journals (compare figures 4.4 and 4.7). Work can only be published if it is sent in, 
and given mutual dependence, national pressures, or language constraints perhaps non-
American scholarship is being sent elsewhere, and more specifically to national IR journals. 
Whilst we may lament the parochial leanings of each journal investigated, especially the 
American ones, it can make sense to be ‘parochial’ for there are material rewards associated, 
especially if one is from an academic community that privileges the national as opposed to the 
international academic realm.855 There are no universal standards, and we must remember not 
to apply our own institutional expectations and pressures on to others. As Wæver argues IR is 
different in different places,856 but also different practices and standards exist, some of which 
may actively encourage parochialism.  
 The claims of American dominance do depict the disciplinary reality, however they do 
not capture all the dynamics occurring. This chapter has so far stressed that there are three 
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composite dynamics operating in the discipline. At the international disciplinary level IR 
experiences 1) American dominance and 2) processes of de-Americanization. Furthermore, the 
tensions between these dynamics raise a number of questions about the future trajectory of the 
discipline and which dynamic may become more prominent. Whereas at the national level each 
IR community experiences and even in some cases promotes 3) parochialism. Additionally, 
another explanatory factor for the comparatively higher degree of parochialism in the US 
publications could be due to the size of the American IR community and therefore another 
consequence of the vast number of universities in the USA housing IR faculty. If American 
parochialism and institutional dominance is an outcome of the structure of the global discipline, 
and the fact there are more ‘American’ IR scholars than academics from other national 
communities, this raises the question of what does this form of dominance mean? Does it shape 
the discipline to a negative extent because more authors from American universities are 
published and present in international outlets of academic expression? The situation is 
multilayered and complex, which is further compounded by the questions raised of what this 
form of dominance entails for the discipline. This chapter will now focus on these questions and 
attempt to provide some answers.   
 
What Does American Institutional Dominance Mean for the Discipline? 
 
According to Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews it is irrelevant how many IR courses spring up 
worldwide and it is immaterial how many research institutes materialise because what really 
counts is what is being taught and researched.857 They have argued that it does not matter if the 
discipline is truly international in institutional terms if “the fundamental ideas investigated and 
taught within those departments are the exclusive products of a limited number of scholars”858. If 
the same American ‘brand’ of IR is taught worldwide and reproduced and cemented this creates 
the potential for the production of a narrow and ethnocentric global discipline. This 
understanding also works in the reverse. For instance, if the discipline is dominated 
institutionally by the US, which I have shown that it is, this could potentially be unproblematic if 
the material being taught and the research being conducted was diverse and multi-centric. One 
can imply that in a sense, is does not matter if there are more ‘Americans’ publishing and 
presenting as long as what they do produce is pluralistic. This then draws on the notion that 
some forms of dominance are more meaningful, or in other words, more detrimental to the 
discipline.  
 If American institutional dominance is simply a product of the size of the US community, 
in terms of the fact that there are more self-identified IR scholars then this will and has 
translated into a higher presence in the discipline’s journals and conferences. This only becomes 
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a disciplinary problem, it seems, if this IR community institutionalises its ideas and way of doing 
IR as the universal template to be adhered to by all IR academics worldwide.859 Therefore 
institutional dominance is only of concern if it goes hand in hand with the other forms of 
dominance such as adhering to the American agenda, theoretical or methodological dominance, 
or if this structural preponderance has been generated intentionally through editorial selection 
and gate-keeping strategies rather than being the product of the sheer volume of American 
academics when compared to other IR enclaves.  
 What we need to ask ourselves is what does it mean to be an ‘American’ scholar? Leaving 
theoretical, and methodological questions aside for the moment, if being an American IR 
academic is tied up with a certain way of viewing the world, and a certain set of assumptions 
borne out of shared experiences and situations then there are serious consequences to American 
institutional dominance. The preponderance of such an outlook would leave a large portion of 
the discipline blind to peculiarities,860 and open to the problems associated with ethnocentrism, 
orientalism, and even colonial/imperialism.861 Certain forms of knowledge would be privileged 
and others delegitimized, biases would be created within the discipline and the scope for agency 
and inclusion severely limited.862 Through tackling issues in international relations through such 
an ‘American’ perspective (if there is one) could lead to ‘real world problems’ due to the 
essentialist treatment of phenomena and a dismissal of ‘local’ knowledge. Whilst my results show 
(see chapter one) that the discipline is not adhering to the American agenda and is focusing on a 
wide range of issues, this does not mean to say that these issues are not being dealt with in an 
ethnocentric fashion due to the embedded nature of the academic within an ‘American’ outlook. 
Clearly there are severe potential consequences and repercussions to American institutional 
dominance.   
 At this juncture more research needs to be done into the nationalities of academics in 
order to assess whether there is the dominance of an ‘American’ outlook. One would need to 
investigate the biographies of IR academics and to see how ‘American’ the US academy is and 
how ‘American’ other IR departments are worldwide. Coding for institutional affiliation does not 
provide us with this information. Therefore in order to gain a clearer insight into the movement 
of scholars and therefore ideas around the globe, to see if Adylini and Mathews fears are realised, 
we would need to explore individual scholars backgrounds and the formation of their academic 
identities. Other factors may be more influential than nationality for example, such as where one 
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studies for their PhD. Becoming situated within a specific institutional framework and ‘way’ of 
studying the discipline could be the decisive force in the generation of a scholarly outlook and the 
ideas she or he embodies and adopts, more so than nationality. For instance if ‘non-American’ 
scholars have been spent time studying or working in American institutions they may have been 
acculturated in ‘American’ methods etc. This could lead to the ‘American’ model of IR being 
exported around the globe, entrenching and even exacerbating American structural 
preponderance in the manner that Adylini and Mathews lament. By looking at biographical 
information, and the movement of academics and ideas around the world would perhaps create a 
slightly different map of the discipline, one that may be more of less dominated by the US.  
 If one were to look at the nationality of IR scholars however, we may find that many 
academics that work in American IR departments are from different nationalities. If this were the 
case then they would most likely bring with them a host of ideas and traditions, meaning that 
they might not hold an ‘American’ worldview, and upon inclusion within an American university 
may even morph the identities and ideas of others. It can be argued that the situation is in 
constant flux, and whilst we all operate with our own worldviews, it is quite difficult to establish 
the determining factors: nationality, education, and so on. All play an influential role, but what we 
can draw from this insight is that IR communities are not as rigid or as clearly defined as we tend 
to presuppose. In our discussions and disciplinary mapping exercises we need to be careful of 
producing homogenous monolithic depiction of IR communities, and look deeper into the 
dynamics of interaction and movement of scholars in and around the globe. This reflexive 
exercise, has perhaps posed more questions than it has answered, and it is evident that more 
research needs to be conducted in order to unpack the claims made here and to provide a more 
nuanced account of the geographical composition of the discipline. Whilst the results have 
produced an image of American institutional dominance, they have not been able to depict the 
specific global positioning of American and non-American scholars, and the associated 
movement of ideas. 
 
Conclusion.   
 
The results of the journal and conference investigations while depicting a plethora of scholars 
researching and writing beyond the confines of the US academy also confirms the presence of 
American institutional dominance. Prefixing dominance with the institutional label, or defining 
dominance as institutional/structural dominance, there are empirical grounds with which we 
can describe IR as an American dominated discipline.  Stanley Hoffmann’s characterization 
applies to represent the contemporary geographical composition of the discipline; International 
Relations is a discipline comprised of more American scholars than those emanating from other 
IR communities. This picture of American preponderance however, is not as clear-cut as initially 
envisaged and the situation is more complex than such accounts denote. For instance, according 
to Peter Marcus Kristensen it is not simply the case of American institutional dominance writ 
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large, but this claim can be refined to include the dominance of a specific region of America.863 
Kristensen’s research into prominent sites of publication shows the dominance of a certain set of 
American universities, all residing in the North East caucus of the US. Once again it seems that 
claims of American institutional dominance need to be refined and expanded upon to capture all 
the dynamics underway.  
 Furthermore, this chapter has sought to question whether American institutional 
preponderance - whether it is American broadly speaking, or a specific group of American 
institutions – is the real concern. This chapter has suggested that it seems to be the ideas, 
theories, outlooks and so on that latch on to the geographical preponderance that are the 
primary concern. Arguably American institutional dominance only becomes a concern and 
warranted of attention and therefore remedy if this coincides with the dominance of an 
‘American’ outlook or way of viewing the world. If American scholars, or those academics 
affiliated with American universities are publishing and presenting more research, but this 
research is diverse, plural and not embedded within a specific ethnocentric foundation then the 
dominant market size of the US academy is not deemed to be as problematic.864 If for example 
this situation is bought about through gate-keeping and exclusionary practices, or has 
engendered rampant ethnocentric research then this is another issue and cause for concern. As 
such this chapter has also sought to raise the following questions and avenues for further 
research in order to unpack and further re-assess this form of dominance: Who are the non-
American universities employing? How ‘American’ is the American IR community? And what 
does it mean to be ‘American’? The answers to these questions will shape the implications and 
the extent to which the US is actually institutionally dominant. For example, if non-American 
universities are employing a relatively large amount of American scholars and it is these scholars 
who are publishing in the international journals, then the degree to which American is 
institutionally dominant will be more profound. Conversely, if the American universities 
themselves are comprised of scholars emanating from different parts of the globe, and are 
actively drawing on these ‘national’ experiences and academic literature then the current level of 
American dominance becomes somewhat diminished. More research clearly needs to be done in 
order to address the question of American institutional dominance in more nuanced terms, and 
to see if American institutional dominance has resulted in the dominance of an ‘American’ 
outlook and framing of research.  
 Whilst this chapter has not been able to answer the above questions, it has attempted to 
provide an explanation as to how America became and remains institutionally preponderant. 
American institutional dominance is largely due to the vast demographic size of its research 
community, in terms of the number of academics present in the American IR academy. Thomas 
Biersteker argued: “At least in part, American intellectual hegemony is a simple product of the 
sheer volume of American IR scholarship. Whether indicated by the number of universities, 
                                                        
863 Peter Marcus Kristensen “The geography of International Relations - mapping the "American 
Social Science" Paper presented at the BISA-ISA joint Convention, Edinburgh, June 2012.  
864 Acharya and Buzan “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?”, pp. 293.  
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think-tanks, or academic and research positions, there are more active IR research scholars 
working in the US than in any other country in the world.865 This chapter has argued that two 
internal conditions explain this structural reality. In institutional terms the US became 
disciplinary dominant because of 1) the actual structure and arrangement of the global discipline 
and 2) the unrivalled resources available in America. These two conditions explain why America 
was able to institutionalise the discipline and develop a body of scholars earlier than other IR 
enclaves. According to Richard Little:  
 
“It is simply a fact of life that during the course of the twentieth century the 
USA was able to devote more resources to research than any other country in the 
world. As a consequence, it was able to establish the necessary critical mass in large 
numbers of fields to set the research agenda and to be at the cutting edge of 
research developments”.866  
 
These two factors endowed the US IR community with a ‘big head start’. The question now 
remains of whether other IR communities can ‘catch up’ or whether the head start has translated 
into an irremovable irreversible structural bias? Whilst US universities remain at the apex of the 
career hierarchy and American journals arguably remain the number one destination for 
scholars seeking to acquire an international reputation867 there is evidence to suggest that the 
growth of other IR communities has resulted in the growth of prestige and stature of non-
American universities and journals.868 This can be seen by the shift in world university rankings, 
the journal citation reports and the decreased flow of students to the US. Combined with the 
growing number of non-American’s publishing in the discipline’s international journals and 
presenting at the discipline’s global conferences (see figures 4.1 and 4.2) its seems that the 
discipline is slowly internationalizing. Whilst America may remain institutionally dominant for 
some time, it seems that IR is on trajectory of internationalization, meaning that overtime we 
could see a decrease in American institutional preponderance. In exploring these explanatory 
factors and examining the results of the journal and conference investigation this chapter has 
sought to illustrate that there is a dual tendency in the discipline. Two dynamics are operating 
simultaneously and the tensions between the two will shape the future composition of the 
discipline. At present the discipline is experiencing a process of internationalization at the same 
time as it experiences American institutional dominance. However, this chapter has also 
demonstrated that a third dynamic is occurring that of parochialism,  
 In addition to confirming US institutional dominance, and showing the wealth of non-
American IR scholars present through publishing and presenting in the discipline, this 
investigation also revealed national parochial tendencies. The associated claims of parochialism 
that go hand in hand with claims of American institutional dominance in the literature were not 
                                                        
865 Thomas Biersteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony”, pp. 309.  
866 Richard Little “Series Editor Preface” in Friedrichs, J. European Approaches to International 
Relations Theory: A House With Many Mansions (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), pp. iii.  
867 Hellmann “International Relations as a Field of Study”.  
868 See for example Kirby “On Chinese, European and American Universities”, pp. 139-146.  
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specific to the US. Whilst parochial tendencies (measured and defined as promoting national 
research) may be more pronounced in the United States, the results revealed that there is a 
broader disciplinary logic underway. The inclination to be parochial was not just an American 
trait but also a global one. Each regional IR community displayed its parochial credentials. 
According to Biersteker “All nationally constituted communities of International Relations are 
parochial in one way or another… while the American International Relations community is most 
certainly parochial, it is hardly alone in the world for being so”.869  
 Overall, there are many dynamics operating in the field and occur at different levels. 
Some of these dynamics explain the current American institutional preponderance whereas 
others call into question its initial significance and meaning. Whilst the results show that the 
American IR community commands a significant and dominant presence in the institutional 
structure of the discipline ultimately we need to question how revealing this insight is, and ask 
whether or not this situation is peculiar to IR. According to Richard Little “Most research, in most 
disciplines is carried out within the US”,870 which raises the question of whether all academic 
disciplines experience a similar American institutional preponderance? Once again more 
research needs to be conducted in order to see whether we can continue to employ the use of 
Hoffmann’s disciplinary characterisation if it is to invoke and signify any deeper meaning.
                                                        
869 Biersteker, “The Parochialism of Hegemony”, pp. 311.  
870 Little, “Series Editor’s Preface”, pp. iii.  
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6. 
 
American Dominance as Gate-Keeping? 
 
All academic disciplines are policed to a certain extent, and the discipline of IR is no exception. 
What is included or excluded into mainstream discourses largely rests upon editorial selection 
and the political practices of publication.871 In the case of IR it is argued that entrance into the 
‘elite journals’ or the upper echelons of the global discipline is apparently only guaranteed by 
adhering to the mainstream’s agenda, and apparently the mainstream is American.872 Certain 
academics, such as Arlene Tickner,873 Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews874, have argued that the 
United States exercises its disciplinary hegemony through its capacity to maintain the status quo 
structure of the field with certain gate-keeping strategies. American power is operationalised 
through 1) granting access to the international disciplinary realm to scholarship that adheres to 
the American mainstream’s preferences, and 2) by constructing barriers to prevent non-
American IR scholarship from being included in the global IR conversation. Arguments of 
American dominance through its gate-keeping abilities however do not capture all the dynamics 
and gate-keeping practices underway in the discipline. The situation is far more complex than 
many disciplinary accounts depict, for instance the gate-keeping practices are more varied, as are 
the gate-keepers themselves. This chapter aims to reveal the actual gate-keeping practices 
occurring, highlight who the gate-keepers are and question whether they are in fact 
predominantly American, and in doing so this chapter challenges certain assumptions of 
American dominance that prevail in the literature.  
This chapter will begin by exploring the claims of gate-keeping by the American IR 
community in more depth and look at how gate-keeping practices are claimed to be exercised. 
The literature gives two such explanatory mechanisms. Firstly, it is claimed that language is used 
as a means of excluding non-American, or more specifically non-Western research. The alleged 
linguistic bias within the discipline has meant that not only have the discipline’s borders been 
policed through using language as a tool of disciplinarity, but also that this penchant for English 
itself perpetuates US dominance. Secondly, it is argued that it is primarily American scholars who 
                                                        
871 As previously noted academic reputations are partially dependent on publications-publication 
rates have a huge impact not only on future publication prospects but also on academic careers. 
The importance of journal access and the subsequent entrance into the ‘international academic 
arena’ is why journal selection processes are viewed as a disciplinary gate-keeping function and 
demonstration of dominance by some academics.  
872 Roland Bleiker “Forget IR Theory” in Chan, S., Mandaville, P. and Bleiker, R. (eds) The Zen of 
International Relations: IR Theory from East to West (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 44-45.  
873 Arlene Tickner “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World” Millennium 32 (2) (2003), 
pp. 295-324.  
874 Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews “Are the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious 
World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations” International Studies Perspectives 
1 (3) (2000), pp. 289-303. 
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are in positions of power within the discipline. Most journal editors, whose efforts and 
interventions crucially shape the field, are allegedly American (or rather from American 
institutions) and therefore advocate accordance with American mainstream’s standards. These 
accounts, as previously mentioned, do not denote all the gate-keeping practices occurring. 
Furthermore, they also keep the focus primarily orientated around the practices of the 
discipline’s journal editors, which overlooks a number of other actors who shape the field 
through their gate-keeping roles; the rest of this chapter will therefore attempt to draw attention 
to these actors.   
 Secondly, this chapter will draw attention to the way the discipline is shaped through 
current gate-keeping practices. The image of the field generated by the journal and conference 
investigations and presented in the previous chapters suggests that the discipline of IR is diverse 
and becoming more international. The disciplinary plurality and diversity implies that, generally 
speaking, research is not being excluded on substantive, theoretical, methodological, or 
institutional grounds. In other words, its seems that one does not have to adhere to the 
established rules set out by the American mainstream in order to gain access to the international 
realm through being published or gaining recognition. Instead gate-keeping practices are 
exercised through the language of standards and whether an article ‘fits’ with the selected 
publication. Each journal has its own agenda, which means that journal editors and their 
reviewers will actively mould the content of each publication and therefore subtlety shape the 
field. There also appears to be a concentrated effort occurring to further ‘internationalise’ the 
discipline. Each of the editors interviewed expressed a responsibility to 1) increase the 
international profile of the discipline through publishing scholarship from a broad range of 
locations, and 2) to include a diverse array of scholars - in terms of interest areas, gender, 
theoretical persuasion, and institutional affiliation - on their editorial boards. Overall, it seems 
that the gate-keeping that takes place is largely not based on where the author is form, and 
whether the research can be designated as non-American or non-Western but rather the style 
and to a degree the content of the manuscript.  
 Thirdly, this chapter will take an in-depth look at who the discipline’s gate-keepers are. 
Thereby questioning the claims surrounding America’s disciplinary dominance through its 
scholars predominantly being in positions of power. The composition of the editorial boards of 
the 12 journals investigated will be examined, as will the journal editors of these publications. By 
taking into account the institutional affiliation and theoretical perspectives of this group it seems 
that whilst American scholars are a prominent group they are not dominant. This chapter will 
argue that selecting editors and reviewers is a political enterprise and explore the tensions 
between these two groups and how they shape the contours of the field, thereby highlighting the 
gate-keeping role of the reviewer, which is often overlooked. Aside from the reviewers, and 
editors there is another politicized gate-keeping force in operation that this chapter will draw 
explicit attention to, and attempt to problematise, and that is the role of Thomson Reuters.  This 
chapter will also look at the effect Thomson Reuters – and more specifically its journal citation 
reports and its determining indicator the journal impact factor (JIF) - is having on the discipline. 
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This chapter will argue that this indicator is shaping the content of IR’s journals, and that 
Thomson Reuters itself is policing the discipline through its selection criteria and other means.    
 Overall, this chapter recognizes that gate-keeping practices do take place in IR but that 
1) the exercise of the power of inclusion or exclusion does not strictly belong to the American 
mainstream, and 2) functions in a number of other ways than the literature tends to depict. The 
power of exclusion is the property of an international group of editors, and Thompson Reuters of 
which both use the language of standards to potentially marginalize work. The situation is 
multifaceted and there are numerous different dynamics and tensions occurring, all of which 
shape the contours of the discipline. The image of the discipline presented here will differ from 
the prevailing image generated as one in which an elite group of American scholars exercises its 
dominance through its gate-keeping strategies. This account aims to draw attention to the effects 
certain actors – actors who often escape being the focus of academic attention - are having on the 
discipline and the varied ways in which they gate-keep and structure the discipline.  
 
Claims of American Gate-Keeping Explored: 
 
As with all disciplines, in IR there is a hierarchy of journals, publication presses and so on.875 
Being published in a certain journal can grant the status of ‘international’ to research and enable 
scholars to enter the global IR conversation.876 Entrance to this ‘international realm’ is arguably 
heavily policed and policed by a certain subset of American scholars. According to Amitav 
Acharya and Barry Buzan, America is intellectually hegemonic because it is able to deny the 
entrance of ‘foreign’ scholarship into mainstream literary circles.877 Because the group of 
American academics who have the power of inclusion and exclusion have an agenda and operate 
with a notion of what it considered ‘appropriate’ or ‘acceptable’ scholarship, certain works are 
supposedly promoted and others rejected.878 If one adheres to the defined standards allegedly 
such work will face less resistance from editors or reviewers and stand an increased chance of 
being published in the top journals and therefore entering the international disciplinary realm. 
Jörg Friedrichs argues:  
“The editorial boards of the leading American and British reviews and 
publishing houses control the access of scientific articles and books to the 
international audience. The more a book or article fits into normal American or 
British patterns of theorizing and research, the more likely it is to reach an 
                                                        
875 Ole Wæver “Still a discipline After All These Debates?” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. 
(eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 297.  
876 Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver “Conclusion: Worlding Where the West Once Was” in Tickner, 
A. and Wæver, O. (eds) International Relations Around the World: Worlding Beyond the West 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 332.  
877 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan “Why is there no non-Western international relations 
theory? An introduction” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (3) (2007), pp. 295-296.  
878 Steve Smith “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science?” 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2 (3) (2000), pp. 385. 
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international target group. If a contribution does not agree with the way how 
scholarship is ‘normally’ done in the United States or Great Britain, it is danger of 
being sorted out in the process of editorial lectureship or peer review.”879 
 
Scholars, like Friedrichs, who argue that IR is an American enterprise claim that the American 
mainstream has operationalised its power with the following gate-keeping strategies: 1) through 
making English the lingua franca of the discipline and 2) through holding key positions (journal 
editors, reviewers) and making sure certain forms of scholarship (scholarship that does not 
adhere to the preferred agenda) are marginalized from the international realm.880 In other 
words, the barriers to inclusion in the international arena that academics face are primarily 
language barriers and editorial decisions, with the majority of editors allegedly being American. 
 Unless research is written in English it arguably stands little chance of being recognized 
and disseminated on an international level.881 Non-English language research may attract 
attention within the confines of the national setting but unless it is translated or originally 
written in English it is unlikely to be picked up on the international radar and bears little chance 
of being broadly dispersed.882 The dominance of the English language has arguably resulted in 
the ignorance of non-English language scholarship.883 The discipline suffers from a linguistic bias 
or what Kim Nossal terms a linguistic imperialism.884 The preference for work to published and 
written in English has meant that the American mainstream has apparently been able to 
capitalize on this situation and use language as an exclusionary mechanism.  
 All the discipline’s major/international journals are published in English therefore if one 
aims to enter into global debates then one is presented with a pressure to publish in English. This 
clearly places Anglophone scholars in an advantageous position. The privileged position that 
Anglophone scholars find themselves in means that their research stands a much higher chance 
of being accepted which effects the international composition of the field and its perspectives. 
Non-English speaking scholars are presented with an immediate hurdle to overcome in the quest 
to get their work recognized.885 Not only are non-English speaking scholars in an unfair situation 
and faced with undue pressures, they are also presented with moral and professional dilemmas. 
                                                        
879 Jörg Friedrichs, J. (2004) European Approaches to International Relations Theory; A House 
With Many Mansion (London: Routledge. 2004), pp. 9.  
880 Thomas Biersteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for ‘American’ International 
Relations” in Tickner, A. B., and Waever, O. (eds) IR Scholarship Around the World: Worlding 
Beyond the West. (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 308-327. 
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882 Anssi Paasi “Globalisation, Academic Capitalism, and the Uneven Geographies of International 
Journal Publishing Space” Environment and Planning 35 (5) (2005), pp. 769-789.  
883 Knud Erik Jørgensen “Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret” European Journal of 
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884 Kim Nossal “Tales That Textbooks Tell: Ethnocentricity and Diversity in American 
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For instance, does one publish in English to arguably further ones career and enter the 
international realm and thereby diversify it through bringing in other perspectives, or does one 
publish in ones national language to aid the vibrancy of one’s national IR community?886 The 
issue of language is a politicized one and carries with it numerous consequences and 
implications, one being to overcome this problematic milieu many students are now frequently 
taught in English and write in English.887 English, according to Thomas Biersteker, has become 
the lingua franca of IR and global academia more broadly speaking.888  
 Not only are the discipline’s gate-keepers able to take advantage of this situation they 
are also able to enforce and entrench it. Kal Holsti in The Dividing Discipline noted the dominance 
of the English language and how it was being used as a blockade to prevent the infiltration of 
‘foreign’ scholarship into the discipline - ‘foreign’ scholarship that may deviate from the 
American standards of acceptable scholarship.889 Those, like Holsti, who claim that IR is an 
American dominated discipline because of the ability of the American mainstream to police the 
borders of the discipline have argued that the current linguistic bias has been embedded and this 
preference exaggerated in order to exclude and create barriers to non-English speaking 
scholarship.890 This in turn promotes and privileges Anglophone scholarship. The American 
mainstream is apparently guilty of accentuating this preference through making no effort to 
translate works or engage with non-English language scholarship. According to Knud Erik 
Jørgensen, “it is most unlikely that members of the English-speaking IR community should begin 
to read articles or books in languages other than English”.891 Furthermore, Kim Nossal has 
argued that the American mainstream is key in facilitating the dominance of English through 
making sure that students tend “not to be exposed to any IR scholarship that is not written in 
English in the original, or translated from another language into English”.892  
                                                        
886 Anne Marie D’Aoust “Accounting for the Politics of Language in the Sociology of IR” Journal of 
International Relations and Development 15 (1) (2012), pp. 120-131.  
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 Certain academics in the ‘English-speaking core’ have attempted to justify the linguistic 
bias through assuming that English as a lingua franca must make access easier for all.893 For 
instance Acharya and Buzan argued that: 
  
“Up to a point, there is truth in this assumption, but for those having to 
work in English as a second or third language, they may feel like a barrier, both 
because of the additional work necessary to put one’s thoughts into a foreign 
language and because of the high rejection rates in the leading English-language 
journals”.894  
 
Similarly, Friedrichs argued, formally establishing English as the lingua franca of IR may have 
some benefits, the primary one being that it will help non-American scholars receive recognition 
and publication. Because at present he argues “To state the obvious, hardly any study about 
international affairs ever has an impact at the international level if it is not written in English or 
translated into English”895. Yet John Groom argues that the use of any language privileges a 
certain mode of thought, a certain culture and a certain way of constructing the truth896. The use 
of English as the linguistic mode for IR scholarship privileges, he states, the Anglophone way of 
thinking. For example, Groom argues, “Any language by its structure, its metaphors, and its 
vocabulary imposes a pattern of thought which reflects its parent culture”.897 Likewise, according 
to Friedrich Nietzsche languages are built on sets of prejudices, which are expressed through 
metaphors and other linguistic devices to exclude certain objects and subjugate others.898 
Whereas Roland Bleiker argues that we “are all conditioned by decades of linguistically 
entrenched values” which then “largely camouflages the system of exclusion that is operative in 
all speech forms”.899 According to Groom, Nietzsche, and Bleiker language is an exclusionary 
mechanism by its very nature, a form of domination, which results in the subjugation in this case 
of non-native English speakers.  
 The use of language is one way that the gate-keepers of the discipline are able to exclude 
scholarship. The American mainstream allegedly endorses the present unilingual construct and 
remains blind to ‘outside’ developments thereby ensuring the boundaries of the discipline 
remain intact.900 Another means in which America is apparently able to police the discipline is 
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through the actions and interventions of American editors and the political practices 
surrounding publication.  According to Steve Smith and Ole Wæver the editors of the discipline’s 
leading journals, who are largely American, privilege work by American scholars (and more 
specifically privilege the work by American rationalist scholars).901 Work that does not meet the 
preferences of this set of America scholars and their (often rationalist) standards of what counts 
as acceptable scholarship, is arguably rejected and does not make its way into the international 
realm, instead it is sent to the margins of the discipline.  
 There have been a number of investigations conducted exploring the alleged gate-
keeping strategies employed by the American mainstream, which have then been used as 
grounds to argue that IR is an American dominated discipline. For example, Arlene Tickner 
investigated the publishing patterns of the discipline’s main journals and revealed that the 
journals under review were heavily weighted against non-American scholars, especially scholars 
living or working in a Third World country.902 Similarly in their journal investigation into the 
rationale behind the American dominance of IR Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews argued “the 
overall picture of the IR discipline as revealed over the past decade in its leading scholarly 
journals remains unchanged, with very little contribution from the periphery being recognized 
by the core”.903 From their results they argued that the processes of editorial selection work to 
assure that the discipline remains an American one divided along spatial lines. Addressing the 
issue again in 2008, Aydinli and Mathews continued to state that America remains intellectually 
hegemonic, demonstrated by the fact that the “leading IR journals still tend to publish the works 
of scholars primarily from North America or Western Europe, and the most influential scholars 
working in the field, as selected by their peers, are mostly American”.904 Marjike Breuning et. al., 
also focused on the practices of publication to argue that IR is an American enterprise. They also 
argued that discipline’s leading journals operate in a gate-keeping fashion, promoting American 
scholarship at the expense of other IR communities’ research. They also claimed to reveal that 
the editorial boards select mainly American scholars, and how the knowledge that is produced 
“focuses on a relatively narrow range of subjects”.905  
According to the aforementioned scholars the leading American journals act as 
disciplinary gatekeepers, and their parochial selection of articles reflects a missed opportunity; a 
chance to improve IR scholarship and a chance to make the discipline truly international. These 
accounts have argued that the preponderant positioning of American scholars as editors has 
                                                        
901 See Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European 
Developments in International Relations” International Organization 52 (4) (1998), pp. 687-727 
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meant that this group of American intellectual elites have been able to enact their agenda and 
publish work that adheres to their standards, and promote American and Western scholarship. 
The way American preferences have shaped the content of the discipline’s journals through 
marginalizing certain scholarship has meant, according to Tickner, that the leading journals do 
not represent the global scholarship available.906 Instead, it is argued, they choose to reflect 
American scholarship, subsequently maintaining the status quo, or in other words sustaining 
America’s hegemonic position. For instance, Tickner argues “Publishing patterns in specialized IR 
journals indicate the pervasiveness of US and European scholars, and the predominance of 
rationalist modes of thought”.907  
Anna Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling using the analogy of a ‘House of IR’ presented a 
review of the contemporary structure of the discipline, mapping out the places within the ‘House’ 
that certain theories, and geographical bodies of scholarship were forced to adopt. They argued 
that non-American scholarship is indeed hidden due to the gate-keeping strategies 
operationalised by the American mainstream.908 Such gate-keeping practices have according to 
Andrei Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov shut “out all the ‘non-Western’ voices sterilizing the field 
and perpetuating the discipline’s hegemonic nature”.909 It has been claimed that it is not only 
‘non-Western’ works that are hidden; the US IR community also largely ignores European IR. 
European knowledge and research does exist en force but is supposedly unseen and therefore 
excluded. Knud Erik Jørgensen argues that European IR theory is what he terms a well-kept 
secret, and he claims it is likely to remain one because of editorial selections and the linguistic 
bias in IR.910  
 The alleged American composition of editorial boards, the rationalist preferences of 
American editors, the predilection for English and the ignorance of non-English language 
research by the American mainstream has arguably resulted in an American dominated 
discipline according to Jörg Friedrichs.911 The gate-keeping practices of American intellectual 
elites have arguably generated an image of the discipline as one to which largely only Americans 
contribute.912 The implications of American gate-keeping, it is claimed, has limited the range of 
scholarship available and has created exclusionary barriers for ‘peripheral scholars’.913 
Academics outside of the loosely defined ‘core’ (usually noted in this instance to either mean the 
US alone, or Western, English speaking scholars) find structural blockades preventing their work 
from entering the international mainstream and having an influence. In other words, the 
                                                        
906 Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently”, pp. 297-298.  
907 Ibid., op cit.  
908 Anna Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the 
Poisies of Worldism” International Studies Review 6 (4) (2004), pp. 21-50.   
909 Andrei Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov (2007) “A Sociology of Dependence in International 
Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR” International Political Sociology 1 (4) (2007), pp. 
320.  
910 Jørgensen “Continental IR Theory”, pp.  31.  
911 Friedrichs European Approaches to International Relations Theory, pp. 8.  
912 Nossal “Tales That Textbooks Tell”, pp. 167-186.  
913 Lucy Taylor “Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives From Latin America” 
International Studies Review 14 (3) (2012), pp. 389.  
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discipline supposedly misses out on engaging with a multitude of perspectives that could and do 
offer new insights and methods of investigation because of the way the American mainstream 
allegedly policies the discipline.914  
 The alleged exclusionary barriers that America has constructed, operate in such a 
manner as to raise the uncomfortable question of ‘what options exist for scholars from the 
‘periphery’? It is argued that ‘peripheral’ scholars are left with a stark dilemma. One self- defined 
peripheral PhD student encapsulated the professed dilemma in an interview with Ersel Aydinli 
and Julie Mathews:  
 
“You have to make a choice between being a nobody or being a somebody. 
Either you’re going to work on core issues in which you have less confidence and 
less chance than others but which offers you the possibility to be a somebody if you 
can ever publish, or you’re going to look to your comparative advantage as an 
international person, write and publish on a specific area, and be a nobody in the 
grand scheme of things”.915  
 
Peripheral scholars appear to be presented with two equally unattractive options; 1) to attempt 
to enter the mainstream through becoming a regional/area specialist or 2) adhering to American 
standards of what is IR and what is acceptable scholarship. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan 
have argued that one of the few ways that ‘peripheral’ scholars can enter into the mainstream 
literature is through being a ‘local expert’916 - thus using their peripheral status to their 
advantage. According to Petr Drulák peripheral scholars ‘tend to be invited to international 
projects as regional experts who can provide local data but from whom no theoretical 
contributions are expected”.917 However, in the alleged existing academic hierarchy within IR, 
area/regional studies are arguably placed in the lower tier, as you only, according to Ole Wæver, 
become an international star by doing theory.918 Therefore ‘peripheral’ scholars may then feel 
pressured to opt for the second alternative, which could possibly permit entrance into the 
mainstream as inclusion is facilitated through cooption. Many see cooption as a dangerous state 
of affairs as the status quo is never challenged, and is actually perpetuated.919 All the problems 
                                                        
914 Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin “Still Waiting After All These Years: ‘The Third World’ on 
the Periphery of International Relations” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6 
(2) (2004), pp. 241-258.   
915 Aydinli and Mathews “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 298.  
916 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan “Conclusion: On the Possibility of Non-Western IR Theory in 
Asia” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (3) (2007), pp. 430-431.  
917 Petr Drulák “Introduction to the International Relations (IR) in Central and Eastern Europe 
Forum” Journal of International Relations and Development 12 (2) (2009), pp. 170.  
918 Wæver “Still a discipline After All These Debates?”, pp. 297. According to Wæver there is a 
hierarchy in the discipline of IR with regards to academic areas of research and the attention and 
prestige they each receive. Wæver argues that IR theory is deemed to be the ‘top tier’, the realm, 
which gains the most attention and thus he claims you only become recognized, and a ‘star’ if you 
‘do’ theory. Wæver claims that substantive, or rather empirical work adopts the middle tier, and 
the area/regional studies form the lower tier.  
919 J. Ann Tickner “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR 
Theorists” International Studies Quarterly 41 (4) (1997), pp. 611-632 
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cooption entails have been discussed in length in the previous chapters. Each chapter has dealt 
with the implications surrounding promoting the American intellectual agenda in its various 
composite parts (substantive focus, theory, method and institutional affiliation) and it’s alleged 
dominance in-depth. The point I simply wish to stress here, is that the claims surrounding 
American dominance in it’s gate-keeping format arguably presents all academics with a stark 
choice, either adhere to the journal editors’ preferences (who are apparently predominantly 
American and ‘rationalist’) or face being rejected and therefore not being published in the 
international journals, thereby inhibiting one’s international reputation and the associated 
material gains.  
 By focusing purely on the dominance of American editors and their rationalist agendas 
such accounts of American dominance in its gate-keeping form have overlooked; 1) the role of 
reviewers through focusing on the role of the editor; 2) the role of external actors such as 
Thomson Reuters; 3) other gate-keeping strategies and 4) the dynamics of diversity and 
internationalization that also exist. Furthermore, the discipline’s journals that were investigated 
for this thesis did not operate as mirror images of the American mainstream’s preferences. The 
results of study into 12 of the discipline’s journal differed from the image of the discipline put 
forth by Tickner, Adylini and Mathews for example. Rather than adhering to the rationalist 
mainstream’s agenda the journals explored published a wide variety of research from different 
theoretical perspectives, using a wide range of methodological approaches, by an international 
group of scholars. The diversity of scholarship published challenges the notions that the US is 
able to police the discipline to such an extent that non-rationalist scholarship is marginalized. 
The next section will present the results of the journal and conference investigation, and 
highlight that other gate-keeping strategies are also employed. In doing so this chapter will 
suggest that the above claims of American dominance that proliferate in the literature and 
discipline may be over exaggerated, because they miss the diverse and international inclinations 
underway and the fact that the academics in gate-keeping roles are not solely or predominantly 
American.   
 
Pluralism and Internationalism. 
 
 
Firstly, looking at the overall inclinations in the discipline exhibited by research published in the 
12 journals examined the claims of American dominance exercised through its gate-keeping 
abilities are challenged due to the plural academic environment. Secondly, through investigating 
the geographical composition of the editorial boards of the 12 journals explored, another diverse 
image begins to emerge. Instead of a primarily American group the discipline’s gate-keepers are 
‘international’ in both their location and ‘outlooks’. Finally, the interviews conducted with a 
number of leading journal editors revealed an existing effort underway to ‘internationalise’ the 
field further, not only in terms of academics but also the make-up of the editorial boards. The 
disciplinary dynamics of diversity and internationalization are highlighted in this section, and in 
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doing so the image of the discipline that emerges is one a discipline that is plural and gate-kept 
by an international elite that is equally heterogeneous and aiming to internationalise the 
discipline. In the process the claim that scholarship is marginalized in terms of where it is form 
or its theoretical orientation is challenged. Instead this chapter will suggest that the gate-keeping 
practices occurring are being conducted in a much subtler fashion and by an international, as 
opposed to American, group. The following section, will then detail the gate-keeping practices 
underway, and how the manner in which they are occurring in IR is not what the majority of the 
literature is depicting.  
 As previously mentioned those who argue that IR is an American discipline claim that 
through editorial selection research that threatens to disrupt the boundaries of the discipline or 
deviates from the traditional agenda is arguably rejected and therefore not published in the 
leading journals.920 What this means is that the American gate-keepers are said to privilege work 
that is either 1) realist, neo-realist or neo-liberal or conventional constructivist, 2) employs game 
theoretic or other rationalist methods and 3) is produced by Americans. However, if we look at 
figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 these assumptions are challenged. If the US is exercising its 
dominance it is doing it through other means, or employing different criteria for inclusion and 
exclusion. 
 
 
Key: P of SS = Philosophy of social science; Sociology of K = Sociology of knowledge. 
Figure 5.1: The theories used in 12 of the discipline’s international journals from 1999-2009.  
                                                        
920 For example see Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 374-402; Tickner 
“Seeing IR Differently”, pp. 295-324; and Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International 
Discipline”, pp. 687-727.  
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Figure 5.2: The methodologies used in 12 of the discipline’s international jounals from 1999-2009.   
 
Figure 5.3: The institutional affiliation of academics published in 12 of the discipline’s international 
journals from 1999-2009.   
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Figure 5.4: The institutional affiliation of participants in the BISA, CEEISA, ISA and ISA-Joint Conventions 
from 2005-2011 (Chairs, panelists, paper-givers).  
The results suggest that the discipline is plural in both theoretical and methodological terms (see 
figures 5.1 and 5.2) and that the discipline is fairly international in terms of who is being 
published (see figures 5.3 and 5.4). Whilst the discipline is not as ‘international’ as it could be, 
over time the discipline has become more international in terms of who comprises the global 
discipline and who is contributing to debates etc. For example, figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that 
there is a growing presence of Turkish, Japanese, Chinese, and South American scholars 
participating and being published in the global discipline, thereby illustrating the growth of non-
Western IR communities. Taking the above into consideration and looking at the amount of non-
rationalist research taking place and the number of non-Western academics that have made their 
way into the international realm we can argue that widespread gate-keeping practices and 
therefore decisions of inclusion and exclusion are not being made on where an article is from or 
whether it adopts elements of the American mainstream model of IR. The degree of multiplicity 
and internationalization challenges a number of disciplinary depictions and accounts. It seems 
that instead of rejecting work based on the institutional affiliation of authors or their theoretical 
or methodological persuasion as the claims in the literature imply, the general reality is that a 
different set of guidelines are informing the majority of decisions as to whether an article should 
be published and therefore enter the international realm.  
 There was one theoretical silence however, which suggests that one group of scholarship 
may be being excluded on theoretical grounds despite the seeming trends for diversity. There 
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was a notable lack of feminist scholarship featured. Figure 5.5 shows the small amount of 
feminist research that was present in the journals investigated from 1999-2009. When 
questioned on the paucity of feminist research one journal editor commented, “there is a lot of 
nasty gate-keeping against feminist scholarship. The marginalization of feminist scholarship has 
been widely documented and has resulted in feminist scholars establishing their own forums in 
which to publish.”921 Many feminist scholars have argued how their research is ignored, 
disparaged, and above all excluded from the discipline’s journals.922 As Jill Steans notes “feminist 
voices continue to be marginalized, ignored or appropriated in the interests of advancing a 
mainstream agenda”. 923  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: The percentage of feminist articles published in 12 international journals from 1999-2009.   
 
 Past practices of gate-keeping have resulted in feminists publishing elsewhere and also 
establishing their own journals such as the International Feminist Journal of Politics and Politics 
and Gender. The question is then raised of whether gate-keeping practices against feminist work 
still exist or whether feminist research is actually being sent into to publications reviewed? 
According to the journal editors interviewed the low numbers of feminist research being 
published in the discipline’s journals was due to the small numbers of submissions, most likely 
because of fears of gate-keeping, rather than the prohibitory practices of editors. All the editors  
                                                        
921 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
922 A. S. Runyan “Still Not ‘At Home’ in IR: Feminist World Politics Ten Years Later” International 
Politics 39 (3) (2002), pp. 361-368; V. Spike Peterson “Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of 
Knowledge, Gender and International Relations” Millennium 21 (2) (1992), pp. 183-206; and 
Marysia Zalewski “Do We Understand Each Other Yet? Troubling Feminist Encounters With(in) 
International Relations” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9 (2) (2007), 
pp. 302-312.   
923  Jill Steans “Engaging from the Margins: Feminist Encounters with the ‘Mainstream’ of 
International Relations” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5 (3) (2003), pp. 
449.  
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interviewed when questioned on the lack of feminist articles present in their respective 
publications from 1999-2009 pointed to the dearth of submissions. One editor stated;  
“People think that there is a conspiracy and that we kill the [feminist] piece 
as soon as it comes in. But the truth is that we just don’t get sent it, and didn’t get it 
before in the 1990s. My sense is that there is less of it [feminism] being done than 
people think. Because I don’t know where else it is going, I don’t see it showing up 
anywhere else”.924  
 
Whereas another claimed; 
“The main problem that we have is that people aren’t sending in the stuff. I 
think it is because a lot of feminist scholars have their own well-established 
feminist networks of journals and publications and peer reviews and so on … They 
have their own spaces for things. When I have asked them [feminists] why they 
don’t send things to other kinds of places outside that network, they regale me with 
horror stories of what happened the last time they did”.925 
 
 These insights suggest that feminists presume their work will be met with 
incomprehension and rejected, therefore they send their research to specialized publications. It 
seems, according to the editors interviewed, that past negative (and at times shocking) 
experiences of gate-keeping are structuring present choices regarding publication outlets.  The 
fear of meeting resistance from reviewers is arguably conditioning journal content. We can with 
some certainty argue that the lack of submissions is not because there is little feminist research 
taking place, for the conference investigation revealed an active feminist IR community engaging 
in many debates and issues. There were numerous panels taking place in all of the conferences 
examined, however audience response may not be as receptive as desired.926  
 Despite the reassurances from the editors interviewed that gate-keeping does not take 
place, and that feminist work is sent to appropriate reviewers and is not actively marginalized on 
theoretical grounds, there is of course no guarantee that such practices have ceased. The current 
pluralistic composition of the discipline however, bodes well for the inclusion of feminist work, if 
feminist scholars choose to submit their work to certain journals, but of course there is no 
guarantee that such work will be met with ‘open arms’.  Biases indeed may be firmly entrenched 
and skirmishes between feminist scholars and the mainstream may continue as a result of 
negative past experiences, harboured resentment and mutual incomprehension. It seems what 
Judith Squires and Jutta Weldes term the ‘wounds of gender’ are being reopened927 by both 
parties through reenacting their predefined and expected positions, and consequently inhibiting 
the amount of feminist research being published.  
 Looking at the gate-keepers themselves, according to Steve Smith the group of 
academics in the political positions of editors and reviewers are preponderantly American, and 
                                                        
924 Interviewed journal editor number 6. 
925 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
926 Tickner “You Just Don’t Understand”, pp. 612.  
927 Judith Squires and Jutta Weldes “Beyond Being Marginal: Gender and International Relations 
in Britain” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9 (2) (2007), pp. 192.  
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this structural dominance is indicative of American disciplinary dominance.928 Upon further 
examination the reality is that there is a geographically diverse group of academics in these 
positions of power. Figure 5.6 shows the geographical make-up of the editorial boards of the 
twelve journals investigated, and that whilst 49.4% of scholars on editorial boards are American 
50.6% are not and are from a diverse array of institutions located around the world. Once again 
the disciplinary actuality after empirical analysis differs somewhat from the widely held 
assumption in the field.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: The geographical institutional affiliation for members of the editorial boards of 12 of the 
discipline’s international journals from 1999-2009.  
 The geographical spread of academics on the editorial boards mirrors the institutional 
composition of the field in terms of academics published in the discipline’s journals. If we look at 
figures 5.3 and 5.6 together we see a similar trend in action. The degree to which the same 
countries populate the discipline is approximately paralleled; the US, Oceania, the UK and Europe 
feature more prominently but scholars from institutions located elsewhere, especially Turkey, 
are diversifying the field by holding such pivotal positions. Although American members 
comprise a majority they are not overwhelmingly dominant, as roughly half of the members of 
the editorial boards are from non-American universities. Furthermore, the higher percentage of 
American’s on the editorial boards is most likely due to a number of factors including 1) the 
greater proportion of American journals included in the sample (5 out of 12); 2) the sheer size of 
                                                        
928 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 383.  
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the American IR community in comparison to the others and 3) the relatively new state of certain 
non-Western IR communities.929 Overall, just as the field seems to be internationalizing in terms 
of who is publishing the field it is also internationalizing in terms of who makes these decisions. 
 Taking a closer look at this group of scholars one is able to further challenge the certain 
notions that are prevalent in the discipline.930 Arguably, if all the members of the editorial boards 
were ‘rationalist’ for example, one could still claim that the American IR community is 
predominant in this manner. However, by crudely bifurcating the discipline I was able to provide 
an insight into whether the members of the editorial boards adhered to the American scholarly 
agenda. After investigating the biographies of each member they were then categorized as either 
‘traditional’ or ‘critical’ in terms of their research agenda. As the information was limited I was 
not able to ascertain whether these scholars specifically adhered to the American mainstream’s 
notions of acceptable scholarship, so I broadened out the understanding of the American 
mainstream to incorporate not only rationalists, but also those academics who address issues 
associated with the traditional concerns of the field in a manner that can be considered ‘problem 
solving’ as defined by Robert Cox.931 Whereas the ‘critical’ category was employed as an umbrella 
term for work that challenges the traditional boundaries of the field, and research that adopts 
‘critical’ theories,932 and an emancipatory agenda.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Orientation of the research agenda for members on the editorial boards of the 12 IR journals 
investigated in 2012.  
                                                        
929 For more on the relative size of the US IR community in comparison to others, and the 
development of non-American IR academies see the previous chapter.  
930 The claims made by Tickner “Seeing IR Differently”, pp. 295-324; Aydinli and Mathews “Are 
the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 289-303; and Smith “The Discipline of 
International Relations”, pp. 374-402 for instance are brought into question.  
931 Robert Cox “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” 
Millennium 10 (2) (1981), pp. 128-129.  
932 By critical theories I mean all those housed under the ‘reflectivist’ and ‘post-positivist’ labels, 
such as constructivism, Critical Theory, post-Marxism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism, 
green theory, feminism and historical sociology.  
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 Figure 5.7 shows that 49.3% of the editorial board members of the journal examined are 
of a ‘traditional’ scholarly nature whereas 50.7% can be classed as ‘critical’. This fairly even split 
can be used to challenge claims suggesting that there is a ‘rationalist’ dominance of editorial 
board members. If one were to gather more information I am fairly certain that the number of 
‘rationalist’ and therefore strictly American mainstream scholars would account for a relatively 
small number of the 49.3% of academics categorized as ‘traditional’. The cursory glance 
conducted revealed that the majority of those classified as traditional were of a ‘classical’ variant, 
meaning operating within the confines of realism and liberalism and focusing on the ‘traditional’ 
agenda, as opposed to ‘rationalist’ understood in the methodological sense. This brief insight into 
the composition of the discipline’s editorial boards shows that the members of the various 
editorial boards do not comprise a homogeneous group.  
 Turning our attention to the editors of the 12 journals investigated we can see that this 
group is also diverse, not only in terms of where they are institutionally based but also their 
theoretical orientation, which again works to question the claims made regarding the way the 
discipline is gate-kept.  Table 5.1 shows this group comprises 17 different academics, of which 
only 5 are based at American institutions. Rather than a group of primarily American scholars the 
discipline’s gate-keepers are from a number of different geographical settings with differing 
academic interests.  The reality is that most journals choose editors from the national setting that 
the journal is linked to, for example the Review of International Studies is the flagship journal of 
the British International Association therefore the editor tends to always be from a British 
Institution in order to keep with the mandate of BISA.933  
 
Journal Managing Editor(s) in 2011. Institutional Affiliation of 
Editor(s) in 2011. 
Australian Journal of 
International Affairs.  
Andrew O’Neil. Griffith University, Australia. 
Cooperation and Conflict. Lee Miles. 
Jan Angstrom. 
Karlstad University, Sweden.  
Uppsala University, Sweden.  
European Journal of 
International Relations. 
Tim Dunne. 
Lene Hansen. 
 
Colin Wight.  
University of Exeter, UK. 
University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark. 
University of Exeter, UK.  
International Organization.  Emmanuel Adler. 
Louis Pauly. 
University of Toronto, Canada. 
University of Toronto, Canada.  
International Relations. Ken Booth. Aberystwyth University, UK.  
International Relations of the 
Asia Pacific.  
Yoshihide Soeya. 
G. John Ikenberry. 
Keio University, Japan. 
Princeton University, USA. 
International Security. Steven E. Miller. Harvard University, USA. 
International Studies 
Quarterly. 
William Thompson.  University of Indiana, USA. 
International Studies 
Perspectives.  
Douglas A. Van Belle. Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand. 
                                                        
933 There are notable exceptions, for instance looking at figure six we can see that Douglas Van 
Belle from the University of Wellington is the managing editor of the American journal 
International Studies Perspectives.  
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Journal of International 
Relations and Development.  
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. American University, USA. 
Review of International 
Studies. 
Nicholas Rengger. University of St Andrews, UK. 
World Politics.  Atul Kohli. Princeton University, USA.  
 
Table 5.1: The institutional affiliation of the managing editors for 12 of the discipline’s international 
journals in 2011.  
Not only are the editors from a wide range of institutions located around the world, also the 
editors in terms of their research interests and theoretical positions are very diverse. Looking at 
the list of academics above they range in their issue areas from critical feminist security studies, 
English school theory, international political economy and the philosophy of social science, and 
cover the theoretical spectrum from realism to post-structuralism. We once again find the 
dynamic of scholarly pluralism underway.  
 Moreover, the discipline’s gate-keepers appear to be not only embodying the discipline’s 
diverse and international composition but also promoting and constructing it.  Each of the 
editors interviewed were aware of the need for their journals to be representative of global 
scholarship taking place and to be actively ‘international’ in terms of their authorship and 
internal structure. According to one editor: 
 
“The board is quite committed to internationalizing the journal. We are 
encouraging submissions from around the world, and this has been partially 
successful, mostly with the Europeans, less successful with the Asian scholars, but 
that’s coming, and coming very rapidly. There are a rising number of Asian 
submissions, and everything is reviewed the same way. The rate of submissions 
outside of North America is rising, however the number of acceptances has not 
changed as rapidly as we might have liked”.934 
 
Each editor expressed a commitment to internationalizing their journal in terms of making sure 
academics from around the world are being published in the respective publications. However, 
editors can only publish what they receive, as one editor commented, “We can only publish what 
we get sent. We are not overly proactive, we tend to rely on what the community sends us, and 
this is why we have to keep an eye on how plural we are”.935 The wish to internationalise the field 
co-exists with the practical considerations of what gets submitted. Even though the editors seem 
to be expressing their desire to actively seek and encourage submissions from a broader array of 
scholars, and in some cases the editors I spoke to have gone out and elicited certain pieces, on the 
whole editors can only consciously increase the geographical profile of the discipline if the 
scholarship is sent in.  
 The expressed efforts underway to internationalize the field challenge the claims in the 
literature surrounding the notion that journal editors are excluding non-American, and 
specifically non-Western scholars. As one editor firmly stated, “We don’t discriminate on where 
                                                        
934 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
935 Interviewed journal editor number 1.  
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people come from, frankly it is unethical and the wrong thing to do”.936 The trend to broaden the 
discipline in terms of geographical diversity was not confined to the pages of the journals, rather 
each journal editor seemed committed to also making sure that their editorial boards and 
committees were also representative of the global community of IR scholars. Whilst one editor 
noted that “The board is disproportionately American, with more American based scholars” they 
also argued that “this is beginning to change, increasingly over the last few years there are 
scholars from the UK, from Germany and from Israel”.937 These insights highlight the dynamics of 
diversity and internationalism occurring in the discipline and how the discipline’s journal editors 
are actively claiming to shape the field so that it is more international and diverse not only in 
terms of what is published but also the structure of the discipline.  
 Regarding the issue of language the journal editors interviewed were aware of how this 
presents non-English speaking scholars with a disadvantage. As one editor commented “We try 
and deal with the English issue as sympathetically as we can, and we will go to great lengths with 
the publishers to proof read and suggest changes ourselves to bring the English up to the 
required standards”.938 Another argued, “You have to make the effort sometimes to get the good 
articles from certain countries up to standards. For example, you get a submission and the 
content is really good, but the language isn’t great and it needs some work. It is worth putting in 
that work, also from the journal’s point of view having those international connections is very 
important”.939 Another admitted to relaxing stylistic standards to help the inclusion of non-
Western research.940 Despite the efforts of editors to internationalize the field through 
encouraging submissions and actively helping to overcome the language barrier the issue of 
standards cannot always be surmounted as one editor noted: 
 
“We do get many submissions from outside of Europe, and some of them 
make it but unfortunately a lot of it doesn’t. It is the same thing as being a graduate 
student; you have to learn how to write academic articles and you also have to write 
for specific journals, and this is a learning process. IR is still young, and social 
science is still young in certain parts of the world so that learning process is still on 
going”.941  
 
IR’s infant state in some countries once again seems to in part explain why the discipline is not as 
international as it could be. However, as the editor above points out over time we can hope this 
will change, as IR develops in certain states the composition of the global discipline should reflect 
this and become even more diverse.  
                                                        
936 Interviewed journal editor number 3.  
937 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
938 Interviewed journal editor number 1. 
939 Interviewed journal editor number 3.  
940 Interviewed journal editor number 8.  
941 Interviewed journal editor number 4.  
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 There is no escaping the fact that English is the dominant mode of expression in IR.942 
However, rather than using this state of affairs to exclude certain scholarship the editors in 
question appear to be working with authors whose first language is not English to help them 
become published. The discipline’s gate-keepers to do not appear to be accentuating the bias in 
place through excluding research based on poor English language standards and using language 
as a barrier as Nossal for example argues,943 instead they are facilitating the inclusion of such 
research.  
 Taking all the above into account it seems that the disciplinary depictions of IR being 
dominated by a group of American rationalist scholars does not capture the current state of 
affairs. The content of the discipline’s journals is more diverse and international than is 
commonly perceived.  Furthermore, those in editorial positions were from various institutions 
around the globe, and that whilst American’s were a prominent group they were not 
predominant as those who argue that America is intellectually hegemonic claim. Editorial 
decisions it seems are not being founded upon adherence a narrow set of parameters, which 
marginalizes non-American non-rationalist scholarship. Rather they are made upon the standard 
of work being submitted and in light of practical considerations. What this means is that other 
gate-keeping practices are occurring which are not encapsulated by the body of literature that 
argues the US exercises its disciplinary dominance through policing the discipline’s published 
content. This next section will explore the other and more common gate-keeping practices taking 
place, and how they are operationalised through the discourse of standards and whether a 
manuscript ‘fits’ with a journal. Through exploring the various practices of editorial interventions 
and the role of reviewers (which is often overlooked) this chapter will show how the discipline is 
being subtlety shaped.  
 
The Gate-Keeping Underway.  
 
There seem to be two prominent ways in which the discipline’s gate-keepers can, and do, police 
the discipline and thus steer the field. Firstly through invoking standards and secondly through 
efforts to maintain a journal’s identity, meaning manuscripts can be rejected if they do not ‘fit’ 
with the aims and scope of a journal. Editors can use these grounds to reject articles and can do 
so in a severe gate-keeping manner, but due to the existing plurality in the publication realm 
such practices seem to be the exception as opposed to the norm. On the whole those in positions 
of power seem to be subtlety shaping the field rather than acting out a rationalist American 
agenda.  
 According to one editor: 
 
                                                        
942 See for instance Jørgensen “Continental IR Theory”, pp. 9-42 and Nossal “The Tales That 
Textbooks Tell”, pp. 167-186.  
943 Nossal, “Tales That Textbooks Tell”, pp. 167-186.  
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 “If an article comes in and we decide it is worth reviewing; as there is an 
initial screening process. The screening process is light, often it is something that is 
inappropriate for the journal, for example it may better belong in an economic 
journal, or it’s an early graduate student paper that was insufficiently vetted by 
their advisors, in these cases we can’t waste the time of the reviewers. However, 
this screen does not work on a substantive basis. Nothing gets ruled out on 
substantive, or ideological, or methodological grounds. If an article comes in and 
gets passed the screening process we find reviewers that will give constructive yet 
sympathetic reviews.”944  
 
Obviously it is the editors themselves who define and construct the standards and what 
constitutes a ‘fit’. This can be used in a fashion to marginalize certain forms of scholarship, as one 
editor commented “In International Relations part of the problem is that everybody has a 
different view of how the discipline works. Not all editors are equally interested in diversity, for 
diversity’s sake, but they all have an interest in maintaining qualitative standards according to 
their interpretations of how International Relations works”.945 Articles are ultimately at the 
mercy of individuals and their interpretations of standards and whether an article is acceptable 
for review and then perhaps publication. This can either be used in a gate-keeping manner in 
order for editors to implement their own agenda and publish work that agrees with their 
assumptions of how world politics operates. If editors were to behave in such a way however and 
if ‘enough rejection slips were to go out people would begin to talk’,946 one could argue that the 
future of the journal could be placed in jeopardy, as academics could potentially begin to cease 
sending in their work. Whilst the issue of standards can be used to exclude work, it can also 
apparently be used in a positive manner. One editor argued: 
 
“At the end of the day the editors make decisions, and we decide what we 
think should be passing muster. That can be used in gate-keeping way or in a way, 
that I like to think we do it, is not so much gate-keeping but about making sure 
there is a certain type of dialogue, and scholarly exchange that is being promoted 
through the kinds of things we are bringing in”.947 
 
 
 Despite fears of gate-keeping it is important that standards are upheld in order for the 
discipline of IR to function as an academic enterprise.948 Editors have to uphold a notion of 
standards to ensure that their journal is publishing the best research in order to maintain or 
create their own prestige within the publication hierarchy. In order for the journal system to 
function standards must be monitored,949 and whilst there is no guarantee that work will not be 
actively marginalized we have to hope that editors behave with a sense of responsibility towards 
the academic community and use the language of standards to preserve the reputation of a 
                                                        
944 Interviewed journal editor number 5.   
945 Interviewed journal editor number 6.  
946 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
947 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
948 Richard Whitley The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences: Second Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 155-158.  
949 Stephen McGinty Gatekeepers of Knowledge: Journal Editors in the Sciences and Social Sciences 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), pp. 4.   
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journal and to benefit the scholarly community. The diversity of research that has been published 
in the ten years investigated suggests that the standards barrier is being used in a largely 
appropriate manner, and that the editors in question have not widely used this in a strict gate-
keeping manner in order to shape the field according to their preferences. However, there are 
bound to be cases that are exceptions to this trend as there are no assurances that work sent in 
will be met with comprehension and treated in a compassionate manner.  
 Another way that work can be marginalized in the discipline of IR is whether it is in 
keeping with a journal’s identity. If research does not conform to the aims and scope of a 
publication this can be used as grounds to reject work. As one editor explained:  
 
“If we get a piece that doesn’t fit the journal, no matter how good it is, we 
will reject it at the editorial level and tell the author that is the grounds upon which 
it has been rejected. Rejections after the refereeing process are always done in 
consultation with all the editors.  We are aware that there are certain things we like 
as editors and certain things we don’t, despite our best efforts at controlling those 
biases they are often impossible to rule out completely”.950 
 
 
Judgements have to be made, and each journal has its own reputation and is renowned for 
different things, for example some are theoretically heavy, others are more economically focused, 
or policy oriented. It is arguably important to maintain the various identities as this ensures that 
there is space in any given discipline for all types of research and supports the growth of 
subfields and research networks and communities. Again whilst there is no guarantee that 
editor’s preferences do not come into play and thus exclude work through using the explanation 
of the ‘fit’ with a journal, there is an important focus attached to making sure space is carved out 
in the discipline for all manner of IR research.951  
 Moreover, there is also a practical reason for editors to make sure the identity of their 
publication is maintained. Editors have to take their audiences into consideration when making 
decisions, as they are accountable for maintaining readerships and this is achieved through 
satisfying audiences. The editors themselves are partially restricted and do not have complete 
room for maneuver. According to one editor they described the business of compiling a journal’s 
content and by extension shaping the content of the discipline as an “an intermitted process”.952 
They argued that it is “not a top-down decision, it is one based on the audience. There’s an 
audience that expects a certain kind of article, you can move the audience a little bit, and they 
gradually move over time”.953 Despite the common image of a domineering editor shaping the 
contours of the discipline through acting out their preferences954 the reality is that such 
preferences and behaviours are conditioned and tampered because editors have to meet 
audience expectations. The gate-keeping that takes place is then partially dependent on the 
                                                        
950 Interviewed journal editor number 1.   
951 Whitley, The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences, pp. 157.  
952 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
953 Interviewed journal editor number 5.   
954 For such an example see Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 374-402 and 
Aydinli and Mathews “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 289-303. 
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community of scholars and readers of specific journals. Each journal has a reputation, which 
attracts a specific audience; the journal editors must then uphold this reputation in order to 
satisfy the existing readership. Whilst the reputation can be shifted this must occur at a slight 
pace in order to meet expectations. The situation is mutually reinforcing and means that whilst 
gate-keeping does occur, the manner in which is does is not solely due to the editors whims but 
their responsibility to their audience, or in other words the academic community. Whilst the 
editors have the final judgment call, these are often made with the audience in mind. 
 Gate-keeping practices clearly take place in the discipline, and in some sense they are 
unavoidable for they serve a crucial function in that they preserve spaces for research, fuel 
dialogue, and by publishing quality research (however defined) this benefits the community at 
large. Although these criteria may be employed in a negative rather than positive manner at 
times, overall due to the diversity and plurality of research published, it seems that the power of 
exclusion has been wielded in a largely responsible manner. It is through these practices that the 
field is shaped in a subtle way. Editors can steer the field in certain directions, for example as 
Robert Keohane argued, “The advantage of being a journal editor is that you are at the centre of 
this process [constructing the intellectual agenda]. You can see it and you can shape it to some 
extent”.955 The extent to which this steering takes place in not universal, the amount of editorial 
interventions changes from publication to publication. Some of the editors interviewed 
acknowledged that they were more interventionist than their peers and went out of their way to 
solicit articles and create certain spaces and conversations. Some relied heavily upon the 
decisions of the reviewers involved and others outwardly declared that they would not be 
confined by their reviewers. Each journal seems to have a different approach and attitude to the 
relationship with their reviewers and how interventionist they as editors should be. This 
divergent attitude is captured in the following statements:  
 
“We are less interventionist than most. If you don’t respect the review 
process what’s the point in having it? The whole reason to have anonymous 
external reviews is so that the field is not shaped or misshaped by a strong 
domineering editor”.956  
 
“Part of our responsibilities as journal editors is not to be completely 
enslaved to our reviewers. Where, for example, the reviewers might be really 
negative about an article, but we think it has promise, so we will try and push the 
article and give the author another chance to improve”.957 
 
There is a delicate balance in operation between the decisions of reviewers and those of the 
editors and it is through these processes and their outcomes that the field is shaped and 
constructed. 
                                                        
955 Robert Keohane in an interview with Harry Kriesler, Conversations with History, interview 
series hosted at the University of Berkeley, November 2004. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5foxGFXNl-s (Accessed on the 04/03/12).  
956 Interviewed journal editor number 5. 
957 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
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 Whilst editors have the first and final decision it is often the reviewers who decide the 
fate of an article. Reviewers have a large role in molding the field, however the extent to which 
they actually do depends on the editor in question. One editor who described themselves as 
interventionist stated that  “We’ve been hands on about how we go about editing our pieces and 
shepherding reviewers and mediating what the reviewers say and so on”.958 Whereas others 
described their role as primarily liaising between authors and the reviewers and basing their 
decisions on those of the reviewers, and only intervening when the reviewer reports disagreed. 
Many of the editors interviewed claimed they primarily went with the decision of the reviewers 
instead of against them due to the fear of irritating reviewers because as one edited commented 
“it is getting increasingly difficult to acquire the reviewers”.959 One editor stated that “I do think 
what is more important in terms of contributing to the discipline is reviewing”960 owing to the 
decision making power they exert. Reviewer’s comments obviously shape articles and what is 
published most of the time is dependent on their decisions. What it evident is that there is no 
uniform process, and with each editor the balance between the editors and reviewers can tip 
either way. Even though some editors are more interventionist than others, it is the reviewers 
who have a large part in deciding what is published, as one editor noted “what makes it through 
this process [publication] is not determined by the editors, but the reviewers”.961 Whilst the 
editors seem to attract more scholarly attention in the debates over gate-keeping the role of the 
reviewer should not be overlooked, and therefore individual reviewing practices questioned and 
reflected upon. Reviewers have a crucial responsibility to the academic community and 
especially in providing guidance to young career academics. The situation is therefore not a 
simplistic as many accounts depict, the reality of the politics surrounding publication is a balance 
between editors, reviewers and the audience, the outcome of which sculpts the field. As one 
editor commented:  
 
“Do you want to be seen as contradicting the reviewers? No, we want to be 
seen as taking the wisdom of both reviewers and then deciding to side with one or 
the other, and as such we are advising the following. Do we have a subtle steering at 
this point? Yes, it is what makes the job interesting. Do we have a subtle role to play 
in steering final drafts? Yes, absolutely. Would I say this was interventionist? I 
would rather say there is room for judgement to be used, and you can as a 
consequence shape articles and you do so by not misshaping them”.962 
  
 Another way in which editors can subtlety steer the field is through compiling special 
issues or forums for instance. Editors have the power to construct certain spaces through 
publishing special issues, thereby raising the profile of a scholarly issue or an area of interest. 
Furthermore through the use of forums editors are able to promote certain conversations and 
debates. As one editor stated; “One of the things that we did deliberately with the journal is that 
                                                        
958 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
959 Interviewed journal editor number 6.  
960 Interviewed journal editor number 3.  
961 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
962 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
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the team went in with the idea that we would actively solicit certain types of special issues and 
certain kinds of short intervention forums because we really wanted to try and create certain 
kinds of spaces”.963 Once again there is no universal conduct with regards to publishing special 
issues, just as there is no universal relationship with reviewers in practice. Not all journals 
publish special issues, for example some association journals do not have the mandate to do this, 
and some editors choose not to. In most cases the decision to put together and publish a special 
issues has to be negotiated with the publisher, and in regards to whether such an issue would 
attract readers.  
 The question of special issues and forums etc is important because they allow editors to 
operate outside of the review process and can therefore seek out or agree to publish items that 
are more in line with their preferences or points they wish to make. It is through this arena that 
editors can more explicitly shape the discipline. However, most editors interviewed when 
questioned on the matter of special issues etc argued that if they did them it was for the purposes 
of 1) highlighting a timely debate, or responding to a contemporary issue for example 9/11 or 2) 
trying to engage more readers. One editor’s response is as follows: 
 
“The only thing I have done to try and rig what the issues look like is that I 
am starting to introduce interventions that are outside of the review process. So I 
look for things that make people unhappy and I try and get them into the journal so 
people will pay attention. …  That’s the sole intervention on the part of the editors 
to the natural process of simply taking what comes in. I am doing it for strictly 
mercenary reasons to try and get more people to read the journal, and if cartoons 
would work I would throw in cartoons”.964 
 
Not only does a journal have a responsibility to the academic community they are also 
responsible to their respective publishers and therefore making sure that the journal continues 
to attract new readers and subscriptions. This has lead to a concern with rankings and making 
sure one’s journal performs well, which in turn has also steered the field as special issues or 
articles are often published in order to help boost a journals impact factor. As one editor 
explained: “I tend to be a bit more proactive in that sense if I don’t think an article is going to 
appeal to the readership, and I don’t think it is going to help our rankings, our citation and impact 
factor, I will reject the article”.965   
 The discipline’s journal editors do have the capacity to mould the contours of the field 
and do so through their interventions either in the review process or through soliciting articles 
or special issues. They create certain spaces, promote dialogue and can privilege certain debates. 
Editors and their reviewers are however, not the only forces in operation that shapes the content 
of IR’s journals and therefore the published content of the discipline. The amount of academic 
attention paid to the annual Journal Citation Report published by Thomson Reuters, and how 
                                                        
963 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
964 Interviewed journal editor number 6. 
965 Interviewed journal editor number 3.  
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where one publishers as ranked by impact factor can determine career prospects, has meant that 
this indicator has begun to effect editorial decisions. This final section will focus on another set of 
gate-keeping practices that are taking place within IR, and seek to problematise the role of 
Thomson Reuters.  
 
Gate-Keeping Behind the Scenes: Thomson Reuters.  
 
This section aims to demonstrate how the politics of publication are taking place even before 
editorial selection and the reviewing process because another set of gate-keeping strategies are 
already in place and monitored by Thomson Reuters. As the field of IR has grown exponentially 
over the last few decades so too has the competition for scholarly posts, notoriety and 
prestige.966 One-way of determining the allocation of jobs and tenure has been to look at the 
publication records of academics and more specifically where scholars are being published, 
resulting in an increased amount of attention being placed on the annual Journal Citation Report 
(JCR) and its decisive indicator; the Impact Factor.967 According to Cam Ha et. al., much has come 
to depend on the JCR and the impact factor, because in certain countries and academic 
communities the impact factor has become a measure for grant applications, job applications, 
promotion and bonuses,968 and often it is used as a criterion for the assessment of departments, 
research funding, and the appraisal of staff performance.969 One journal editor commented 
explicitly on how more and more is coming to hinge upon the journal impact factor “because the 
rankings have been locked in to so many other evaluation processes”970 whereas another stated: 
 
 “More and more, the academic career system is dependent on these 
measurements. When you evaluate someone for a position the quality of the article 
doesn’t really matter but it is where is it published. You ask whether they are 
publishing in the top ten journals or others. All the incentive structures are geared 
around publishing in the top ranked journals”.971  
 
The increased concern with rankings has begun to effect editorial practices and what is included 
in a given publication. Furthermore, because Thomson Reuters operates with its own parameters 
                                                        
966 Kim Nossal “Home-Grown IR: The Canadianization of International Relations” Journal of 
Canadian Studies 35 (1) (2000), pp. 96.  
967 J. C. Sharman “Benchmarking Australian IR: Low Impact, a Bookish Lot or a Very British 
Affair?” Australian Journal of International Relations 62 (4) (2008), pp. 529-531.  
968 Tam Cam Ha, Say Neng Tan and Khee Chee Soo “The Journal Impact Factor: Too Much of an 
Impact?” Annals Academy of Medicine 35 (12) (2006), pp. 911.  
969 Simon Hix “A Global Ranking of Political Science Departments” Political Studies Review 2 (3) 
(2004), pp. 293–313; Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Theofanis P. Mamunear and Thanasis Stengost 
“European Economics: An Analysis Based on Publication in the Core Journals” European 
Economic Review 43 (4-6) (1999), pp. 1150-1168 and Larry Goodson, Bradford Dilman and Anil 
Hara “Ranking the Presses: Political Scientists’ Evaluations of Publisher Quality” PS: Political 
Science and Politics 32 (2) (1999), pp. 257-262.  
970 Interviewed journal editor number 3.  
971 Interviewed journal editor number 7.  
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and definitional practices, this has resulted in some forms of research being promoted at the 
expense of others.  
 In order to explore the gate-keeping role of Thomson Reuters, firstly, how the Journal 
Impact Factor is formulated will be explained and in doing so this section will briefly touch upon 
some of the problems with this formulation. Secondly the way the selection criteria to be 
included in Thomson Reuter’s Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) - and therefore for a journal to 
be eligible for ranking – will be explored. It will be argued that these criteria privilege certain 
forms of scholarship and delegitimise others, thereby policing the field of IR. Finally, this section 
will look at how the ranking system has become tied into many other forms of evaluation and 
how this has begun to effect editorial decisions and resultantly journal content.  
 The JIF was formulated specifically for the annual Journal Citation Reports and measures 
the number of citations a journal receives on average for each article published in a specific time 
frame. Therefore the JIF is a measure of the frequency with which the average article in a journal 
has been cited in the JCR year. The impact factor is calculated by dividing the number of citations 
in the JCR year by the total number of articles published in the previous two years. As described 
by its creator Eugene Garfield the journal impact factor is calculated based on two elements: “the 
numerator, which is the number of citations in the current year to items published in the 
previous two years, and the denominator, which is the number of substantive articles and 
reviews published in the same two years. The impact factor could just as easily be based on the 
previous year’s articles alone, which would give greater weight to rapidly changing fields”.972 
Currently, the impact factor of journal A in year B would be calculated using the following 
formula:  
 
 Impact Factor = all the citations in B to articles in A during (B-1) + (B-2) 
                                                all substantive articles and reviews in A during (B-1) + (B-2). 
 
This means for example that a journal with an impact factor of 3.5 will in the last two years had 
it’s individual articles cited, on average, three and a half times. Citing may be from the same 
journal, however most are claimed to be from different publications.  According to Michael Giles 
and James Garand journal impact factor “measures the citations a journal receives on average for 
each article published during a set time-period. Journals with higher impact scores are viewed 
ipso facto as more influential in scholarly discourse than journals with lower impact scores”.973  
 Despite its consistent use, the widespread attention and praise that the JCR and the JIF 
have received as means to sort journals in terms of quality, they are nonetheless widely criticized 
tools of scientific evaluation, and subject to a number of faults and biases. Numerous criticisms 
have been levied against the use of the impact factor and many questions have been posed as to 
                                                        
972 Eugene Garfield “The History and Meaning of the Journal Impact Factor” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 295 (1), (2006), pp. 90.  
973 Michael W .Giles and James C. Garand “Ranking Political Science Journals: Reputational and 
Citational Approaches” PS: Political Science and Politics 40 (4) (2007), pp. 741.   
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the accuracy of the journal rankings produced. Referring to the impact factor one journal editor 
commented that “It is simply a flawed indicator”.974 Whereas another stated;  
 
“Most people who understand how it is calculated realize how capricious 
the measurement is, how it is mainly designed for the natural sciences, and how it 
can be gamed a little bit. It is a model that has come from the natural sciences, and it 
doesn’t fit perfectly with the social sciences”.975  
 
 Addressing some of the frequently raised criticisms briefly, the journal impact factor has 
been deemed inaccurate due to the way the figure can be manipulated and concerns with it’s 
underlying premise.976 It is claimed, by Tam Cam Ha et al., for example that the way the journal 
impact factor is calculated results in the 80/20 phenomenon, or in other words a skewed 
distribution of citations in most fields.977 The JIF as well as being misleading is also open to 
manipulation through the process of self-citations. By citing one’s self and the use of in-house 
citations and flattery a journal’s impact factor can be significantly boosted.978 As one editor noted 
“We in the journal discussed how easy it would be to play a game which would ensure a rapid 
rise up the league table. It would not take too much implementing”.979 Moreover, the credibility 
of the JIF and its suitability to the social sciences can be challenged due to the foundation upon 
which it is formulated. The JIF is calculated on the premise that citations represent a mark of 
approval by others and stand for the acknowledgement of influential work. However, some 
citations, especially in the social sciences, are not for the purpose of praise but rather critique. In 
other words controversial or deplorable papers may be highly cited due to disapproval thereby 
distorting impact factor.980 These criticisms and countless others, have led many to consider the 
rankings produced by the JCR as inaccurate, arbitrary and limited.  
 Considering how much has come to depend on the JCR and its impact factor it is 
worrying that the figure can be manipulated and subject to alarming inaccuracies. These worries 
are compounded by its gate-keeping role. The gate-keeping practices come into force with the 
                                                        
974 Interviewed journal editor number 6. 
975 Interviewed journal editor number 5. 
976 For more in-depth critiques of the citational approach to ranking journals and the impact 
factor see James Garand “An Alternative Interpretation of Recent Political Science Journal 
Evaluations” Political Science and Politics 23 (3) (September 1990), pp. 448-451, James Garand 
and Michael Giles “Journals in the Discipline: A Report on a New Survey of American Political 
Scientists” PS: Political Science and Politics 36 (2) (2003), pp. 293–308, Stephen P. Harter and 
Thomas Nisonger “ISI’S Impact Factor as Misnomer: A Proposed New Measure to Assess Journal 
Impact” Journal of the American Society for Information Science 48 (12) (1997), pp. 1146-1148, 
and Thomas Plümper “Academic Heavy-Weights: The ‘Relevance’ of Political Science Journals” 
European Political Science 6 (1) (2007), pp. 41-50.   
977 Cam Ha et. al., “The Journal Impact Factor”, pp. 911-916.  
978 Garand and Giles “Ranking Political Science Journals”, pp. 745. For more on the effects of self-
citation see Guang Yu, Dong-Hui Yang and Hi-Xiu He “An Automatic Recognition Method of 
Journal Impact Factor Manipulation” Journal of Information Science 37 (3) (2011), pp. 235-245 
and Jong Foo “A Study of Journal Self-Citations and Intra-Citing within the Subject Category of 
Multidisciplinary Sciences” Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (4) (2009), pp. 491-501.  
979 Interviewed journal editor number 8.  
980 David F. Hendry “Research Assessment Exercises” quoted in Garand and Giles “Ranking 
Political Science Journals”, pp. 741.  
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way Thomson Reuters is able to designate some journals as ‘acceptable’ and ‘approved’ whereas 
others are denied the gold standard awarded by being included in the SSCI and therefore 
becoming eligible to be ranked. The fact that certain journals are not awarded an impact factor 
due to their ‘outsider’ status not only conditions academic behaviour - in that it effects where 
scholars send their work – it also has implications on the way research is perceived by the 
academic community which then has further implications in terms of career progression. This is 
because work published in a non-ranked journal is not considered as merited as an article in a 
JCR ranked publication because in certain circles manuscripts published in non-ranked journals 
carry less value and academic notoriety.981 It is this power to grant inclusion and the authority it 
entails that enables Thomson Reuters to act as an agent of control and shape the discipline of IR.  
 Currently Thomson Scientific lists and subsequently ranks 81 journals as ‘International 
Relations’. In other words out of all the IR journals that are presently published Thomson Reuters 
recognizes only 81, meaning that a number of publications are either excluded completely or are 
classified as something other than IR. Many journals are not included in the ISI citation indexes 
and therefore are not evaluated and ranked using impact factor, whilst others are included in 
other subject categories.982 There are two exclusionary mechanisms in operation here; 1) the 
selection criteria employed and 2) definitional practices. The selection processes and definitional 
processes work to ensure that the SSCI is ‘comprehensive but not all-inclusive’983 and resultantly 
journals that are excluded are not promoted and are subsequently marginalized to a certain 
degree. Whilst there is unfortunately not the space here to delve too deeply into the biases in 
operation through the selection processes at work, I will however focus on how Thomson 
Reuters privileges ‘Western’ journals through it’s preference for journals to be published in 
English before examining the exclusionary definitional processes.   
 Thomson Reuters’s selection process for the journals it covers is based on three key 
elements: Citation Data, Journal Standards and Expert Judgment. 984 Even when certain journals 
do manage to obtain sufficient citation data they can still be excluded using the other criteria. For 
example Garfield noted “Many Third World editors have asked us why their publication is not 
covered by the ISI when it’s impact, although low, is comparable to other journals that we do 
index”.985 The ‘journal standards’ criterion is comprised of a number of different factors: 
timeliness, international editorial conventions, English-language bibliographic information, and 
peer-review,986 and it is the preference for journals to be completely written in English hidden 
within the bibliographic information standards that reveals Thomson Reuters bias towards 
                                                        
981 Sharman “Benchmarking Australian IR”, pp. 532.  
982 For instance the journal Ethics and International Affairs is not included in the citation index 
and the journal Third World Quarterly is not categorized as an IR journal, and instead appears 
under the classification ‘Planning and Development’.  
983 Eugene Garfield “How the ISI Selects Journals for Coverage: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Considerations” Current Contents 22, (1990), pp. 186. 
984 Garfield “How the ISI Selects Journals for Coverage”, pp. 185.  
985 Ibid., pp. 189.  
986 James Testa “The Thomson Scientific Journal Selection Process” Contributions to Science 4 (1) 
(2008), pp. 70. 
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English language journals, thereby automatically striking out a number of journals that are 
produced outside the ‘Anglosphere’.  
 The selection criteria asks for a clear minimum of abstracts or summaries in English, and 
all the bibliographic information. However, Thomson Reuters’ penchant for the full text to be in 
English is revealed by both James Testa (the Director of Editorial Development and Publisher 
Relations for Thomson Scientific) and Garfield; Testa acknowledges that Thomson Scientific 
“tries to focus on journals that publish their full text in English”,987 whereas Garfield states, “If 
editors truly want wider notice of their journals by the international research community, they 
ought to publish articles, titles, abstracts, and cited references in English”.988 The predilection 
towards journals published in English has also been acknowledged by Cam Ha et. al., who argued 
that the SSCI database is dominated by North American publications.989 It appears that Thomson 
Reuters is using English as a mechanism for exclusion, and capitalizing on the linguistic prejudice 
already present in the discipline,990 Thomson Reuters’ seems to be perpetuating this 
predisposition whilst simultaneously downplaying local fields of knowledge and promoting 
predominantly American and ‘Western’ journals.  
 Looking at the second exclusionary mechanism in operation, certain journals are 
featured in SSCI, such as Third World Quarterly for instance, but are not categorized as IR 
journals, this raises the question of who is making the decision for what counts as International 
Relations? Who is disciplining the discipline through creating definitional boundaries? The 
definition of what constitutes IR employed by Thomson Reuters could explain why certain 
journals are excluded, instead of an omission on the grounds of quality or agenda compliance, 
some journals that are broadly conceived to be within the realm of International Relations could 
be marginalised because they fall outside the boundary created by Thomson Reuters. Currently 
Thomson Scientific classifies IR journals as those covering “resources concerned with foreign 
policy, comparative world politics, world commerce and trade, international legal issues, peace 
studies and conflict resolution, military alliances and strategic studies”.991 This definition 
revolves around the traditional focus and core of the discipline: cooperation and conflict. 
Consequently, this means that Thomson Scientific employs a rather narrow, state-centric and 
reductive view of the discipline. This could explain why a number of self-defined IR journals, 
such as Global Networks, Perspectives on Politics, and Ethics and International Affairs could be 
missing from the IR category for they could be counted as too interdisciplinary, and too broad. 
Furthermore, the traditional nature of the classification could also explain why publications 
focusing on migration, gender, internal conflicts, the environment etc, or journals based on 
newer and more critical theoretical approaches to the discipline, and different geographical foci 
could also be absent and omitted for they are not counted as IR, but rather ‘doing’ or focusing on 
                                                        
987 Ibid., op cit.  
988 Garfield, “How the ISI Selects Journals for Coverage”, pp. 192.  
989 Cam Ha et. al., “The Journal Impact Factor”, pp. 912.  
990 See previous section and Jørgensen, “Continental IR Theory”, pp. 9-42.  
991 Thomson Reuters “International Relations: Category Description” Scope Notes, ISI Web of 
Knowledge. Available at http://admin-apps.isiknowledge.com  (Accessed on 06/02/11).   
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something else, something deemed to be outside the realm of what has been defined as ‘IR’ by 
Thomson Reuters. Interestingly what is and isn’t included is at the definitional discretion of 
Thomson Reuters experts, who remain unidentified to the public. The definition employed by the 
Thomson Reuters clearly operates as a disciplinary gatekeeper as it works to exclude a number 
of publications from being promoted as IR, and demarcates them as doing another form of 
disciplinary scholarship. Yet who is making these gate-keeping decisions remains a mystery, a 
hidden mechanism of disciplinarity, for the constructed definitional boundary clearly endorses 
certain forms of knowledge, whilst marginalizing others.  
 It is apparent that Thomson Scientific promotes certain journals, and simultaneously 
advocates certain knowledge and academic productions. By awarding a number of journals with 
a gold standard Thomson Reuters has generated a limited list and ranking of ‘approved’ journals. 
Meaning that the small number of permitted journals “requires that publications not included in 
the rankings do not qualify as research”.992 Thomson Reuters inadvertently controls and 
facilitates access to the discipline’s international arena due to its various processes of inclusion 
and exclusion and operates as a manufacturer of dominance behind the scenes. It is not involved 
with the process of specific editorial selection, meaning the decision to individually leave out or 
incorporate authors, but rather it operates on another level of gate-keeping, a level where it can 
delegitimize whole journals and promote whole bodies of scholarship. Not only does Thomson 
Reuters gate-keep the discipline’s journals by approving some and not others, through the murky 
definitional practices employed it is also able to label and promote some journals as IR journals 
and exclude others. Through arbitrarily at times labeling certain journals as IR993 or not it is 
worryingly evident that Thomson Reuters has the capacity through its so-called experts and its 
JCR to hinder the dissemination of certain outlets of scholarly knowledge from reaching a wider 
audience. These exclusionary mechanisms are important because of the impact they have on 
scholarly reputations. Work published in a non-Thomson Reuters ‘approved’ journal arguably do 
not carry the same prestige and can be viewed as adhering to lower academic standards than 
articles featured in JCR ranked publications.994 This situation is made all the more problematic by 
the dearth of disciplinary attention paid to this disciplining organization,995 Thomson Reuters, 
and its methods of selection, or rather gate-keeping. As it stands the focus remains largely on 
editorial practices and decisions. Unfortunately, however, the disciplining practices do not end 
here, the JCR and it’s impact factor is also beginning to affect the published content of ranked 
journals. The situation of citational dependence means that indirectly Thomson Reuters is 
                                                        
992 Cam Ha et. al., “The Journal Impact Factor”, pp. 912.  
993 For instance the Cornell International Law Journal is classed as an IR journals whereas the 
Harvard International Law Journal is not. Another example of the arbitrary categorizational 
processes comes in the form of Market Policy, which is counted as an IR journal, and Defense and 
Peace Economics is not.  
994 Cam Ha et. al., “The Journal Impact Factor”, pp. 912. Also see Paasi “Globalisation, Academic 
Capitalism and the Uneven Geographies of International Journal Publishing Space”, pp. 769-789.  
995 There are a few exceptions, one being Sharman’s article “Benchmarking Australian IR”, pp. 
529-540. More attention is paid to Thomson Reuters in other fields including Political Science, 
but within IR the attention this organization receives in fairly minimal.  
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influencing what is substantively included in a publication as the concern with the rankings is 
beginning to partially influence editorial decisions.  
 Not only does the JCR discipline the discipline of IR through its powers of categorization 
and exclusion, it also has a disciplining affect on the content of the journals it indexes.  As one 
journal editor frankly stated, “Is this measurement affecting life in the journals? Yes, it is”.996 The 
concern with rankings has meant that journal editors are becoming less likely to include articles 
of a certain persuasion because of their poor citational potential. The majority of journal editors 
interviewed have lamented this situation, as one editor explained; “you’ve got to keep an eye on 
those indicators, and keep the esteem of the journal going. Its’ unfortunate really because you do 
end up rejecting stuff that is a good and interesting read, in favour of stuff that is theoretical and 
more academic/ivory tower focused. As an editor you have to make those choices”.997 This 
situation was echoed by another journal editor, who expanded on the type of scholarship that 
would potentially become more and more marginalized: 
 
 “I think the JCR and the JIF are going to become more important, and that 
journal editors are going to have to pay more attention to these factors … It’s 
distressing, because it means that certain pieces, like philosophy of social science 
articles will become less attractive because they don’t get cited as much, because 
there aren’t that many people doing the philosophy of IR. So there aren’t that many 
people to cite, and certainly not when compared to other areas of research”.998  
 
The attention paid to the JCR by journal editors, and especially their respective publishers, has 
meant that editors are making certain choices regarding submissions due to the pressure created 
by a concern with maintaining or increasing a journals ranking. A fixation with citations means 
that research in areas of IR that do not attract as much attention, such as the philosophy of social 
science, or historiography, risk being rejected on the grounds that they will not be heavily cited 
and therefore will not aid a journal’s impact factor. Such scholarship faces being marginalized 
due to the structural forces of Thomson Reuters. This emergent situation also appears to be 
working in the reverse; an increase in impact factor is influencing what work is being sent where. 
One journal editor noted that the increase in their impact factor corresponded with an increase 
of large-N quantitative studies, whereas another noted a general overall increase in 
submissions.999 The JCR seems to be conditioning journal editors and academics alike and in a 
more pronounced fashion over time.1000 The more focus the JCR has received has resulted in 
Thomson Reuters have a more disciplining effect on content due to the publishers and editors 
concerns with the figures, and this situation shows no sign of abating any time soon. According to 
one editor “These things are measured imperfectly, yet does the figure matter? Yes, increasingly 
this factor seems to matter”.1001 The disciplining role that Thomson Reuters has is not only a 
                                                        
996 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
997 Interviewed journal editor number 3.  
998 Interviewed journal editor number 2.  
999 Interviewed journal editor’s numbers 1 and 2.  
1000 Interviewed journal editor number 8.  
1001 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
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distinct disciplinary reality it also looks to be a future one.  If the discipline remains fixated with 
rankings and performance indexes this will result in further marginalization and sterilization of 
the field, which will only hamper intellectual production, and dynamism of the discipline. As H. F. 
Moed somewhat prophetically noted in 2002 “The use of impact factor compiled by the ISI may 
have ‘inappropriate and counterproductive consequences”.1002 
 
Conclusion.  
 
This chapter has sought to reveal the complex workings of different actors and structural forces 
and how these all shape the field of IR. In demonstrating the range of dynamics, gate-keeping 
strategies and gate-keepers this chapter has attempted to reveal how the disciplinary accounts 
that argue that IR is an American dominated discipline due to its gate-keeping abilities do not 
capture all the dynamics and mechanisms in action. Certain actors, such as reviewers and 
Thomson Reuters, have been largely overlooked, due to the focus on the discipline’s journal 
editors. Furthermore the processes of editorial selection and the content of a given publication 
are largely presented as a top down process, yet the reality is a negotiated space between editors, 
reviewers, the target audience and the publishers. Also, throughout this chapter the dynamics of 
diversity and internationalism that were also highlighted work to challenge certain notions 
regarding the way the US allegedly dominates the discipline.  
 This chapter began by reviewing the claims in the literature that argues that the US IR 
community is intellectually hegemonic due to its gate-keeping abilities. This body of scholarship 
states that IR is an American enterprise because a group of American elites are able to control 
access to the discipline’s international arena (and therefore the global IR conversation) and 
marginalize non-Western scholarship.  By 1) using language as an exclusionary barrier, and 2) 
parochial editorial decisions made by an overwhelming American set of academics scholars such 
as Kim Nossal,1003 Knud Erik Jørgensen,1004 Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews1005 have argued that 
the American IR community is able to dominate the discipline through excluding non-rationalist 
and non-Western/American research. The result of these two gate-keeping strategies is arguably 
a discipline that reflects the American mainstream’s rationalist preferences, a discipline that is 
controlled by Americans, and therefore the discipline is largely written and published by 
Americans. The rest of this chapter, however, proceeded to show how these prominent claims 
are not only over-exaggerated but they also overlook other gate-keeping practices and gate-
keepers.  
                                                        
1002 H. F. Moed “The Impact Factor Debate: The ISI’s Uses and Limits” Nature 415, (2002), pp. 
731-732.    
1003 Nossal “Tales That Textbooks Tell”, pp. 167-186.  
1004 Jørgensen, “Continental IR Theory”, pp. 9-42 also see Knud Erik Jørgensen “Towards a Six-
Continents Social Science: International Relations” Journal of International Relations and 
Development 6 (4) (2003), pp. 330-343. 
1005 Aydinli and Mathews “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 289-303.  
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 The results presented have suggested that the discipline of IR is a plural and 
internationalizing discipline. Firstly, because of the diverse array of academics publishing from 
different geographical locales it seems that research is not generally being excluded because of 
where it emanates from. Secondly, the breadth of divergent theoretical and methodological 
perspectives present in the 12 journals examined over a ten-year period, from 1999-2009, 
highlights how the American rationalist agenda is not being adhered to; therefore it is difficult to 
substantiate the claim that research is being marginalized in IR on substantive grounds. 
Furthermore, the inquiry into the editorial boards of the 12 journals showed that the academics 
in gate-keeping positions are not overwhelming American, and these scholars comprise a diverse 
group, not only in terms of their institutional homes but also in their research interests and 
perspectives. Finally, the discipline’s gate-keepers interviewed, expressed an interest in further 
internationalizing the field, and instead of accentuating the linguistic bias in the field, the journal 
editors appeared to be aware of language difficulties and claimed to be working with authors 
rather than against them to help with the pressures to publish in English. Taking the three lines 
of inquiry into account (journal content, composition of editorial boards, interviews with journal 
editors) the results challenge the claims of American dominance because it does not seems that a 
preponderant American set of scholars control access to the international realm and publishes 
work that matches their rationalist preferences.  
 This chapter has tried to stress that other gate-keeping strategies are taking place. 
Whether an article is published in a given journal largely rests upon two criteria; 1) the standard 
of the manuscript in question and 2) whether that manuscript ‘fits’ with the aims and scope of 
the publication. The discipline’s journal editors can exercise their decision making power in a 
negative gate-keeping manner using the above grounds to do so. There is no guarantee that 
editors will not enact their own agenda by only publishing work that adheres to their preferences 
and ideas of what constitutes ‘good IR scholarship’ and can therefore exclude non-Western 
scholarship. The diverse array of scholarship published by scholars from around the globe, as 
illustrated by the data presented, suggests that in general the discipline’s gate-keepers are 
largely behaving in a responsible manner and are promoting diversity and pluralism. The gate-
keeping that predominantly occurs is operationalised in a much more subtle manner than the 
literature depicts. It seems the field is gently steered in certain directions by each editor rather 
than widespread practices of exclusion of certain bodies of scholarship conducted by a 
domineering editor. Obviously there will be exceptions and cases where scholars feel that their 
research has been rejected on unfair grounds, and the criteria of standards and ‘fits’ exercised in 
a negative rather than positive manner. Sadly there are no guarantees that such practices will 
never occur but pragmatically rejections need to occur in order for the journal system to 
function.  Standards have to be put in place and decisions made in order to facilitate good 
academic practice and ensure and preserve space for certain forms of research and the vibrancy 
of sub-fields and research communities.  Whilst this may not be of much comfort to those who 
feel marginalized and unfairly excluded, the data however does suggest that such decisions are 
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on the whole made in good faith and instances of dominating editorial preferences are the 
exception as opposed to the norm.  
 Throughout the course of this investigation what I found particularly puzzling was that 
most claims of gate-keeping and therefore promoting American IR scholarship at the expense of 
other non-American, and more specifically non-Western, research were directed primarily at the 
journal editors alone. Yet reviewers have just as much, if not more in some cases, gate-keeping 
potential. The fate of an article is often based on the reviewer reports, and these reports have the 
ability to shape an article itself.  Whilst there is no universal policy as to the relationship between 
editors and reviewers in action most of the editors interviewed seemed to respect the decision of 
the reviewers. However, as it is the editors themselves who select the reviewers of a manuscript 
it can be claimed that the editors are misshaping the field through choosing unsympathetic 
reviewers. As one editor noted “One might also suggest that referees act as gate-keepers on 
behalf of editors”.1006 When challenged on this issue the editors interviewed emphatically 
declared that this was not the case.  For instance one editor argued, “If an article comes in and 
gets past the screening process we find reviewers that will give constructive yet sympathetic 
reviews. We are not going to send an article to someone who hates that particular approach”.1007 
But in the quest to select reviewers each editor also commented upon the increasing difficulty of 
finding reviewers. Given the rapid expansion of the discipline, the dramatic rise in the number of 
IR journals over the last couple of decades1008 and the increasing number of submissions to each 
journal it appears each reviewer is generally asked to do more reviews and growing pressures 
have lead, it seems, to increasing refusals to review manuscripts. According to one editor: “There 
used to be an idea that if you did research you owed the business the ability to do reviews 
because otherwise the business would collapse, that norm is out, I don’t think it exists anymore. 
People are much more utilitarian and look at what is in it for them”.1009  The growth of the 
discipline worldwide has bought with it new pressures and implications for the publication 
sphere, which further highlights the crucial role of the reviewer in the shaping the field. 
 What is included or excluded in the international disciplinary realm is not solely at the 
decision of a collection of editors, but also reviewers and even the academic community itself. As 
noted previously in this chapter the decision to publish an article or not is also made by taking 
the audiences’ exceptions of the journal into consideration and whether an article ‘fits’ with the 
aims of the journal and it’s reputation for being a hub for specific research. As such this chapter 
has aimed to reveal the numerous gate-keeping strategies in place and how the situation is multi-
layered and much more complex than commonly perceived. Instead of a domineering editor who 
single-handedly controls the published content of a journal, the reality is that what is published is 
the outcome of a top-down and bottom-up process, the product of which moulds the contours of 
                                                        
1006 Interviewed journal editor number 8.  
1007 Interviewed journal editor number 5.  
1008 Gunther Hellmann and Harald Müller “Editing (I)nternational (R)elations: A Changing World” 
Journal of International Relations and Development 6 (4) (2003), pp. 372-389.  
1009 Interviewed journal editor number 6.  
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the discipline. Furthermore, this chapter has also aimed to show there are other disciplining 
forces in action that are conditioning academic behaviour and policing the discipline’s borders.  
 The final section of this chapter has sought to problematise the exclusionary 
mechanisms employed by Thomson Reuters and draw attention to how it is disciplining the 
discipline of IR. Through it’s selection criteria for inclusion in the Social Science Citation Index, 
Thomson Reuters legitimizes certain forms of scholarship and brands some journals with the 
status of ‘approved scholarship’ whilst marginalizing others. It also has the power to label and 
demarcate what scholarly outlets count as ‘IR’ and which come under other subject headings. It is 
through these mechanisms that Thomson Reuters acts as a disciplining agent and has the ability 
to gate-keep whole publications. Furthermore, the increased attention paid to Thomson Reuter’s 
annual JCR has not only disciplined academics (in terms of deciding where to send their work) 
because in part their career prospects are coming to depend on publishing in ranked journals, it 
also has begun to affect the content of journals. The interviews held showed how journal editors 
were beginning to favour articles that were likely to be cited over those that weren’t and how 
they were also aware of the benefits of publishing a widely controversial paper in order to boost 
citations and therefore rankings. Operating behind the scenes and before editorial decisions are 
being made Thomson Reuters and its Journal Citation Report has a disciplining effect on IR. 
Moreover, a continued and heightened concern with rankings has only compounded the 
conditioning effects of Thomson Reuters on the discipline and begun to influence editorial 
decisions and determine individual career prospects. As one editor noted “The discipline’s 
journals certainly are gate-keepers, particularly given the close relationship between promotion 
prospects and publishing in high-quality journals. We are well aware that a publication in our 
journal could make someone’s career if it is the right piece”.1010   
 Overall this chapter has shown that there are a host of agential and structural factors 
shaping the field of IR. Gate-keeping practices of some form are inevitable in every academic 
discipline, and there will always be forces and dynamics in operation that mould and steer the 
discipline in question. There will also always be those who are in a position to exercise the power 
of exclusion. In the contemporary discipline of IR, however, those in such positions are not 
overwhelmingly American.  
                                                        
1010 Interviewed journal editor number 1.  
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7. 
 
Conclusion: Diversity and Dominance in International Relations. 
 
The issue that is at the core of this thesis and what it has attempted to show is that it is not 
simply a matter of arguing or demonstrating whether International Relations can be perceived to 
be an American dominated discipline, the question that we need to be asking and exploring is, in 
what ways and how does the US dominate? By changing the focus of the analysis to the means 
and exercise of dominance we can begin to capture all the different dynamics occurring in the 
discipline that shape the contours of the field and impact upon IR academics. One of the central 
arguments of this thesis has been that if we solely focus on the question of American dominance 
in a yes or no fashion, and define dominance in an ambiguous unspecified manner, we tend to 
overlook certain disciplinary realities and project inaccurate and deterministic images of the 
discipline which resultantly condition certain forms of marginalizing academic behaviour.   
 In order to produce a detailed account of the current trends and inclinations in the 
discipline and to see to with what degree and how the US dominates the discipline of IR this 
thesis began by disaggregating the term dominance. By unpacking the term and looking at five 
prominent ways in which American dominance is claimed to be operationalised in the literature 
a number of disciplinary self-images emerged. Each self-image claimed to demonstrate the 
exercise of American disciplinary dominance. Yet, after extensive empirical analysis into different 
academic arenas this thesis has shown that the United States dominates in some ways and not 
others thereby challenging certain prominent claims regarding the composition and orientation 
of the discipline. Meaning, depending on the perspective used one would arrive at a different 
answer to the question of ‘is the discipline of IR dominated by the United States’? It is because 
academic communities can exercise their dominance in multifarious ways and dominate in 
certain forms and not others that we must begin to question the use and accuracy of certain 
disciplinary accounts and depictions. Furthermore, we must begin to talk about disciplinary 
dominance by specifying the way in which an academic community may dominate. In doing so 
this thesis has argued that we will be able to reveal the plural and diverse working within the 
discipline of IR that exist alongside certain American dominant dynamics.  
 This thesis has drawn on the work of Antonio Gramsci, and his conception of 
dominance.1011 According to Gramsci a dominant actor becomes the ‘model’ for others to follow 
and emulate.1012 This thesis was then premised upon emulation being the primary measurement 
                                                        
1011 For more see Steve Jones Antonio Gramsci (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 41-56; Chantal 
Mouffe “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci” in Mouffe, C. (ed) Gramsci and Marxist Theory 
(London: Routledge, 1979), pp. 168-203; and Antonio Gramsci Prison Notebooks (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), pp. 55-57.  
1012 Antonio Gramsci quoted in David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 36.  
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for dominance. This meant that in each definition and means of dominance this study was 
looking to see if the American mainstream’s intellectual agenda had been emulated and 
subscribed to by the majority of IR scholars.1013 However, there was little emulation in action in 
this study. Rather than replicating what is conceived to be ‘good’ or ‘approved’ IR scholarship by 
the American mainstream, the discipline displayed its pluralist tendencies in numerous ways.1014 
The results of the journal and conference investigations have shown that the discipline is more 
plural and diverse than is commonly accounted for. As such throughout the course of this thesis 
each chapter questioned the prevailing knowledge and assumptions in the field. 
 This study has attempted to show that within the discipline there exists a wide range of 
theories and methods being used to question/approach/investigate an equally broad range of 
research interests. The discipline’s pluralism (substantive, theoretical and methodological) 
represents itself as what Colin Wight terms an ‘engaged stance’ rather than a situation where 
Paul Feyerabend’s ‘anything goes’ attitude is adopted.1015 Instead of being diverse for diversity’s 
sake the discipline’s pluralistic efforts have been in order to expand the discipline’s horizons, 
make the discipline more relevant to those in the ‘Third World’, be better able to respond to 
pressing international problems and growing inequalities, enrich scholarly efforts, and to move 
away from potential theoretical and methodological dogmatism. The reality of this diverse 
academic environment challenges the widely held perceptions in the discipline of IR being 
dominated by Realist/Neo-Realist/Neo-Liberal/Conventional Constructivist research,1016 
rational choice approaches,1017 and having an American-centric focus,1018 all of which have 
apparently been maintained and perpetuated by a set of American disciplinary gate-keepers.1019 
These prevalent disciplinary depictions have been challenged by the data presented. 
 This concluding chapter will recap on the findings of each of the previous chapters in 
order to show the various trends and inclinations in the contemporary discipline, and how the 
discipline’s plural and diverse tendencies co-exist with American theoretical and institutional 
dominance. This concluding chapter will then embark on a reflexive exercise and contextualise 
                                                        
1013 Pinar Bilgin “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29 (1) (2008), pp. 5-23.  
1014 Also see for example Michael Wesley “The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism” Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 55 (3) (2009), pp. 325.  
1015 Colin Wight Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 230.  
1016 Ole Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European 
Developments in International Relations” International Organization 52 (4) (1998), pp. 703.  
1017 Chris Brown “Fog in the Channel: Continental International Relations Theory Isolated (or an 
essay on the paradoxes of diversity and parochialism in IR theory)” in Crawford, R. M. A. and 
Jarvis, D. S. L. (eds) International Relations-Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in 
International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 215.   
1018 Steve Smith “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic 
Country, Hegemonic Discipline” International Studies Review 4 (2) (2002), pp. 67-85. 
1019 Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews “Are the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious 
World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations” International Studies Perspectives 
1 (3) (2000), pp. 289-303. 
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the claims being made in light of their institutional basis.1020 This chapter will then seek to briefly 
examine the virtual reality that has been created by IR academics which generates certain self-
disciplining practices.  According to Jörg Friedrich’s “American hegemony over the discipline 
should be seen as a social rather than as a brute fact. This is because the dominant self-
understanding of the discipline as an American social science is more of a social construction 
than an objective truth”.1021 Therefore, this chapter will also look at the implications of this 
widely held belief and how it is conditioning academic behaviour, especially in relation to the 
treatment of ‘peripheral scholarship’.1022 This chapter will then unpack the foundational premise 
of this thesis, that IR is a discipline. This underlying and framing assumption is often challenged, 
hence this section will briefly argue and demonstrate that IR is a discipline and argue that this 
thesis itself captures the workings of IR as a discipline. This chapter will then conclude by 
drawing all the elements together and presenting avenues for further research.  Overall, this 
concluding chapter aims to 1) illustrate the current plural disciplinary state of affairs; 2) 
encourage academics to be more reflexive and nuanced with the way the discipline is depicted 
and dominance conceptualized; 3) prevent the seamless and unquestioning reproduction of the 
image of IR as an American dominated discipline; and 4) present some suggestions for future 
research.  
 
Pluralism, the Empirical Reality.  
 
As previously mentioned, the self-image of American intellectual hegemony in IR has become 
ingrained and functions as a quasi-fact, and through focusing on dominance the dynamics of 
pluralism are often negated. In demonstrating IR’s pluralist tendencies and empirically 
demonstrating the diversity of scholarship taking place each chapter has in turn challenged and 
even overturned certain prominent assumptions, especially those regarding the theoretical and 
methodological orientation of the discipline.   
 Chapter one demonstrated the discipline’s pluralist subject matter. Instead of the 
discipline’s focus being synonymous with the foreign policy concerns of the US administration, 
the field is actually preoccupied with investigating a wide array of issues. The discipline it seems 
has moved beyond the traditional state-centric agenda and American affairs and is researching a 
broad array of foci.1023 The data presented in the chapter on dominance defined as agenda setting 
demonstrated that the ontological scope of the discipline of IR goes beyond traditional concerns 
                                                        
1020 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce “Advancing a Reflexive International Relations” Millennium 39 (3) 
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and addresses a plural range of international issues ranging from environmental concerns, 
gender relations, to poverty, hunger, torture and so on.  This plurality contradicts the popular 
image of the discipline that has been created by Stanley Hoffmann1024 and reproduced by Steve 
Smith1025 and others.1026 Whilst the discipline in the 1970s may have revolved itself around the 
wants and needs of American policy-making elites this is no longer the case.1027 This chapter 
argued that the discipline has exercised its critical distance and is investigating a host of issues, 
such as forms of inequality that have previously been ignored.1028 However, the popular 
narrative of American dominance due to its agenda setting capabilities still pervades the 
collective disciplinary mindset.1029 For example, according to Smith the effect of US disciplinary 
dominance is witnessed and exercised through the US’s ability to “skew the discipline towards 
the policy concerns of the US, and to ensure that the available theories for studying these 
concerns are theories that fit the US definition of ‘proper’ social science”.1030  Yet the results 
presented show this not to be the case, the discipline has not been orientated around US 
concerns. Furthermore, the theories that the discipline has used to research the diverse arrange 
of topics that come under the rubric of international relations, are not primarily those deemed 
‘proper’ by the US mainstream.  
 Chapter two challenged another, and perhaps even more entrenched set of disciplinary 
depictions. Rather than a discipline dominated by either realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism or 
conventional constructivism the journal investigation suggests that IR is theoretically plural. 
Whilst Ole Wæver argues there is US hegemony in IR and this is demonstrated through the 
dominance of neo-realism and neo-liberalism,1031 after extensive examination into 12 of the 
discipline’s international journals this is not the current situation. Neither were classical realism 
or constructivism found to dominate the discipline as Kenneth Waltz1032 and William 
Wohlforth1033 argue they do. Instead of the existence of an American theoretical orthodoxy in 
either its realist, neo-neo or constructivist variant, the journal investigation revealed a diverse 
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and plural theoretical environment. The American mainstream still may be advocating the use of 
realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and/or conventional constructivism and declaring that such 
approaches constitutes ‘proper’ IR research1034 but it seems the global discipline does not agree. 
The data presented revealed the diverse array of theoretical endeavours being undertaken, and 
this diversity displayed itself in the American journals as well as the non-American ones. 
Crucially, the theoretical plurality was not confined to the non-American sphere; it seems it is a 
global disciplinary reality. However, the prominent notion in the discipline is still that realist, 
neo-neo and conventional constructivist research comprises the majority of global academic 
output, due to scholars emulating the American theoretical preferences in order to gain entrance 
into certain publications and gain international scholarly recognition.1035 Consequently, chapter 
two can be depicted as serving a myth-breaking function; for it challenges a number of the widely 
held assumptions regarding the theoretical composition of the global discipline through 
illustrating the discipline’s plural inclinations.  
 Despite the plural theoretical environment American theories writ large still dominate 
the discipline, therefore in a certain sense the US IR community is still theoretically dominant. 
Whilst this dominance does not exercise itself in the form of a theoretical orthodoxy and 
consequently theoretical dogmatism, the American IR community produces the greatest volume 
of theoretical research, therefore one can still stake a claim that America is theoretically 
dominant.1036 It can be argued that certain theoretical approaches such as liberalism, 
constructivism, and historical sociology for instance can be classified as ‘American’. Given the 
alleged dependence of other IR communities on American theoretical texts we can argue that the 
US is theoretically and in this sense disciplinary preponderant. However, this chapter concluded 
by raising a number of questions regarding whether we can label a theory as belonging to 
academic community X. This chapter asked what does it mean for a theory to be classed as 
American, given the fact that all theoretical works draw on numerous influences and are suffused 
with American, non-American, Western and non-Western elements.1037 Moreover, taking into 
account the numerous works published recently that have looked for, promoted, and encouraged 
further developments of non-Western IR theory,1038 it may be the case that non-American IR 
                                                        
1034 Brown, “Fog in the Channel”, pp. 203.  
1035 Roland Bleiker “Forget IR Theory” in Chan, S., Mandaville, P. and Bleiker, R. (eds) The Zen of 
International Relations: IR Theory from East to West (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 37-67.  
1036 Kal J. Holsti The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1985) and Amitav Acharya, and Barry Buzan “Why is There No Non-Western 
International Relations Theory? An introduction” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7 (3), 
(2007), pp. 287-312 
1037 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”, pp. 5.   
1038 See for example Rosa Vasilaki “Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-Western 
IR Theory” Millennium 41 (1) (2012), pp. 3-22; Robbie Shilliam International Relations and Non-
Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2011); and Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney (eds) Thinking International 
Relations Differently (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).    
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communities are becoming less dependent upon US theoretical works.1039 Overall, this chapter 
sought to highlight the numerous dynamics in operation that exist alongside exist other. 
Theoretically the discipline is both plural, dominated by the US and experiencing a non-Western 
theoretical influx. Overall, the situation is a lot more complex and fluid than many previous state 
of the discipline articles have captured.  
 Chapter three aimed to highlight the discipline’s pluralist tendencies methodologically 
speaking. This chapter sought to challenge a number of claims in the literature regarding the way 
the US IR community allegedly exercises its dominance methodologically. One frequently hears 
scholars deploring the dominance of rationalism and rational choice, game theoretic, and formal 
modeling methods in the discipline of IR.1040 Numerous articles either in passing or as an object 
of sustained critique problematise and bemoan the dominance of a particular set quantitative 
methods,1041 because this suspected methodological dogmatism has resulted in the 
marginalization of historical and interpretive research. Yet the results presented showed how the 
popular narrative fails to represent the current methodological trends in the discipline. Rather 
than a preponderance of research using rational choice, formal modeling, and other popular 
economic methods the field was more qualitative in its methodological orientation and 
furthermore the majority of scholars were using interpretivism as the means of analysis. Instead 
of methodological totalitarianism, and adherence to the American mainstream’s blueprint for 
‘proper’ social science conduct, the discipline once again displayed its pluralistic inclinations 
thereby challenging another prevalent disciplinary self-image.  
 The actual paucity of quantitative research of the sort advocated by mainstream 
component of the US IR community adopted outside of the US raised the question of why some 
ideas travel and are disseminated readily by other academies and others do not? Chapter three 
concluded by questioning whether the sheer scarcity of rationalist research found in the journals 
investigated could be due to the fact that certain IR enclaves have not readily received such ideas 
and in fact rejected them.1042 This chapter suggested that because of their incompatibility with 
                                                        
1039 Kim Hutchings “Dialogue Between Whom? The Role of the West/Non-West Distinction in 
Promoting Global Dialogue in IR” Millennium 39 (3) (2011), pp. 639-647.  
1040 For instance see Darryl S. L. Jarvis “International Relations: An International Discipline?” in 
Crawford, R. M. A. and Jarvis, D. S. L. (eds) International Relations-Still an American Social Science? 
Toward Diversity in International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 
369-380 and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, N. (2006) “BISA at Thirty: Reflections 
on Three Decades of British International Relations Scholarship” Review of International Studies 
32 (4) (2006), pp. 665-676.  
1041 For example see Nicholas Guilhot “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science 
and the Birth of IR Theory” International Political Sociology 2 (4) (2008), pp. 281-304; Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); and J. Ann Tickner “Dealing 
with Difference: Problems and Possibilities for Dialogue in International Relations” Millennium 
39 (3) (2011), pp. 607-618 
1042 Morten Valbjøn “Blank, Blind or Blinded? Cultural Investigations in International Relations” ” 
in Jørgensen, K. and Knudsen, T. (eds) International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives 
and Destinations (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 203.and Friedrichs, European Approaches to 
International Relations, pp. 14.  
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certain national intellectual persuasions, historical context1043 and the type of questions being 
asked by scholars in non-American IR communities rationalist methods had not been used more 
generally. The lack of ‘fit’ has meant that America has not been able to exercise its dominance 
methodologically, as other scholars have opted for a plethora of other methods, methods that 
enable scholars to address the questions they are asking. Once again the aim of this chapter was 
to reveal the various interactions taking place and to question the applicability of certain 
universal characterizations of IR, especially those regarding the field’s methodological 
inclinations.  
 Chapter four showed that American scholars, defined as scholars from American 
institutions, command an overt presence in the discipline, in terms of numbers of scholars being 
published and participating at conferences. More American IR scholars were found to be present 
in the discipline’s forums than academics affiliated with universities from other geographical 
regions. As such the data detailed supports the various claims put forth in the literature that IR is 
an American dominated discipline if we define dominance institutionally.1044 In this realm of 
dominance the empirical reality matched the prominent conceptualization. However, in 
seamlessly reproducing this disciplinary self-image one runs the risk of diverting attention away 
from the large number of non-American scholars participating in the global discipline.1045 In a 
sense American institutional dominance is only one side of the disciplinary reality, it co-exists 
alongside non-American scholarly efforts. If one simply talks of US institutional hegemony this 
gives the impression that no one is publishing outside of the US,1046 and as the results show this 
is not the current state of affairs. The data suggests that the discipline is internationalizing itself; 
for instance the journal editors interviewed noted the “increase in submissions from further 
afield”.1047 If the discipline continues along this trajectory we could potentially see a decrease in 
the present American institutional stronghold as other IR communities develop and increase 
their prestige.1048 This chapter also argued that American institutional dominance is nowhere 
near as damaging in terms of its associated parochialism as the literature tends to depict.1049 As 
                                                        
1043 Pierre Bourdieu “The Social Condition of the International Circulation of Ideas” in 
Schusterman. R. (ed) Bourdieu: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999), pp. 
220-228.  
1044 For example see Thomas Biersteker “The Parochialism of Hegemony: Challenges for 
‘American’ International Relations” in Tickner, A. B., and Wæver, O. (eds) IR Scholarship Around 
the World: Worlding Beyond the West (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 309 and J. C. Sharman 
“Benchmarking Australian IR: Low Impact, a Bookish Lot or a Very British Affair?” Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 62 (4) (2008), pp. 531.  
1045 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”, pp. 5-23. 
1046 Donald Puchala “Third World Thinking and Contemporary International Relations” in 
Neumann, S. G. (ed) International Relations Theory and the Third World (London: Macmillan, 
1998), pp. 133-157.  
1047 Interviewed journal editor number 6.  
1048 Gerard Holden “Approaches to IR: The Relationship Between Anglo-Saxon Historiography 
and Cross-Community Comparison” in Jørgensen, K. and Knudsen, T. (eds) International Relations 
in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 232.  
1049 Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker “The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future 
Archeologist of International Savoir Faire” International Studies Quarterly 28 (2) (1984), pp. 121-
142; Kim Nossal “Tales That Textbooks Tell: Ethnocentricity and Diversity in America. 
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such chapter four broached the question of whether some forms of dominance are more 
destructive for the discipline than others. This chapter argued that it seems that institutional 
dominance is only a major disciplinary concern if it brings about the preponderance of a certain 
theory, method, focus, which subsequently results in either dogmatism or ethnocentrism. If 
scholars from American institutions dominate the discipline but they constitute an eclectic and 
diverse group then the associated concerns in the literature seemed somewhat diminished.1050   
 Overall, the results presented in chapter four portray an underlying plurality. Whilst the 
discipline is still characterized by American institutional dominance, there is also a lively non-
American and crucially non-Western body of research that is being published in the discipline’s 
journals (including the American ones), and being presented at the discipline’s international 
conferences. This plurality of perspectives and influences may not be as prominent as one may 
hope for; but there are still plenty of non-American voices contributing to the global IR 
conversation.1051 Yet, as chapter four noted more research needs to be done in this realm of 
dominance to find out the extent to which America dominates and to explore the consequences in 
more depth. This chapter presented a number of avenues for further inquiry, for example one 
needs to investigate the biographies of IR scholars in American and non-American universities to 
see the movement of scholars around the globe, because upon further examination one may find 
that there are more American scholars located in non-Western universities. This could result in 
the dissemination of ‘American’ ideas and the acculturation of ‘American’ models thereby 
enhancing America’s institutional stronghold.1052 But one may also find that there are numerous 
non-American scholars located in American universities as well as other institutions. Such 
scholars could bring with them a host of different ideas based on non-American knowledge and 
facilitate dialogue and interactions that result in the spread of such ideas.1053 Either way the 
movement of scholars results in the flow of ideas around the globe and the dilution of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Introductions to International Relations” in Crawford, R. M. A. and Jarvis, D. S. L. (eds) 
International Relations-Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International 
Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 167-186.  Susan Strange “1995 
Presidential Address, ISA as a Microcosm” International Studies Quarterly 39 (3) (1995), pp. 289-
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1050 Acharya and Buzan “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?”, pp. 
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1051 For example see Giorgio Shani “Toward a Post-Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth and 
Critical International Relations Theory” International Studies Review 10 (4) (2008), pp. 722-734; 
Petra Roter  “At the Centre and Periphery Simultaneously: The Incomplete Internationalization of 
Slovenian International Relations” Journal of International Relations and Development 12 (2) 
(2009), pp. 180-186; and Isaac Kamola “Reading the Global in the Absence of Africa” in Tickner, 
A. and Blaney, D. (eds) Thinking International Relations Differently: Worlding Beyond the West 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 183-204.  
1052 Peter M. Kristensen “Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication in International 
Relations” International Studies Review 14 (1) (2012), pp. 32-50.  
1053 Amitav Acharya “Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories 
Beyond the West” Millennium 39 (3) (2011), pp. 619-637.   
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geographical boundaries belonging to epistemic communities.1054 What I am trying to elicit is 
that academic communities are not the monolithic entities that they are depicted as. The 
boundaries of these communities are rendered somewhat ‘fuzzy’ due to the influx of scholars 
from other IR communities and the influences and ideas they bring with then which impact and 
shape their interactions with other academics.  
 Chapter five addressed the claims that American institutional dominance is enabled by 
the preponderant number of American scholars in influential positions within the discipline.1055 
One widespread disciplinary self-image is that the American IR community is able to exercise and 
perpetuate its dominant position due to its gate-keeping abilities.1056 Various articles examining 
the political nature of publication practices have argued that an American rationalist elite polices 
the discipline’s borders and only permits entrance to research that adheres to its standards of 
what constitutes ‘good IR scholarship’1057; i.e. rationalist research.1058 Chapter five, however, 
challenged these popular notions. The investigation into a number of the discipline’s gate-
keepers found that those holding the positions of power were not overwhelming American, in 
fact the discipline’s gate-keepers constituted an international and plural group. Furthermore, the 
level of plurality witnessed in previous chapters also worked to challenge the arguments that an 
elite group of scholars predominantly publishes work that meets its supposed rationalist 
preferences.  
 The final chapter explored the current gate-keeping practices taking place by a 
heterogeneous set of scholars and showed how these deviate from the prominent assumptions 
operating in the discipline. In general, it seems that research is not being denied entrance into the 
international sphere on substantive, theoretical, methodological or institutional grounds. Instead 
the language of ‘fits’ and ‘standards’ was being and is being used to determine whether work will 
be published in a given journal. Furthermore this chapter argued that the narrative of an 
American set of rationalist journal editors policing the discipline’s boundaries diverts attention 
away from the influential role of the reviewer and Thomson Reuters, thereby obscuring the 
actual disciplining practices taking place. The somewhat misplaced academic attention has 
ensured that two groups who help determine journal content escape being the subject of 
academic scrutiny, which then ensures that these practices continue unchallenged. This chapter 
sought to problematise the impact that the JCR and its impact factor are having on the discipline 
                                                        
1054 Yongjin Zhang “The ‘English School’ in China: A Travelogue of Ideas and Their Diffusion” 
European Journal of International Relations 9 (1) (2003), pp. 87-114.  
1055 Adylini and Mathews, “Are the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 289-303. 
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of IR, and raise awareness of the biases in operation in Thomson Reuters selection criteria, in 
order show how other structural forces are disciplining IR. 
 Overall, each chapter works to 1) empirically demonstrate the existing levels of 
pluralism in International Relations and 2) show how complex the current disciplinary 
environment is and how there are numerous dynamics in operation that are shaping the field, 
which table 6.1 has attempted to summarize. Through demonstrating all the different pluralistic 
tendencies, how American disciplinary dominance is exercised, and the different structural 
forces in operation this thesis has attempted to show how the issue of whether IR is an American 
dominated discipline is not one that elicits a yes or no answer. This is because the answer to the 
question changes depending on the perspective used (see table 6.1). Furthermore, through 
entrenching this disciplinary self-image without prefixing the way in which the US dominates 
problematically encourages us to ignore the other dynamics that co-exist. But what must also be 
stressed is that whilst the American IR community is intellectually hegemonic institutionally and 
theoretically, American preponderance is not as pervasive across the discipline as the literature 
tends to depict (see table 6.1). This is because the discipline of IR is becoming increasing 
‘internationalized’ in terms of not only who is contributing to the global IR conversation but also 
the perspectives and theories that are being drawn upon. Resultantly, certain scholars have 
argued that the discipline has the potential to become increasing de-Americanized, and therefore 
more geographically plural,1059 which has generated a discourse of ‘disciplinary transformation’.     
 
Definition of Dominance.  Evidence of Dominance. Disciplinary Inclinations.  
Agenda-setting.  No.  Independence from 
American foreign policy 
making elites.  
 Global ontological 
pluralism.  
Theoretical Dominance.  Yes and No.   American dominance in 
terms of the volume of 
theoretical research 
produced.  
 Global theoretical 
pluralism, which is 
increasing due to the 
influx of non-Western IR 
theory.  
Methodological Dominance.  No.   Global methodological 
                                                        
1059 Holden “Approaches to IR”, pp. 225, also see Gerard Holden “Who Contextualizes the 
Contextualizers? Disciplinary History and the Discourse About IR Discourse” Review of 
International Studies 28 (2) (2002), pp. 265.  
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pluralism. 
 Differing national 
methodological 
preferences.  
Institutional Preponderance.  Yes.   American institutional 
dominance.  
 National parochialism.  
 Global 
internationalization.  
Gate-Keeping.  
 
No.   Pluralism and 
internationalization 
encouraged.  
 Gate-keeping practices 
through ‘fits’ and 
‘standards’.  
 Gate-keeping role of 
Thomson Reuters.  
 
Table 6.1: Dominance and Diversity: The findings from each chapter summarized.  
 
For example, the degree of pluralism in the field in all its variants, the lack of emulation of the 
American mainstream’s preferences in the global discipline, and the growth, independence and 
diversity of non-American IR communities1060 has lead Miles Kahler to claim that “International 
Relations no longer remains an American social science”.1061 The diverse nature of IR national 
communities leading to different ways the discipline is practised, researched, theorised and 
taught1062 around the world, has resulted in the emergence of a dialogue surrounding IR’s 
apparent ‘transformation’ from an American enterprise to an international one. In other words, 
this thesis is not alone in questioning the extent to which America dominates the discipline of IR. 
Scholars such as John Groom1063, Gerard Holden,1064 and Knud Erik Jørgensen1065 have used the 
                                                        
1060 Valbjøn, “Blank, Blind or Blinded?”, pp. 203.    
1061 Miles Kahler “International Relations: Still an American Social Science?” in Miller, L. B. and 
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1062 See for instance J. K. Choi “Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea” Asian 
Perspective 32 (1) (2008), pp. 193-216; Bob S. Hadiwinata “International Relations in Indonesia: 
Historical Legacy, Political Intrusion, and Commercialization” International Relations of the Asia-
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“Latin American IR and the Primacy of lo práctico” International Studies Review 10 (4) (2008), pp. 
735-748. 
1063 A. J. R. Groom and William Olson International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in 
Interpretation (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 325. Also see A. J. R. Groom and Peter 
Mandaville “Hegemony and Autonomy in International Relations; The Continental Experience” in 
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current ‘eclectic and assorted spectrum of current IR scholarship taking place throughout the 
world’1066 to question the assumptions of American disciplinary dominance. However, just like its 
counterpart the claims that question the extent to which American dominates the discipline are 
also empirically light.1067 Resultantly the data presented here could be employed in such a way as 
to provide the empirical support needed to verify these claims. However, to use the data here in 
such a manner would be to problematically overlook certain tendencies within the discipline.  As 
previously mentioned the key issue is not whether IR is or is not an American discipline, it is 
about the degree of dominance exercised and crucially how an academic community dominates.  
 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter the central aim of this dissertation was to 
encourage scholars to refine their claims regarding American dominance, and this also applies in 
the reverse. Depending on the frame used one can make either claim. For instance, if one looks at 
American dominance methodologically and then institutionally one would arrive at a different 
answer to the question of whether the United States is intellectually hegemonic. Without 
detailing the manner in which America does or does not dominate claims relating to IR’s 
American self-image make little sense. Through disaggregating the concept of dominance a 
variety of different disciplinary depictions surface, and each relates differently to the issue of 
whether Stanley Hoffmann’s characterisation applies to the contemporary field. The disciplinary 
reality concerning the discipline’s relationship with the American IR community is multilayered 
and complex, and we must begin to capture this in our disciplinary depictions. Whilst the 
discipline of IR is a plural enterprise and exhibits diverse inclinations in terms of the research 
being conducted, these efforts exist alongside American theoretical and institutional dominance. 
The issue is not black and white and the image of IR shifts depending on the lens used, and this 
also may be dependent on one’s geographical location. Perspective as, as Groom and Mandaville 
argue, everything.1068 Whether one agrees with the pluralistic depiction of the discipline that has 
been generated here will invariably depend upon the “locale and vantage point from which one 
views the discipline”.1069 To certain scholars working in specific American universities the 
discipline may feel like an American dominated one, as it might also to scholars in other 
geographical locales who feel dependent on ‘American’ texts, methods and even academics 
themselves.1070 Context has a vast determining effect upon one’s view of the discipline. As such 
                                                                                                                                                              
Crawford, R. M. A. and Jarvis, D. S. L. (eds) International Relations-Still an American Social Science? 
Toward Diversity in International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 
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1065 Knud Erik Jørgensen “Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret” European Journal of 
International Relations 6 (9) (2000), pp. 28.  
1066 Mark Boyer “Old Whine in New Bottles” Journal of International Relations and Development 6 
(4) (December 2003), pp. 390-398.  
1067 For instance, authors such as John Groom and Peter Mandaville, have tended to point to 
general trends and based their arguments from individual experiences alone. See for example, 
Groom and Mandaville “Hegemony and Autonomy in International Relations”, pp. 159.  
1068 Groom and Mandaville “Hegemony and Autonomy in International Relations”, pp. 151.  
1069 Ibid., op cit.  
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the institutional setting and frame of this thesis will now be taken into consideration and 
reflected upon in order to question whether the plural view presented is dependent upon its own 
institutional basis.  
 
Institutional Perspectives and Reflexivity. 
 
As noted in Chapter three the British International Relations community has an international 
reputation of being diverse, eclectic1071 and having it’s own ‘way of doing IR’ that is distinct from 
the American academy.1072 This self-image is also shared internally; according to Chris Brown 
British IR academics have an image of themselves as; 
 
 “an open, pluralistic discipline, not affected by the kind of gate-keeping that, 
allegedly, distorts US international relations, and it is indeed true that in the course 
of the last two decades British IR has been remarkably open to new forms of 
knowledge”.1073  
 
The British IR academy is often commended for establishing an independent IR community that 
is not influenced by US preferences.1074 As Caroline Kennedy-Pipe notes, “at least on this side of 
the Atlantic, we are surely not obliged to follow the rather odd scholarly fashions that dominate 
our fellows on the other side”.1075 Whilst there was a degree of convergence (in terms of similar 
frameworks and foci) between the burgeoning American and British IR communities during the 
inter-war period,1076 the 1950s saw the beginning of an increased division between the two IR 
academies. The Second Debate resulted in a clear divergence between the US approach to IR and 
the British one.1077 Combined with the development of British IR theory the ‘distance’ between 
British and American scholarship on international politics has persisted, if not increased.1078 The 
consequences of this distance and independence from the American IR community has meant 
that the British IR academy has been able to unfetteredly 1) create an academic community that 
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is plural and comprises an “increasingly cosmopolitan mix of intellectual orientations”1079 and 2) 
pursue its methodological preferences for interpretive and reflectivist approaches, thereby 
offering an “alternative to behaviouralism and positivism”.1080  The result of which has been, 
according to Chris Brown, that “unlike most other national IR communities, Britain has its own 
brand, with extensive recognition in the United States and elsewhere”.1081  
 The British IR community has amassed an international reputation,1082 its theoretical 
endeavours are recognized globally (by American and non-American scholars alike) and there is 
a large degree of dialogue between the British and American IR communities.1083 Furthermore, 
its theoretical efforts, and pluralism (substantive, theoretical, epistemological and 
methodological) has made the UK an attractive and favoured destination for IR scholars and 
students.1084 Great Britain is a recognized centre for IR, because as Knud Erik Jørgensen and 
Tonny Brems Knudsen note “In the UK we find the biggest and best organized International 
Relations (IR) community in Europe with the biggest and best annual conference and a unique 
journal and book publication infrastructure”.1085  
 It is within this plural, esteemed, and professionally developed academic environment 
that this PhD has been written. Furthermore, I was lucky enough to study for my undergraduate 
degree in IR and my MSc in International Relations Theory at two prestigious UK universities.1086 
As such I have become accustomed to an academic environment that favours and promotes 
substantive, theoretical, epistemological and methodological diversity.1087 I have been taught and 
influenced by scholars with diverging research interests and specialism’s who have amounted 
global reputations.1088 Also I have witnessed first hand the impact of non-American scholars on 
the global discipline and through my own research network I have worked, interacted, and 
socialized with IR scholars from all over the globe, all contributing to the global IR conversation 
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(2002), pp. 12. For more on the global disciplinary effects of this institutional starting point see 
Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That 
Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919” Millennium 39 (3) (2011), pp. 735-758.  
1087 Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 397.  
1088 My main academic influences have been my supervisor Colin Wight, my former mentor Milja 
Kurki, and Steve Smith (who is also the Vice Chancellor of the University where I studied for my 
PhD). I have also been inspired and taught by Tim Dunne, Toni Erskine, Lene Hansen, Iver 
Neumann and Hidemi Suganami.  
 160 
through inter-IR community dialogue. Therefore, my view of the global discipline of IR has been 
shaped by the institutional structures of the UK IR community and my own ‘global’ IR 
experiences.1089 
 Moreover, the wealth of British theoretical works, the distance (in terms of intellectual 
traditions and preferences) between the UK IR community and the American academy, the 
vibrancy of the professional identity of British IR – in terms of the number of highly ranked 
journals, universities that offer IR courses, and size and number of conferences – has meant that I 
do not feel dominated by the United States IR community.1090 I have not been dependent on the 
US for theoretical texts, methodological approaches or  research, and I do not feel the need to 
emulate the American mainstream in order to gain recognition and entrance into the global IR 
community. Resultantly, I am perhaps predisposed to see pluralism. Had I of been based in 
another IR community, one that feels the hegemonic presence of the US in certain ways I may 
have interpreted the results produced in a different manner, one that perhaps draws more 
heavily upon American institutional dominance and used this realm of dominance as grounds to 
construct a slightly different image of the discipline.  
 As a result of the importance of perspective and personal experiences certain scholars 
may feel that the empirical presentation of a plural global discipline put forth here does not 
capture their disciplinary reality. Their institutional experiences may differ remarkably and as 
such they may discern American and/or Anglo-American disciplinary dominance. For example, 
European scholars have referred to the UK IR community as ‘a little America’,1091 and have 
critiqued the UK IR community for not paying enough attention to European IR and Continental 
theory.1092 According to Jørgensen and Knudsen “British IR has been guilty of a certain lack of 
interest in continental scholarship. With the exception of the particularity of the ECPR sessions 
and the pan-European conferences in the 1990s, encounters with continental IR theory have 
been individual rather than institutional”.1093 Consequently, European scholars like Jørgsensen 
and Knudsen may have a different perception of the global discipline with regards to its self-
image1094 because of their interactions with both the American and British IR academies. In order 
to explore the tensions produced due to the differing perspective more research is needed into 
individual experiences and disciplinary perceptions. The data featured here is formed from 
investigations into institutional forms of academic research therefore looking at individual 
attitudes and insights gained through questionnaires for example, might produce another insight 
                                                        
1089 Loïc Wacquant, ‘Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s 
Sociology’, in Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (eds) An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 1-60.  
1090 This investigation therefore has been “informed by larger institutions and discursive 
structures of power” Matthew Eagleton-Pierce “Advancing a Reflective International Relations”, 
pp. 2.  
1091 Jørgensen and Knudsen “United Kingdom”, pp. 149.   
1092 Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 398.  
1093 Jørgensen and Knudsen “United Kingdom”, pp. 163.  
1094 For more see Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (eds) International Relations in 
Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).  
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into the way the discipline is practiced and organized.  Scholars, for example, may feel dominated 
by the US, and argue that the global discipline is an American one based on individual 
experiences without this being the empirical actuality as illustrated through journal or 
conference content.1095  
 The different perceptions based on different perspectives have in a sense constructed a 
virtual reality.1096 In other words, the perceptions of some have produced a narrative that others 
have adopted and reproduced, resulting in a widespread disciplinary depiction that may be 
removed from the empirical reality of a large percentage of the discipline.1097 What might be an 
actuality for some has become a virtual reality for others. The social construction of this 
disciplinary self-image and its pervasive nature has resulted in certain self-disciplining 
behaviours, which further entrenches this disciplinary characterization and the performance of 
‘American disciplinary dominance’. The next section of this concluding chapter will now look at 
how this narrative conditions academic behaviour and how certain disciplinary ‘myths’ have 
enabled the construction of a virtual disciplinary reality.   
 
The Virtual Reality?  
 
According to Duncan Bell: “Scholars routinely tell stories to each other and to themselves about 
how their discipline or specialism emerged, how it evolved over time and how they fit into this 
account. These are discipline-defining mythologies”.1098 The mythologies produced however are 
not only confined to tales of the past, they also operate as current depictions. The notion that IR 
is an American discipline has become of one the most prevalent images of the contemporary 
discipline. This thesis has shown how widespread this characterization is and how many have 
uncritically adopted and reproduced this self-image. This disciplinary description is sustained 
through the constant reproduction of this image both in the literature and academic behaviour 
regardless of whether it may be the actuality. As Jörg Friedrichs argues “in a certain sense 
International Relations is as much an American social science as IR scholars behave and view 
each other as American social scientists”.1099  
 This thesis has repeatedly argued the discipline is more plural than is commonly 
depicted; yet academics often behave as if the discipline were suffering from certain forms of 
                                                        
1095 See for example the claims of Chris Brown and Steve Smith when compared to the data 
presented throughout this thesis; Brown “The Development of International Relations Theory in 
the UK”, pp. 309 and Smith “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 399-400.  
1096 I use the term ‘virtual reality’ to denote and capture that which has been awarded the status 
of ‘real’ and is treated as the ‘reality’, yet this state of affairs is the product of a narrative. It is a 
social construction that differs from the empirical reality. My use and understanding of this 
concept is based on the work of Jean Baudrillard, for more see Jean Baudrillard The Perfect Crime 
(London: Verso, 2008), pp. 29-32; 65-71 and Jean Baudrillard The Spirit of Terrorism and Other 
Essays (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 27-30; 38.  
1097 Friedrichs, European Approaches to International Relations Theory, pp. 1.  
1098 Duncan Bell “Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond” International Affairs 85 
(1) (2009), pp. 5.  
1099 Friedrichs, European Approaches to International Relations Theory, pp. 2.  
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intellectual dogmatism and totalitarianism. Resultantly academics themselves begin to construct 
a reality whereby the United States dominates the discipline. As Bell notes: 
 
 “Disciplinary mythologies perform various legitimating functions, 
classifying some positions as the product of intellectual progress, others as 
consigned for ever to the proverbial dustbin of history. Engines of identity 
construction, they help to mark and police the boundaries of disciplines, as well as 
shaping the self-understandings of scholars”.1100  
 
The understanding of IR as an American dominated discipline enables scholars to construct their 
own academic identities and through such performances of feeling dominated the discipline is 
policed.  
 Chapter two noted the effects of certain self-disciplining practices borne out of the 
widespread adoption and reproduction that IR is an American dominated discipline and the 
effects they have had on the discipline. The chapter on theoretical dominance attempted to 
highlight that academics often discipline themselves and construct their own marginal positions 
and academic identities through treating certain theories as though they were dominant. 
Through defining themselves in relation to certain American schools of thought they immediately 
place themselves in a marginal position. Through performing their own marginality and 
entrenching this image the notions of American dominance seem to capture the current 
perceived environment. More worryingly than the self-disciplining practices of certain academics 
is the treatment of ‘peripheral scholarship’ by some within the discipline and even those who 
perceive themselves to be on the margins. What has been designated as ‘peripheral scholarship’ 
is that which is often produced in the Third World. Because certain IR communities are perceived 
as dependent on American texts and American ways of doing IR it is then argued that ‘peripheral 
scholarship’ amounts to nothing other than what it has been taught.1101 In other words it is not 
original. Such scholarship has been labeled as ‘thoughtless emulations’,1102 which problematically 
denies it any agency. Differences are overlooked, as are the individual merits of such 
scholarship.1103 This situation is inherently problematic. Through revealing the current plural 
situation and how American dominance within IR is not as pervasive as is often imagined we can 
hope to bring about an end to these forms of academic behaviour and to begin recognizing the 
diverse and original research taking place in what has been classified as the ‘periphery’. 
Furthermore, through empirically illustrating the different plural and international inclinations 
within IR we can see that the differing dynamics in the discipline has shown that “the dominant 
self-understanding of the discipline as an American social science is more of a social construction 
than an objective truth”.1104  
                                                        
1100 Bell “Writing the World”, pp. 5.  
1101 Puchala “Some Non-Western Perspectives on International Relations”, pp. 129.   
1102 Bilgin “Thinking Past ‘Western IR’”, pp. 13.  
1103 Acharya “Dialogue and Discovery”, pp. 624.  
1104 Friedrichs European Approaches to International Relations Theory, pp. 10.  
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 Another means in which IR scholar’s self-discipline themselves and aid the construction 
and reproduction of American hegemony in IR is through individual publication choices. As 
chapter five noted IR scholars have argued that the US is able to exercise its disciplinary 
dominance through processes of inclusion and exclusion into the discipline’s international 
journals. Research examining the political nature of publication practices has argued that an 
American neo-realist/neo-liberal elite polices the discipline’s borders and only permits entrance 
to research that adheres to the editors standards of what constitutes ‘good IR scholarship’1105; i.e. 
quantitative research using a rationalist theoretical framework.1106 Such notions about the 
discipline have resultantly constrained the behaviour of IR scholars. Fears of being rejected have 
prevented scholars from sending their work to journals they perceive to be ‘rationalist’. 
Publication choices can become limited if one adopts the assumptions about certain journals and 
their gate-keeping practices.1107 Meaning, academics are disciplining themselves and potentially 
bringing to fruition that which they lament.  
 The international reputation that each journal amasses influences academics in terms of 
deciding where to send their work. Academics have to make strategic choices regarding where 
their work will best received.1108 If American journals are perceived to be openly hostile to work 
that falls outside of the rationalist rubric then scholars who use discourse analysis, or semiotics 
may feel that there work will be rejected and thus choose to send their research to a more 
compatible journal. Because editors can only publish what is submitted, if these practices become 
widespread the identity and orientation of each journal will be reinforced, as will the grounds for 
claiming that IR is dominated by the U.S if we define dominance in terms of gate-keeping. If 
scholars aren’t sending in their manuscripts to certain publications because they don’t adhere to 
what they perceive to be the preferences of the editors then the situation become somewhat of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. If ‘critical’ and ‘qualitative’ work is not being sent to certain publications 
then that work cannot be published and the editors will publish the work that the receive, which 
might be more rationalist and quantitative in orientation. Through behaving as though IR is an 
American dominated discipline scholars could begin to turn the virtual reality into an empirical 
one.  
 These narratives however, whilst they may not capture the empirical reality, do aid the 
constitution of IR as a discipline. As Steve Smith argues “We construct and reconstruct our 
disciplines just as much as we construct and reconstruct our world”.1109  According to Smith we 
‘sing our world into existence’ just as we ‘sing our discipline into existence’. Certain discourses 
                                                        
1105 Bleiker, “Forget IR Theory”, pp. 44-45.  
1106 Aydinli and Mathews “Are the Core and the Periphery Irreconcilable?”, pp. 289-303; Tickner 
“Seeing IR Differently”, pp. 295-324; and Marijke Breuning, Joseph Bredehoft and Eugene Walton 
“Promise and Performance: An Evaluation of Journals in International Relations: International 
Studies Perspectives 6 (4) (2005), pp. 447-461.  
1107 For example see Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations”, pp. 374-402.  
1108 Paasi “Globalization, Academic Capitalism and the Uneven Geographies of International 
Journal Publishing Space”, pp. 772-774.  
1109 Steve Smith “Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and 
September 11” International Studies Quarterly 48 (3) (2004), pp. 510.  
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and historical accounts, whilst the may serve certain legitimating purposes, and overlook certain 
dynamics, do in fact constitute the discipline of IR because they present an image of a discipline 
which is united by certain issues/questions/foci and divided and dominated by others.   
 
The Discipline of International Relations.  
 
This thesis is built upon the understanding that IR is a discipline; this is a fundamental premise of 
this thesis and as such an immediate point of critique. The ideas laid out here and the topic itself 
has been challenged through disputing the premise of IR’s disciplinarity. Despite the controversy 
and lengthy debate surrounding this issue there are numerous grounds upon which one can 
make the claim about IR’s disciplinary status, and furthermore this thesis can itself be viewed as 
an insight into IR’s disciplinarity in action.  
 Whether or not one conceives IR to be a discipline is in large due to the definitions or 
criteria of disciplinarity that are employed. As Ole Wæver argues many of the claims that state IR 
is not a discipline rest on a “false premise that it is possible and necessary to have agreement 
over objects or definitions in a discipline”.1110 Michael Brecher,1111 Kal Holsti,1112 and others,1113 
have all argued that IR is a non-discipline based on three frequently cited factors; 1) a lack of 
consensus over the field’s subject matter; 2) IR’s interdisciplinary beginnings and nature; and 3) 
what is perceived to be a paucity of distinct theory and methodology. To qualify as a discipline 
the emphasis is often placed on consensus or rather conventionalism around subject matter,1114 
theory choice, methodology and the purpose of IR.1115 According to Harry Howe Ransom in order 
to qualify as a discipline International Relations needs: 
 
“first of all, a distinct subject-matter; secondly, agreed upon abstractions or 
models; thirdly concepts uniquely adapted to the analysis of international 
behaviour; fourthly, a specialized vocabulary, with precise definitions; fifthly, 
standardized analytical methods allowing re-testing or replication of initial 
                                                        
1110 Ole Wæver “Still a Discipline After All These Debates?” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. 
(eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 290.  
1111 Michael Brecher “International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: Flawed 
Dichotomies, Synthesis and Cumulation” International Studies Quarterly 43 (2) (1999), pp. 213-
264.  
1112 Kal Holsti in Adam Jones “Interview with Kal Holsti” Review of International Studies 28 (3) 
(2002), pp. 621.  
1113 For other examples see Morton Kaplan “Is International Relations a Discipline?” The Journal 
of Politics 23 (3) (1961), pp. 462-476; Kennedy-Pipe “At a Crossroads”, pp. 351-354; Alan James 
“The Realism of Realism: The State and the Study of International Relations” Review of 
International Studies 15 (3) (1989), pp. 215-229 and Philip Windsor ‘Foreword’ in Dyer, H. C. and 
Mangasarian, L. (eds) The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art (Hampshire: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989).   
1114 See for instance Quincy Wright The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-
Century Crofts, 1955), pp. 23.  
1115 William Wallace “Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in 
International Relations” Review of International Studies 22 (3) (1996), pp. 305-306.  
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analysis; and finally, a centralized system for cataloguing, evaluating, and 
communicating research and its results”.1116 
 
Scholars such as Ransom have tended to conflate disciplinarity with consensus, the results of 
which being that if a discipline is conceived as too plural, and therefore ‘fragmented’ and 
‘divided’ it cannot be awarded disciplinary status.1117  
 To conflate ‘disciplinarity’ with a consensus around an agreed subject matter, or method 
for instance, is to misunderstand the concept of a discipline. Wæver has shown that “the history 
of science is full of disciplines that did not agree at all on their self-definition, subject matter, or 
methodology and continued nonetheless”.1118 The lack of consensus is not particular to IR, but is 
actually akin to the majority of disciplines. As William Olson and A.J.R. Groom have argued the 
“criticisms leveled against international relations as a discipline could to some degree be leveled 
at other subjects as well”.1119 For example, both Sociology and Psychology have suffered similar 
internal disputes; the idiosyncrasy being that their disciplinary status has not been brought into 
intense dispute. Nor is disciplinarity dependent upon the degree of, or absence of, 
interdisciplinarity. Some scholars1120 have viewed IR’s interdisciplinary origins negatively, 
viewing IR as nothing but a mish-mash of other disciplines, and claiming that it is too dependent 
on other academic realms to be considered a disciplinary entity of its own.1121 As William Olson 
and Nicholas Onuf have suggested “perhaps one of the reasons for the slowness of acceptance of 
International Relations as a discipline lies in what has been recognized from the beginning, that 
the subject impinges on and draws from so many other subjects, each of which has its own 
disciplinary characteristics”.1122 However, according to Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “All 
disciplines beg, borrow and steal from each other”.1123 If this is the case, as I believe it to be, 
Buzan and Little’s assertion highlights the impossibility of there being any fully autonomous and 
independent realms of academic pursuit. In a sense all disciplines are interdisciplinary, so the 
claims that IR is not a discipline because it is too interdisciplinary are rendered void for they 
could be applied to a number of academic spheres, such as Political Science and Biology, both of 
which are currently unproblematically conceived to be disciplines. What one defines as a 
discipline is not dependent upon the constant reproduction of consensus, or an absence of 
influences from other disciplines. Rather, what constitutes a discipline according to Richard 
                                                        
1116 Harry Howe Ransom “International Relations” The Journal of Politics 30 (May 1968), pp. 369.  
1117 Holsti The Dividing Discipline.  
1118 Wæver, “Still a Discipline After All These Debates?”, pp. 291.  
1119 Olson and Groom International Relations Then and Now, pp. 115.  
1120 For example see Holsti The Dividing Discipline.    
1121 Barry Buzan and Richard Little “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual 
Project and What to do About It” Millennium 30 (1) (2001), pp. 19.   
1122 William C. Olson and Nicholas Onuf “The Growth of a Discipline: Revisited” in Smith, S. (ed) 
International Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1985), pp. 
15.  
1123 Buzan and Little “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What 
to do About It”, pp. 19.   
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Whitley1124 and Ole Wæver1125 are the institutions, discourses, professionalization and the 
identity of academics who self-identify as belonging to a given discipline. Meaning International 
Relations is “a well established academic discipline, with an institutional emplacement and a 
substantial specialist, theoretical and analytic literature”.1126  
 According to Andrew Abbott the departmental structure of the modern research 
university resulted in thinking in terms of disciplines, as knowledge and scholars became 
organized into categories and gained a professional identity.1127 One does not have to cast a very 
in-depth glance to see IR’s disciplinarity in action. There are numerous departments, Chairs of 
International Relations, research centers, IR courses, and PhD programmes all over the globe, all 
of which work to produce and reproduce IR’s disciplinary status.1128 IR is treated as a separate 
academic endeavour due to its institutionalization across the globe. Even in the US where IR is 
often considered a sub-discipline of Political Science, there are IR departments, faculty members, 
and IR courses thereby producing and reproducing the discipline. Furthermore, these internal 
mechanisms are self-reinforcing, meaning that it has become gradually harder to challenge the 
disciplinary system, as careers now depend on disciplinary identification. For instance, Wæver 
argues that graduates would lose career options if there were no longer a discipline of IR, as they 
would fail to qualify as students or PhD’s in XX.1129 However it is defined, there is something 
called IR that exists within the university framework, showing that IR exists as a separate branch 
of academic study. This is because the discipline “has attempted to provide authoritative 
knowledge about the subject matter of international politics”1130 meaning there is a loose 
overarching research frame under which students are taught, and the discipline’s conversations 
are taking place.  
 Linked to its institutional existence is IR’s professional one. There is an extensive body of 
networks, conferences, working groups, associations, journals and career hierarchies. The 
professional organizations, such as the International Studies Association (which was established 
in 1959) and its various regional and national affiliates (for instance the British International 
Studies Association, Nordic International Studies Association, or the Central and Eastern Europe 
International Studies Association) for example, are comprised of academics partaking in ‘IR’. 
What should be studied, and how, may be under continuous debate but there is a permanent 
                                                        
1124 Richard Whitley The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences: Second Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 153-218.  
1125 Wæver, “Still a Discipline After All These Debates?”, pp. 290-292.  
1126 Fred Halliday “The Future of International Relations: Fears and Hopes” in Booth, K., Smith, S. 
and Zalewski, M. (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 318.  
1127 Andrew Abbott Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001). For more on 
how the departmental system gave rise to disciplinarity see Whitley, The Intellectual and Social 
Organization of the Sciences, pp. 9-34 and Bell “Writing the World”, pp. 3-22.  
1128 For detailed examples of the growth of the discipline worldwide see Arlene Tickner and Ole 
Wæver (eds) International Relations Scholarship Around the World: Worlding Beyond the West 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2009).  
1129 Wæver, “Still a Discipline After All These Debates?”, pp. 292.  
1130 Brian Schmidt The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International 
Relations (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1998), pp. 12.  
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institutional structure to IR comprised of scholars worldwide who are actively involved in a 
specific academic enterprise. The various professional associations (ISA, Standing Group for 
International Relations, Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs, to name a 
few) have served to build up a community of IR scholars through establishing and cementing 
their distinct professional identity and providing a structure for the IR conversations that are 
taking place thereby entrenching IR’s disciplinary status. The social structure of IR helps hone 
professional identities, organize research activities, and aids the construction of scholarly 
reputations and career advancement due to the mutual dependence of academics upon each 
other.1131 The field of IR is a myriad of professional relationships all interacting within a social 
structure which academics crucially see and label as a discipline.  
 Moreover, if academics perceive themselves to be part of a specific scholarly endeavour 
they aid the constitution of that discipline and bring it into existence, and entrench it’s standing 
through founding further institutions and professional organizations. Through seeing themselves 
as a part of a discipline and behaving in terms of a discipline academics themselves constitute 
and construct IR’s disciplinary status. According to Barry Buzan and Richard Little IR “serves as a 
clear node of identity for an intellectual community comprising many thousands of people”.1132 In 
other words academics comprise and aid the construction of the field through self-identification 
and in turn give depth and substance to the institutional identity of IR. It is clear that 
International Relations is a discipline and that its existence can be seen through the form of a 
‘coherent conversation pursued by scholars who self-consciously understand themselves as 
participants in this particular field of inquiry’.1133 
 Writing about the origins of the discipline Robert Vitalis argued: 
 
“As American scholars began for the first time to identify themselves as 
experts in something called IR and begun to introduce their students to the 
workings of contemporary history or world politics, as universities began to raise 
money to support these experts and institutionalize this expertise, as the 
philanthropies paid out, and as a canon was gradually accumulated and transmitted 
in professional association meetings, in classrooms, and in the first textbooks”.1134  
 
Vitalis highlights how the elements of disciplinarity are interrelated and work together to 
reproduce and stabilize IR’s disciplinary status. The self-identification of scholars defining 
themselves as working in a field called IR alongside the departmental model – thereby creating 
the beginnings of an institutionalized academic field – led to the professionalization of IR. In turn 
the organization and structure of IR has facilitated the creation of future identities and given a 
concrete forum for the ‘IR discourse’, all of which helps to reaffirm nodes of identity. The 
situation is mutually constitutive as well as mutually reinforcing, ensuring that “There is always 
                                                        
1131 Whitley, The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences, pp. 87-95.  
1132 Buzan and Little, “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project”, pp. 19.  
1133 Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy, pp. 12.  
1134 Robert Vitalis “Birth of a Discipline” in Long, D. and Schmidt, B. C. (eds) Imperialism and 
Internationalism; in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York 
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disciplinarity”.1135 Disciplines are surprisingly stable organizations whose existence does not 
depend on ‘consensus’1136 but rather on the individuals who identify themselves as part of a 
shared academic conversation the social structures they engender. According to Ole Wæver “The 
discipline [of IR] is real and reproducing – even in the absence of a clear and given object (i.r.) 
and a shared agreement (IR)”.1137  
 This thesis has empirically demonstrated IR’s lack of consensus. It has attempted to 
show how diverse the discipline is in its object of focus, theoretical orientation and the 
methodologies its academics employ. The diversity exhibited throughout the course of this 
dissertation means that IR cannot be conceived of as a harmonious discipline, however, it is a 
discipline nonetheless. The absence of agreement does not preclude IR from achieving 
disciplinary status because this ‘discord’ occurs within a disciplinary framing. The discipline’s 
theoretical pluralism for instance displayed itself in IR journals, and was employed by academics 
that self identify as IR scholars and are institutionally affiliated and based within IR departments, 
and subsequently labeled as Professors/Lecturers/Researchers of International Relations. The 
conferences that were investigated and the professional associations that organize these 
gatherings draw IR scholars together and facilitate the ‘IR conversations’ that take place, all of 
which entrenches IR’s disciplinary identity and constitutes the discipline. This thesis can be 
conceived to be a study of disicplianrity in action, for it shows the relationships IR academics 
have with each other, the shared conversations, and the disciplining activities that take place. 
This thesis is not only premised on the fact that IR is a discipline it also constitutes this identity 
through demonstrating its disciplinary features and disciplinarity. Moreover, through analyzing 
hundreds of journal articles I became aware of how many academics actually refer to IR as a 
discipline and treat it as such. The field was frequently described and understood as a discipline, 
which itself stabilizes and reproduces IR’s disciplinary status.   
 Furthermore, it is important to stress and re-affirm that IR is a discipline because there 
is much at stake in the disciplinary debate for those who identify themselves as IR scholars. The 
label of ‘discipline’ and the act of declaring an academic field as a discipline is a disciplining move 
in itself as the concept of a discipline (regardless of how it is defined) carries with it certain 
connotations, expectations, and standards. Stating IR is not a discipline is destructive for it 
implies that IR is not sufficiently developed or mature, that it fails to meet certain standards, and 
that it lacks in intellectual pedigree when compared to other academic disciplines. The internal 
critiques are not only damaging in and of themselves they also stimulate the external ones, and 
provide a foundation for critique from those outside of the discipline of IR who already question 
                                                        
1135 Ole Wæver and Arlene B. Tickner “Introduction; Geocultural Epistemologies” in Tickner, A. B. 
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the discipline’s merit, distinctiveness and purpose.1138 Even the disciplinary debate serves to fuel 
the widespread outer image of International Relations as a “backward social science”.1139 
Externally IR is often viewed as something that “cannot be treated as anything other than 
divided, directionless and disputatious”1140 due to the sheer number of debates, and that our 
theoretical enterprises are ‘feeble’1141 and our field atheoretical.1142 The internal debates over 
IR’s disciplinary status unfortunately aid these critiques and encourage misperceptions about the 
nature of our field.    
 To negate IR as a discipline is not only destructive in terms of purporting a view of the 
field as ‘backward’ ‘immature’ ‘directionless’ and so on it has also been used in a conservative 
manner to gate-keep the discipline. Certain scholars who hold a traditional view of what ‘IR’ is 
and what the discipline should be studying have used the arguments that IR is not a discipline 
because it apparently no longer has an agreed core to marginalize work that goes beyond the 
traditional state-centric purview.1143 Those who have widened the discipline’s agenda have from 
this perspective caused the alleged fragmentation and disciplinary dissolution for not ‘doing 
IR’.1144 Consequently, these specific arguments have resulted in calls to limit the field’s 
parameters and herald a return to the traditional scope of IR, and the branding of certain 
research as ‘non-disciplinary’.  Yet, this thesis has endeavoured to highlight the benefits of IR’s 
‘engaged pluralism’1145 and the associated expansion of the substantive, theoretical and 
methodological purview. Chapter two for example discussed at length how the discipline’s 
theoretical pluralism is to be celebrated as it prevents the discipline from the dangers of 
oversimplification, and ensures that the discipline is relevant to those in a variety of locations. 
According to Steve Smith for example theoretical pluralism has permitted IR “to develop theory 
relevant to a wider range of humanity”.1146 However, whilst the discipline does not suffer from 
dogmatism this concluding chapter, and the thesis as a whole, has argued that IR’s plural 
tendencies exist alongside certain forms of American disciplinary dominance. As such, this final 
section will once again highlight the importance of perspective and suggest some avenues for 
further research.  
  
Avenues for Further Research.  
                                                        
1138 For an example of the sort of external critiques that take place see Alan Sked “The Study of 
International Relations: A Historians View” in Dyer, H. C. and Mangasarian, L. (eds) The Study of 
International Relations: The State of the Art (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989).   
1139 Buzan and Little “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project”, pp. 29.  
1140 Ibid., pp. 32.  
1141 Alan Ryan “A Theory of Growing Concerns” Times Higher Educational Supplement 27th 
November 1998. Available at 
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=161061&sectioncode=22  (Accessed on 
the 09/09/12).  
1142 Halliday “The Future of International Relations”, pp. 319.  
1143 Kal Hosti in Jones, “Interview with Kal Holsti”, pp. 621.  
1144 Brecher, “International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond”, pp. 213-264.  
1145 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, pp. 230 
1146 Smith “Introduction”, pp. 12.  
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Whilst this thesis has endeavoured to highlight all the differing inclinations in the discipline and 
shed a different light on the issue of American disciplinary dominance it is evident that more 
research needs to be done to unpack this issue further. Firstly, American institutional dominance 
needs to be examined in greater depth as noted towards the beginning of this chapter. The 
degree that this form of dominance takes could be more or less depending on the placement of 
academics around the globe. If numerous academics in non-American universities are American 
then this form of dominance would be much more pervasive and have a number of damaging 
consequences for the discipline. In order to see whether American scholars are positioned 
globally the biographies of academics needs to be investigated. By looking at the nationality of 
scholars and their institutional affiliations we will be able to see the movement of academics and 
therefore ideas around the globe. As well as looking at nationality we need to look at where 
academics obtained their PhDs. This would enable an insight into whether academic 
environments have a determining effect on academic influences and inclinations. This purview 
into the discipline would also allow an insight into not only how ideas move but also the 
constitution of different IR communities and whether they are actually as monolithic as they are 
perceived to be.  
 Secondly, there are other ways in which the US could dominate that have not been 
addressed in this thesis. For instance America could exercise its hegemonic influence 
pedagogically. The use of American texts and literature could be dominant in many IR courses 
throughout the globe. Thereby generating an undergraduate body of scholars who are 
acculturated and influenced by American theories, worldviews and methods. To examine this 
arena and to see if the US is dominant is this manner academic syllabi need to be examined. 
Scholars such as Hayward Alker and Thomas Biersteker1147 have assessed American dominance 
in this way, but a more comprehensive and up to date survey of the global field needs to be 
conducted. This would therefore add another insight into the workings of and the degree of 
American disciplinary dominance.  
 Thirdly, this thesis has addressed the issue institutionally, in terms of assessing trends in 
the discipline through analyzing the content of the discipline journals and conferences. Whilst it 
has empirically demonstrated that IR is not dominated by the US in certain ways certain 
academics may feel dominated and may have experienced specific forms of ‘American 
dominance’. Exploring the perceptions of IR academics would provide an insight into the ‘virtual 
reality’ that I argue has been created and is perpetuated. By conducting a questionnaire aimed at 
IR academics globally would reveal the perceptions and feelings of scholars relating to the issue 
of US dominance. This would also allow for a further comparison between the empirical reality, 
                                                        
1147 Alker and Biersteker “The Dialectics of World Order”, pp. 121-142 and also Biersteker “The 
Parochialism of Hegemony”, pp. 308-327.   
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as demonstrated through the actual research trends and inclinations taking place, and the ‘virtual 
one’ and whether certain IR communities experience a great degree of American dominance.  
 Fourthly, the relationship between external actors and IR scholars needs to be examined 
in greater depth. Whilst chapter one explored the relationship between foundations and thinks, 
US foreign policy and IR scholars it did not chart the direct relationship between foundations, 
think tanks and academics. Looking at this set of relationships could reveal another form of US 
dominance being exercised. Foundations create specific research projects/award grants to suit 
their interests and organize conferences to ensure a certain output, if such efforts are drastically 
orienting the research being conducted in a certain IR community then there could be evidence 
of dominance (US or otherwise). Furthermore, the impact that funding bodies (such as research 
councils), institutions (including government agencies) and governmental assessment exercises 
needs to be examined to determine whether such forces are also effecting the shape and content 
of the discipline. This thesis provided a largely internal view of the discipline, which needs to be 
complimented by a more thorough investigation of the external dimension; especially looking at 
institutional constrains (such as governmental review exercises), to see if the US is exercising its 
dominance through other means.  
 Finally, whether this situation is specifically distinct to IR needs to be examined. We 
must empirically assess whether other academic disciplines also experience forms of US 
dominance, and if they do in what manner and to what degree. After investigation it could be 
revealed that other disciplines are also dominated by the US or alternatively it could be 
discovered that this situation could be distinctive to IR. If either scenario is found to be the case, 
the reasons as to why need to examined and potentially problematised. Questions could need to 
be raised about the endemic global dominance of America intellectually speaking, which if found 
raises some uncomfortable for scholars in other disciplines.  Overall, further research must be 
conducted to explore other possible ways in which the US might exercise its hegemonic position 
both within the discipline of IR and other academic fields.  
 To conclude, IR is both diverse and a discipline, but it is a discipline that experiences 
certain forms of US dominance. Crucially, America exercises its disciplinary preponderance in 
specific ways, meaning that it is dominant in some ways and not others. Depending on the 
definition of dominance used one could arrive at a different disciplinary self-image regarding 
whether the discipline is perceived as ‘diverse’ or ‘dominated’. In actuality the discipline is both, 
and we must begin to 1) highlight all the composite dynamics occurring within the discipline, 2) 
prefix discussions of dominance with the form it takes, 3) talk about the degrees of American 
dominance, and the way it is being exercised whilst 4) also addressing and acknowledging the 
other tendencies and inclinations that the discipline is experiencing. By continuing to employ 
universal disciplinary depictions we run the risk of perpetuating a discourse that not only fails to 
capture the current complexities and reality, it also encourages academics to embark upon self-
marginalising behaviours and to reject ‘peripheral scholarship’ because it is perceived to the 
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mimic American model of IR.1148  Furthermore, by failing to question and empirically explore 
such universal disciplinary self-images the discipline has created an environment where the US 
dominates more as a social construction rather than as a pervasive empirical actuality. It is 
imperative then that we become more accustomed to systematically and empirically 
investigating that which is readily assumed in order to avoid seamlessly reproducing certain 
disciplinary depictions that are not only problematic, and deterministic but also overlook many 
dynamics and disciplinary realities. 
                                                        
1148 Acharya “Dialogue and Discovery”, pp. 624.  
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Appendix I.  
Methodological Notes. 
 
Institutional Affiliation Codebook 
 
The journal and conference investigations conducted in this thesis used a qualitative content 
analysis in order to explore the geographical composition of the discipline.  To see whether the 
discipline of IR could be characterized as an American dominated field (if we define dominance in 
institutional terms) the institutional affiliation of each author from the twelve journals examined 
from 1999-2009 was noted, as was the institutional basis of each paper giver/chair/discussant 
from the four conferences investigated from 2005-2011. The following codes were used to 
determine into which category the authors of the articles/conference participants should be 
placed. The codes were modified from and based upon the 2007 TRIP survey, which examined 
the trends in the discipline from 1980-2006.1149  
 
Codes for the Institutional Affiliation of Authors:  
 
0- The United States of America 
1- Latin America (including Mexico) 
2- Canada (including Greenland) 
3- The United Kingdom 
4- Western Europe 
5- Former Soviet Union/Russia/Eastern Europe (including the Central Asian states except 
Afghanistan) 
6- East Asia (including China) 
7- South Asia 
8- South East Asia 
9- Middle East and North Africa 
10- Sub-Saharan Africa, 
11- Oceania 
12- Other. 
 
The above categories contain the following countries: 
 
                                                        
1149 Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney “The International 
Relations Discipline, 1980-2006” Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August/September 2007, pp. 2. Available at:  
www.irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip.publications.php  (28/08/2013).  
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0-United States of America  
 
1-Latin America and Caribbean:  
Antigua, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, 
Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French 
Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Suriname, St. Barts, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
 
2. Canada and Greenland. 
 
3. The United Kingdom: 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. 
 
4. Western Europe:  
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canary Islands (Spain), Denmark, Finland, France,  
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,  
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the   
Vatican City. 
 
5. FSU/Russia/Eastern Europe, including Central Asian states, except Afghanistan:  
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,  
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan.  
 
6. East Asia:  
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Tibet. 
 
7. South Asia:  
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka  
  
8. Southeast Asia:  
Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar/Burma, Philippines,  
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam  
  
9. The Middle East and North Africa:  
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Gaza & West Bank, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco (including Western Sahara), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey 
(incl. Turkish Cyprus), Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, etc.), and Yemen.   
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10. Sub-Saharan Africa:  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African  
Republic, Chad, Comoros Islands, Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Democratic Republic of Congo  
(Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-  
Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,  
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville),Rwanda, Sao Tome &  
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland,  
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
  
11. Oceania:   
Australia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,  
Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu.   
 
Theoretical Categories Defined. 
 
Classical Liberalism: This category refers to the liberal theory of International Relations. It is 
the transposition of core liberal values (individual freedom, political participation, private 
property, equal opportunity) to the international level, which has generated a series of 
corresponding assumptions about international political life. Classical Liberal IR theory has taken 
the insights of classical liberal thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Richard 
Cobden for example and applied their claims to the international level. Early classical liberal IR 
theorists include Norman Angell, Woodrow Wilson, Joseph Schumpeter and John Maynard 
Keynes. This varied ‘liberal heritage’ has resulted in a number of different strains of classical 
liberal IR theory.1150  
 Republican liberalism, argues that liberal democracies tend to be more pacific than other 
forms of government.1151 Republican liberals, such as Michael Doyle, have developed the 
democratic peace thesis to show that “Even though liberal states have become involved in 
numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage 
in war with one another”.1152 Commercial liberalism argues that economic interdependence 
creates incentives for peace and cooperation. Through the promotion of capitalism and increased 
trade relations (through the removal of barriers to commerce) the costs of war become too high 
                                                        
1150 Michael Doyle “Liberalism and World Politics” American Political Science Review 80 (4) 
(1986), pp. 1151-1169.  
1151 Andrew Moravcsik “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” 
International Organization 51 (4) (1997), pp. 515.  
1152 Michael Doyle “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 
(3) (1983), pp. 213. 
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for those involved and hence states are deterred from entering into conflictual relations.1153 
Hence we can claim that Classical liberals hold the view that “Capitalism and democracy are 
forces for peace”.1154 Regulatory liberalism “contends that international law and institutions 
promote international accommodation”.1155 Through membership to international institutions 
states can widen their self-interests through cooperation, which discourages the pursuit of 
national interest.1156 Regulatory liberals argue that the international system is normatively 
regulated.1157  
 Liberal internationalists believe in human rights and ensuring that a state respects its 
citizens. Liberal internationalists argue that “if it is wrong for an individual to engage in socially 
acceptable or criminal behaviour, it is also wrong for states”.1158 All Liberals believe that human 
beings are endowed with certain rights, benefits and protections, however Liberal 
internationalists argue that these principles should be promoted universally.1159 This 
commitment to universal human rights leads liberal internationalists to over turn the principle of 
state autonomy and non-intervention when human rights are not being respected. Classical 
liberals are divided over the issue of intervention. Some liberals (non-interventionists) defend 
the principle of state sovereignty whereas others (such as liberal internationalists) “feel that the 
promotion of ethical principles can justify intervention in the internal affairs of other states”.1160    
 There is therefore no single theory of classical liberalism in IR,1161 instead there are a 
multiple of liberal approaches. However, if an article identified as adopting/advocating one of the 
above forms of classical liberalism then it was placed in the category ‘classical liberalism’. This 
category denotes the different classical liberal theories that are united by the insight that “states 
are embedded in domestic and international civil society, which decisively constrains their 
actions”.1162  In other words all classical liberals believe that the internal structure of the state 
will condition its behaviour, both in terms of its foreign and domestic policies.  
 Despite their differences all classical liberal theories are individualistic, universalistic 
and optimistic. Due to certain shared principle this category was created to house all the research 
that either labeled itself as a form of classical liberalism or was designated as ‘classical liberal’ 
                                                        
1153 Joseph Schumpeter Imperialism and Social Classes (Cleveland: World Publishing Co, 1955), 
pp. 75-76.  
1154 Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”, pp. 1986.  
1155 Andrew Moravcsik “Liberalism and International Relations Theory” Harvard University, CFIA 
Working Paper No. 92-6, 1992, pp. 2.  
1156 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).  
1157 Scott Burchill “Liberalism” in Burchill, S. et. al., (eds) Theories of International Relations: Third 
Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 64.  
1158 Ibid., pp. 66.  
1159 G. John Ikenberry “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World 
Order” Perspectives on Politics 7 (1) (2009), pp. 72.   
1160 Burchill “Liberalism”, pp. 69.  
1161 Diana Panke and Thomas Risse “Liberalism” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds) 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 91.  
1162 Moravcsik, “Liberalism and International Relations Theory”, pp. 2. 
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during the analysis.  All classical liberal thinkers in IR share the assumptions that the principal 
actors in world politics “are individuals and privately-constituted groups with autonomous 
preferences”.1163 Secondly, each is universalistic in that each classical liberal ultimately aspires 
for each state to be ‘liberal’ either economically, politically, socially or all the aforementions. In 
other words, all classical liberals believe in progress. Thirdly, all classical liberals are optimistic 
in the sense that they believe that anarchy can be tamed and that the international system can 
become peaceful with war becoming obsolete.  
 Due to these shared principles this category was created to house all the research that 
either labeled itself as a form of classical liberalism or was designated as ‘classical liberal’ during 
the analysis. If articles were underpinned or adhered to/advocated the above claims and beliefs 
after a careful critical reading it was designated as classical liberal.  
 
Classical Realism: Classical realism is a theory of International Relations that focuses state 
power, national interests and unitary decision-making. Classical realists argue that states are the 
principal actors in world politics, as the state is the personification of its collective human 
nature.1164  The central premises of classical realism are that 1) is that human nature is selfish1165 
(humans are self-maximizing egoists, therefore states are self-interested) and 2) the 
international system is anarchic (meaning there is no higher power that the state, no 
international government.1166 These two principles lead classical realists to argue that in order to 
survive states should seek power and security, as states can only rely on themselves to achieve 
their own security.1167 Self-interest and anarchy create what classical realists term a ‘self-help 
system’.  
 Due to the continuities of human nature and anarchy “realists see insecurity, and 
particularly military security, as the central problem, and power as the prime motivation or 
driving force of political life”.1168 Classical realism emphasizes the competitive and conflictual 
nature of international politics. This is reflected in classical realism’ “core ideas, like the balance 
of power, which is one of the most long-standing analytical tools of realism, and the security 
dilemma”.1169 
                                                        
1163 Ibid., op cit.  
1164 Richard Ned Lebow “Classical Liberalism” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds) 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 55.  
1165 Hans Morgenthau Politics Amongst Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace: Seventh Edition 
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993), pp. 4.  
1166 Jack Donnelly Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp. 10.  
1167 Robert Gilpin “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” in Keohane, R. (ed) Neo-
Realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 305.   
1168 Barry Buzan “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?” in Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. (eds) 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
50.  
1169 Ibid., pp. 51.  
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 Classical realists adopt a tragic vision of international politics, where human nature is 
unchanging as is the violent nature of the international system.1170 Articles that shared this vision 
and the assumptions of anarchy, human nature, and insecurity held by classical realists such as 
Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, and/or used the analytical frameworks of 
balance of power or the security dilemma were designated as classical realist.  
 
Communitarianism: Communitarianism refers to a theoretical perspective that seeks to “lessen 
the focus on individual rights and increase the focus on communal responsibilities”.1171 Whereas 
cosmopolitans focus on our ethical responsibilities to all human beings, communitarians argue 
that our responsibilities should be to the community. Communitarians adopt this claims because 
they argue that “individuals in society generally value commitments to certain forms of 
community over the claims of individual freedom, with the political implication that citizens tend 
to support first and foremost a government that provides the social conditions that allow them to 
lead fulfilling communal lives”.1172 
 Communitarians draw on the Aristotelian idea that justice is rooted in "a community 
whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man and the good of that 
community"1173. Communitarians emphasize the influence of society on individuals and contend 
that values are rooted in common history and tradition. The definition of community varies and 
can refer to anything from the nuclear or extended family to the political state or nation. In this 
approach, ethical thought is grounded in communal values, established social standards and 
traditions, and considerations of the larger society. Articles that self-identified as 
‘communitarian’ were placed in this category, as were articles that were deemed to adhere to or 
advocate the above principles and claims.  
 
Competing theories: This category was created to refer to articles that used two or more 
theoretical approaches. Certain articles examined two competing theories of IR and used the 
article to examine the merits and failures of each. Whereas others ran a scenario using two 
theories showing how each was applicable. This category therefore denotes research that did not 
advocate one particular theory but rather discussed two or more theories without favouring one 
over the other(s), or articles suggesting a synthesis of approaches. For an example of an article 
that fitted the above criteria and was subsequently categorized as ‘competing theories’ see 
                                                        
1170 Richard Ned Lebow The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
1171 Tom L Beauchamp and James F. Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics: Fifth Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 7.   
1172 Daniel A. Bell “A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism: The Case of Singapore” 
Political Theory 25 (1) (1997), pp. 8.  
1173 Amy Gutmann “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3) 
(1985), pp. 308.  
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Caroline Fehl’s “Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist 
Constructivist Approaches”.1174 
 
Constructivism: Constructivism defined here refers not a theory of IR but to “a set of arguments 
about social explanation”.1175 It is best conceived of as an approach to international politics.1176 
However, Alexander Wendt sought to develop a constructivist theory of IR, which he developed 
in his seminal book A Social Theory of International Politics1177. Wendt’s claims and his theory are 
widely contested by self-identified constructivists, which is why it is defined here as an approach. 
The category constructivism refers to a series of strands of ‘social constructivist’ thought that 
draws on social theory about the role of knowledge and knowledgeable agents in the constitution 
of reality.  Constructivism as a body of thought is often presented as a spectrum with 
conventional accounts at one end and critical accounts (such as consistent constructivism1178) at 
the other.1179 Despite the debates between constructivists and the different strands that exist 
there are a number of assumptions shared by all ‘constructivists’. The similarities allowed for the 
emergence of this category, therefore if an article adopted these assumptions it was classed as 
‘constructivist’.  
 Firstly, all constructivist approaches have a social ontology. Constructivists depict the 
world as inter-subjective and constructed through collectively meaningful structures and 
processes. The interplay between the material and the ideational (which is the key for 
constructivists) leads them to focus on social relations, because as Karin Fierke notes “As 
fundamentally social beings, individuals or states cannot be separated from a context of 
normative meaning which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them”.1180  
 Secondly, all constructivists argue share the view that knowledge is socially constructed 
and produced through shared understandings. Constructivists use the concept of social facts to 
denote facts that are facts only by human agreement, and such facts account for the majority of 
facts studied in IR.1181 Thirdly, all constructivists share the assumption that reality is socially 
                                                        
1174 Caroline Fehl “Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for Rationalist 
and Constructivist Approaches” European Journal of International Relations 10 (3) (2004), pp. 
357-394.  
1175 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View” in 
Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, S. (eds) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 
2005), pp. 55.  
1176 Nicolas Onuf World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations 
(Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 1.   
1177 Alexander Wendt Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).   
1178 See for example K. M. Fierke “Constructivism” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds) 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 175-177.  
1179 Ted Hopf “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” International 
Security 23 (1) (1998), pp. 181.   
1180 Fierke, “Constructivism”, pp. 170.  
1181 Ibid., pp. 171.  
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constructed. Nicolas Onuf famously argued, ‘international politics is a world of our making’.1182 
This assumption is premised on the social construction of knowledge. According to 
constructivists the material world does not come classified and that therefore our objects of 
knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language (inter-subjectivity).  
This means that different collective meanings are attached to the material world twice, once as 
social reality and secondly as scientific knowledge. In other words, knowledge is both a resource 
that people use in their day-to-day life for the construction of reality 
 Fourthly, constructivists argue, “normative or ideational structures are just as important 
as material structures”.1183 According to constructivists structures are made of social 
relationships. Social structures therefore have three elements: shared knowledge, material 
resources and practices. Social structures are defined in part by shared understandings, 
expectations or knowledge. These constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their 
relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual.1184 Whilst social structures include material 
resources, viewed independently constructivists argue that material capabilities explain 
nothing.1185 The effects of material resources presuppose structures of shared knowledge, which 
vary and are not reducible to capabilities. The constructivist understanding of structure leads 
them to argue that non-material structures condition and constitute actors identities as well as 
constrain their behaviours. Agents and structures are then from a constructivist view point 
mutually constituting; “Normative ideational structures may well condition the identities and 
interests of actors, but those structures would not exist if it were not for the knowledgeable 
practices of those actors”.1186 
 Finally, all constructivists are committed to explaining or understanding change.1187 This 
category was employed to capture all research described as ‘constructivist’. Whilst there are 
many different strands of constructivist thought this label was used as an umbrella term to note 
all research that self-identified as being ‘constructivist’ or adopted the core constructivist 
assumptions detailed above.  
 
Cosmopolitanism: Cosmopolitanism defined here refers to “the ideal of the cosmopolitan, the 
person whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world”.1188 
The core shared by all cosmopolitans is the idea that all human beings belong to a single 
                                                        
1182 Onuf, World of Our Making.  
1183 Christian Reus-Smit “Constructivism” Burchill, S. et. al., (eds) Theories of International 
Relations: Third Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp, 196.  
1184 Alexander Wendt “Anarchy is What States Make of It” International Organization 46 (2) 
(1992), pp. 391-425.  
1185 Alexander Wendt “Constructing International Politics” International Security 20 (1) (1995), 
pp. 73.  
1186 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp. 199.  
1187 Fierke “Constructivism”, pp. 168.  
1188 Martha Nussbaum “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” Boston Review 19 (5) (1994), pp. 13.   
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community and that this community should be promoted and created.1189 Whilst there are 
different strands of cosmopolitan thought for example legal or moral, all cosmopolitans however 
share three central claims; 1) individualism – the unit of concern are human beings rather than 
tribes, families, religious groups, political communities, or states for example; 2) universality – 
according to Thomas Pogge “the status of ultimate concern attaches to every human being 
equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites or Muslims”;1190 
and 3) generality; that this status applies globally.1191 Articles that purported these beliefs, and 
used cosmopolitanism to advocate certain practices, or critique the current order were included 
in this category. Furthermore, as this is a normative theory, articles that advocated a global civil 
society or cosmopolitan order based on the above commitments were classified as cosmopolitan.  
 
Critical Theory: Critical Theory refers to a specific strain of thought that emerged from the 
Marxist tradition. Critical Theory grew out of the Marxist tradition and its origins can be found in 
the 1920s with the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, of which the principal members were 
Mark Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno.1192 The early Critical Theorists were critical of 
positivism and ‘instrumental reason’. Horkheimer illustrated this through a critique of what he 
termed ‘Traditional Theory’, “a form of theory, which he associated with positivism and those 
forms of social science that tried to imitate the objectivity of the natural sciences”.1193 
 According to Richard Devetak: “Critical theory is essentially a critique of the dogmatisim 
it finds in traditional modes of theorizing. This critique reveals the unexamined assumptions that 
guide traditional modes of thought, and exposes the complicity of traditional modes of thought in 
prevailing political and social conditions. To break with dogmatic modes of thought is to 
denaturalize the present”.1194 Critical Theory is therefore critical of neo-realism and neo-
liberalism, or what Robert Cox terms “Problem-solving approaches”.1195 Cox argues that such 
theories take the world for granted and ask how it can be made to function as smoothly as 
possible.1196 By contrast, critical theory asks how current global arrangements came into being 
thereby not treating it as a given, but as a constructed order, an order than has been bought 
about due to prevailing power relations, and then look towards what alternative possibilities 
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remain.1197 Cox defines critical theory as being a ‘theory of history in the sense of being 
concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historical change”.1198 Cox 
argues that “critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order 
different from the prevailing order”.1199 Critical Theory is a guide to strategic action for bringing 
about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to sustaining the existing 
order.  
 There are different strands of Critical Theory in IR, the most prominent and influential 
are the Neo-Gramscian, Habermasian , and the Critical Security School (commonly referred to as 
the Welsh School). Despite the substantive differences between the strands of Critical Theory 
there are a number of key tenets that they share and that are central to all strands of critical 
theory, which are; 1) a commitment to emancipatory politics;1200 2) a commitment to self-
reflection and the recognition of the political nature of knowledge;1201 3) adopting an approach of 
Immanent Critique1202 and 4) a belief in social transformation.  
Articles that shared the same commitments and principles and that drew on the work of the 
Frankfurt School, and other Critical Theorists were classed under the category ‘Critical Theory’.  
 
English School: According to Andrew Linklater “The foundational claim of the English School is 
that sovereign states form a society, albeit an anarchic one in that they do not have to submit to 
the will of a higher power”.1203 English School theorists, such as Robert Jackson and Tim Dunne 
for example, accept that the international system is anarchic, and therefore that violence is an 
endemic feature, but they argue that anarchy can be controlled through international law and 
morality.  
 A key feature of the English School is the distinction between a ‘system of states’ 
(international system) and a ‘society of states’.1204 According to Hedley Bull a system of states “is 
formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts 
of a whole”.1205 Whereas a society of states comes into existence “when a group of states, 
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313-326.  
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conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the workings of common institutions”. The current shared interests between states 
and the development of institutions such as international law, explains for English School 
theorists “the surprisingly high level of order and surprisingly low level of violence between 
states given that their condition is one of anarchy”.1206 
 This distinction allows English School theorists to explain the evolution of modern 
society, and explain the emergence and collapse of different balance of powers.1207 The English 
School’s understanding that the international political system is more orderly and civil than 
realists argue does not lead English School theorists to adopt a ‘utopian’ view. They hold that 
“violence is ineradicable”1208 and whilst some English School theorists argue that states have 
socialised in terms of developing the “the art of accommodation and compromise which makes 
an international society possible”1209 they stress that “visionaries are wrong in thinking that the 
current international order is merely a stepping stone to a universal community”.1210 Because of 
their views on order and violence the English School is often depicted as a via media approach 
between classical realism and classical liberalism.1211 However, contra classical realist, English 
School theorists argue that states are concerned with human rights and justice, and not just 
power. But it is the different conceptions and competing ideas held by states about how such 
ideals can be implemented that can produce disagreements and damage the international 
order.1212 
 Articles using this theoretical framework, or advocating the insights of the English 
School (as defined above) where included in this category for the purpose of this analysis.  
 
Feminism: This category was devised to quantify the number of articles using feminist IR theory. 
Whilst feminist IR theory is not one unified body of thought there are central shared tenets that 
each strand of feminist IR theory holds. Feminist IR theory is therefore defined as theory that 1) 
Looks at social and gender relations from the micro level of analysis;1213 2) Has ‘gender’ as its 
unit of analysis.1214 All strands of feminist IR theory share the concept of ‘gender lenses’.1215 They 
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argue that by putting on gendered lenses the researcher becomes predisposed to see different 
power relations, and that real power lies in the construction of masculine and feminine and 
everything else follows.1216  ‘Gendered lenses’ it is argued help deconstructed gender constructs 
that have become naturalized; 3) All feminist approaches are normative in orientation. Much 
contemporary feminism is committed to progressive or emancipatory goals, particularly the goal 
of achieving equality for women through the elimination of unequal gender relations;1217 and 4) 
Not all feminist approaches are ‘post-positivist’ but the majority are.1218 This means that feminist 
IR theory tends to question the construction of knowledge in IR. Feminist IR theory argues that 
most knowledge whilst presented as universal is actually constructed by men and is about and 
for men.1219 Articles that exhibited such claims and aims were categorized as ‘feminist’.  
 
Green Theory: The category green theory refers to a body of thought that draws on “radical 
green discourses from outside the discipline of IR”1220 to generates a series of claims, concepts, 
and aims to expose and counter “the ecological blindness of IR theory”.1221 Green IR theorists 
adopt an ‘ecocentric philosophy’ which views all creatures of earth as having value independent 
of human beings.1222 All forms of life are therefore respected and for their own sake, not just 
“their instrumental values to humans”.1223 Green theorists critique other IR theories for being 
anthropocentric and seek to protect not only human communities and future generations but 
also “the larger web of life, made up of nested ecological communities at multiple levels of 
aggregation”.1224 
 Green IR theory is normative and is concerned with environmental justice. It also seeks 
to increase participation and deliberation and therefore promotes a reimaging of the political 
landscape.1225 Other central concepts to Green Theory are ecological security and sustainable 
development. There are many different strands of Green Theory, for example there is the ‘IPE 
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wing’ of Green theory, and the Ecoanarchist strand.1226 However, what unites these variants is 
their ecocentric ontology and ecocentric ethics.1227 Hence any article that adopted an ecocentric 
outlook or agenda was included in the ‘Green Theory’ category.  
 
Historiography: This category was constructed in order to place articles that used theories from 
historiography to provide a historical analysis of the developments of the discipline of IR. Articles 
that drew on the work of R.G. Collingwood, Hayden White, Quentin Skinner, or John Gunnell for 
example and used these insights to put forth a series of arguments about the discipline of IR were 
classed as ‘historiography’. Again such articles are not a-theoretical but instead are drawing on a 
different canon of thought to offer a different perspective of IR. For an example of work placed 
under this label for the purpose of this investigation see Hidemi Suganami’s “Narrative 
Explanations and International Relations”.1228 
 
Historical Sociology: Is a brand of sociology concerned with how societies (their origins, laws, 
institutions, conventions ect) develop through history. Historical sociology looks at how social 
structures that many regard as natural an in fact shaped by complex social processes.  It began to 
make an imprint in the discipline of IR in the 1980s and over the past thirty years “historical 
sociology in International Relations has contributed to a number of debates ranging from the 
examination of the origins of the modern states-system to unraveling the core features and 
relative novelty of the contemporary historical period”.1229 For instance, historical sociologists, 
such as Charles Tilly1230 have argued that states were formed “not as a natural product of an 
alleged liberal social contract, but as forged in the hear of battles and warfare. Nor indeed should 
the anarchic system of sovereign states be regarded as natural”.1231 IR historical sociologists have 
sought to provide rich analyses through intersecting the dimensions of structure, history and the 
international.1232  
 For the purposes of this investigation historical sociology is defined through its aims to 
“unravel the complexity that lies behind the interaction between social action and social 
structures”.1233 For IR historical sociologists international factors are “juxtaposed, conjoined and 
interrelated with domestic processes with the aim of finding patterns that explain important 
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historical processes including general and regional crises that provoke wars, processes of state 
formation, varieties of capitalist development, forms of imperialism and so on”.1234  
 
Neo-Liberalism (Liberal Institutionalism): There has been much debate regarding neo-
liberalism’s distinction from neo-liberalism, with John Mearsheimer arguing “liberal 
institutionalism can hardly be called a theoretical alternative to realism, but instead should be 
seen as subordinate to it”.1235 Even one of the theory’s architects, Robert Keohane, stated neo-
liberalism “borrows as much from realism as from liberalism”.1236  Even though neo-liberalism 
accepts some of the assumptions of neo-realism such as anarchy and state-centrism, it draws a 
different prognosis for the international system.  
 Through employing rational choice and game theory to anticipate the behaviour of 
states, neo-liberals seek to demonstrate that cooperation between states can be enhanced even 
without a hegemonic player, which can enforce compliance with agreements.1237 The theory was 
formulated to explain the growing degree of state cooperation in the international system. One 
such mechanism used by neo-liberals to explain cooperation is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The key 
to solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma is for each side to convince the other side that they have a 
collective interest in making what appear to be short-term sacrifices (the gain that might result 
from successful cheating) for the long-term benefits (the substantial pay-off from mutual long-
term cooperation).1238 This means convincing states to accept the second best outcome in the 
short term for the best outcome in the long term.  The principle obstacle preventing the 
cooperative outcome is the fear of being cheated by another state. This is the problem that 
institutions must solve and how they bring about cooperation. Institutions according to neo-
liberals deter cheaters and protect victims. They also “serve state objectives not principally by 
enforcing rules, but by facilitating the making and keeping of agreements through the provision 
of information and reductions in transaction costs”.1239  
 For Robert Keohane anarchy is mitigated by regimes and institutional cooperation, 
which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations.1240 Regimes 
constrain state behaviour, and enhance trust, continuity and stability in a world of ungoverned 
anarchy. Neo-liberals therefore share the belief that that international institutions have a role in 
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changing conceptions of self-interests.1241 There are substantial differences between neo-realists 
and neo-liberals,1242 and between classical liberals and neo-liberals, and hence a category 
capturing this theory neo-liberalism could be employed. Articles that sought to explain 
cooperation based on the principles of rationality and absolute gains were designated as neo-
liberal. Articles that argued that anarchy could be mitigated through regimes and institutions, but 
that such institutions were dependent on powerful states and their self-interest were also 
designated as neo-liberal. Using the above claims and assumptions of neo-liberalism if articles 
adhered to these or advocated them they were noted as being ‘neo-liberal’.   
 
Neo-Realism (Structural Realism): Neo-realism accepts many of the assumptions of classical 
realism regarding anarchy and human nature, and neo-realists also agree that states are the 
principal actors in international politics. However, neo-realists argue that the permissive cause of 
conflict is not man’s bellicose nature, but rather it is lack of a hierarchical international 
system.1243 It is the anarchic structure of the international system, neo-realists argue, that 
conditions states behaviour and “forces states to pursue power”.1244  
 According to neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, the ordering principle of the 
international system is anarchy.1245 The international system will never be hierarchical; the 
unchanging condition of anarchy means that self-help is the necessary principle of action. States 
must act in accordance with the logic of self-help or be punished by the system. According to 
Waltz; “structures encourage certain behaviours and penalise those who do not respond to the 
encouragement … The international imperative is ‘take care of yourself’”.1246  
 In an anarchic realm, neo-realists argue that states (or rather units) are functionally 
similar and tend to remain so. In an anarchic system the system creates the same basic incentives 
for all states, so they become like units functionally. Neo-realists ignore the differences between 
states; they overlook regime differences and cultural differences. As John Mearsheimer argues 
neo-realists “treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the 
fact that some state are more or less powerful than others”.1247   
 In a neo-realist account of the international system the only variable is the distribution 
of capabilities among states. The structure of the system is determined by the by the distribution 
of capabilities among states. In other words it is the number of great powers that determines the 
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structure of the system in terms of whether it is uni-polar, bi-polar or multi-polar. The different 
poles of the system will then encourage different forms of behaviour, typically either 
bandwagoning or balancing. Like classical realists, neo-realists also use the balance of power and 
the security dilemma as analytical tools.  
 Whether an article was classified as neo-realist predominantly depended on its 
distinction from classical realism. The differences between the two theories lie in the level/focus 
of explanations. According to neo-realists: international anarchy is the key to explaining the 
behaviour of states not human nature. Secondly, the theories differ over the concept of power. 
For neo-realists power is not an end, it is a means to an end and the end is security. As Waltz 
argues “The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may 
not serve that end”.1248 Thirdly, neo-realism was developed as a ‘scientific approach’ to IR in 
order to overcome the limitations of classical realism’s approach.1249  
 Authors that were implicit about their theoretical orientation were designated as neo-
realist if they adhered to the above principles. The claims being made were assessed as were the 
methods being used in order to determine whether an article was either classical or neo-realist. 
Furthermore, the category neo-realism accounts for both strains of thought that are divided over 
the issue of how much power is enough.1250 Both defensive and offensive realists were denoted 
as neo-realist.  
 
Marxism: Articles that that declared or adopted a variety of Marxist theory were designated as 
Marxist. There are a number of different strains and divergent variations of Marxism and if an 
article used or advocated any of these it was classified as ‘Marxism’. Marxism is defined as a 
theory centered on providing “a critical interpretation of capitalism understood as an historically 
produced – and therefore mutable – form of social life, rather than as the ineluctable expression 
of some essential human nature”.1251 For Marx capitalism was a system of largely unchecked 
exploitation in which “the bourgeoisie controlled the labour power of members of the proletariat 
and profited from their work”.1252  
 Instead of just providing a critique of capitalism Marx sought to facilitate an end to 
alienation, exploitation and estrangement. His efforts to understand capitalism and human 
history were so that he could change the present structure. Marx wrote that ‘philosophers have 
only interpreted the world the point is to change it’.1253 Marxists see our lives, social relations, as 
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historical and social products, yet the critical question that Marxists focus on is how might we 
organize ourselves differently?1254 All strands of Marxist theory are transformative, have 
emancipatory aims and are premised on a dialectical understanding of agency and structure.  
 Marxists argue that our world has been produced by historically situated human social 
agents, therefore humans are collectively capable of recreating their world. However, as Marx 
famously argued  “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they 
do make it under circumstance chosen by themselves, but under circumstance directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past”.1255 Marx believed humans continuously 
remade their world and themselves, but they were constrained by the economic system and class 
structure.1256 All strands of Marxist IR theory also share a materialist conception of history. 
Marixists argue that the processes of historical change are ultimately a reflection of the economic 
development of society. Meaning that economic developments are the motor of history.  
 Articles that adopted or were premised on the above assumptions and aims were 
categorised under the heading ‘Marxist’ for the purpose of this study. 
 
Philosophy of Social Science: This category was designed to note research that used meta-
theories primarily drawn from the Philosophy of Social Science rather than theories of IR. Such 
articles were not a-theoretical but used theories from a different discipline to comment 
on/critique/advocate certain theoretical or research practices within IR. Articles that were 
explicitly focused on meta-theoretical issues and used philosophies of social science such as 
positivism, pragmatism, or critical realism, or theorists such as Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul 
Feyerabend, and Roy Bhaskar for example were captured with this category. For a prime 
example of an article that would have been classed under the category ‘Philosophy of Social 
Science’ see Colin Wight’s 1996 article “Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication 
in International Relations Theory”.1257 
 
Postcolonialism: Postcolonial IR theory draws on existing critical bodies of thought such as 
Marxism, Feminism and Postmodernism, but what distinguishes post-colonialism “is its attention 
to the imbrication of race, class and gender with power”.1258 Post-colonialism begins with the 
premise that imperialism constitutes a critical historical juncture in which postcolonial national 
identities were constructed in opposition to European ones, thus they became the European’s 
‘Others’ and placed in a subordinated position.1259 Postcolonialism criticizes Western ways of 
thinking (such as rationalism, or other universalist modes of thought) for their Eurocentric and 
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Orientalist biases.1260 Postcolonial IR theory not only offers a different critique of knowledge and 
power it also “offers new ways for thinking about techniques of power that constrain self-
determination, whether they emanate from within or without”.1261 The ultimate goal of post-
colonialism is accounting for and combating the residual effects of colonialism on cultures. It is 
not simply concerned with salvaging past worlds, but learning how the world can move beyond 
this period together, towards a place of mutual respect.1262 Postcolonialism is a normative theory 
of IR for it seeks to propose a way beyond present power relations. This category was used to 
denote articles and research that adhered and advocated the above principles and assumptions.  
 
Poststructuralism: Post-structuralism is defined here as a worldview (or even an anti-
worldview). Post-structuralism is not a specific model or theory of international relations, rather 
it is a critical attitude/approach or even ethos which calls attention to the importance of 
representation, the relationship between power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in the 
production and understanding of global affairs.1263 Instead of being another school of thought 
with its own favoured actors and issues to highlight, poststructuralism should be understood as 
promoting a new set of questions and concerns. According to Michel Foucault post-structuralism 
“has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we 
are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them”.1264 You won’t find a poststructuralist 
theory as such, in terms of an explanation of X, Y, Z, or why international politics is the way it is, 
rather you will find poststructural analyses of certain events, problematising assumptions, and 
posing different questions. Poststructuralism is rarely seen by its practitioners as one of a series 
of contending approaches to the theorization of IR. On the contrary, it is opposed to such a 
project. It goes about its work differently, intervening in specific locations and in particular 
debates.  
 However, there are a number of assumptions that ‘poststructuralist’ thinkers share and a 
number of common themes on which their research focuses, which allows them to be grouped 
together under the category ‘poststructuralism’. A starting assumption of poststructuralist 
thought is that there is no point outside the world from which the world can be observed:1265 all 
observations and all theoretical systems, in physical theory or natural science as well as social 
theory, are part of the world they seek to describe or account for, and have an effect in that 
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world.1266 For example, theories are not and cannot be politically neutral, but rather inevitably 
have a social and political impact. In this picture of the world, then, the theorist of IR is not a 
detached observer of world politics but inevitably a participant in it.  
 Furthermore, poststructuralists argue that there is no Archimedean perspective that 
defeats all others, there is no transcendental position from which to make judgements, as we are 
all embedded individuals, therefore there is no objective point to make a judgement.1267  
Consequently poststructuralists argue that there is no such thing as ‘truth’ or ‘a truth’, only 
competing perspectives. As Devetak notes “In the absence of a universal frame of reference or 
overarching perspective, we are left with a plurality of perspectives”,1268 or as Friedrich 
Nietzsche claimed “there is only perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’”.1269  
 This understanding of knowledge leads poststructuralists to focus on interpretation and 
language. David Campbell argues that “interpretation is unavoidable and such that there is 
nothing outside of discourse, even though there is a material world external to thought”.1270 
Furthermore, Richard Rorty claims “We have no access to something called reality apart from 
that which we represent as reality in our concepts, language and discourse”.1271  
Poststructuralism is “embedded upon a discourse of anti-realism”,1272 meaning they argue that 
there is nor reality independent from human experiences. According to poststructuralists reality 
is “sociolingusitically constructed”.1273 What is ‘real’ for poststructuralist is there dependent on a 
human attribute (language and interpretation).1274 For poststructuralists narrative is everything, 
not just to understanding an event, but also in constituting that event.1275 As Richard Devetak 
writes: “According to such a conception events acquire the status of ‘real’ not because they 
occurred but because they are remembered and because they assume a place in narrative. 
Narrative is not simply a re-presentation of some prior event, it is the means by which the status 
of reality is conferred on events”.1276  
 Due to the constitutive effects of discourse, poststructuralists seek to expose the 
intimate connection between claims to knowledge and claims to power and authority. Foucault 
argues, that ‘truth’ cannot be separated from power, on the contrary, systems of power are 
                                                        
1266 Michel Foucault The Archeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock Publishers, 1972).  
1267 Devetak, “Postmodernism”, pp. 164.  
1268 Ibid., op cit.  
1269 Frederick Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morals: Ecce Homo (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), 
pp. 12.  
1270 David Campbell “Poststructuralism” in Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (eds) International 
Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 216.  
1271 Richard Rorty The Linguistic Turn (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967).  
1272 Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism” 
International Studies Quarterly 44 (2) (2000), pp. 215.  
1273 Jim George Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 156.  
1274 Roy Bhaskar Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London: 
Verso, 1989), pp. 147.  
1275 Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, pp. 219.  
1276 Devetak, “Postmodernism”, pp. 164.   
 165 
needed to produce truth, and in turn, truth induces effects of power.1277 What counts as ‘true’ in 
any particular historical period depends on the social structures and mechanisms that are in 
place to validate particular methods or certain people of institutions as capable of producing 
‘truth’.1278 For instance, academic discourse, according to Foucault, emerged not as a result of 
scholarly inquiry, but as the direct consequence of power relations.1279 Power then is implicated 
in all knowledge systems, and notions like reason and truth are the productions of specific 
historical circumstance, meaning all knowledge is relative.  
 Poststructuralists tend to put the issues of interpretation, representation, power and 
knowledge, and the politics of identity at the forefront of concerns. These shared themes and 
assumptions surrounding reality (anti-realist ontology), knowledge, power and language meant 
that articles that adopt these premises could be classed as ‘poststructuralist’ for this study.   
 
Rationalism: This category emerged from the literature. A number of articles defined 
themselves as theoretically rationalist. Rather than specifying whether they were using a ‘neo-
realist’ or –neo-liberal’ approach authors choose to identify themselves as ‘rationalist’. The term 
‘rationalism’ was coined by Robert Keohane in his 1988 ISA Presidential address.1280 Keohane’s 
use of the label of rationalism was to denote approaches to IR that adopted the understanding of 
individual as ‘rational actors’. ‘Rationalists’ in this sense argue “that we should treat individuals, 
and by extension states, as utility maximizers, and ignore every other aspect of their social 
being”.1281 Not only then does this category capture neo-realist and neo-liberal research, it also 
works to include research that draws on microeconomic theory, for certain strands share the 
same rational actor assumptions.1282  
  
Reflectivism: This category also emerged from the body of literature being investigated. A 
number of articles labeled themselves as theoretically reflectivist. This term was also coined by 
Keohane and is used as a binary opposite to ‘rationalism’.1283 Therefore the ‘label’ reflectivist was 
often used to denote how an article was not premised on the assumptions of rationalism and in 
fact opposed them. Reflectivism is defined as the rejection of the explanatory and rational 
assumptions of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and the adoption of ‘reflexivity’, social 
                                                        
1277 Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980).  
1278 Devetak, “Postmodernism”, pp. 164.  
1279 Foucault The Archeology of Knowledge.  
1280 Robert Keohane “International Institutions: Two Approaches” International Studies Quarterly 
32 (4) (1988), pp. 379-396.  
1281 Milja Kurki and Colin Wight “International Relations and Social Science” in Dunne, T., Kurki, 
M. and Smith, S. (eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 23.  
1282 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View” in 
Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and Simmons, S. (eds) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 
2005), pp. 55.  
1283 Keohane, “International Institutions”, pp. 379-396.  
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explanation and the stress on the non-neutral and political nature of knowledge and theory.1284 
There many ‘reflectivist’ theories in IR, for example Critical Theory, Feminism and Post-
structuralism are reflectivist. However, only the articles that self-identified as ‘reflectivist’ and 
did not advocate another theoretical approach were noted in this category 
 
Sociology of Knowledge: This category did not emerge from the investigation, instead this 
category was constructed to refer to research that used theories from the branch of though 
known as the ‘sociology of knowledge’. Instead of using IR theory the articles placed in this 
category used theories from a different discipline in order to comment on the practices of IR 
scholars. The articles are therefore theoretical or theoretically inclined but have not drawn on 
the canon of collective thought known as IR theory. Articles that drew on the work of Emile 
Durkheim, Karl Mannheim, Robert Merton, Richard Whitely, and Pierre Bourdieu for example 
and used these insights to investigate and comment on knowledge production and the associated 
practices in IR were noted as ‘Sociology of Knowledge’. Ole Wæver’s article “The Sociology of a 
Not So International Discipline”1285 is an example of an article included in this category.  
 
No International Relations Theory: This category refers to the articles that contained no IR 
theory and that couldn’t be classed as a ‘philosophy of social science’, ‘historiographical’, or 
‘sociology of knowledge’ article. Certain articles drew on theories from psychology, and public 
policy for example. To avoid creating a very large number of categories such articles were 
collated together under the category ‘no IR theory’. This label should not be read as ‘no theory’ 
and that the articles must be a-theoretical, but instead this category is to include work that is 
theoretical but draws on a wide range of thinkers outside of the aforementioned disciplines. 
Overall 16.6% of articles (501 out of 3022) contained no IR theory, see figure 6.1. This category 
was omitted from the data presented because this category contained a very disparate set of 
articles (and the remaining percentages recalculated) in order to focus on the theories present 
and the actual IR theoretical trends occurring.  
                                                        
1284 Kurki and Wight, “International Relations and Social Science”, pp. 23.  
1285 Ole Wæver “The Sociology of a Not So International American and European Developments in 
International Relations” International Organization 52 (4) (1998), pp. 687-727.  
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Key: P of SS = Philosophy of Social Science; Competing = Competing theories; No IRT = No international 
relations theory.  
Figure 6.1: Distribution of theoretical approaches in the 12 journals under review from 1999-2009.  
 
Methodological Categories Defined. 
Archival Analysis: Is the method whereby the researcher examines accumulated documents, or 
archives of an organisation/institution/culture etc. Archive materials can include statistics 
collected by non-governmental and governmental agencies, diaries, newspapers, multimedia, and 
historical records.1286 Archival analysis is defined as “the locating, evaluating, and systematic 
interpretation and analysis of sources found in archives”.1287 However, archival materials may be 
examined and analysed for different purposed than those with which they were originally 
collected.1288 
                                                        
1286 Alan Bryman Social Research Methods: Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 215.  
1287 Louise Corti “Archival Research” in Lewis, M. S., Bryman, A. and Liao, T. F. (eds) The SAGE 
Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods (London: Sage, 2004).  
1288 For a good example of the use of Archival Analysis in IR see Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock 
“Integrative Complexity of Communications in International Crises” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
21 (1) (1977), pp. 169-184.  
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Case Studies: Rather than as a ‘method of selecting the source of data’1289 the definition of case 
studies here refers to a methodological choice and process rather than ‘a choice of what is to be 
studied’.1290 It is a method in which one or a few instances of a phenomenon are studied in 
depth.1291 As Stake notes “case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular 
nature of the case in question”.1292 The term ‘case’ is often used to denote a location, “such as a 
community of organisation”,1293 and the emphasis is placed on an intensive examination of the 
setting/case.1294 
Comparative Analysis: The method of comparative analysis is based on the application of 
comparison between different entities, such as interviews, official documents, individuals groups, 
and states, or different points in time. These “entities or time periods are then analysed to isolate 
prominent similarities and differences”.1295 It is this process that is described by the term 
comparative analysis.1296  
Content Analysis: Is the method used to quantify the content of documents and texts in terms of 
a set of predefined/predetermined categories in a systematic manner.1297 Content analysis is 
defined by Bernard Berelson as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communications”.1298 In this definition, and 
therefore the definition used for the purpose of this study, content analysis has a quantitative 
dimension as the method is used in order to generate quantitative data from texts etc.  
Counterfactual Analysis: Counterfactual analysis is a method used to explore causal relations 
through examining a causal relation in terms of its counterfactual dependence. Counterfactual 
analyses of causation focus on counterfactuals that tell us what would have been the case if the 
world had been different in order to help us understand the causal relations in operation that at 
                                                        
1289 Norman Blaikie Designing Social Research: Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 
pp. 186.  
1290 R. E. Stake “Qualitative Case Studies” in Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds) The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research: Third Edition (London: Sage, 2005), pp. 443.  
1291 Joachim K. Blatter “Case Studies” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative 
Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
1292 R. E. Stake The Art of Case Study Research (London: Sage, 1995).  
1293 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 49.  
1294 For more see R. K. Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods: Third Edition (London: Sage, 
2003).  
1295 Melinda C. Mills “Comparative Analysis” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of 
Qualitative Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
1296 For more see Richard Rose “Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis” Political Studies 39 
(3) (1991), pp. 446-462.  
1297 Bryman Social Research Methods, pp. 183.  
1298 Bernard Berelson Content Analysis in Communication Research (New York: Free Press, 1952), 
pp. 18.  
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first are not apparent.1299 Counterfactuals take the form of ‘if it were the case that X, then it would 
be the case that Y’.   
Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis: Refers to a study conducted at a specific point in time, 
which takes a cross-section of a population/system at a single point in time.1300 A cross-sectional 
time series analysis is therefore a collection of data from a sample of individuals/groups/states 
at a particular moment in time as a basis for inferring claims about the population/international 
system from which the sample emerges.1301 The analysis can be a one-off or it can be repeated at 
regular intervals in order to provide a means of assessing change(s).  
Deconstruction: Is a method which asserts that meanings, dichotomies and meta-physical 
constructs are dependent on arbitrary signifiers which renders their meaning unstable. A 
deconstructive approach therefore seeks to highlight the constructed and dependent nature of 
certain concepts, categories, entities etc and urge a re-
reading/reconsideration/destabilisation/destruction.1302 The 1989 Oxford English Dictionary 
defines deconstruction as “A strategy of critical analysis associated with the French philosopher 
Jacques Derrida, directed towards exposing unquestioned metaphysical assumptions and 
internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language”.1303 Nicholas Royle however 
points out the inherent irony and problems with defining deconstruction1304, and as Derrida 
himself noted “whenever deconstruction finds a nutshell—a secure axiom or a pithy maxim—the 
very idea is to crack it open and disturb this tranquillity”. Whilst recognising the inconsistencies 
and issues with defining deconstruction for the purpose of this study the above definition was 
used.  
Discourse Analysis: Discourse analysis is best understood as a collection of related methods for 
studying language use and its role in social life, in other words there is no one version of 
discourse analysis. According to Jonathan Potter some of the versions of discourse analysis 
“study language use with a particular interest in its coherence over sentences or turns, its role in 
constructing the world, and its relationship to context”.1305 Regardless of the specific variant all 
forms of discourse analysis emphasize, “the way versions of the world, of society, events and 
                                                        
1299For more see L. A. Paul “Keeping Track of Time: Emending the Counterfactual Analysis of 
Causation” Analysis 58 (3) (1998), pp. 191-198 and Jonathan Bennett “Event Causation: The 
Counterfactual Analysis” Philosophical Perspectives 1 (1987), pp. 367-386.  
1300 W. Paul Vogt Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology: Third Edition (London: Sage, 2005), pp. 
74.  
1301 John Bynner “Cross-Sectional Survey” in Jupp, V. (ed) The Sage Dictionary of Social Research 
Methods (London: Sage 2006), pp. 53.  
1302 Jacques Derrida quoted in Caputo, J. D. (ed) Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with 
Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), pp. 32.  
1303 J. A. Simpson and E. S. C Weiner The Oxford English Dictionary: Second Edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989). 
1304 Nicholas Royle “What is Deconstruction” in Royle, N. (ed) Deconstruction: A Users Guide 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 1-13.  
1305 Jonathan Potter “Discourse Analysis” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of 
Qualitative Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
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inner psychological words are produced in discourse”.1306 Rosalind Gill argues that discourse 
analysis can be thought of as consisting of four main themes; 1) discourse is a topic; 2) language 
is constructive; 3) discourse is a form of action and 4) discourse is rhetorically organised.1307 
Hence the methodology of discourse analysis is bound up with certain ontological and 
epistemological beliefs, therefore this method is also action-orientated. 
Econometrics: Econometrics is according to Paul Vogt “(a) The application of statistical methods 
to economic data, usually to forecast economic trends and decide among policies. (b) The branch 
of economics applying statistical models, often models based on multiple regressions, to 
economic problems”.1308 In other words it refers to the application of economic principles using a 
mathematical/statistical approach or vice versa1309. For this study econometrics was 
distinguished from the category ‘statistical analysis’ due to its application to economic problems 
and the author’s economic basis. Often the articles designating themselves as using 
‘Econometrics’ were using statistical models to analyze and unpack economic issues and were 
therefore specifically developed to be applied to economic problems and were therefore 
formulated using economic theory.  
Ethnography: Ethnographic research involves the researcher immersing him/herself in a group 
for an extended period of time (either in a covert or overt manner). During this time the 
researcher observes behaviours, listens to what is said in conversations, and asks questions.1310 
Ethnographic research normally entails long periods of time in the 
field/organisation/community/group etc in order for the ethnographer to understand and 
describe the situation/context from an insider’s perspective. As David Fetterman notes “The 
ethnographer is both storyteller and scientist; the closer the readers of an ethnography come to 
understanding the native's point of view, the better the story and the better the science”.1311 
Event History Analysis:  Is the method for studying “the movement over time of subjects 
through successive states or conditions by asking them to remember biographical data. The goal 
of the research is to study change from one state to the next and how long each of the states 
lasts”.1312 Event history analysis is therefore concerned with patterns and correlates of the 
                                                        
1306 Jonathan Potter “Discourse Analysis as a Way of Analysing Naturally Occurring Talk” in 
Silverman, D. (ed) Qualitative Research: Theory, Method, and Practice (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 
146.  
1307 Rosalind Gill “Discourse Analysis” in Bauer, M. W. and Gaskell, G. (eds) Qualitative 
Researching with Text, Image and Sound (London, Sage, 2000).   
1308 Vogt, Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology, pp. 103.  
1309 There are a number of different econometric analysis models for more see W. Wojciech, W. 
Charemz abd D. F. Deadman New Directions in Econometric Practice: General to Specific 
Modelling, Cointegration and Vector Autoregression (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992). 
1310 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 292.  
1311 David M. Fetterman “Ethnography” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative 
Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
1312 Vogt, Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology, pp. 111.  
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occurrence of events and is often used to study duration data.1313 The term ‘event’ broadly 
speaking may be defined as “a qualitative change that occurs at some particular point in 
time”.1314 According to Kazuo Yamaguchi, “by definition, an occurrence of an event assumes a 
preceding time interval that represents its non-occurrence”.1315 Therefore an event is the change 
in continuity. An event is the change from the norm, or rather the period of non-occurrence in 
which it is defined against.  
Formal Modelling: Formal modelling is the building of models in order to test the propositions 
of the model which represents a set of relationships. The term ‘formal’ denotes the use of logical 
or algebraic symbols rather than words to state the propositions of the model.1316 However, 
according to A. Evans et al., “The degree of formality of a model is not necessarily related to its 
form of representation. In particular, graphical notations can be regarded as formal if a precise 
semantics is provided for their constructs”.1317 Formal modelling is then the construction of a 
model which describes a dynamic system using formal language. Often formal models are 
executed by a computer simulation, but not always. For a good example of the construction of a 
formal model in IR to test a series of hypotheses see Peter Bennett’s 1995 article “Modelling 
Decisions in International Relations”.1318 
Genealogy: Is a method that questions ideas and practices that are presented as universal. 
Through using a genealogical approach the actual emergence of such ideas/identities etc is 
revealed. According to Fred Evans “Ultimately, genealogy attempts to show that all practices have 
variable meanings and reflect different forces rather than possess intrinsic meanings and point to 
a permanent reality”. Genealogy involves a ‘tracing back’ through history in order to highlight the 
constituting roles of practices and how such practices construct the identities of objects and 
subjects with which we interact, thereby exposing the intimate connection between claims to 
knowledge and claims to political power and authority. As Roland Bleiker summarises 
genealogies “focus on the process by which we have constructed origins and given meaning to 
particular representations of the past, representation that continuously guide our daily loves and 
set clear limits to political and social options”.1319   
Hermeneutics: Melissa Freeman defines hermeneutics as “the study of the theory and the 
practice of understanding and interpretation. It is built on the assumption that interpretation is 
                                                        
1313 Kazuo Yamaguchi Event History Analysis (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 1.  
1314 Paul Allison “Event History Analysis” in Hardy, M. and Bryman, A. (eds) Handbook of Data 
Analysis (London: Sage, 2004).  
1315 Yamaguchi, Event History Analysis, pp. 1.  
1316 Vogt Dictionary of Statistics and Methodology, pp. 67.  
1317 A. Evans et al., “Developing UML as a Formal Modelling Notation” in Muller, P. A and B’ezivin, 
J. (eds)  Proceedings of UM 1998 International Workshop, Mulhouse, France, June 3 – 4, pp. 3.  
1318 Peter G. Bennett “Modelling Decisions in International Relations: Game Theory and Beyond” 
Mershon International Studies Review 39 (1) (1995), pp. 19-52.  
1319 Roland Bleiker Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 25.  
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not a straightforward activity even though people do it all the time when they interact with 
others and the world”.1320 Hermeneutics is premised on the aim of the researcher being to seek 
out the meanings of a text from the perspective of its author. Which leads the researcher to pay 
attention to the social, historical, cultural context within which a text is produced and vice 
versa.1321 Certain hermeneutic methods, based on the work of Hans Gadamer, instead of looking 
“for what the author of a text intended, or the ‘real’ meaning”1322 have begun to see the text as 
engaged in dialogue. Understanding a text involves what Gadamer terms the ‘fusion of horizons” 
of the text, and the interpreter; “a process in which the interpreter’s horizon is altered and the 
text is transformed”.1323 Certain hermeneutic approaches focus on the mediation and translation 
of languages, and how different interpreter in different social/temporal setting are likely to 
produce different understandings. 
Historical Analysis: This category was designed in order to group articles that identified as 
using a ‘historical’ method, such life history methods, political histories, international histories, 
biographies, historiographies, and historicist arguments. In order to escape creating too many 
categories for this analysis and thus thinning out the results, this category was devised in order 
to capture the number of different historical methodologies being used in IR and to ascertain 
their impact on the discipline.  
Historical Materialism: Is a methodological approach to the study of history, society and 
economics advanced by Karl Marx. It provides a means of exploring the dialectic between 
historical processes and societal causation.1324 According to Marx:  
 
“The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on 
the nature of the actual means they find in existence and have to reproduce. This 
mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the 
physical existence of the individuals. Rather, it is a definite form of activity of these 
individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their 
part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, 
coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they 
produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions 
determining their production."  
 
Therefore in order to understand history and social processes one needs to understand the 
‘modes of production’ in operation. Historical materialism is the method of identifying and 
organizing data that emphasizes the priority of socio-economic factors as the locus of causal 
significance. Historical materialism according to Frank Harrison “identifies ‘class structure’ 
                                                        
1320 Melissa Freemann “Hermeneutics” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative 
Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
1321 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 394.  
1322 Blaikie, Designing Social Research, pp. 101.  
1323 Ibid., op cit.  
1324 For more see Frank Cunningham “Practice and Some Muddles About the Methodology of 
Historical Materialism” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2) (1973), pp. 235-248.  
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produced and perpetuated by the specific of the prevailing ‘mode of production’”.1325 Any article 
employing this methodological approach was placed under this category for the purpose of this 
investigation.   
 
Interpretivism: Defined her for the purpose of this study refers to the distinct methodology 
drawn from the Interpretivist tradition that is often juxtaposed with positivism.1326 This 
definition is drawn from the work of Alfred Schutz1327 and is linked to Weber’s Verstehen for the 
method focuses on interpreting subjective and cultural aspects of social phenomenon.1328 Rather 
than operating as a broad category which could include ‘interpretive approaches’ such as 
hermeneutics, phenomenology, or ‘interpretive content analysis’ the category interpretivism is 
used to designate research that uses interpretive judgments and inductive reasoning in order to 
provide explanations and understandings of phenomena.1329 The method refers to the 
understanding and interpreting of texts, documents, events, in a subjective manner which relates 
to the subjective nature of the artifacts being interpreted.  
Interviewing: Interviewing is the process in which knowledge is produced through the 
conversational interaction between an interviewer (the researcher asking the questions) and an 
interviewee or a group of interviewees. The purpose of the interview is to “obtain knowledge 
about a given topic or some area of human experience”1330, therefore interviews are designed to 
serve the researchers ends which are external to the dialogue itself. As Svend Brinkmann notes 
“In most cases, research interviewing involves a “one-way dialogue” with the researcher asking 
questions and the interviewee being cast in the role of respondent”.1331 However, interviews can 
take on a number of forms – unstructured, semi-structured and structured.1332 Group interviews 
or discussion (or what are often referred to as focus groups) allow for group interaction and 
arguably “provide greater insight into why certain opinions are held”1333 than individual 
interviews. The assumption behind this claims is that “people become more aware of, and can 
reflect on, their ideas and assumptions being confronted with contrary views”.1334 
                                                        
1325 Frank Harrison “Historical Materialism” in Mills, A. J., Durpepos, G. and Wiebe, E. (eds) 
Encyclopaedia of Case Study Research (London: Sage, 2010), pp. 440.  
1326 Blaikie Designing Social Research, pp. 99.  
1327 Alfred Schutz “On Multiple Realities” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5 (ISSUE) 
(1945), pp. 533-576 and Alfred Schutz “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human 
Action” in Natanson, M. A. (ed) Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Random House, 
1963), pp. 302-346.  
1328 Max Weber The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949).  
1329 Norman Blaikie “Interpretivism” in Lewis-Beck, M. S., Bryman, A. and Liao, T. F. (eds) The 
SAGE Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods (London: Sage, 2004), pp. 509-511.  
1330 Svend Brinkmann “Interviewing” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative 
Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
1331 Ibid., op cit.  
1332 For more see Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 319-343.  
1333 Blaikie, Designing Social Research, pp. 207.  
1334 Ibid., op cit. For more see L. J. Millward “Focus Groups” in Breakwell, G. M. et al., (eds) 
Research Methods in Psychology: Third Edition (London: Sage, 2007), pp. 274-298.  
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Linguistic Analysis: Linguistic analysis is often contrasted with discourse analysis. Discourse 
analysis is often referred to “as the study of language 'beyond the sentence'”1335, whereas 
linguistic analysis is primarily concerned with the ‘smaller bit of language used’ within the 
sentence. For example linguistic analyses often focus on “sounds (phonetics and phonology), 
parts of words (morphology), meaning (semantics), and the order of words in sentences 
(syntax)”.1336  
Literature Review: Often the articles in question employed a literature review as their 
methodology. The relevant literature was examined, critically assessed and judgements for 
future research were made. A literature review is a thorough summary and critical analysis of the 
relevant research/literature on the topic of question.1337 The aim of a literature review is to bring 
the intended audience up-to-date with the array of arguments/insights on a topic,1338 and to 
justify future research in the area by pointing out the flaws/inconsistencies/problems etc with 
the current body of research.  
Longitudinal Analysis: Refers to the collection of data from the same individuals or groups 
across time.1339 It is often contrasted again cross-sectional time series analysis, as rather than 
taking a sample at a specific time it looks at the same sample over time thereby using temporal 
sequencing.1340 Longitudinal analysis can vary from repeated measures of a specific group and a 
control group at two points in time “to a large-scale long-term birth cohort study”.1341  
Participant Observation: Participant observation a method of data collection in which the 
“researcher takes part in everyday activities related to an area of social life in order to study an 
aspect of that life through the observation of events in their natural contexts”.1342 It centres on 
the roles of particpation and observation (however the degree of each can vary) in order to 
provide and gain an in-depth understanding of a particular social content, or topic. Ethnography 
includes the method of participant observation but it goes beyond it through engaging with the 
                                                        
1335 Gillian Brown and George Young, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), pp. viii.  
1336 Deborah Tannen “Discourse Analysis” published by the Linguistic Society of America. 
http://www.linguisticsociety.org/content/discourse-analysis (Date accessed 7/09/13).  
1337 C. Hart Doing a Literature Review (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 5.  
1338 Patricia Cronin, Frances Ryan and Michael Coughlan “Undertaking a Literature Review: A 
Step-by-Step Approach” British Journal of Nursing 17 (1) (2008), pp. 38.  
1339 John Bynner “Longitudinal Study” in Jupp, V. (ed) The Sage Dictionary of Social Research 
Methods (London: Sage 2006), pp. 164.  
1340 For more see D. Magnusson and L Bergmann Data Quality in Longitudinal Research 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
1341 Ibid., op cit.  
1342
 Lynne E. F. McKechnie “Participant Observation” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia 
of Qualitative Research Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
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subjects, and often involves a long time period and a more complete immersion into the 
society/group/community etc.1343  
Process Tracing: Process tracing requires the collection of a large amount of data, preferably 
from a wide range of sources as it is used for “exploring causal processes and analysing complex 
decision-making”.1344 Process tracing aims to identify formal and informal structures, processes, 
mechanisms, and causal relationships within an agency or organisation involved in delivering 
particular functions. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett “In process tracing, the 
researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts and other sources to 
see whether the causal process a theory hypotheses or implies in a case is in fact evident in the 
sequence and values of the intervening variable in that case”.1345 The method of process tracing is 
then used to identify the effect of an independent variable(s) on the outcome of the dependent 
variable, thereby establishing the various causal processes underway.1346  
Quantitative Analysis: This category was devised in order to place research that was 
‘quantitative’ in orientation and that did not lend itself to be included in any of the other 
categories such as statistical analysis. If researchers employed quantitative methods of data 
collection but did not analyse these through the use of statistics or models then such articles 
were deemed as quantitative. To clarify quantitative analyses are those that collect data through 
processes of measurement and counting and analyse that data through its quantitative capacity.  
Rational Choice: This label refers to the methods of modelling social behaviour based on the 
assumption of the rationality of actors. This category differs from formal modelling because the 
models created are constructed (or even constrained) with regards to the belief in the rational 
behaviour of agents.1347 This category emerged as many authors were describing their work as 
‘rational choice’ through using ‘rational choice methods or approaches’. Hence this category 
refers to articles that used game theory, quantitative (small and large N-studies) and modelling 
methods using deductive reasoning based on the assumption of the rationality (and therefore 
utility maximising behaviour) of actors.1348  
                                                        
1343 Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersly “Ethnography and Participant Observation” in Denzin, 
N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research: Third Edition (London: 
Sage, 2005), pp. 248.  
1344 Oisin Tansey “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling” 
PS: Political Science and Politics 40 (4) (2007), pp. 1.  
1345 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 6.  
1346 Jeffrey Checkel “Tracing Causal Mechanisms” International Studies Review 8 (2) (2006), pp. 
362-370.  
1347 Duncan Snidal “Rational Choice in International Relations” in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. and 
Simmons, B. (eds) Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 75.  
1348 For more see James Mahoney “Rational Choice Theory and the Comparative Method: An 
Emerging Synthesis?” Studies in Comparative International Development 35 (2) (2000), pp. 83-94.  
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Semiotics: Semiotics is the study of signs, and is therefore an approach to the analysis of signs, 
and other phenomena such as documents with the aim of seeking out their deeper meaning. Alan 
Bryman defines semiotics as a method concerned with uncovering “the processes of meaning 
production and how signs are designed to have an effect upon actual and prospective consumers 
of those signs”.1349 Semiotics is an approach to the analysis of symbols in everyday life1350 and 
helps us examine how we look at signs/symbols etc, “how things stand in relation to other things, 
and how those mediated relationships help us understand things better”.1351  
Spatial Modelling: Spatial modelling (spatial analysis) provides a means for exploring spatial 
relationships, for example conflicts, within a particular environment. The models generated 
operate on the premise of a spatial dependence among the modeled objects.1352 Spatial models 
are primarily used to derive information about spatial relationships s between geographic 
phenomena.1353 
Statistical Analysis: In order to avoid producing an even larger number of categories the 
designation ‘statistical analysis’ refers to all methodologies which involve the use of statistics. 
Hence this category incorporates regression analysis (including logistic regressions), the use of 
SPSS, descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. Regression analysis is defined as a “body of 
statistical techniques in which the form of the relationship between a dependent variable and 
one or more independent variables is established so that knowledge of the values of the 
independent variables enables prediction of the value of the dependent variable or the likelihood 
of the occurrence of an event if the dependent variable is categorical”.1354 In other words 
regression analysis is a method used in order to determine causal relationships.1355 Whereas 
inferential statistics is the method in which statistics from inferences are produced “about 
situations or social groupings that have not been observed directly”.1356 In contrast to descriptive 
statistics, inferential statistics “are used to make generalisations derived from estimates based on 
probability”.1357 Inferential statistics are often dependent upon the observational outcomes of 
descriptive statistics.  Descriptive statistics are the statistics generated from the actual 
                                                        
1349 Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp. 183.  
1350 Ibid., pp. 393.  
1351 Gary Shank “Semiotics” in Given, L. M. (ed) The Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research 
Methods (London: Sage, 2008).  
1352 Wolfgang Kainz, Max J. Egenhofer, and Ian Greasley “Modeling Spatial Relations and 
Operation with Partially Ordered Sets” International Journal for Geographical Information Sources 
7 (3) (1991), pp. 215-229.  
1353 John O’Loughlin and Luc Anselin “Bringing geography back to the study of international 
relations: Spatial dependence and regional context in Africa, 1966–1978” International 
Interactions 17 (1) (1991), pp. 29-61.  
1354 David Byrne “Regression Analysis” in Jupp, V. (ed) The Sage Dictionary of Social Research 
Methods (London: Sage 2006), pp. 259.  
1355 For more see David S. Byrne Interpreting Quantitative Data (London: Sage, 2002) and S. 
Menard Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (London: Sage, 2001).  
1356 Iain Crow “Inferential Statistics” in Jupp, V. (ed) The Sage Dictionary of Social Research 
Methods (London: sage, 2006), pp. 147.  
1357 Ibid, op cit.  
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observations made (for example the date derived from sources such as surveys, or data 
archives)1358, whereas inferential statistics make inferences based on these observations. This 
allows inferential statistics to make statistical generalisations, further hypotheses and 
predictions.1359 Statistics such as chi-square, Cramer’s V, Pearson’s product moment correlation 
coefficient and Student’s t are all inferential.1360  
Interviews.  
As noted in the introductory chapter the interviews I conducted with the editors of leading IR 
journals were of a semi-structured nature. In order to 1) explore the allegations of gate-keeping 
levied at discipline’s journal editors 2) investigate the publication practices of the respective 
journals and 3) examine the influence of the Journal Citation Reports (JCR) the following 
questions were posed:  
 
1. Background Information. 
 How would you situate yourself within the discipline theoretically?  
 What sub-fields do you identify yourself with, if any? 
2. Editorial Experience. 
 How long have you been the editor of Journal X for?  
 How did you become to be the editor of Journal X?  
 Is this your first time as a journal editor? If no, what other journals have you edited, and 
for how long? How do the two journals and the experiences compare?  
 Are you involved with any other journals? For example, are you on any other editorial 
boards? Is there ever any conflict of interests?  
3. Situating the Journal. 
 What are the aims of your journal? And have they changed over time?  
 How would you situate your journal? In other words how do you think it compares to 
other journals within the discipline?  
 Who is your specific target audience? 
 Do you think that your journal is better received in some countries than others?  
 Would you say that your journal is more sympathetic towards certain issues, theories or 
methods?  
 Does the international reputation of your journal influence what articles you receive for 
submission?  
                                                        
1358 For more see Bernard Ostle Statistics in Research (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1963) 
and P. J. Bickel and E. L. Lehamnn “Descriptive Statistics for Non-Parametric Models: 
Introduction” The Annals of Statistics 3 (5) (1975), pp. 1038-1044.  
1359 V. Gayle “Inferential Statistics” in Burton, D. (ed) Research Training for Social Scientists 
(London: Sage, 2000), pp. 385. For more see D. Rowntree Statistics without Tears (London: 
Penguin, 1981).  
1360 Crow, “Inferential Statistics”, pp. 148.  
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  Are there any types of scholarship that you notice do not get submitted?  
4. The Selection Process.  
 What are your approximate submission rates, and roughly what percentage do you 
accept and publish?  
 How do you select articles for publication? In other words what is the refereeing process 
for your journal?  
 How do you select your reviewers? Do you have a standard board of reviewers who are 
elected?  
 How interventionist are you as a journal editor?  
 Do you try and link articles in order to create ‘themes’ for each issue? And how do you 
decide upon whether to compile special editions, if you do? 
 There appears to be a growing tendency to ‘internationalize IR scholarship’ do you try 
and actively internationalise the content of your journal?  
5. Gate-Keeping. 
 IR’s journals have been described by various academics as the ‘disciplines gate-keepers’, 
permitting access to the discipline’s international realm to certain works, and thereby 
approving certain works and delegitimizing others; what are your thoughts? Do you 
agree? What are the ‘gate-keeping realities’? 
 How do you view your role in the process of ‘legitimating’ knowledge in the field?  
 Do journal editors have an active role in constructing or rather steering the discipline? 
According to Robert Keohane the advantage of being a journal editor is that you are able 
to be at the centre of certain processes, in that you can focus attention to certain issues, 
promote certain views, thereby creating the intellectual agenda, and subsequently 
shaping the field.  
 What responsibilities do you think a journal editor should have to the IR community?  
6.  The Journal Impact Factor.  
 Do you know how the JIF is formulated?  
 Do you know how journals are selected for inclusion into the ISI database and then the 
JCR?  
 Do you think there has been an increase in the amount of attention paid to the annual 
JCR and if so what do you think the consequences of this have been?  
 How concerned with are you with the annual rankings?  
 (If the journal is ranked) Do changes in the rankings affect what is submitted to your 
journal? Have you noticed any changes in submissions with either an increase or 
decrease? 
 (If the journal is not ranked) Why is your journal not included in the JCR? Was this a 
political decision taken the editorial team to not be included?  
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Appendix II. 
 
Sample Consent Form For Interviews.  
Title of Research Project:  
‘Is International Relations an American Dominated Discipline?’ 
 
Details of Project: 
This project is aiming to discern whether the discipline of International Relations can be 
characterised as an American dominated discipline, and therefore what it means for America to 
be intellectually hegemonic. This investigation seeks to explore the sociology and self-image of 
the discipline of International Relations. The date obtained here will be part of a wider mixed 
methods investigation into the different realms of academic production and practice in IR, and 
used to help shed light on whether the field of IR is dominated by the United States, and if so 
what form(s) this alleged dominance takes.  
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research or your interview data, please contact: 
Helen Louise Turton, Department of Politics, College of Social Science and International Studies, 
Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter University, Devon UK, EX4 4RJ. Tel 00 44 (0) 1392 263184, 
hlt207@ex.ac.ukIf you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss 
with someone else at the University, please contact: Professor Colin Wight (Supervisor) 
C.Wight@exeter.ac.uk or Doctor Matt Lobley (Ethics Committee member for the Department of 
Politics) mlobley@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Confidentiality 
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for 
the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may 
be required by the law). You will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you 
can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below). Your data will be held in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act [it will be kept anonymously for five years and then 
destroyed] 
 
Anonymity 
Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name, but I 
will refer to your role and position as a journal editor. Although it will be clear which journals I 
am looking at, your affiliation with Journal X will remain anonymous, as you will be one of 12 
journal editors being interviewed. You will therefore remain anonymous unless you choose to 
wave your right to anonymity (see box below). 
 
Consent  
I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I can 
withdraw consent at any time by contacting the interviewers. 
TICK HERE:      DATE…………………………..... 
TICK HERE TO WAVE RIGHT TO ANONYMITY:  
Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data 
Name of interviewee:....................................................................... 
Signature: ......................................................................................... 
Email/phone:..................................................................................... 
Signature of researcher…………………………………………………. 
 
2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, 
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